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### **Army size, state expenditure and warfare culture in sixteenth-century Portugal**

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#### **Abstract**

This chapter examines the relation between army size, state expenditure, and warfare culture in sixteenth-century Portugal. It tackles directly one of the components of the Military Revolution debate, more specifically the mounting size of armies and the financial efforts that states had to develop in order to muster and maintain a large number of effectives, sometimes along several battlefronts, during the early modern period. Using sixteenth-century mainland Portugal as a case study, it will be argued that this country did not witness the same rate of growth in army size, nor were the necessary economic, social and political conditions met in the first place. The reasons to explain such lack of progress go beyond the economic and demographic factors. Political and cultural aspects equally determined the survival of a relative archaism into the sixteenth century and even beyond. In order to demonstrate such argument, a threefold analysis will be made to the following topics: evolution of the size of army and demographics; state expenditure; and, lastly, warfare culture.

## **Introduction**

This chapter examines the relation between army size, state expenditure, and warfare culture in sixteenth-century Portugal. It tackles directly one of the components of the Military Revolution debate, more specifically the mounting size of armies and the financial efforts that states had to develop in order to muster and maintain a large number of effectives, sometimes along several battlefronts, during the early modern period. Using sixteenth-century mainland Portugal as a case study, it will be argued that this country did not witness the same rate of growth in army size, nor were the necessary economic, social and political conditions met in the first place. The reasons to explain such lack of progress go beyond the economic and demographic factors. Political and cultural aspects equally determined the survival of a relative archaism into the sixteenth century and even beyond.

After a brief bibliographic review, a quantitative and qualitative analysis to three interrelated topics will be offered in order to demonstrate this argument. The first topic will explore the relationship between the evolution of the number of effectives, the demographics, and military recruitment in order to determine army sizes across the abovementioned period. Additionally, the recruitment capacity as against the evolution of demography will be factored in, using several benchmarks. The second topic will examine the state's military expenditure. This will attempt to determine whether resources were increasingly spent on warfare or if, on the contrary, redistribution from the crown to the nobility continued to be privileged, having an impact on warfare. The third topic concerns warfare culture and its impact not only on military recruitment, but also in matters of political decision-making, with obvious consequences on the main topic of this chapter. The results of this threefold analysis will help clarify why, according to the point of view stated above, the army in sixteenth-century mainland Portugal never grew in size. As such, it falls short of meeting all of the traditional components for the existence of a Military Revolution. Instead, the Portuguese monarchy generally kept to a continuity which did not differ substantially from the period before. Therefore, military change was of little significance to sixteenth-century Portugal.

## **Debates around the Military Revolution and the case of early modern Portugal**

Since Michael Roberts set down the founding concepts of Military Revolution in the mid-twentieth century, a vast number of authors have advanced with different iterations of the conceptual underpinnings of this theory. Those included the dissemination of new tactics and technology, the increase in size of armies, and the evolution of fortification. Debates have centred around the chronology of the changes, the relevance of those changes, and even around the definition of the concept itself.<sup>2</sup>

One of the major debates regards the growth of armies and its links to the rise of the early modern state.<sup>3</sup> As Steven Gunn points out, there is a division between historians and sociologist historians who identify war and competition between states as the key to state development, and their counterparts who see war as but one of many other relevant factors in the emergence of the state.<sup>4</sup> There is no absolute consensus about the exact period where army numbers increased significantly. Geoffrey Parker advocates that a revolution started in the early sixteenth century, having the structural change in fortifications being as its driving force, allowing in turn for subsequent developments in tactics as well as the growth in the number of effectives. Other authors, such as Jeremy Black, mark out a significant increase in the size of armies as being limited to the period of 1660-1720 only, that is before the advent of bigger transformations at the end of the eighteenth-century.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, costs with warfare increased considerably in the period between 1500 and 1700. Together with the improvement of fortifications, the provision of naval forces and the recruitment and upkeep of troops were the at the top of expenses.<sup>6</sup> In order to support these additional costs, states had to gradually find other sources of income, notably through a more efficient taxation system as well as redoubled mechanisms of credit. Over the last three decades, there has been much debate around the progressive transition of different European powers from being a "domain state" to a "tax state" and, finally, to a "fiscal state".<sup>7</sup> This was a long and unequal process throughout Europe. While Spain, The Netherlands and Sweden are usually mentioned as examples where the "tax" state emerged earlier, other cases - such as England or Denmark - would remain as a "domain" states for a longer period.

Regarding the Portuguese context, quantitative studies on army sizes still lack. They would allow for a clearer picture in the long run. In what concerns accounts of military recruitment, much remains to be done. Few scholars have dealt more

profoundly with this topic – such as António M. Hespanha and Fernando Dores Costa – for the 17th and 18th centuries essentially. The literature has often stressed the fact that the absence of mainland episodes of war between c.1476 and 1640 (with the brief exception of the Spanish invasion of Portugal in 1580) explains the durability of somehow archaic military practices.<sup>8</sup> To a certain extent, this idea is close to David Eltis's for England in the late fifteenth century up to the mid-sixteenth century, where the lack of engagement with Continental wars originated a gap in the development warfare. Likewise, the generalized absence of Portugal from the European battlefields contrasted with multiple experiences of warfare overseas, in which naval war and/or a strong amphibious component during siege episodes remained much more prominent than open field battles.<sup>9</sup>

This point, while certainly valid for many territories, seems to be excessively deterministic for the internal context of Portugal, as it does not necessarily imply that the needs of recruitment mainland Portugal were slim. On the other hand, conflicts in the northern Africa–Mediterranean complex increased the defensive needs of mainland Portugal, due to the rise of Moorish piracy on the coast. Thus, this elongation of the Portuguese frontier southwards into North Africa – such as the north African outposts were regarded by contemporaries – cannot be dissociated from a more efficient and enlarged basis of recruitment. This made additional manpower available to both Europe and the African continent. In fact, attempts to reform the way military recruitment and training was made – in order to implement a new order of battle (*ordenanças*) inspired in the Italian Wars model – had happened since the early 1520s.<sup>10</sup> Although it was not implemented until 1570, some of these early contingents even experienced overseas warfare in both Africa and Asia with mixed success.<sup>11</sup> Despite the general acceptance of such evidence in sixteenth-century Portuguese military history, it has hardly been confronted by other relevant data, starting with the number of resources that the state would spend with war. Therefore, much empirical and comparative work still needs to be done.

The development of the state topic has been widely debated globally for the past fifty years. Portugal is not an exception. Legal historians have been highly influenced by the work of António M. Hespanha, which contradicts the more traditional vision of a centralizing state in the late 1400s, while advocating the autonomy of peripheral powers and their ability to contest the political centre well into the end of the early modern period.<sup>12</sup> In fact, during the sixteenth century the king and the royal family only

controlled a third of the kingdom's total area, representing 38% of the population.<sup>13</sup> This had obvious implications for warfare, as the monarchy continuously had to foster cooperation with the most powerful stakeholders (lay and ecclesiastical lords).

Economic historians participating in the debate of the development of the state have examined the rise of the fiscal state and, more recently, the capacity of institutions and the state to manage the debt stock from the 1500s onwards. There has been a debate about the transition from a "domain" to a "tax" state, following the Bonney–Ormrod model. For the late medieval period, it has been highlighted the state appropriation of a tax (*sis*) that was municipal in its origin, together with the request of extraordinary sums of money (*pedidos*) at the Portuguese parliament (*Cortes*). While in the late 1300s and early 1400s, the rationale for the appropriation of those subsidies was tied to war efforts, afterwards it became clear that they were also meant to help maintain the royal family and their clientele, through the redistribution of resources. Approximately two thirds of the state expenditure between 1473 and 1527 consisted of redistributive payments – such as subsidies to the royal family and the high nobility, annuities, household pensions, scholarships and dowries.<sup>14</sup>

The sixteenth century saw the implementation of institutional reforms and changes and setbacks to the fiscal regime, mostly with the new statute of the treasury (*Regimento da Fazenda*) in 1516 and with the reconversion of the taxation model (*sisas*) in 1560s. The impact of overseas trade on Portuguese finances must be highlighted, especially between the early sixteenth century and the mid-1530s, and in the last quarter century.<sup>15</sup> Because of this, sixteenth-century Portugal has usually been described as a period of stagnation in terms of fiscal innovation, with the state developing only slowly.<sup>16</sup> The continuity of some features of a "domain" state (after Portugal arguably had grown into becoming a "tax" state even before 1500) would delay the transition to a "fiscal" state, while the redistribution of resources among the royal clientele continued as the major current.

Stagnation did not necessarily imply a low level of "stateness" if Portugal is to be compared with its European counterparts. The new institutional economic history has recently shown that the fiscal capacity of both Portugal and Spain in 1500 was higher than England's, for instance. This remained true until the mid-seventeenth century, when the Dutch Republic eventually showed a greater ability to claim from society higher fiscal resources.<sup>17</sup>

Lastly, one should mention the importance of credit as the first emissions of public debt in Portugal started in the year 1500.<sup>18</sup> The crown presented warfare as the rationale behind the first emissions, but overseas trade has been recognized as the driving force towards indebtedness. Because of the revenues from the overseas trade, the crown was able to control the debt stock until 1544. After this point, the rapid growth of accumulated debt due to the provisioning of the Indies *armadas* had short term consequences, such as the closing down of the Portuguese factory (*feitoria*) in Antwerp, in 1549. Little is known about the developments from 1549 to 1560, the time when the first default happened – close in time to the defaults in Spain and France, respectively in 1557 and 1558.<sup>19</sup> Again, it would be helpful to understand more clearly how much of that credit was used to pay for soldiers and supplies both overseas and (if at all) on the mainland. It is expected that some conclusions can be drawn from that.

#### **Army size: number of effectives, demography and military recruitment**

For a correct assessment of the issues surrounding the size of armies in early modern Portugal, some aspects that existed from before, in the medieval period, must be pointed out. Firstly, that there was no "national" army, something which can even be considered artificial and which would materialize only in the modern period. The army that the king was able to gather, mostly transiently, was nothing more than the product of smaller armies combined. Thus, not only was it composed of the contingents directly under the king's command (such as the municipal militias, members of the royal demesne, or paid mercenaries), but also of the seigniorial armies.<sup>20</sup> Note that from the recruitment estimates by Francisco Pereira Pestana for 1534, only 55 up to 60% of the total number of troops were summoned directly by the monarch, and these included dependents of the royal household and men recruited from the royal jurisdictions. The remaining came from the military orders, the secular church and the high nobility.<sup>21</sup> While these figures pose a number of issues (discussed below), they illustrate the royal dependency from peripheral powers.

A second, connected aspect is the permanence of seigniorial recruitment until very late in the early modern period. As the right to recruit, at the local and regional levels, in many cases was in the hands of the nobility, the king always depended on the nobles to increase his recruitment capacity. Thus, the dichotomy of cooperation and

(occasional) conflict between these two stakeholders was very much alive throughout all of the early modern period.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, it is also worth mentioning the differences between the estimated numbers of recruitment, the contingents actually mustered, and (most of the times) the amount of men who actually made it to the battlefield; the latter being the most reliable to estimate army sizes.<sup>23</sup> After these considerations, the major question is: did the number of effectives on the battlefield increase?

**Table 1: Number of effectives in Portuguese armies in Iberian and North African war theatres (15th-16th centuries)**

Setting or battle	Portuguese effectives	Year
Ceuta	18.600-19.000	1415
Alfarrobeira	16.000	1449
Toro	19.000-19.600	1476
Azemmour	20.000	1513
El-Ksar el-Kebir	c.20.000	1578

Sources: Encarnação, "A batalha de Toro", 148; Hespanha, "Introdução", 9-11; Monteiro, *A Guerra*, 90-94; Monteiro, "The evolution of the army", 228; Sousa, "The war on land", 247-248.

In the long run – that is, from the early fifteenth century until the closure of the dynasty of Aviz (1578-1580) – it is quite clear that the most relevant military episodes always involved a number of effectives between 16.000 and 20.000 (Table 1). This remained true well into the early modern period.<sup>24</sup> Exceptions to this threshold of 20.000 units seems to have been the conquests of Ksar es-Seghir (1458) and Asilah (1471), where Afonso V was able to gather, respectively, 22.000 and 23.000 effectives.<sup>25</sup> That the difference in numbers in the conquest of Ceuta (1415) and king Sebastião's in the battle of El-Ksar el-Kebir (1578) is so short seems staggering. Similarly for the battle of Alfarrobeira, the army of king Afonso V against his uncle, the regent *infante* Pedro (1449), was not radically different in size from the one that conquered Azemmour in 1513. This is especially relevant, given that the king's army, at Alfarrobeira, did not represented a sum of all Portuguese effectives, provided the inherent context of civil war.

**Table 2: Size of European armies, 1475-1595**

	Spanish Monarchy	The Netherlands	France	England	Sweden	Portugal
1475	20.000	-	40.000	25.000	-	19.600
1555	150.000	-	70.000	20.000	15.000 (1559)	20.000
1595	200.000	20.000	80.000	30.000	15.000	20.000 (1578)

Sources: Table 1; Parker, "A Military Revolution...", 44; Lynn, "Recalculating French Army...", 125; Lindgren, "Men, Money and Means", 130-131.

Comparisons with other European powers on Table 2 put this evolution into perspective. It has been stressed that pondering the size of armies in early modern Europe, based on the amount of effectives, reserve troops, and mercenaries, is complex.<sup>26</sup> It seems, in the case of Portugal, that the number of effectives in campaign was not far from the real recruitment capacity, setting aside the issue of there being "paper soldiers".

Like elsewhere in Europe, the evidence for military recruitment available does not always corroborate the propensity to stagnation that is observable in the Portuguese number of effectives. On the contrary, it is excessively optimistic.<sup>27</sup> One good example is the recruitment estimates mentioned earlier authored by Francisco Pereira Pestana, a distinguished military officer, which were transmitted to king João III (*r.*1521-1557) around 1534. The context during this period was of Moorish power being asserted in North Africa. Repercussions in Portugal took the form of a debate regarding the possible invasion of the kingdom of Fez or the conservation of the existing Portuguese outposts.<sup>28</sup> Pestana, unrealistically, declares that João III would be able to gather between 40.000 and 45.000 effectives, consisting of 7.100 horsemen, 30.000 infantry (10.000 town militiamen and 20.000 foot soldiers), plus mercenaries and artillery.<sup>29</sup> This estimate was a fallacy because Pestana not only included troops which would be very hard to muster – from garrisons in north African and Atlantic outposts to the private forces of ecclesiastics and lay lords (discussed in the segment about warfare culture) – but also because of the extraordinary costs, since the enterprise would cost an estimated 150.000 *cruzados* (or 150.000 ducats). This sum would be difficult for the monarchy to obtain, in a context of an increasing public debt and escalating financial rupture (see the state expenditure segment).



All of the previous estimates on the number of effectives have to be pondered against the demography of the realm, focusing on its evolution from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth century. Recent scholarship has argued that during the decades before the depression caused by the Black Death (c.1320-1330) Portugal had around 1.000.000 inhabitants.<sup>30</sup> This was lower than the first reliable numbers, dating from the *Numeramento* (1527-1532) ordered by king João III, in which the overall population number (depending on the coefficient of individuals per household) falls between 1.120.000 and 1.250.000.<sup>31</sup>

On one hand, it has been stressed that the second half of the fifteenth century was a period of growth, both in the economy and in terms of population, the latter increasing to numbers close to the pre-Black Death levels.<sup>32</sup> This period of growth, which became the steadier as the sixteenth century drew nearer, suggests a total population close to that indicated in the *Numeramento*. On the other hand, there were factors which, other than stopping this growth, perhaps diminished its increase rate. It is certain that from 1400 onwards famine, bad crops, episodes of war and epidemics happened all around the kingdom, making a steady demographic growth difficult.<sup>33</sup> After 1500, there was another issue to consider: the emigration to India, from the opening of the Cape Route. Authors diverge slightly on figures and averages, as both indicators vary according to period and context. Guinote, Frutuoso and Lopes stressed that until 1524 the maximum number of persons emigrating per year to India was 3.000. The figure increased to 4.000 at least on two occasions: the *armadas* of 1528 and 1571.<sup>34</sup> In turn, Godinho presented slightly higher figures, suggesting that more than 4.000 individuals shipped to India in 1524, and between 4.000 and 5.000 in 1538.<sup>35</sup> Despite these variations, it is obvious that some thousands (usually men in active age) were sent overseas per year, and many did not return as shipwrecks, on board diseases, and war casualties were frequent. Other factors, such as natural disasters (there was the plague in 1506, 1527 and 1569, as well as an earthquake in 1531) and food shortage, advise a more conservative estimate of the total population.

**Table 3: Ratio of effectives per total population, 1415-1580**

Effectives (year)	Total population estimates (year)	Ratio of effectives per total population (percent)
18.600-19.000 (1415)	1.000.000 (1415)	1,86%-1,90%

16.000 (1449)	900.000 (1450)	1,78%
19.000-19.600 (1476)	1.000.000 (1500)	1,90%-1,96%
20.000 (1513)	1.120.000 (c.1530)	1,79%
20.000 (1578)	1.200.000 (1580)	1,67%

Sources: Table 1; Rodrigues, *História da População*, 519.

Table 3 presents the ratio of effectives per setting (as described in Table 1) when compared with the closest benchmark for estimating population. As can be seen, the percentages of effectives in the period covering between 1415 and 1580 were close to 2%. Despite not being especially populous, Portugal's military recruitment capacity was considerable throughout this period.<sup>36</sup> When compared, the ratio of effectives – the percentage of population in the army – in the mid-sixteenth century would be, in theory, slightly inferior to Spain's (close to 2% from the second quarter of the sixteenth century), comparable to Sweden's (around 1,5% in 1555), and far superior to France's (less than 0,5% per cent throughout sixteenth century).<sup>37</sup>

This evidence suggests that military needs on the mainland could be satisfied by the existing recruitment ratio. Major challenges would be met as overseas requirements increased, since the demand for the navy and the outposts in Africa and Asia was continuous.

### **State expenditure**

According to the Military Revolution debate, conceptual thinking around the topic of the rise of army sizes has been linked to the development of the state's ability to generate financial resources. In turn, the rise of the fiscal state has been seen as a consequence of warfare needs, as the latter justified increased taxation levels. It will be argued that, given the context of overseas warfare and intercontinental trade throughout the sixteenth century, the crown decided to continue with its redistributive policy towards their clientele rather than making a considerable investment in military recruitment, with the aim of adding to the army. State expenditure was generally assigned according to political and economic needs. Thus, it was clearly in line with the former period. This would suggest a certain degree of stagnation on the level of "stateness".

There are three possible ways to explore state expenditure in military affairs: a) the state "budgets"; b) the exceptional expenses; c) the growth of public debt, considering credit amassed by the crown since the early 1500s. During this period, state budgets dealt with estimates of expenditure and not exactly with what was being spent in the end. They are available in a limited number and the way they were envisaged through time makes a direct comparison difficult.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, comparison with other (similarly under developed) lists of state expenditure and revenues provides us with benchmarks for the years 1527, 1534, 1543, 1557, 1563, and 1588.

**Table 4: Set expenditure, 1527-1588 (in percentage of the state budget)**

	1527	1534	1543	1557	1563	1588
Alms and public works	5,0	1,0	0,8	1,0	1,1	2,2
Annuities ( <i>tenças</i> )	26,7	29,5	33,8	24,7	33,1	22,1
Debt servicing	11,9	4,0	n/a	6,0	13,2	17,3
Dowries & scholarships	5,0	4,8	n/a	1,6	3,7	0,3
Subsidies to the high nobility	3,1	2,0	9,2	4,0	6,0	2,6
Household pensions ( <i>moradias</i> )	17,9	8,6	12,8	0,6	2,5	3,8
Judicial system	2,6	3,0	2,8	1,7	3,5	7,4
North Africa and the navy	13,6	24,8	n/a	31,4	n/a	36,3
Royal chamber and/or treasury	5,5	5,5	4,7	18,8	8,1	6,0
Royal family subsidies	8,7	7,1	5,1	2,6	5,4	0,0
Exceptional expenses	n/a	9,7	12,0	7,6	12,2	2,0

**Sources and criteria:** categories adapted from Henriques, *State Finance*, p. 285 [Fig.36]. The category "North Africa and the navy" contains expenditure with the Atlantic outposts. "N/A" is used when the estimate was not included and/or was not discernable. Data per benchmark as provided by Pereira, "O Orçamento...", 208-210 [1527]; *CSL*, vol. I, 38-42 [1534]; Pinto, "Folha de receita e despesa do Reino para 1543", 161-164 [1543]; *Gavetas*, vol. I, 891-895 [1557]; Pinto, "Folha de receita e despesa do Reino para 1563", 169-172 [1563]; Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP), cód. 637, fls. 11v-34v [1588].

Table 4 shows expenditure from 1527 to 1588 (which is the first known budget under the Habsburg composite monarchy). By adding figures for all the categories identified with the redistributive policy – that is, annuities, dowries and scholarships, subsidies to the high nobility, household pensions, and royal family subsidies – it is interesting that all benchmarks total 50% or more, with only two exceptions (1557 and 1588, respectively with 33,5 and 28,8%). This indicates that the redistributive policy remained relevant for most of sixteenth century, although gradually losing preeminence as the period ended.

Two reasons explain this decrease. First and foremost, the expenses with overseas affairs, which are clear in the percentages for 1534, 1557 and 1588 (respectively, 24,8, 31,4 and 36,3%). The early 1530s were a turning point for north Africa, because of the rise of Moorish power, the debate held at the Portuguese court on whether the Portuguese outposts should be maintained or partially abandoned, and the ceaseless call for more means and men. As such, among these overseas expenses was the cost of the *armadas* and the garrisons of each outpost, namely soldiers and other military staff.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to accurately tell how much expense was dedicated solely to maintaining and/or enlarging the army. The budget for the last benchmark (1588) indicates that a little over one third (35%) of the expenditure with overseas affairs was assigned to the payment of wages and the maintenance of soldiers and military staff. This would represent 12,7% of the yearly total. While relevant, this estimate is without comparison, making it impossible to see how it evolved. Yet, it is still lower, for instance, than the estimate for annuities, which continued to be one of the top bulk expenses.

A second other reason lies perhaps in the growing tendency to obtain a more careful and considered plan of expenditure, especially given the context of public debt growth in the mid-sixteenth century, as well as higher challenges in the upkeep of the overseas trade. The evolution of some of these categories supports this argument. For instance, the apparent coincidence between the benchmarks of 1534, 1543, and 1563 and the request for extraordinary subsidies in the *Cortes* (see next paragraph) should be highlighted. In turn, after 1560 more resources were being assigned to servicing the debt. This is very clear from the increase in the respective percentage in 1588, although it can already be noticed in 1563. The fact that from 1534 onwards budgets started to include a category for extraordinary expenses is revealing. This can be attributed

hypothetically to the awareness, by high officials of the king's treasury (*vedores da fazenda*), of the financial situation as deserving concern.<sup>39</sup>

Apart from the expenditure calculations by the monarchy, the exceptional expenditure should be taken into account as well. This came through additional requests for funding (*pedidos* and/or *serviços*), which were usually presented before parliament (*Cortes*). In the same way as in the late medieval period, the sixteenth-century *Cortes* under the Aviz dynasty urged parliamentary representatives to disburse the *serviços* needed in order to cover this type of expenditure. Between 1525 and 1580, the *Cortes* met six times. In four of them (Torres Novas in 1525, Évora in 1535, Almeirim 1544, and Lisbon in 1562) the crown was able to collect extraordinary revenues worth 550.000 *cruzados* (or 220.000.000 *reais*).<sup>40</sup> Behind these requests was the need to pay for dowries, the expenses with *armadas* and overseas trade, and military costs with the north African outposts. Between 1523 and 1544 the crown had an extraordinary expenditure of 1.092.000.000 *reais*, of which half (51,3%) was destined to pay for dowries, more than a quarter (29%) for *armadas* to the Indic, and only 14,7% for military expenses in north Africa.<sup>41</sup> This order reflected the priorities of the crown, as redistribution and the overseas trade came first, and warfare only second as an unplanned contingency.

An alternative way to assess state expenditure with military recruitment relies, even if partially, on the evolution of sovereign credit through the emission of public debt during the sixteenth century. As already noticed, extraordinary expenses were high and additional *serviços* fell short of financial necessities. Therefore, the conditions were created for the debt stock to increase. We know that the debt stock increased in this period, and that this became a problem for state finances during the rule of João III, specifically from 1540 onwards. The need to finance the overseas expeditions was the main reason why public debt kept growing, as money was required not only to arm ships and buy silver – the exchange currency for spices – but also to recruit soldiers, subsidize fortification works in north Africa and the province of Algarve, and to pay for additional war-related expenses.<sup>42</sup>

Unfortunately, it is not possible to accurately discern how much of the credit generated from debt emission was allocated to funding the army alone. Out of the emissions carried out between 1500 and 1580, approximately half concerned warfare and fortifications in north Africa.<sup>43</sup> As other scholars have noted, these emissions were bought by nationals (often close to the king) for relatively small amounts, especially

when compared with financial credit granted elsewhere in Europe.<sup>44</sup> Only sporadically were these emissions substantial in terms of warfare, such as the credit of 100.000 *cruzados* (40.000.000 *reais*) that allowed king Sebastião to part fund the offensive war against Fez, in 1578.<sup>45</sup> While this topic is still largely unexplored and deserves further study, one is tempted to suggest that credit was of little significance to military change, especially in what concerns the increase in size of armies. It certainly boosted the number of effectives momentarily in times of crisis, but no structural change happened regarding the overseas garrisons, and even less in the mainland.

### **Warfare culture**

Finally, it remains to evaluate to what extent warfare culture slowed down military change. That is, what were the consequences of the well-established martial culture, personified by the chivalry *ethos*, to the progressive attempts of improving warfare. This idea is not a new, as the deepening incompatibility between the service of noblemen seeking for the king's patronage and the modernization of warfare in the overseas outposts has already been stressed by other authors.<sup>46</sup> Many noblemen showed their contempt for the new tactics and order of battle (*ordenança*). The idea of having to fight unmounted, side by side with men considered to be inferior, was a complete overturn of values that were deeply embedded.

Nobles were expected to serve the king whenever they were most needed, much in the same way of the *auxilium et consilium* of medieval times. Yet, practice did not always support the theory. The military service in India became progressively popular when compared with service in north Africa, as the chances of capturing wealth were higher in India.<sup>47</sup> In both –just as in the mainland – requests for more men were trivial throughout the entire period. However, in times of extreme need, there were men who contested the obligation to serve overseas, especially in India, for instance the noble firstborns (*morgados*) responding to the king's request of them to join the Indian *armada* of 1537. During the subsequent litigation (which eventually they won), the noblemen said in their defence that they would only fight for what they considered to be the "border" of the kingdom (i.e., the Moroccan outposts).<sup>48</sup> Economic motivations were clearly at stake, as in theory the noble rank and status ensured them the means to live comfortably, not having to risk their lives abroad. What is most remarkable, was the open departure from the monarch's orders.

There were divergences regarding also the service in Africa. In a critical moment of heavy Moorish attacks on the north African outposts (in 1541, by the Saadian army), king João III decided to on a general inquiry to every Portuguese village and town. The inquiry was to determine that each royal or seigniorial officer (depending on who had jurisdiction) could enlist all able men for service to the king in battle, along with horses and arms. It is not surprising that there was resistance to this. Perhaps the most relevant evidence is the small number of inquiries that are known today. Out of more than 800 villages and towns in Portugal in 1541, only 20 to 30 inquiries were returned to the king, most of them from locations controlled by the crown directly, or by a royal family member, or by a member of the nobility that was close to the monarch. Therefore, it is likely that many of the jurisdictional lords chose to ignore the action. As Romero de Magalhães has put it, "the [early] modern state in Portugal took its time until manage to assemble a military organization without having nobles and jurisdictional lords as mediators".<sup>49</sup>

Moreover, the king was perfectly aware of the resistance that the local nobles might put up. The regiment to be followed by the royal officers ordered to leave the (potentially problematic) nobility until last: "you will place the *fidalgos* last in the inquiry. And you will make it with so much dissimulation that it has to appear as a pure coincidence".<sup>50</sup> While it was not convenient to openly provoke the nobility, measures had to be taken so that the nobles did not cause unnecessary complications. Also, control over them had to be increased, as noble resources would probably enable at least some of them to muster more men, mounts and arms.

The implications of warfare culture were also considerable regarding the several attempts to implement innovative tactics through a new order of battle. Scholarship has mostly explored two situations: an early attempt of military change during the 1520s, and its definite implementation in 1570, during the rule of king Sebastião. On both occasions, resistance coming from different social strata was visible. From commoners to nobles, the population saw the new order of battle (*ordenanças*) as being oppressive. The nobility expressed the same contempt as their counterparts in the north African outposts. João Rodrigues de Sá e Meneses, the city governor (*alcaide-mor*) of Porto at that time, is known to have made his divergence public, having to serve among the commoners (*gente baixa*).<sup>51</sup> Nobles from other locations around the kingdom did the same.

The problem, though, was not merely the inherent hierarchical conflict enshrined in the *ordenança*. Again, the greatest challenge for the crown was to prevent nobles from withdrawing resources, especially their own servants, from the enlarged recruitment basis. Evidence from the 1520s indicates that in Évora, after the recruitment of the vassals (*criados*) of local noblemen, the latter did not only refute participation, but also barred those affiliated to them.<sup>52</sup> In Tavira and Faro (in the province of Algarve), the nobles went even further by threatening the royal officer (and the commoners) with death if he dared to proceed with the *ordenança*.<sup>53</sup>

Lastly, the nobility's reaction to the implementing of the *ordenanças* in 1570 should be highlighted. This time, the juridical framework was more defined, with some of the mustering powers being attributed to the municipalities (*câmaras*). More specifically, in the absence of the governor (*alcaide*) – who was often the jurisdictional lord – the municipalities had the right to elect a captain to carry out the recruitment.<sup>54</sup> Facing a new attempt to constrain their military prerogatives, the nobles were quick to contest this royal intention. The high nobility, among them the Duke of Braganza and the Count of Tentúgal, protested vehemently, mentioning that taking away from them the nomination of officials responsible for recruiting troops in their jurisdictions was something they would not accept.<sup>55</sup> Considering the moderate success of its late sixteenth-century implementation, the recruitment on behalf of the nobles continued to exist and cooperation had to be achieved among powers. Perhaps the greatest proof of the continuous influence of the nobility in warfare lies on the origin of the bulk of militias led by king Sebastião to north Africa in 1578 (from the centre and south of the realm), as this was traditionally an area of royal influence, as opposed to the seigniorial north.

With these considerations in mind, it is clear that warfare culture was an obstacle to military change both overseas and on the mainland. In Portugal, the chivalric *ethos* was incompatible with the recent tactics being transferred from other European warfare scenarios. The nobility openly confronted innovations in tactics and the order of battle, and it was very reluctant, to say the least, to cooperate with the monarchy. Therefore, one can conclude that military change was unwelcome to large portions of the society, starting with the nobles who were interested in conserving their martial model.



## Conclusions

It can be concluded that, despite the renowned attempts to introduce innovations in tactics and a new order of battle, military change was not significant in sixteenth-century Portugal. There was no visible increase in the size of the Portuguese army in the long run. On the contrary, it seems that the maximum size of 20.000 effectives, seen occasionally on the battlefield, repeated itself from the late fifteenth century until the end of the early modern period, at least. Yet, it is clear that up until the end of sixteenth century, the Portuguese recruitment capacity kept up with the rest of Europe, including countries engaged in Continental wars and which had a greater need to muster as much men as possible. Presumably, the recruitment capacity was enough to fulfill the needs of the mainland. On the contrary, military efforts overseas required much more manpower and were in permanent *deficit*.

Likewise, the analysis of state expenditure in its various forms – whether according to state budgets, extraordinary expenditure, or credit – tells a mixed story. On one hand, continuity regarding the late medieval period is noticeable, as royal redistribution still had a considerable weight in the calculated total expense. On the other hand, expenditure with overseas affairs increased substantially over time. Many necessities contributed to this, including the assembly of *armadas* for the Indic (which took the lion share) and for the coast patrol, the fortification of outposts, and provisions and ammunition for numerous locations within the empire. The costs with soldiers were also included in the gross total, albeit it is impossible to isolate and compare them effectively. Still, it seems that there is no correlation between a hypothetical increase of resources spent overseas and the increase of recruitment and effectives in the army. Statecraft seems to be in a state of relative stagnation for most of the sixteenth century, and even if there were eventual bursts of development, they were not caused by warfare.

Warfare culture also played a role in the failure of military change. Despite the several attempts to "modernize" recruitment procedures and, consequently, to depend less on the nobility and the ecclesiastical lords, the crown continued to redistribute resources hoping that these stakeholders would provide military service whenever necessary. Royal attempts at military innovation were seen as an interference in the military prerogatives of local governors (*alcaides*), indirectly diminishing their authority. As these attempts continued, the crown faced much opposition.

In spite of providing matter for discussion, the Parkerian model of military revolution does not seem to hold well in this scenario. Instead, military change in sixteenth-century Portugal was not significant, it was badly received by large portions of society, and the continuities from the late medieval period were the norm.

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<sup>2</sup> Among the main literature that champions the concept and its applicability, see Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1988) and also David Eltis, *The Military Revolution on Sixteenth Century Europe* (London: Taurus Academic Press, 1995). For strong criticism around the concept, its chronology, and application see Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1991), 93-96; several essays on Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); David Parrott, *The Business of War. Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 71-100; and, more recently, in Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo, *The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe. A Revision* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 1-14, 85-88.

<sup>3</sup> Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), 20-28, 67-95; Jan Glete, *War and State in Early Modern Europe. Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-military States, 1500-1660* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 10-41; Steven Gunn, David Grummitt, and Hans Cools, "War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Widening the Debate," in *War & History* 15 (4) (September 2008): 371-388.

<sup>4</sup> Steven Gunn, "War and the emergence of the state: western Europe, 1350-1600," in *European Warfare, 1350-1750*, eds. Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (New York & Cambridge: C. U. P., 2010), 50-73.

<sup>5</sup> Jeremy Black, *European Warfare, 1494-1660* (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), 47-48.

<sup>6</sup> Frank Tallett, *War and Society in Early Modern Europe, 1495-1715* (London & New York, Routledge, 1992), 168-187; Irving. A. A. Thompson, "Money, Money, and Yet More Money! Finance, the Fiscal-State, and the Military Revolution: Spain, 1500-1650," in *The Military Revolution Debate*, 273-298.

<sup>7</sup> See the essays on *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200-1815*, ed. Richard Bonney (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and also Richard Bonney and William M. Ormrod, "Introduction. Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth: towards a conceptual model of change in Fiscal History," in *Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth. Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130-1830*, ed. William M. Ormrod, Margaret Bonney, and Richard Bonney (Stamford: Shaun Tyas, 1999), 1-21.

<sup>8</sup> António M. Hespanha, "Introdução", in *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, dir. Manuel Themudo Barata and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2004), vol. II, 9-33 (9)

<sup>9</sup> About these topics see: Francisco C. Domingues, "The State of Portuguese Naval Forces in the Sixteenth Century," in *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2003), 187-197; José Virgílio Pissarra, "O Galeão Português e o desenvolvimento das marinhas oceânicas, 1518-1550" (PhD diss., University of Lisbon, 2016); and also Miguel Dantas da Cruz, "From Flanders to Pernambuco: Battleground Perceptions in the Portuguese Early Modern Atlantic World," in *War in History* 26 (3) (July 2019): 316-341.

<sup>10</sup> Jean Aubin, "Le capitaine Leitão: un sujet insatisfait de D. João III," in *Le Latin et L'Astrolabe. Recherches sur le Portugal de la Renaissance, son Expansion en Asie et les Relations Internationales*, (Lisbon & Paris: Centre Culturel Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996), vol. II, 309-369; Pedro de Brito, "Knights, Squires and Foot Soldiers in Portugal during the Sixteenth-Century Military Revolution," in *Mediterranean Studies* 17 (2008): 118-147 (129-145).

<sup>11</sup> Luís Costa e Sousa, "The war on land," in *War in the Iberian Peninsula, 700-1600*, ed. Francisco García Fitz and João Gouveia Monteiro (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2018), 247-248.

<sup>12</sup> See, among other works, António M. Hespanha, *As Vésperas do Leviathan. Instituições e poder político: Portugal, século XVII* (Coimbra: Almedina, 1994).

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<sup>13</sup> Leonor Freire Costa, Pedro Lains and Susana Münch Miranda, *An Economic History of Portugal, 1143-2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 21-22.

<sup>14</sup> António Castro Henriques, *State Finance, War and Redistribution in Portugal, 1249-1527* (PhD diss., University of York, 2008), 273-300; see as well João Cordeiro Pereira, "O Orçamento de Estado Português no Ano de 1527," in *Portugal na Era de Quinhentos. Estudos Vários* (Cascais: Patrimonia Historica, 2003), 159-210.

<sup>15</sup> Costa, Lains and Miranda, *An Economic History*, 97-99.

<sup>16</sup> Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, "Finanças Públicas," in *História Económica de Portugal (1700-2000)*, ed. Pedro Lains and Álvaro Ferreira da Silva (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 2005), vol. I, 237-261; Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, "Introduction: the rise of the fiscal state in Eurasia from a global, comparative and transnational perspective," in *The Rise of Fiscal States. A Global History, 1500-1914*, ed. Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla and Patrick K. O'Brien (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-35 (4); see as well Leonor Freire Costa, "Fiscal Innovations in Early Modern States: which war did really matter in the Portuguese case?" GHES Working Paper n° 40 (2009).

<sup>17</sup> António Castro Henriques and Nuno Palma, "Comparative European Institutions and the Little Divergence, 1385-1800," EHES Working Paper n° 117 (2019): appendix A1; see as well Leonor Freire Costa, António Castro Henriques, and Nuno Palma, "Portugal's early modern state capacity: a comparative approach," unpublished manuscript.

<sup>18</sup> See the rationale behind Manueline charter dated from 20th February 1500 in José Joaquim da Costa Gomes, *Colecção de leis da dívida pública portuguesa* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1883), 120-121.

<sup>19</sup> António Castro Henriques, "Uma dívida oceânica," in *Revista Contraste* (36) (2001): 12-16. The ongoing project "Sovereign debt and private credit in Portugal (1668-1797)" (PTDC/HAR-HIS/28809/2017), coordinated by Leonor Freire Costa, will add some inputs to this topic.

<sup>20</sup> João Gouveia Monteiro, *A Guerra em Portugal nos finais da Idade Média* (Lisbon: Editorial Notícias, 1998), 79-83.

<sup>21</sup> B.A., Cód. 51-V-37, fls. 407-431. Published in Otília Rodrigues Fontoura, *Portugal em Marrocos na época de D. João III: abandono ou permanência* (Funchal: Centro de Estudos de História do Atlântico, 1998 [1966]), 185-194.

<sup>22</sup> See, among others, Hespanha, "Introdução", 9-33 and Jeremy Black, *Kings, Nobles and Commoners. States and Societies in Early Modern Europe* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2004), 54.

<sup>23</sup> A structural issue during the pre-modern period. See Hespanha, "Introdução", 25-26 and Monteiro, *A Guerra*, 79-83.

<sup>24</sup> See on this volume the chapter authored by Fernando Dores Costa. For the late medieval period, João Gouveia Monteiro stressed that the figure of 20.000 effectives was only achievable in ideal and sporadic conditions. See Gouveia, "The evolution of the army", 228.

<sup>25</sup> Paulo Dias, *A conquista de Arzila pelos Portugueses - 1471* (MA diss., New University of Lisbon, 2011), 13-17.

<sup>26</sup> John A. Lynn, "Recalculating French Army Growth During the Grand Siècle, 1610-1715," in *The Military Revolution Debate*, 117-147 (119)

<sup>27</sup> About the exaggeration on numbers of "paper soldiers", see Black, *A Military Revolution?*, 6-7 and Lynn, "Recalculating French Army Growth...", 128-132.

<sup>28</sup> Fontoura, *Portugal em Marrocos*, 185-194. For the respective North African context, see Weston F. Cook Jr., *The Hundred Years War of Morocco. Gunpowder and the Military Revolution in the Early Modern Muslim World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 167-216.

<sup>29</sup> It has been stressed that, outside of North African expeditions, the Portuguese monarchy rarely hired mercenaries. See José Virgílio Pissarra, "Navios de remo", in *Navios, Marinheiros e Arte e Navegar, 1500-1668*, coord. Francisco Contento Domingues (Lisbon: Academia da Marinha, 2012), 80.

<sup>30</sup> António Castro Henriques, "Plenty of land, land of plenty: the agrarian output of Portugal (1311-20)," *European Review of Economic History* (19) (2) (2015):149-170 (168-169); Rodrigues argued that in 1340 Portugal would contain 900.000 inhabitants. See Teresa Rodrigues, *História da População Portuguesa: das longas permanências à conquista da modernidade* (Porto: Afrontamento, 2008), 519.

<sup>31</sup> Rodrigues, *História da População*, 519; Serrão, using the coefficient of 4,3 individuals per household, obtains a middle figure on 1.216.000 habitantes. See José Vicente Serrão, "População e rede urbana em Portugal nos séculos XVI-XVIII," in *História dos municípios e do poder local (dos finais da Idade Média à União Europeia)*, dir. César Oliveira (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1996), 63-77.

<sup>32</sup> Ana Maria Rodrigues, "The Black Death and Recovery, 1348-1500," in *An Agrarian History of Portugal, 1000-2000. Economic Development on the European Frontier*, ed. Dulce Freire and Pedro Lains (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2017), 45-68.

<sup>33</sup> Costa, Lains and Miranda, *An Economic History*, 24-25.

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- <sup>34</sup> Paulo Guinote, Eduardo Frutuoso, e António Lopes, *Naufrações e outras perdas da "Carreira da Índia", séculos XVI e XVII* (Lisbon: Grupo de trabalho do Ministério da Educação para as Comemorações dos Descobrimientos Portugueses, 1998), 49-50.
- <sup>35</sup> Vitorino M. Godinho, *Mito e Mercadoria. Utopia e Prática de Navegar, séculos XIII-XVIII* (Lisbon: Difel, 1990), 364-369.
- <sup>36</sup> Similar conclusions for the late medieval period can be found in Monteiro, *A Guerra*, 79-87.
- <sup>37</sup> Jan Lindgren, "Men, Money, and Means," in *War and Competition between States*, ed. Philippe Contamine (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 134, 137.
- <sup>38</sup> About this point, see Henriques, *State Finance*, 281-285 and Bonney, "Introduction," in *The Rise of the Fiscal State*, 10-11.
- <sup>39</sup> Gomes, 114-115.
- <sup>40</sup> Frei Luís de Sousa, *Anais de D. João III*, 416; Joaquim Romero Magalhães, "As estruturas políticas de unificação," in *História de Portugal*, dir. José Mattoso (Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores, 1993), vol. 3, 61-114 (74).
- <sup>41</sup> Sousa, *Anais*, 415-416.
- <sup>42</sup> Henriques, "Uma dívida oceânica," 12-16.
- <sup>43</sup> Gomes, 120-169.
- <sup>44</sup> Henriques, "Uma dívida oceânica": 12-16.
- <sup>45</sup> Gomes, 159-160.
- <sup>46</sup> Malyn Newitt, "The Portuguese Nobility, and the Rise and Decline of Portuguese Military Power, 1400-1650," in *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism*, ed. D. J. B. Trim (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 89-115; Vasco Resende, *A Sociedade da Expansão na época de D. Manuel I: mobilidade, hierarquia e poder entre o Reino, o Norte de África e o Oriente* (Lagos: Câmara Municipal, 2006), 38, 161-169.
- <sup>47</sup> Henriques, *State Finance*, 267-272.
- <sup>48</sup> Diogo do Couto, *Da Ásia de Diogo do Couto. Dos feitos que os portugueses fizeram no descobrimento dos mares e terras do Oriente*, vol. 5 (Lisbon: Regia Officina Typografica, 1780), 271.
- <sup>49</sup> Joaquim Romero Magalhães, "As Estruturas Sociais de Enquadramento da Economia Portuguesa de Antigo Regime: os concelhos," in *Concelhos e organização municipal na época moderna: miunças I* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2011): 11-39(19).
- <sup>50</sup> ANTT, CC, Part 2, mç. 235, n° 9 [Letter of João III to the royal officer (*corregedor*) in Esgueira. Lisbon, 18th May 1541].
- <sup>51</sup> For the case study of Porto see Elaine Sanceau, "A ordenança no Porto no reinado de D. João III," in *Boletim Cultural da Câmara do Porto* 29 (3-4) (1966): 504-544; Aubin, "Le Capitaine Leitão", 309-369; Brito, "Knights": 136-140.
- <sup>52</sup> Aubin, "Le Capitaine Leitão", 309-369.
- <sup>53</sup> Brito, "Knights": 141-142.
- <sup>54</sup> Magalhães, "As Estruturas", 20-21.
- <sup>55</sup> See Mafalda Soares da Cunha, *A Casa de Bragança, 1560-1640. Práticas senhoriais e redes clientelares* (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 2000), 254-256.