

**The transatlantic security dilemma after 9/11:
Lessons from Britain – the role of Tony Blair**

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TÍTULO The transatlantic security dilemma after 9/11:
Lessons from Britain – the role of Tony Blair

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EVANTHIA BALLA

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Abstract

The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent awareness of terrorism had a significant impact on the European and American security playing field. It became evident that differences in threat perceptions and security policy approaches existed between the United States (US) and Europe, and within Europe itself. However, while the war on terror and the attack on Afghanistan provoked some reflection across the Atlantic and within Europe, the Iraq war became the focal point of a transatlantic crisis and the source of significant divergences and political clashes between European states.

The current work argues that post 9/11 period provides some important political lessons to the transatlantic community and especially to Europe. In a world rich in political and security adventurism, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) appear more threatening than ever before. As such, transatlantic partnership remains vital for the world security and for the development of adequate responses to global challenges.

In the words of Sir Winston Churchill *The price of greatness is responsibility*. In our world, that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats, this means that America and Europe face a historical opportunity to contribute to a fairer, safer and more united world. For this to be achieved political will and leadership is needed more than ever before.

Americans and Europeans are not from different planets and their common values are their common interests. European weak and non-articulated approach to international crisis ultimately penalises Europe itself and the world.

Special focus is placed on the distinctive role that the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair played throughout this period. After 9/11 Blair stood tall to the events and took a stand elaborating further his doctrine of international community and taking action diplomatically and militarily defending a progressive view of the world, starting from the reality of interdependence in an age of globalisation, and acting according to certain values. It is through his controversial practicing of leadership that the current work draws a map of challenging new realities in the international scene.

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Acronyms

ABM	Anti-ballistic missile
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BMDO	Ballistic Missile defence Organisation
BMENA	Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
CAP	Common Agriculture Policy
CCC	Capabilities Commitments Conference
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe[an] Countries
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Area
CESDP	Common European Security and defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces (NATO)
COPS	Political and Security Committee of the EU
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CW	Chemical Warfare
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
DPP	Defence Planning Process (NATO)
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community (1957-87)
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union (EU)
EUMS	Military Staff of the European Union
EPC	European Political Co-operation
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESDPS	European Security and Defence Planning System
ESS	European Security strategy
EU	European Union (1993-)
EUROFOR	European (Rapid Deployment) Force
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G-7	Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the United States)
G-8	Group of Eight (G-7 plus Russia)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency

IGC	Intergovernmental conference
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ITAR	International Traffic in Arms Regulations
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MD	Missile defence
MONUC	Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo
MLF	Multilateral Force
MOD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly (NATO)
NACC	North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NATO)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEC	Network Enabled Capability
NGO	nongovernmental organisation
NPA	NATO Parliamentary Assembly
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
NTA	New Transatlantic Agenda
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (EU)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
REACH	Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and restriction of Chemicals
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
SDR	Strategic Defence Review (UK)
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSC	UN Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Foreword

Professor Francisco Proença Garcia

In her book, Evanthia Balla addresses a fundamental problem of international security, the transatlantic link and the security dilemma that Europe faced (and continues to face) in the post - 9/11 terrorist attacks era.

The attacks made evident the lack of coherence in threat perceptions as well as on security approaches between EU Member States and consequently to the definition of common strategic responses by the EU as a whole. These responses, against the backdrop of Iraq, came to create a crisis in transatlantic relations and a source of serious political differences between the European countries. We must not forget that Europe is made up of nations states, with several dynamics and geo-strategic realities.

In today's complex international context we can witness a reorganisation of power on a global scale, where we can see changes in the relative weight of States and where the international power is increasingly dispersed and diffused, Europe, still under construction and in search of a new path and identity, needs to rethink itself and accept a new notion of power. Europe lost its relative relevance, and the processes that used to be controlled and led by Europe during recent centuries are now subject to different rules and models. Europe no longer dominates, or hardly dominates, and can only influence certain world contours with great difficulty.

The author reminds us in her analysis of the position taken by Tony Blair in the face of the reality of economic and demographic growth of the Asian countries, especially India and China. Blair considered that Europe should strengthen and consolidate its transatlantic link, on the principle that there is no irreducible alternative between the European and transatlantic option since they complement each other. In this context it seems crucial to deepen the European pluralism, as well as the involvement and consent of the people of Europe.

NATO, which is a regional alliance with global interests is also the guarantor par excellence of the transatlantic link, and we can go even further, claiming that it is the political and diplomatic instrument that Americans use to talk to Europe, without having to pass by *Rua La Loi*, in Brussels.

In this book the Euro-American security cooperation is also closely analysed. The European security architecture is complex and dynamic. It is based on a deal between the US and Europe, on the one hand, and in an understanding between Europeans themselves, on the other. The two dimensions appear in NATO and in the EU, respectively. These two

dimensions influence one another and should be examined, as the author does well, together.

NATO continues to be the most important security mechanism in Europe and continues to be the main vehicle to keep the United States involved in European Security Affairs. No other organisation can effectively plan and coordinate the various military forces of all Nations contributors, including the American military presence.

NATO and the EU share a strategic partnership through the same values and strategic interests, cooperating in a spirit of complementarity and partnership. The two organisations work together to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts in Europe and elsewhere.

Despite six decades of existence, the Atlantic Alliance maintains its essential mission, to guarantee that a community of freedom, peace, security and shared values remains. However, within the Alliance exists the plurality of perspectives of the Organisation and different national interests. Indeed, some allies focus on new risks and threats, others put the emphasis on the need to preserve the ability of territorial defence, seeking to emphasise the importance of the geographical elements of diverse nature. Others have come to favour partnerships and/or enlargement. Nevertheless, the consensus around the intangibility of the Washington Treaty is obvious, in particular the preservation of the Indivisibility of the Security of the Alliance and its article 5, as well as of decision-making by consensus, a fundamental basis of NATO.

In this Alliance, military capabilities and US investment are crucial. The superiority of capabilities begins in the American nuclear presence in Europe, which continues to give clear political indication that the transatlantic link survives with the guarantees of *Extended Deterrence*, and a possible withdrawal shall always receive a negative political signal.

If the Alliance's nuclear policy raised questions to some Member States, particularly in Western Europe, today the war in Ukraine has received support raised mainly from territories belonging to the former Warsaw Pact, as the threat to them comes from Russia, hence stressing the need of NATO Nuclear Posture as the guarantor of their invulnerability.

While this nuclear presence remains, NATO should develop missile defence in Europe as an element of its increasingly important defensive posture, adding a precious array of deterrence by denial. An effective missile defence system could be complementary and, in time, the replacement of nuclear sharing as a means to keep the United States committed to European defence.

In the current strategic concept the Alliance reaffirms the EU as a unique and essential partner underlining the determination to improve the strategic partnership, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency, and always respecting the autonomy of both organisations.

Under the Alliance, Member States take decisions that affect the security of all Europeans in a vital way, and yet such decisions are not

concerted among all EU members. The European position on NATO could arise from some form of “enhanced cooperation” between the 21 common members of the NATO/EU.

However, although there are no incompatible strains between the two projects, there have been divergent political preferences and, surprisingly there is little substantial cooperation between the two. For a possible and credible cooperation, at least the difficulties of the Cyprus/Turkey relationship must be overcome.

The credibility of the European voice within NATO will depend on the Europeans themselves, their unity, the coherence in their action and their commitment. But it is within the Alliance that the greatest difficulties appear in the liaison between the United States and its European allies. If Iraq was the paradigm of different political standings, the operation in Libya laid bare shortcomings in terms of useful military capabilities, political will and above all the continuous lack of investment in defence by Europe.

In that theatre, less than half of the allies participated in operations and less than one third were willing to participate in attack missions. Many of the allies were spectators not because they did not want to participate, but simply because they could not participate. The constraints were mainly due to political constraints, but military capabilities were (and are) also deficient.

If we compare the defence spending of Europe with the United States, the contrast is also great. After the U.S., Europe remains the world power with the most advanced military capabilities. The question, however, is whether Europe will be able to maintain that advantage over the next 10 or 20 years.

This situation puts at risk the future possibility of combined operations within the Alliance. The forces of NATO Transformation create a gap between the military capabilities, threatening the interoperability.

Europe needs to invest more efficiently and achieve more and better European military capabilities. At the current pace of cuts, it is difficult to see how Europe can maintain its military capabilities sufficiently to sustain current operations similar to those in the future.

This is particularly troubling when one also considers the redistribution of global military power, a change embodied in the relative decline of European defence spending compared with emerging powers or the United States. It seems obvious that we need to stop wasting money and valuable efforts duplicating capacity and development programs. We must embark on a *Smart Defence* that focuses on multinational approaches and programs and capabilities, among others, *pooling and sharing*. This is the way to avoid the very real possibility of collective military irrelevance, and also confront the Member States with the responsibility of a fair share of the burden of common defence.

At least since the time of President Bill Clinton, the United States has encouraged the development of a European defence identity, and that Europe should take responsibility for its own regional security, looking

to lessen the gap between the allies who are willing and able to pay the price to bear burdens and commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of membership to NATO, but have difficulty in sharing the risks and costs, a stance seen as unacceptable by the United States.

They begin to be given explicit instructions by the elite American rulers that the situation is changing and that this change is going to be accentuated. Remember the timely warnings of the former Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, in 2011; for him there will be no will in the US to pay for increasingly precious resources, on behalf of the Nations that are only apparently willing, to devote the necessary resources or make necessary changes to be capable partners. These Nations are eager for American taxpayers to take on increasing security burdens caused by reductions in European defence budgets. Gates adds, that if current trends for the reduction of European defence capabilities are not changed, future political leaders of the United States, for whom the cold war has not been a formative experience, may consider that the return for the investment in NATO is not worth it.

The economic challenges that European countries face are immense, but that should not stop them from seeing a broader strategic framework. Developing a more coherent European defence, strengthening the transatlantic link, and improving NATO's links with other global actors are ways to prevent the economic crisis from becoming a crisis of security. The way Europe responds to this challenge will determine its place in the global order and the future of world security.

Though we wait for concrete results in the short and medium term, we are aware that the efforts must be seen in a long-term perspective, and political leaderships which are clarified and stable should continue to play a major role. The case study of Tony Blair that Evanthia Balla's book develops is a clear example of a leader who acted in accordance with certain values, pursuing an active policy of commitment in a complex and uncertain context. Blair as a leader pursued a controversial political and military action based on the British national interest strongly linked with Western values of freedom, democracy and rule of law, firmly believing in the importance of the transatlantic union for security in the 21st century. Evanthia Balla's book helps us to accurately understand the complex and uncertain international context we live in today as well as the decisive role of political leaders in this context.

Introduction

The attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent awareness of terrorism had a significant impact on the European and American security environment. It became evident that differences in threat perceptions and security policy approaches existed between the United States (US) and Europe, and within Europe itself. However, while the war on terror and the attack on Afghanistan provoked some reflection across the Atlantic and within Europe, the Iraq war became the focal point of a transatlantic crisis and the source of significant divergences and political clashes between European states. Some European governments, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Spain and Portugal, chose to actively support the United States, while others such as France and Germany withheld their support or even confronted the US in the United Nations (UN).

In a world moving closer together, with new powers emerging, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) appear more threatening than ever before and transatlantic relations remains relevant and vital for the world security. For Blair, we are living in a world of *low predictability* where global challenges require global responses. The role of the European Union (EU) in the world has to be re-defined, decisions have to be taken and answers over the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have to be provided.

The current study analyses the transatlantic security environment after 9/11 – transatlantic strategic cultures, ESDP developments, ESDP-NATO relations and Blair's political answer as a European leader. It seeks to draw some specific lessons over the best way the transatlantic community and especially Europe shall meet the global challenges of our times.

The period examined in the current work lies between 9/11¹, the day of the terrorists' attacks in New York and Washington till the end of Blair's premiership, July 2007. This period forms an era rich in political decisions and actions. So, under this prism, is a duty for any International Relations researcher to study the above-mentioned realities and seek to formulate lessons of power and leadership; especially on what states need to seek and what to avoid in the future.

The work's scientific approach to this challenge is essentially empirical, but theoretical as well.

First of all, the present work weighs claims and facts, analysing the political and security scenario in transatlantic relations upon 9/11 and

¹ September 11, 2001: in the present work is referred as nine-eleven and is written 9/11.

the role of Tony Blair as a global leader; seeking answers to the following research questions:

- Have the dominant threat perceptions across Europe and the Atlantic changed after 9/11 and to what extent does the transatlantic community remain vital?
- What are the main lessons deriving from the decisions taken and choices made during the Iraq crisis for both America and Europe?
- What are the challenges and limits to NATO's and ESDP future roles and is there any space for synergy between the two organisations?
- Why Blair supported the Bush Administration, especially in the war against Iraq in 2003?
- What is distinctive in Blair's policy?
- And what the transatlantic community needs to learn from the British policy and national interest defence initiatives?

The policy responses of both America and Europe after 9/11 had an empirical reaction to historical events. The basic fact is that for Americans and Europeans the end of the Cold War marked the end of a relationship maintained from 1949 to 1989. This relationship was based on the common cause of fighting communism; with Europeans depending increasingly on America for their security and defence. So today no one can easily predict how this relationship will be restructured; events however do dictate its actual course and configuration.

Hence, this study starts from two basic hypotheses: Firstly, that we do live in a global world of *low predictability* where America and Europe needs each either to face today's global challenges. Their common values are their common interests too. The second hypothesis tests whether Europe need to develop a stronger presence in the world scene. And it is Blair's distinctive political stance that forms the case study that really tests the accuracy of these hypotheses and brings important lessons to the transatlantic community.

The period under examination signals the beginning of a series of distinctive military adventurism and institutional re-accommodation based mainly on the recognition that the world today more than ever before is challenged by the emerging threats of terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Accordingly, the current empirical study includes the examination of the most important military adventures after 9/11, mainly the war in Afghanistan and the Iraq war and the reaction of both transatlantic partners US and Europe, and between European members as well, testing the above mentioned hypothesis in the light of Blair's words and actions.

Similarly, the institutional re-accommodation of both NATO and the ESDP project are analysed, testing also the validity of the above-mentioned hypotheses. Special focus is given to the characteristic role that the Prime Minister Tony Blair played throughout this period. Through his controversial practicing of leadership the current work aims to draw a map of new realities in the international scene.

Particularly, there are examined two main schools of thought distinguished in the current period: the establishment, optimistic school of thought and the estrangement, pessimistic school of thought. These schools are selected to serve the purposes of this study as their debate characterises predominantly the academic and political dialogue on transatlantic relations in the post 9/11 era, and especially after the Iraq war and the subsequent crisis between the two sides of the Atlantic.

Government and NATO representatives are typical spokespersons of the establishment, optimistic school of thought, arguing that there are no fundamental problems in US - European relations. The estrangement school of thought argues that the United States and Europe are drifting apart and are headed for divorce. The main representative of this school is Robert Kagan who famously characterised Americans being from Mars and Europeans being from Venus.

On this basis, the first chapter of this book analyses the similarities and differences in transatlantic security perceptions between the US and the EU after 9/11, under the light of their persisting quest between unilateralism and multilateralism and their distinctive character and purpose. In order to achieve this, the current study evaluates the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) (2002) and the European Security Strategy (ESS) (2003), as they form regulators of expectations in transatlantic relations, with the potential to shape future policy choices. Strategies involve thinking about what goals are achievable and how. For the purpose of the current work the most important element is that strategies contain principles of doctrine and core beliefs about what is threatening and how it can best be encountered. Strategies also shape expectations on each other's future behaviour, yet they do not form binding documents over policy results. Their importance lies in their reflection of the dynamics, ideological shifts and perceptions across the Atlantic.

The origins and compositions of the two documents are examined thoroughly, placed in their historical context (before and after the beginning of the Iraq war, respectively). Changes occurring in the 2006 new NSS were also placed in perspective. The chapter argues that there are some areas of conceptual divergence that will certainly continue to affect the future of US-EU relations, mainly the NSS's deriving doctrine of military preemption, unilateral action and US primacy and the ESS's strong emphasis on multilateralism diplomacy and international law. However, many similarities between the two documents do reflect the general consensus on changing security priorities, with the emerging of new threats to their common values: terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts and failing states. Both the US and EU converge on their basic goals to promote security, democracy and advance human rights, broadly reflecting the common, liberal democratic values that have transitionally cemented their relationship.

Also reflected is the need for common action to common challenges ahead in an era of high interdependence but at the same time unpredictability, as Tony Blair espoused even before 9/11. Studying conceptual

frameworks, one cannot escape noting the British distinctive foreign policy character. Blair's doctrine of international community predates the US and EU strategic documents, and is best formulated in the British Defence White Paper of 2003. Blair shook up conventional thinking in international politics supporting in words and in practice his doctrine: a power of community is revealing itself, a realisation of how fragile our frontiers are in the face of the world's new challenges. States would, or at least should respond to the increased interdependence of globalisation by defining their particular interests in terms of the wider international interest, and common values coincide with common interests. Blair places high emphasis on the importance of transatlantic unity for achieving global security - while he envisions Britain as bridge between the two continents.

Building on the grounds provided by Blair's vision and mainly his doctrine of international community the first chapter places special emphasis on the future of the EU's role, as a security and defence actor on the international scene. It argues that the EU will continue to develop the theoretical framework and capacities to act alone on security matters but differences between its Member States' national interests will continue to prevail. Transatlantic unity remains vital.

The second chapter discusses in depth the most criticised military and political adventure of recent years, the Iraq war. Iraq, though not the prime focus of this study - forms the defining event and the practical experiment of the new international parameters: globalisation, urging threats of terrorism and WMD and American and European political reactions both cooperative and at odds. Blair is once again the leader that draws the attention, of the public, media and academics alike. The lessons drawn from both the unilateral policy of the US and the weakness of EU to respond effectively to the crisis need to be examined to form a necessary guide towards future policies and actions. The current work recognises the fact that today various centres of power do exist, rather than a single hegemonic power; it also recognises the fact that the US remains the sole superpower in the sense that is the only state that combines political, economical and military power alike.

The current analysis places the focus firstly on the US political decisions and actions against Iraq, particularly in the context of US - EU relations and on the future of the American power projection. Lessons are drawn on what to avoid and what to take on next time. Secondly, the focus lies on Europe's peculiar character and dis-unity during the crisis. The lessons for Europe are drawn both in relation to its future role in the world scene and in relation to its approach towards its greatest partner, the US. On this basis it is tested whether strengthening European defence should rest on the following foundations: Leadership and courage at European and national level, Europe's credible security and defence policy, binding Atlanticism with European integration.

The Iraq war is considered as the defining event of Blair's premiership. For the purpose of the current study thus the motives behind Blair's

highly questionable policy in Iraq need a particular clarification. Why did he do it and what difference did it make that he did? The impact of his decision on his doctrine of International Community and mainly on his belief in transatlantic unity is principally tested.

The third chapter evaluates the two main institutions in the military sphere between the two sides of the Atlantic, NATO and EU. More specifically it seeks to analyse the evolution of NATO and the ESDP and their future relationship. The US led wars and their repercussions for European security, in Afghanistan and Iraq, shall form the case study of NATO-ESDP power testing and future role.

The present work thus examines firstly how NATO is changing and how it has responded to the new challenges it faces, given the current climate of uncertainty, as an institution competing as well as cooperating with the EU/ESDP. The analysis is based mainly on NATO's Summits Declarations since 9/11 and the actual missions in which NATO participated in the same period. Secondly, the unique in genre and *sui generis* in scope project of the ESDP is examined in detail; basically through the Declarations and Treaties signed and the missions that the EU undertook after 9/11. Both NATO and EU have been transforming, trying to cope with the new challenges of the post Cold War and post 9/11 periods. The various contrasting US approaches, from enthusiastic to opposed, show the difficulty US faces in accepting balanced partnerships, yet needing and asking burden for sharing.

Although the Iraq crisis shook NATO and EU to their foundation, NATO has become a flexible institution, remaining a relevant and compelling military alliance for both America and Europe. ESDP, on the other hand, seems to have different agendas in different national capitals, divided between Atlanticists and Europeanists. However, it has become more and more usable over time. Beginning in 2003, ESDP has been involved in 16 missions in three continents. Yet major complex issues still exist in the EU that need to be resolved, mainly budgetary and decision making accommodations. Still, EU's strengthening as a security actor has become important for both America and NATO's own survival, with a vibrant transatlantic relationship at its core. Europe needs the achievement of, as repeatedly supported by Blair during his premiership, a vastly improved defence capability to play its part in NATO or in its own right where NATO chooses not to be engaged. This seems the best way for the transatlantic community to pursuing its ideals and interests in today's globalised world.

The fourth chapter is mainly focused on the British policy and actions. The analysis is placed firstly on two policy conceptions of the Blair era that have raised a vast academic discussion and political turmoil especially given the fact that they were materialised into an active policy of intervention: the doctrine of the international community and the subsequent liberal interventionism stance and the British bridge linking the two sides of the Atlantic notion. Both ideas are tested especially under the light of the Iraq war.

This chapter places Blair's doctrine of international community in perspective, while studying liberal interventionism in practice. Blair placed his moral position in action during the Kosovo crisis, and after 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq. Testing Blair's doctrine in practice answers what the Blair doctrine really is. How does the Blair doctrine compare to the Bush doctrine? And to what extent can actual interventions be understood as successful applications of the Blair doctrine?

This chapter seeks to draw lessons from recent experiences, and makes the case for a more realistic, sophisticated and pragmatic approach. Leadership and courage will be placed as distinctive elements in Blair's legacy so far. This chapter argues that Europe has to be engaged, dynamic, and, where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence. Blair's political choices were also formulated around the belief that the transatlantic unity is indispensable for meeting the new challenges of the 21st century and America is the key partner for this to be achieved. Europe has to be a strong and trustful ally, with strong military capabilities and the political will to make a difference in the world, assuming its responsibilities, and offering primarily security to its own people.

The concluding chapter comes to sum up the main lessons deriving from the above analysis, answering at the same time the main research questions posed at the beginning of this study. The Iraq war demonstrated more than ever before the limitations of a common European approach to important international crisis and America's limitations as the sole superpower not capable of answering all the worlds' issues independently. It also demonstrated that any international action has to be based on a legitimate just cause and a trust based political strategy. We need each other. Transatlantic unity is indispensable. In our interdependent world of new and complex threats, America and Europe have to take their common interest and make the most of it. Britain's special relation with the United States is thus not just a British asset; but potentially a European one.

Chapter I

TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGIC CULTURES AFTER 9/11 AND BLAIR'S RESPONSE

The 9/11 aftermath revealed that there are both different, as well as equal policy and threat perceptions across the Atlantic and within the EU itself. These perceptions were formulated in political speeches and national security strategies and were validated through specific political and military action. Kagan argues that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus and notions such as American hegemony, preemption, European dis-unity, the Anglo-American special relationship and Blair's bridge concept were also awakened and tested.

1. A multilateral Europe contrasting with a unilateral America? Theories over power and strategy

Whilst during the Cold War, US took responsibility for the protection of the free world assisted by its key allies in Europe and particularly by NATO, during the post Cold War era and especially after 9/11 new opportunities and challenges for both arose. After 9/11 transatlantic and intra-European debate over Iraq produced deep splits among the allies, as US unilateralism endured with serious consequences.

Robert Kagan famously characterised Americans as being from Mars and Europeans from Venus.² Phillip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro argued that transatlantic relations are indeed, in a poor state³. And Elizabeth Pond claimed that even the survival of NATO is doubtful.⁴ On the other hand, Mark Pollack suggests that transatlantic differences have been exaggerated.⁵ Commonly, for Timothy Garton Ash, *Europe and America are not oil tankers. They are political assemblages of millions of individual human beings. It's time to look at them closely.*⁶ Common opinion, as shown in a poll, in 2004, showed that 70% of Americans and 60% of Europeans

² Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America vs Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf, New York, 2003.

³ Phillip H. Gordon, *Allies at war: America, Europe and the Iraq Crisis*, MacGraw Hill, New York, 2004.

⁴ Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire. The near death of transatlantic Alliance*, European Union Studies Association, Pennsylvania, 2004.

⁵ John Peterson, Mark A. Pollack, *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty First Century*, Routledge, 2003, p. 53.

⁶ Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West*, Penguin Books, London 2005.

believed that their countries do share common values and views in world problems.⁷

The core of Kagan's argument is that the differences between Europe and America are shaped by their military capabilities. Mainly, Kagan argues that Europeans and Americans disagree about not only power and threats, but also means. US military power is accompanied by the tendency to use it while in Europe, weak militaries coexist with an aversion to war. Within the EU framework, Europeans prefer to deal with problems within the scope of political negotiation, technical and humanitarian aid and multilateral support and assistance. America, on the other hand, as the sole economic and military superpower, is much readier to use its military capacities - when diplomacy does not work - supported by defence spending of more than twice the combined amount for the EU members. Europeans argue that they are better in negotiating — but this is only because they lack the means to impose their will. Yet, for Cooper, this is an oversimplified version of Kagan's argument. It is not true that Europeans have weak military capability; after the US and Russia there are not many countries who are on a par with the EU.⁸ Europeans have used force and they continue to be willing to use force when necessary. It was Anglo-French artillery rather than American bombing that made the difference in Bosnia; and it was the British and French who were willing to send in ground troops when the air campaign in Kosovo seemed to be going nowhere. Nevertheless, European capability for intervention abroad is severely limited, as the campaign in Afghanistan and the campaign in Iraq have demonstrated.

It is not just that the US spends twice as much on defence as its European allies combined. It also spends much more efficiently. European allies do not spend together; instead they spend separately on equipment that duplicates capabilities but is rarely interoperable. Consequently, they achieve neither the concentration of power nor the economies and scale that the US does. Europe, because of its separate policies and organisations, spends much more on administration and headquarters and much less on fighting capabilities.

However, the discussed transatlantic tensions arose both from the military predominance of the US and a shift in grand strategy towards a neo-conservative approach. No political entity can possibly pre-empt every threat to it, nor rid the world of every hostile regime.⁹ On the other hand, Europe was divided, and with no single voice and military capabilities

⁷ Stefan Ganzle, Allen G. Sens, *The changing Politics of European Security. Europe Alone?* Palgrave Macmillan press, New York, 2007.

⁸ Robert Cooper. "The European Answer to Robert Kagan", *Transatlantic Internationale Politik*, 2, 2003.

⁹ Europe has become further divided along a fault line of either support or opposition to US led military action in Iraq. Further complicating this issue, especially in light of NATO's recent disagreement over providing defence to Turkey, is the decision that was taken at the Prague Summit to extend NATO's sphere of influence to the global level.

strong enough to carry its own weight. Thus it was not capable of playing the best role in the crisis.

There have been two main schools of thought discussing the US - EU course of relations, especially after the end of the Cold War.¹⁰ The establishment, optimist school of thought which argues that there are no fundamental problems in transatlantic relations¹¹ and the estrangement, pessimist school of thought which argues that the US and Europe are drifting apart.¹² Advocates of the first view claim that the main pillars of that relationship are strong. The US and Europe, despite the end of the Cold War, continue to face common threats. They believe also that US and European governments have many common interests and seek to promote the same values.

On the other hand, proponents of the second school of thought support the view that with the end of the Cold War, the US and Europe no longer face a shared threat. They therefore no longer need to be united on every issue. They predict also that America's unipolar moment will not last, and that it will lead to counterbalancing efforts by the European Union, among other rising powers like China and India. Commonly they

¹⁰ The optimist school of thought includes liberal theorists while the pessimist's school, realists and neorealist. The optimists-pessimists distinction is more adequate for the current study as qualifies the view over the future outcome of the transatlantic intercourse.

Based on "The New Transatlantic Security Network", Policy Papers #20, Publication of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Robert Bosch Foundation Research Scholars Program in Comparative Public Policy and Institutions, 2002, <http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/PDF/articles/Chantal.pdf>.

¹¹ See, for example, Ronald D. Asmus, "United We'll Stand", *Washington Post*, 06.05.2002, Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, Public Affairs, New York, 2001, Wesley Clark, *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire*, Public Affairs New York, 2004; Robert J. Lieber, "No Transatlantic Divorce in the Offing", *Orbis* 44, No. 4, 2000; Robert J. Lieber. *The American Era: Power & Strategy for 21st Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2007; Antony J. Blinken, "The False Crisis over the Atlantic," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 80, No3, May-June 2001, p.p.35-48; Christian Tusschoff, "The Ties That Bind: Allied Commitments and NATO Before and After September 11," in Esther Brimmer, Benjamin Schreer, and Christian Tusschoff, "Contemporary Perspectives on European Security", *German Issues* 27, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 2002, p.p.71-95.

¹² See, for example, Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, No. 113, June-July 2002, John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2001; John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No.5, September-October 2001, p.p.46-61; Stephen M. Walt, "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart", *The National Interest*, No. 54, Winter 1998-1999; Charles Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," *International Security*, Vol 23, No 2, Fall 1998, p.p.40-79; Julian Lindley-French, "Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 September", Institute for Security Studies, *Chaillot Papers*, No 52 May 2002; Jessica Matthews, "Estranged Allies," *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2001, p.p. 48-53.

argue that the US and Europe have increasingly divergent interests and different ways of looking at the world.

Americans and Europeans differ in their support for multilateral rules and institutions, with the US more sceptical than the EU about the utility of multilateral agreements on a series of issues.¹³ However, the idea of a multilateralist Europe contrasting with a unilateralist America is misleading. Both US and EU support for multilateralism is and has always been selective, reflecting the international power position and the domestic political interests of states on each side of the Atlantic.

Indeed, the EU's multilateralism is somehow misleading as European countries have always been, and remain, selective in their support for multilateral cooperation; both among themselves and with third countries. As Orfeo Fioretos suggests *EU Member States support specific forms of multilateral cooperation if and insofar as such cooperation allows them to sustain their comparative economic advantage*.¹⁴ The UK, for example, is considered to be an opponent of deeper multilateral cooperation, yet in areas such as financial services the UK has been a leader in pressing for ambitious and legally binding EU rules to liberalise trade. Similarly, integrationist countries such as Germany and Italy may favour multilateral cooperation generally, but oppose binding multilateral rules or institutional reforms that might threaten valued domestic policies, such as German opposition to the proposed EU Directive on corporate takeovers, and Italian concerns over the extent of the EU's common arrest warrant.¹⁵

The selective nature of EU multilateralism is reflected as well in the long and difficult development of its CFSP and ESDP. Indeed, even within areas that are the subject of CFSP deliberations, unilateral initiatives by the Union's larger states have been common; as, for example, was the unilateral German decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and the British decision to side with the US on Iraq in 2003.

European attachment to multilateralism is based on national interest, meaning that Europeans do not advocate multilateralism through instinct. European attachment to multilateralism is based on interest. The post-1945 emergence of the European continent from the disaster of war was a success for multilateralism and for US leadership. It was the United States that invented modern multilateralism as a working system in the aftermath of World War II. By pooling their sovereignty into the European Union and other multilateral organisations, European states have followed that lead and succeeded in enhancing regional security and stability.¹⁶

¹³ John Peterson, Mark A. Pollack, *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty First Century*, Routledge, 2003, p. 115.

¹⁴ Orfeos Fioretos, "The domestic sources of multilateral preferences: varieties of capitalism in the European Community" in Peter A Hall and David W Soskice, (eds) *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 215.

¹⁵ For a thorough inside on EU past and current events, see <http://europa.eu.int>.

¹⁶ See Henry A. Kissinger, "Diplomacy", Simon and Schuster, New York and London, 1994, p.p. 50–52; Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Collective

*Reforming multilateralism undoubtedly presupposes a high degree of courage and determination from political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic as well as several restraints: on US unilateralism, on the French penchant for power balancing, and on German idealism.*¹⁷ In a globally interdependent world, a commitment to multilateralism represents a long-term investment. If the weakest and poorest feel that their voice is not being heard, then they will soon become angrier and more dangerous. Even the strongest country in the world needs friends and allies. But allies must be treated as such and allowed to participate not only in the execution, but also in the formation of policy.

The dilemma and the question lies in the level of cooperation on the definition, promotion, and defence of those shared values. The transatlantic partnership, if it is to endure and thrive, must be more than a purely utilitarian and ad hoc association. The success of the EU's attempt to construct a strong and credible foreign policy will in many respects determine the future of the transatlantic relationship.

Therefore, although Europeans and US citizens share a community of values, that situation can change if Europeans conclude that they have little say in shaping the definition, promotion, or defence of those shared values. The US cannot and should not be viewed as the new empire of the 21st century, as the wise words of Thucydides teach us:

*So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the Athenians that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and what was impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The reason for this was their extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes.*¹⁸

The modern world is complex and interdependent. The broad security agenda that we must confront demands the possession of not just military but also economic, diplomatic, and industrial strength. As a recent study by the Chicago Council for Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States shows, US foreign policy attitudes are not so different from those in Europe: most US citizens favour an active foreign policy to deal with a wide range of international issues, showing strong support for multilateral rather than unilateral approaches to foreign policy, and exhibiting more readiness to use military force multilaterally rather than unilaterally.¹⁹

Security Idea and Changing World Politics" in *Collective Security in a Changing World*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss Boulder, Colo Lynne Rienner, 1993, p.p. 3–18, p. 56.

¹⁷ Joachim Krause, "Multilateralism: Behind European Views", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 27, No 2, Spring 2004, p.p. 43–59.

¹⁸ Thucydides, M. I. Finley (Editor, Introduction), Rex Warner (Translator), *The History of the Peloponnesian War: Revised Edition*, Penguin Classics, 1954; Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War*, HarperCollins Publishers, London, 2003.

¹⁹ Jeremy Black, "Blair, Britain, Europe and International Relations?" *Watch on the West*, Newsletter of FPRI's Center for the Study of America and the West, Vol 3, No 9, Nov. 2002, <http://www.fpri.org/ww/0309.200211.black.blairbritaineuroperelements.html> last access: 05.05.2006.

What is needed and wanted on both sides of the Atlantic is not a US empire, but US leadership; leadership that comes with great responsibilities. For Europe, influence must be earned through the assumption of obligations and duties. For the United States, power should be exercised with moderation and legitimacy in order to attract allies and keep away enemies.²⁰

2. 9/11 and the initial reactions

*In my nine years as prime minister, I have not become less idealistic or more cynical. I have simply become more persuaded that the distinction between a foreign policy driven by values and one driven by interests is wrong. Globalization begets interdependence, and interdependence begets the necessity of a common value system to make it work. Idealism thus becomes realpolitik.*²¹

On September 11, 2001 a series of airline hijackings and suicide attacks were committed by 19 militants associated with the Islamic extremist group Al-Qaeda against targets in New York and Washington D.C.. The attacks and the subsequent awareness of terrorism had a significant impact on the European and American security environment. The attacks left America and particularly the Bush Administration in clear shock, launching immediately the famous *War on Terror*. 9/11 also deepened US preference for unilateralism and the clearest indication of this was the US decision to start the Afghan campaign unilaterally.

The terrorist attacks were denounced by media and governments worldwide. Top Muslim organisations in the US condemned the atrocities and leaders in most Middle Eastern countries, including Afghanistan did so too.²² Iraq was a noticeable exception. *Saddam Hussein's Iraq said the United States deserved Tuesday's attacks in New York and Washington as the fruits "of its crimes against humanity".*²³

NATO allies, on the other hand, did come together and, in the same spirit as the French article in *Le Monde*, *Nous Sommes Tous Américains*,²⁴ invoked for the first time in NATO's history article V of the North Atlantic Treaty²⁵. However, America preferred to preserve the maximum

²⁰ Journal article by Javier Solana; Harvard International Review, Vol. 24, 2003.

²¹ Tony Blair, "A Battle for Global Values", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 1, January-February 2007 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html> last access: 01.03.2007.

²² Encyclopaedia Britannica, on-line, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/762320/September-11-attacks#tab=active~checked%2Citems~checked&title=September%2011%20attacks%20-%20Britannica%20Online%20Encyclopedia> last access: 03.12.2007.

²³ CNN World on line, "Attacks draw mixed response in Mideast", 12.11.2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/12/mideast.reaction/index.html> last access: 16.12.2007.

²⁴ *Le Monde*, "Nous sommes tous Américains", 13.11.2001, p. 1.

²⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949:

room for manoeuvre and autonomy of action and refused NATO's support at the time.

Europe expressed with a common voice solidarity with the American people and Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission at the time, announced: *In the darkest hours of European History, America stood close with us. Today we stand close by America.*²⁶ Furthermore, the European Council of the 21st of September 2001 stated that it would fight terrorism in all its forms and that *the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union.*²⁷ In the same spirit, at the June 2002 European Council in Seville, it was decided to increase EU's involvement in the fight against terrorism *embracing all Union policies, including by developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and by making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational.*²⁸

While Europe showed solidarity to America, European nations were unable to take action as a whole on issues as important as peace and war. The war in Afghanistan was *moving the EU away from its goal of becoming a single, operative voice on issues as vast and sensitive as peace and war.*²⁹ Further complicating the EU's situation were the neutral countries — Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland — who emphasised that the EU has no authority in military matters.

Blair was the only EU leader to understand the significance of the attacks to the American soul and the probability of the only superpower acting or overreacting alone leaving Europe out of the events. Yet, while Blair was gaining prestige in Washington, it seemed to have difficulties in finding Europe's heartbeat. He travelled forty thousand miles in the eight weeks following 9/11 events, conducting fifty-five meetings with other leaders.³⁰

Article 5, parag. 1: "*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.*" NATO on-line library: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm> last access: 30.07.2008.

²⁶ CNN.Com /World, "World mourns attack victims", 12.11.2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/12/world.reaction/> last access: 02.03.2007.

²⁷ Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21.09.2001, Gateway to the European Union, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf last access: 11.11.2006.

²⁸ The EU leaders at the Seville Summit decided to strengthen arrangements for sharing intelligence and developing the production of early warning reports, drawing on the widest range of sources too. See: Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, 21-22 June 2002, Annex V, Gateway to the European Union, <http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm> last access: 10.07.2006.

²⁹ John Vinocour, "Ghent Meeting Underscores Factionalism: Fight Against Terrorism Opens Fissures in the EU," *International Herald Tribune*, 22.10.2001, http://www.iht.com/articles/2001/10/22/eu_ed3_1.php last access: 11.11.2006.

³⁰ Peter Riddell, "Europe", in Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh, *The Blair Effect 2001-2005*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 368.

In Europe, though, he was more inclined to approach the big powers of Europe separately rather than all Member States, using EU's formal institutional structures. During the Gent European Summit in mid-October 2001, Blair had an exclusive meeting with the French President Jacques Chirac and the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder which was criticised by Romano Prodi as *solo diplomacy*.³¹ He subsequently arranged a Sunday evening meeting in Downing Street's Number 10, on 4th of November 2001, including only his French and German European partners. The list of guests, however, expanded to include Italy, Spain, Belgium (EU presidency at the time) and the Netherlands. Still, no collective interest was to be formed; nor Europe's common voice was to be transmitted.

In any case, the Bush administration decided to act alone, based more in an a la cart way of coalition support. As the Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld claimed at the time, *the mission will define the coalition – not the other way around*.³² Britain, on the other hand, whose operations and reconnaissance were further developed in the region with significant military action and resources, was welcomed by the US. Although to a lesser degree than Britain, France and Germany also participated in the war. America had decided that military action is more efficient and unified when European nations are organised under American command, avoiding delays caused by hesitant allies in Yugoslav war *The Pentagon saw the Kosovo Campaign as the successful application of precision airpower, hindered by consultations with hesitant European allies...*³³ Joseph Nye has stated that unilateral action should not be ruled out in cases where the survival of American national interest is at stake, although international support should be sought whenever possible.³⁴

And Lord Robertson recognised in a speech in Salen Sweden that the American critics of Europe's military capability are right but one cannot say that America does not need Europe as an ally.³⁵ Europe and America do share common values and interests and have a common duty, as the democratic, developed Western World, to nurture their relationship to face today's global challenges. Weapons of Mass Destruction and terrorism are among the most serious threats to the future security of the entire world.

The National Security Strategy of the United States and European Security Strategy³⁶ suggest that there have been clear differences in the

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 368.

³² Donald Rumsfeld, 'A New Kind of War', *New York Times*, 27.11.2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/opinion/27RUMS.html>.

³³ William Wallace, "As viewed From Europe: Transatlantic Sympathies, Transatlantic Fears," *International Relations* 16, No. 2, August 2002, p. 282.

³⁴ Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the Worlds Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Oxford University Press, 2002, Chap. 5.

³⁵ Lord Robertson, "The Transatlantic Link," Speech given at the Annual Conference of the defence and Society, 21.01.2002, in Salen, Sweden, available online, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/sp2002.htm> ; last access: 29.01.2007.

³⁶ The NSS and ESS are not binding documents and thus they do not constrain the strategic autonomy of decision makers. Nevertheless, they have been chosen as

allies' approach but common values and interests in our era keep the two sides of the Atlantic linked together. Interdependence is the key characteristic of the modern world and although the political model of a country cannot be transplanted to another one, democracy and freedom are values shared by all free people around the world apart from nationality or religion.

Blair, in the context of his doctrine of international community, declared that an active foreign policy of engagement, not isolation is needed, transatlantic relations are vital as ever. Europe needs more than ever a strong presence in the world scene, showing courage and leadership, and taking risks, making the difference. Blair shook up conventional thinking in foreign affairs. Blair's vision, certainly, gives important lessons to Europe, in what to avoid and what to pursue in future security encounters.

3. America's perceptions and responses – US national strategy after 9/11

Focusing on America's ideology and response to 9/11. On what ideological basis has the US acted?

The US foreign - policy debate in the post 9/11 period is framed across, among other issues, the choice between unilateralism (going alone) and multilateralism (working in concert with other states). The roots of this debate lay in the tension between America's twin identities, as characterised by French political theorist Raymond Aron in *The Imperial Republic*³⁷: The US is an imperial power dominating and maintaining an international order according to its governing norms; at the same time, a republic, a sovereign state existing within a system of sovereign states equal under international law. The tension created by the two identities has important practical consequences. For example, should the United States act in a conflict region where its national interests are not directly at stake? Should it use unilateral force to prevent a rogue state from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction?

In this line of reasoning, this clash of identities seems even more alarming in the post- 9/11 world. For some political observers, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington provoked real changes in US policies, both foreign and domestic; changes with a scale comparable to that of the readjustment of the early Cold War era. Although the then Secretary of State Colin Powell observed after 9/11, *Not only is the cold war over, the post-cold war period is also over*³⁸, the events of that day do not seem to have altered the real structure of international relations.

references by the current analysis as they do form significant official statements of US and EU ambitions, goals and future policies.

³⁷ Raymond Aron, "The Imperial Republic; the United States and the World, 1945-1973", Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1974.

³⁸ Quoted in "The Imperial Republic after 9/11", by Robert S. Litwak, *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol 26, Issue 3, Summer 2002, p. 76.

American diplomatic history has shown both realism and liberalism approaches over the years.³⁹ Typically in the beginning of the 90's, George W. Bush campaigned on a realist foreign policy platform of returning to a focus on state power relationships. He said: *We must defend America's interests in the Persian Gulf and advance peace in the Middle East, based upon a secure Israel.*⁴⁰ Clinton also in his first inaugural address in 1993, stated that *When our vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act – with peaceful diplomacy when ever possible, with force when necessary.*⁴¹

Before 9/11, Bush administration's statements reflected a conflicted attitude towards international organisations and treaties. He rejected international treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, arrangements seen as a potential constraint on the sovereign exercise of power and US national interests. *While I believe there is global warming, both the causes and the impact of this slight warming are uncertain... The Kyoto Protocol is ineffective, inadequate, and a bad deal for America and Americans.*⁴² After 9/11 President Bush quickly rediscovered the value of multilateralism. The terrorist attacks were directed not just at the US but at the global system itself. The common perception of the threat posed by terrorism to their own societies and to the global economy pushed the US and Europe into an ever closer relationship. The US and Europe became united in a common struggle against terrorism as well as in other international cases, such as the successful launch of a new round of world trade talks under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation.⁴³

However, in practice, after 9/11, the American administration rather followed what has been identified as the neoconservative agenda. The neoconservative notion has little to do with Republican versus Democrat; it is more a contest between realists and idealists, with the neo-conservatives being at the idealist side. Realists are conservative in the

³⁹ See Realists as: Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty-Years' crisis, 1919-1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Macmillan, London, 2001, Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1948; George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1954, Liberals as: Woodrow Wilson, *A Day of Dedication: The Essential Writings and speeches of Woodrow Wilson*, Macmillan, New York 1965; *The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics*, D.C. Heath, Boston, 1918, Bertrand Russell, *Has Man a Future? and Which Way to Peace*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1962.

⁴⁰ International Relations Centre - Foreign Policy in Focus. Foreign Policy of the Major U.S. Presidential Candidates, <http://www.fpiif.org/candidates/topics.html> last access: 09.10.2005.

⁴¹ Bill Clinton, First Inaugural Address, 21.01.1993, <http://www.barteby.com/124/pres64.html> last access: 01.09.2005

⁴² International Relations Centre - Foreign Policy in Focus. Foreign Policy of the Major U.S. Presidential Candidates, <http://www.fpiif.org/candidates/topics.html>.

⁴³ See more on Thomas C. Beierle, "From Uruguay to Doha: Agricultural Trade Negotiations at the World Trade Organisation", Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 02-13, March 2002, <http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-02-13.pdf> last access: 09.06.2007.

true sense of the word.⁴⁴ They do not seek to take risks to extend liberal democratic ideals. On the contrary, they seek to maintain American primacy and would not seem to risk taking on a mission so demanding as remaking the Middle East⁴⁵.

In reality, American policy followed its own agenda as a powerful nation capable of imposing its will and serving its own national interest. The US did not seem to trust international institutions to reshape the global environment. In addition to this, the tendency towards what the columnist Charles Krauthammer proclaimed as the new unilateralism, that the United States, because it is so strong, because it is unipolar, ought to act unilaterally was apparent.

Krauthammer argues that the US has the power and ability to control events around the world. However, the idea that with military power solely the US can solve all problems seems unjustified. US cannot control all events around the world. In addition, and as Fukuyama contra-argued to Krauthammer's point, *The world's sole superpower needs to remember that its margin of power is viewed with great suspicion around the world and will set off countervailing reactions if that power is not exercised judiciously.*⁴⁶

In reality, the Afghan operation revealed the extraordinary ability and desire of the US military to operate virtually alone. In the Iraq war too, as we shall examine latterly in detail, the US took on the operation claiming a threat to its own vital interests, overlooking many allies' suspicions and demands. On the ground, the military instruments employed in the conflict exposed the gap in military capabilities that exists between the US and other countries, including its closest NATO allies. However, the fact that for an effective counterterrorism campaign against Al-Qaeda organisation, which is operating in more than 60 countries, close multi-lateral cooperation is required, it was also exposed - notably in the area of intelligence. Such multilateralism offers an effective means of attaining American objectives, and, equally important, it provides political legitimacy for American actions.

Similarly, world politics lie on three different policy levels: military power, economic relations and transnational relations. The United States is the only military power with global capacity. Yet, economic relations are multipolar by definition.⁴⁷ The United States, Europe, Japan, and

⁴⁴ Zachary Selden, "Neoconservatives and the American Mainstream", *Policy Review*, Issue 124, Hoover Institution Press, 2004, p. 29.

⁴⁵ Adam Wolfson, "Neither Idealist nor Realist. Bush Foreign Policy", *Current*, No 476, October 2005, p.3-8.

⁴⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "The Neoconservative Moment", *The National Interest*, Summer 2004, p. 67. Interesting is also to see that, Francis Fukuyama in his article "The Fall of America, Inc", published in *Newsweek* magazine in 2008, says again that America's power and influence has rested on the fact that most people found the American form of self-government good and wanted to follow its example for their own societies and once again the test for America is its capacity to reinvent itself. Francis Fukuyama, "The Fall of America, Inc", *Newsweek magazine*, 13.10.2008, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/162401/output/print> last access: 04.12.2008.

⁴⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, Oxford University Press, 2002.

China account for more than two-thirds of world activity in the world economy. The transnational relations, on the other hand, range from beneficial transnational actors to terrorist networks. And it is obvious that that field, the field of transnational relations, there is no solution except cooperative solutions.

Furthermore, issues like financial stability, terrorism, climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, are issues which matter very much in daily life in all societies of the world. In that sense these issues are multi-lateral too.⁴⁸ So when one supports, as Krauthammer does, unilateralism, they see only one dimension of international relations.

The US does need to cooperate in all dimensions of international relations: economic exchanges as well as transnational relations. In these fields it can be forced to act multilaterally. In fact, realists claim there is a balance of power in the world, and whenever it gets seriously out of balance, other countries will team together to balance the largest one.⁴⁹

The US cannot forget its view of international relations, reflected clearly in its National Security Strategy. *America has need of idealism and courage, because we have essential work at home - the unfinished work of American freedom. In a world moving toward liberty, we are determined to show the meaning and promise of liberty.*⁵⁰

Even historically, American leaders such as Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John F. Kennedy fought both to protect the American people and to expand opportunity for the next generation. They tried to ensure that America stood for and fought for the freedoms sought by billions of people beyond its borders.⁵¹

The NSS reflects the US focus on the dramatic changes in both the international security environment and in emerging military technologies. Besides, the new political parameters in the international scene represent a challenge and an opportunity for America; a challenge because they require changes in the military strategy to protect and promote US interests and an opportunity because the US will need to continue to prosper in the new environment.

3.1. The US National Security Strategy

The US National Security Strategy (NSS) reveals three important elements. Firstly, it reveals that 9/11 changed America's security environment, leading it to a war on terror, probably for an extended period

⁴⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong*, Profile Books, 2006; The Economist, "Foreign policy, How to go global", 23.03.2006.

⁴⁹ Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and Governance" *Political Science and Politics*, Vol 32, December 1999, p.p. 693-700; The Economist, "When the Snarling's Over," 13.03.1999.

⁵⁰ The White House, President Bush's Second Inaugural: Reversing FDR Friday, 21.01.2005, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>.

⁵¹ Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 4, July-August 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62636/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership>.

of time. Specifically, US stressed that the combination of terrorism, rogue states and Weapons of Mass Destruction created an alarming environment of global threats and it had strong responsibilities as the world's sole superpower to confront them. Secondly, preemption and democracy promotion become core components of American policy. We cannot forget that NSS was born in a period before the invasion of Iraq when confidence in the power of military preemption was still high. Condoleezza Rice's realism seems evident in the totality of the document too, especially in the key phrase *a balance of power that favours freedom*. Last but not least, US has the power, political, economic and military to impose its will and intents to preserve this preeminence. And though US enlists the support of the international community (with no special mention to its European old allies), it claims that will not hesitate to act alone when necessary, showing a preference for unilateral actions.

Accordingly, and in perspective, the NSS main goals were:

3.1.1. To maintain US Preeminence

In the NSS, US preeminence exists *to promote a balance of power that favours freedom*⁵².

The NSS is drawn around the undisputable reality that US enjoys the economic, diplomatic, military, technological, cultural, and geographical power necessary to impose its will whenever necessary.⁵³ This goal reflects the principle that US preeminence represents an opportunity and even a duty to use American power to make the world a better and safer place; and in particular, to deter *potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the US*.⁵⁴

More specifically, US has to maintain its predominance in a world towards three main groups of states. Firstly, a group of great powers like France, Russia, China and a stronger European Union. US preeminence is aimed at deterring these states from challenging US power. Secondly, a group of states that are major regional powers like Iran, and North Korea. It concerns regional powers that have been the focus of US military strategy and defence planning and the target of the most intense uses of US military power since the end of the Cold War. Last but not least,

⁵² The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

⁵³ See William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security*, Vol 24, No 4, 1999, p.p. 5-41. For a contrary view, see Charles A. Kupchan "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity", *International Security*, Vol 23, Issue 2, 1998, p.p. 40-79. See also: John J. Mearsheimer *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton & Company, 2003, Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival*, Metropolitan Books, 2004 (It examines the United States' political, military and economic motives, in comparison —often in contrast— to its rhetorical support for democracy, the Middle-East peace process, free trade, and human rights).

⁵⁴ The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

under consideration are also a larger number of states, including many in Africa and South Asia. Many of these states have recently been scenes of humanitarian crises that ultimately involved US military forces.⁵⁵

There are, however, some important dilemmas for the US.

Approval for its actions has to be produced and maintained. Power rests on consent as much as on coercion. Thus, credible leadership and reference to a universal set of values are needed to support US objectives, especially today, in a world of interdependence. For Blair *this is about justice and fairness as well as security and prosperity* and cannot be achieved *without a strong alliance, with US and Europe as its core.*⁵⁶

3.1.2. Defeating Global Terrorism

The NSS calls for a worldwide campaign to destroy *terrorist organisations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.*⁵⁷

NSS though recognising that to defeat terrorism today requires support across borders; mainly new productive international relationships and redefinition of existing ones, it does not make any special reference to its long standing European allies and friends.⁵⁸ This campaign supports governments in their efforts against terrorists in their own countries with intelligence, law enforcement, and military assistance and the goal is defeating terrorism.

Military force, however, in the war on terrorism must be carefully planned and directed otherwise can be counterproductive.⁵⁹ Here the test which exists for American power is a potential failure to respond vigorously to terrorist challenges, which might create an impression that the US lacks the will to defend itself, tempting, thus, further challenges.

As we have seen, with the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon came the realisation of a new unifying threat, terrorism,

⁵⁵ Robert Lieber, *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Bruce W. Weinrod, "The Case for U.S. Power; Why America Must Seek Preeminence", *The Washington Times*, 25.04.2006, p. 19; Brendan Conway, "The Pre-Emptive Strike; Security Means Added Responsibilities", *The Washington Times*, 06.04.2004, p. 17.

⁵⁶ Tony Blair, "A Battle for Global Values", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 1, January-February 2007 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html> last access: 01.03.2007.

⁵⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

⁵⁸ Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, Routledge, London, 2006, introduction p.p. 1- 16.

⁵⁹ Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro *The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy*, Rand, Santa Monica, CA., 2003, p. 10; Dennis L. Bark, *Americans and Europeans: Dancing in the Dark*, Hoover Institution Press, 2007; Dana H. Allin, Gilles Andreani, Philippe Errera, and Gary Samore, *Repairing the Damage: Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Consensus*, Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007; Christina V. Balis and Simon Serfaty, *Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic Relations*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004.

WMD, and the linkage between them.⁶⁰ Yet, this type of terrorism is not directed only against the US, but it is a threat to all the countries and peoples of the world. This fact forms a new opportunity for transatlantic cooperation. The American goal should be to ensure also that the transatlantic relationship remains relevant to today's challenges and to pursuing broader common interests together. The means in this fight they cannot only be military, they have to be political as well, and states should not rely only on force but on legitimacy and respect too.

*We will not succeed simply by military or security means. It is a political challenge. Terrorism recruits adherents on the basis of an appeal to human emotion. It can be countered only by a better, more profound, well-articulated counter-appeal.*⁶¹

3.1.3. Defusing Regional Conflicts

We build a world of justice, or we will live in a world of coercion. The magnitude of our shared responsibilities makes our disagreements look so small. (President Bush, Berlin, Germany, May 23, 2002)⁶²

The NSS pays particular attention to regional conflicts in the Middle East, especially between Israeli-Palestinian forces and India and Pakistan, in Indonesia, Latin America and Colombia, and to the opportunities for development and progress in Africa, despite that continent's severe problems that coexist with disease, war, and desperate poverty.

Indian economic growth promises to make it a democratic great power that will have influence well beyond South Asia. In contrast, the situation in Pakistan remains unsettled. Pakistan appears to use its nuclear weapons capability to advance Pakistan's strategic goals in Kashmir, not to mention, the very act of internal political power struggle. Where there is instability, forces that support the Taliban or even Al-Qaida are keener to act.⁶³

NSS supports the view that the circumstances in which America's action is justified cannot be anticipated. In the Persian Gulf and North East Asia, Central and South Asia, US military engagement stands out as most likely to be required, both because of the instability of those

⁶⁰ Richard N. Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course*, Public Affairs, 2005.

⁶¹ Tony Blair, "What I've learned", *The Economist*, 31.05.2007, http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9257593 last access: 01.06.2007.

⁶² The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

⁶³ The preceding discussion on India and Pakistan is partially based on Ashley J. Tellis *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal*, Rand Corp, 2001.

Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was killed 27.12.2007 in a suicide attack after a campaign rally, dashing hopes for a smooth transition to democracy and creating chaos across the country.

regions, presence of immense ungoverned spaces and the continued existence of severe transnational and terrorist threats and because of their importance to US interests – oil production and supply has been restrained in many countries because the oil fields are in war zones; plus the social problems generated by illegal immigration and drug trafficking.

Although, the US provides for building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises no special mention is given to particular institutions such as EU or NATO. Defusing regional conflicts, though, will be easier if Europe and America stand together.⁶⁴

*In a world in which China and India will each have a population three times that of the EU, anything else is completely out of date.*⁶⁵ The events in world crisis regions show us every day that it takes the contribution of many states to make progress towards stabilisation.⁶⁶

3.1.4. Preventing Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination... History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action. (President Bush, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002)⁶⁷

The NSS pays particular attention to the new threat posed by rogue states and terrorist groups relying on their demonstrated determination to obtain and use WMD.⁶⁸ It is difficult to keep WMD related knowledge and technologies from spreading, as the existing arms control and non-proliferation regimes are weak. The Bush administration specifically accused Iraq and Iran of having nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon programs and raised serious concerns about Libya and Syria's chemical

⁶⁴ And not only in Africa: The NSS mentions cooperation with European partners basically for strengthening Africa's fragile states, for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations in the region.

⁶⁵ Tony Blair, "What I've learned", *The Economist*, 31.05.2007, www. http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9257593 last access: 01.06.2007.

⁶⁶ Well over 30 nations have made a commitment in Southeast Europe, and just as many have made a commitment in Afghanistan and in Iraq, approximately.

⁶⁷ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

⁶⁸ See: United Nations: Disarmament US Department of State Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI); Reports regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction; Global Security. org FAS assessment of countries that own weapons of mass destruction; Terrorism and the Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East Iranian Chemical Attacks Victims (Payvand News Agency); Iran: 'Forgotten Victims' of Saddam Hussein Era Await Justice Comparison of Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese translations Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Come Clean - The WMD Awareness Programme Nuclear Weapons Effects, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_of_mass_destruction external links, last access: 02.08.2008.

and biological warfare activities.⁶⁹ Moreover, India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea are developing ballistic missiles. A particular worry is that nonstate terrorist groups may even be able to acquire this capability and weapons proliferation may, thus, be beyond the capacity of the US and its allies to reverse.⁷⁰

On this basis, *Enlightened Atlanticism*⁷¹ suggests that the Broader Middle East can be a creative transatlantic mission. US can neither prevent nor respond alone to the threat of WMD. But most importantly, without legitimacy, it will not be feasible for the US to make and sustain the alliance relationships that American national security requires. Again, the pursuit of legitimacy must be understood as an influential element of alliance policy. Tony Blair has called the US to take a more cooperative approach on this field. Indeed, *If America wants the rest of the world to be part of the agenda it has set, it must be part of their agenda, too.*⁷²

3.1.5. Developing Cooperative Action with the Main Centres of Global Power

We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war. (President Bush, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002)⁷³

In the past, it was assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today's world, the context of power differs greatly. Military, economic, and transnational issues dominate the agenda and the distinction between soft and hard power becomes less and less important.⁷⁴

The NSS does support cooperative action with other global powers.⁷⁵ In brief, the NSS provides an agenda for expanding and transforming the NATO alliance and calls for renewed attention to America's alliances in Asia in the war against terrorism and becomes cautious in its discussion of the remaining difficulties in US relations with Russia and China.

⁶⁹ John Bolton, *Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations*, 1st Threshold Editions 2007.

⁷⁰ John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom. Securing America's Future", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No 6, November-December 2007.

⁷¹ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Speech, "The future of the transatlantic security partnership NATO", *Welt am Sonntag Forum*, Berlin, 08.11.2004, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/11/mil-041108-nato01.htm> last access: 31.08.2007.

⁷² At the annual Davos meeting in January 2005, Blair, quoted in James Traub, "Freedom, From Want", *New York Times*, 13.02. 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/13/magazine/freedom-from-want.html> see also.

⁷³ The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

⁷⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, "Affairs Grand Strategy in the Second Term", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 84, No 1, January-February 2005, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 11.11.2006.

⁷⁵ The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

Nevertheless, maintaining cooperative relations with great powers is becoming particularly difficult in Asia because the region is producing two rising great powers: China and India. They are likely to be competitive with each other and with the other regional great power, such as Japan.⁷⁶ The view of Beijing, however, giving priority to economic growth at home and to good relations abroad is reflected in China's willingness to support, at least passively, the US war on terrorism and US actions and deployments in Central Asia.⁷⁷

On the other hand, Russia's evolution remains a mystery.⁷⁸ Since 9/11, US-Russian relations have been running well as the result of the two countries' common interest in defeating Islamist terrorism and as a tactic on Vladimir Putin's part to enhance Russia's diplomatic role. Nonetheless, the future of the relationship remains highly uncertain.

Even so, the US have dismissed European power. NATO over recent years has transformed itself from a Cold War security structure into a partnership for peace.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the American administration appears to view NATO as a toolbox for creating and sustaining military capabilities only complementary to those of US forces. The EU allies are not even mentioned. In the NSS, the main centres of global power do not include EU.

3.1.6. Operational Freedom and Coalition Support

While the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country⁸⁰

In the NSS an approach whereby the US must maintain the capacity to operate alone and must demonstrate the willingness to use that

⁷⁶ On Chinese coercive options toward Taiwan, see Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, *Dire Strait?: Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy*, Rand Corp, 2000.

⁷⁷ This discussion of alliances in Asia is based on William Tow, *Assessing U.S. Bilateral Security Alliances in the Asia Pacific's Southern Rim: Why the San Francisco System Endures*, Stanford University, Asia/Pacific Research Center, October 1999; Robert D. Blackwill, and Paul Dibb, eds., *America's Asian Alliances*, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 2000.

⁷⁸ Steven M. Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2005; 'The Economist', "Russia's new leadership Spot the president", 13.12.2007.

⁷⁹ See: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James M. Scott, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003, p. 246, 6th ed.; Andrew J. Bacevich, "Different Drummers, Same Drum", in *Annual Editions on American Foreign Policy*, McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, p. 20; Jonathan Kirshner, Barry Strauss, Maria Fanis, and Matthew Evangelista, "Iraq and Beyond: The New U.S. National Security Strategy", Cornell University Peace Studies Program, *Occasional Paper 27*, January 2003, http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/publications/occasional_papers/Iraq-and-Beyond.pdf.

⁸⁰ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

capacity is emerging. In such circumstances, the administration seems to believe that US allies and partners will usually follow the US lead and yet allow US forces to maintain their freedom of action. This view does not rule out all coalitions but rather assumes that the US will be primarily interested in operating with allied forces that provide effective military capabilities, especially if combat is involved. Thus, future coalitions will not be composed only of the willing but, more importantly, of the able.⁸¹

This type of coalition-building stands in direct contrast to the permanent alliances like NATO. In contradiction to this approach, the Bush administration also actively encouraged NATO's expansion, sanctioning and invitation of seven former members of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union to join NATO at the Prague Summit in November 2002.⁸²

US appears to view NATO as an important instrument for creating and sustaining military capabilities complementary to those of US forces; that can be accessed when appropriate and when the government in question is willing, without needing to submit to NATO alliance procedures.

However, *operational freedom* based on no hesitation to act alone, and *coalition support* based on the support of the willing nations only seems inconsistent with the institutional norms of a security community. Primarily it is inconsistent with the international legitimacy required to make US foreign policy effective.⁸³

On this basis, the NSS has faced important critics.

Hendrik Hertzberg emphasises the key phrase in the Bush document, judging by the number of times it is repeated (five), is *a balance of power that favours freedom*. For Hendrik Hertzberg, the idea of world government looks very much like a generous American dictatorship - a dictatorship of the entrepreneurial.⁸⁴

Lindberg says that Bush is now promoting with his liberty doctrine not only a model but also an answer - a final one⁸⁵ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg in a Brookings Institution Policy Brief on the NSS point also to an inner contradiction in this vision of a new world order - a contradiction that can lead to charges of hypocrisy.⁸⁶

⁸¹ The planned integration of one of the Army's Stryker Brigades into US forces in Europe, slated for 2007, is one example of this trend in overseas presence.

⁸² Michael Ruhle, "NATO after Prague: learning the lessons of 9/11", *Parameters*, 06.22.2003, <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-102835192.html>, last access: 05.01.2006.

⁸³ Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, No4, July-August, 2003, p.p.74-89; Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.

⁸⁴ Hendrik Hertzberg, *Politics: Observations and Arguments, 1966-2004*, Penguin, 2005.

⁸⁵ Tod Lindberg, "The Treaty of the Democratic Peace," *The Weekly Standard*, 12.02.2007. See also Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, Yale University Press, 2006.

⁸⁶ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, "The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation, Policy Brief", Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution, 2003, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/dai02/dai02.pdf>, last access: 12.03.2006.

So, *It cannot be in either the American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security.*⁸⁷ The National Security Strategy provides little specific guidance for the US military and can hardly serve as a basis for detailed or long-term military planning. So, in March 2006 American government published an updated version of the 2002 National Security Strategy.

3.2. The new National Security Strategy

Preemption was again at the core of the American strategy. The document maintains that the US will act unilaterally if its vital interests are threatened. *If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self defense, we do not rule out use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.*⁸⁸

More specifically, this time, preemption is pointing at another potential target, Iran. The lists of evil states included also Syria, North Korea, Cuba, Belarus, Zimbabwe and Burma. The notion of preemption still leaves a degree of uncertainty in the minds of any potential enemy, about how the US might respond to a growing threat - intelligence about an enemy's capabilities and intentions can be proven wrong.⁸⁹ In addition, the failure to find Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq undermined a vital assumption of this strategy too.

Meanwhile, the war on terrorism becomes one subsection of the overall document, though an important one. On topics such as genocide, human trafficking and AIDS, the strategy describes itself as *idealistic about goals and realistic about means.*⁹⁰

The NSS revised version places a greater emphasis on working with allies and declares diplomacy to be the strong preference in tackling the

⁸⁷ The Brookings Brief quotes Henry Kissinger, in James W. Skillen: "Iraq, Terrorism, and the New American Security Strategy", *First Quarter*, 2003 [http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader\\$933](http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$933) For European reactions to the US National Security Strategy, see also Jolyon Howorth, *The US National Security Strategy, European reactions*, in Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, Routledge, London 2006.

⁸⁸ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>, last access: 02.06.2006; see also Helle Dale, "Freedom Doctrine; The President's National-Security Strategy", *The Washington Times*, 22.03.2006, p.17.

⁸⁹ John G. Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Forging A World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century", Final report of the Princeton Project on National Security, 2006, <http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf> last access: 22.02.2007; Daniel W. Drezner, "The New World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 2, March-April 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 12.03.2008.

⁹⁰ Peter Baker, «Bush to Restate Terror Strategy. Doctrine of Preemptive War To Be Reaffirmed», *Washington Post*, Thursday, 16.03.2006, p. A01; see also Michael D. Huckabee, «America's Priorities in the War on Terror Islamists, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan», *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 87, No 1, January-February 2008.

threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁹¹ The 2006 National Security Strategy restates Washington's dual position by arguing that great-power consensus *must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching. Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, along with our partners, must reform them. Where appropriate institutions do not exist, we, along with our partners, must create them.*⁹² There is still a reemphasis given to the coalition of the willing, as often being the best way to deal with international threats.

The image of America as a promoter of liberal democracy around the world is seen as the best path to a more prosperous and open international order. The National Security Strategy focused on spreading democracy abroad, and the White House launched a series of initiatives designed to foster democracy across the globe, not least the military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the Arab world - Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt - US efforts have not succeeded. In none of these places is democracy even close to being securely established.

Nowhere are people eager, or even willing, to be ruled by foreigners. Additionally, the prospects for democracy in the Arab countries are poor. Countries that become wealthy through the extraction and sale of oil, often called petro-states, rarely conform to the political standards of modern democracy. For this reason, liberty and free elections have less favourable reputations in the Arab Middle East than elsewhere.⁹³ As in Iraq and in Afghanistan, recent efforts to accelerate political reform in the region have proven extremely difficult as elections are polarising events, particularly in societies already marked by sectarian conflict. In fact, liberty cannot be implanted; the required skills and values can be neither imported nor outsourced, they grow up with the people, and make part of their way of life. Anthony O' Hear says that *reasonableness* is always rooted in the historical experience of a people⁹⁴. Though, freedom has always been part of human nature. And we should always struggle for its defence.

Democratic institutions cannot simply be transplanted; but today, more than ever before, we do need to face a globalised reality. Holland, for instance, is set to have a Muslim majority sometime in this century, and strong suspicions exist over insurgencies in Iraq organised in Oslo, this new reality will definitely have implications for our Western societies.⁹⁵

Thus America is significant to continue working to establish an enduring peace and freedom in the world. But US efforts to advance

⁹¹ See The Terrorism Index, *Foreign Policy*, Issue 162, September-October 2007 p. 60, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/pdf/terrorism_index.pdf last access: 10.12.2007.

⁹² The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America March 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> p. 15.

⁹³ Michael Mandelbaum, "Democracy Without America", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 5, September-October 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 11.11.2007.

⁹⁴ Anthony O' Hear *Plato's Children: The State We Are In*, Gibson Square, 2006, p. 103 and Interview with Anthony O' Hear.

⁹⁵ Anthony O' Hear *Plato's Children: The State We Are In*, Gibson Square, 2006, p. 97.

democracy should focus on building the rule of law, social justice, more prosperity for all, and more effective and less corrupt governments to those countries.⁹⁶ Rebuilding a failed state takes an enormous commitment of manpower, money, and time. This realisation should serve as a cautionary guide to such endeavors in the future. Where the war on terrorism is concerned, US strategy should be to target terrorists rather than to call for regime change. This would mean focusing military efforts on destroying terrorist cells and networks while using political and economic tools to address the long-term sources of instability in the Middle East.⁹⁷

A strategic approach to American alliances will enable the US to translate its unique power into effective global influence that enhances American national security.⁹⁸ International action presupposes that we can persuade friends and allies and accept to be persuaded by them too. Given the fact that America's history is linked to the values of freedom and democracy, America is qualified to play an active role as a promoter of these values. As John Gaddis points out, one of the reasons the US was seen as the lesser of two evils was related to the US history of establishing domestic security and prosperity without the tendency or need to establish global dominance on the backs of other nations.⁹⁹

And at this point is more than clear that, the US should favour realistic partnerships, international collaboration continues to be in the US' national interest.¹⁰⁰

We cannot be fighters only; we must be leaders and partners as well. As Tony Blair advocates, the transatlantic ties in terms of history, values, and interests are unique. And this time the future of the transatlantic relationship lies in confronting the challenges of the twenty-first century worldwide.

⁹⁶ Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 4, July-August 2007; John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom. Securing America's Future", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 6, November-December 2007 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, 01.01.2008 James Dobbins, "Who Lost Iraq?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 5, September-October 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 11.11.2007.

⁹⁷ Josef Braml, "Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?", The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2007, p.p. 117-130, http://www.twq.com/07autumn/docs/07autumn_braml.pdf last access: 01.01.2008.

⁹⁸ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Alliances and American National Security", October 2006, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>; Lenard J. Cohen, Alexander Moens, Allen G. Sens, *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, Praeger, 2003.

⁹⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, Bush Preemption Doctrine The Most Dramatic Policy Shift Since Cold War Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, 06.02.2004 <http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=6755>, last access: 06.12.2007; John Lewis Gaddis, "Affairs Grand Strategy in the Second Term", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 84, No 1, January-February 2005, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 11.11.2006.

¹⁰⁰ Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, "Grand Strategy for a Divided America", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 4, July-August 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 14.01.2008.

4. European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World

4.1. The European Security Strategy: The Document

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.¹⁰¹

Turning now the page to the European reactions to the post 9/11 settings, that was the principle of the Solana document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, adopted in December 2003.¹⁰² Europe's strategy is mainly based on three objectives:

Extending the security zone around Europe

The ESS aims to build security in its neighbourhood, by extending the benefits of social and economic cooperation as stabilisation factors and as used in the Balkans to the benefit of Eastern neighbours such as Ukraine and Moldova. The EU has to be engaged in the Mediterranean area and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a strategic priority for the EU.

Establishing effective multilateralism based on the UN

EU's other objective is an effective multilateral system, with functioning international institutions and a rule based international order. On this basis, UN and transatlantic partnership are key words in the document. The fundamental structure for an effective multilateral system is the UN and the transatlantic relationship is one of its core elements. ESS also reaffirms the need for the EU to become involved in the world scene in a preventive way and act when the rules are violated.

¹⁰¹ European Council, "A Secure Europe in A Better World - The European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12.12.2003, p. 14.

¹⁰² In June 2003 an initial draft of the European Security Strategy (ESS) was presented to the European Council in Thessaloniki (Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 10881/03, Cossec3, 25 June 2003). After a six month consultation period, the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, presented the revised final text of the ESS to the European Council in December 2003. The strategic objectives outlined in the June 2003 draft continued to be advocated in the new version of the ESS, although added emphasis was given to multilateralism and the EU's relationships with the US, Russia, NATO and other key partners. The development of both military and civilian capabilities was also highlighted as a necessity for credibly underpinning these objectives. However, as a direct response to earlier criticisms over the use of the term "pre-emptive engagement", the single most significant change in the December 2003 text was the abolition of "pre-emptive engagement" as a concept and the inclusion of "preventive engagement".

Responding to the global threats

The EU needs to respond to the global threats of terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and organised crime by recognising that the traditional form of defence belongs to the past. Indeed, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, for almost half a century, major world powers entrusted the security of their nation to a balance of power among states. But today, the first line of defence lies abroad.¹⁰³ Thus to enhance international security and face potential threats caused by terrorism and organised crime, increased co-operation internationally needs to be applied.

In particular, the ESS identifies a number of challenges, as energy dependency and competition for natural resources, and in the developing world poverty and mortal diseases. It also formulates some political priorities for meeting the objectives mentioned before, of addressing the threats, building a secure neighbourhood and promoting effective multilateralism. These priorities are: be more active, more capable, more coherent, and work with partners.

Accordingly, the ESS is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the global security environment and acknowledges the mixed perceptions of globalisation that exists. It identifies five key threats:

- terrorism,
- Weapons of Mass Destruction,
- failed states,
- organised crime,
- and regional conflicts.¹⁰⁴

The second section outlines the European Union's *strategic objectives*:

- building security in the European region
- and creating a viable new international order.

There are two statements that reflect the change in European security perception after 9/11: *the first line of defence will often be abroad*, primarily via conflict prevention; and the statement that none of the new threats is *purely military* or manageable through purely military means.¹⁰⁵ EU's comprehensive neighbourhood policy is focused on building security in the European region by developing a circle of friends from the Caucasus to the Balkans and around the Mediterranean. By creating a viable new international order, on the other hand, EU seeks to develop international law, based on UN support.¹⁰⁶ But most importantly, the most innovative aspect of this section is the emphasis on using the European Union's powerful trade and development policies in a conditional, integrated,

¹⁰³ Jolyon Howarth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2007.

¹⁰⁴ European Council, "A Secure Europe in A Better World - The European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12.12.2003.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 6 and 7.

¹⁰⁶ Richard Gowan, "The EU's Security Strategy and the United Nations", Paper for 48th Annual ISA Convention, Chicago, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 02.28.2007.

and targeted way. This seems to imply that the EU recognises its powerful assets and is keen to use them in efficient and effective way.

The final section of the ESS addresses the political priorities for the EU. The EU needs to be *more active, more coherent, and more capable*.¹⁰⁷ One of the statements of the document which guaranteed US approval, asserts *the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and, where necessary, robust intervention*.¹⁰⁸ The US supports a Europe more capable of carrying the weight of its own defence.

The European Security Strategy document itself inevitably constitutes something of a compromise between different cultures and approaches among EU Member States. The ESS, it is claimed, will contribute to *an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer, and more united world*.¹⁰⁹

But how did the EU finally agree mutually on such a security strategy?

There are three key reasons.

Firstly, a joint security strategy aims to move the EU into the post-9/11 security environment and to advancing Europe's economic and political interests. EU Strategy aspires to go beyond mere *soft power* and *get real* developing its own hard power to defend its interests and its population.¹¹⁰ EU Member States still recognise that in our era, an *era of globalization, distant threats may be of as much concern as those that are near at hand*, and that *when necessary, robust intervention is necessary*.¹¹¹ The document also calls for *preventive engagement*, but without clear indications as to when the use of military force may be considered legitimate to prevent (for example) WMD-proliferation or humanitarian emergencies.¹¹²

The EU agreed on a joint strategy aiming to repair the damaged transatlantic relationship, caused by the Iraq war, and provide Europe's continued relevance to US security agenda. To that end, the EU document opens with the remark that *the United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security*, and closes with the statement, *acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world*.¹¹³ This is the belief of all EU Member States and the message is that Europe with global political ambitions does not challenge the US but instead aims to position itself as a strategic partner. The document thus states that the *EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus shall tackle the challenges of the new century*.¹¹⁴ The document also

¹⁰⁷ The European Security Strategy, p. 11.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p.11.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p. 14.

¹¹⁰ Peter van Ham, "Europe Gets Real: The New Security Strategy Shows the EU's Geopolitical Maturity", AICGS Advisor, 09.12.2004.

¹¹¹ The European Security Strategy, p.11, 6, 11 again, respectively.

¹¹² While the phrase of "pre-emptive engagement" from the Thessaloniki draft was replaced in the final ESS draft by the phrase "preventive action" it does demonstrate the will of the EU to address threats before they reach European soil.

¹¹³ The European Security Strategy, p.1 and p. 13 respectively.

¹¹⁴ European Council, "A Secure Europe in A Better World - The European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12.12.2003.

accepts a world of well-governed democratic states, in accordance with the conceptual underpinnings of the US administration's worldview, yet, in a less provocative and more diplomatic tone.¹¹⁵

The ESS document also aimed to ease disagreements inside the EU. On 20 March 2003, the United States together with the United Kingdom launched military operations against Iraq. This controversial move revealed serious disagreements among European states. Hence, ESS came as a success for EU's capacity to take decisions even in troubled times. The divergence over Iraq tested the limits of the EU as an institutional framework of high strategic importance. In that sense, the ESS offered an *acquis stratégique* by establishing priorities and setting policy goals. However, coalitions of willing Member States, although not mentioned as such in the document, may be tempted to take the lead without waiting for all Member States to reach a consensus.¹¹⁶

The new Security Strategy may not be able to solve EU's strategic problems nor the transatlantic relationship faults. It is, however, a necessary step in the slow process towards the EU's political maturity.¹¹⁷

4.2. European Security Strategy and European Security and Defence Policy

As far as the European Security and Defence Policy is concerned, it did not receive a specific strategic concept by the ESS. In the context of the time of its adoption, the ESS aimed in stating the EU's ambition of becoming a global player and for setting out a rule-based concept of international relations guided mainly by humanitarian drives. It forms also an answer to the American NSS demonstrating in many ways opposition to the unilateral and interventionist preferences presented by the US neoconservative document. The EU's contribution to global governance is based on multilateralism, using force only as a very last resort. For the EU even the fight against international terrorism is a task involving a

¹¹⁵ Sven Biscop, "The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture", Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, October, 2007; Lawrence Freedman, "The Transformation of Strategic Affairs", *Adelphi Paper* No 379, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2006, p. 39; Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2007, p. 178; Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds.), *The EU and the European Security Strategy – Forging a Global Europe*, Routledge, London, 2007; Alyson Bailes, "The European Security Strategy – An Evolutionary History. Policy" Paper No 10, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2005, p. 14; Mario Telò, *Europe: A Civilian Power? European Union, Global Governance, World Order*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2006, p. 59.

¹¹⁶ Recent controversy over the "Tervuren-option" on a possible autonomous European military headquarters (initiated by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg) illustrates these centrifugal tendencies within the EU on security and defence matters. See more in the Gateway of the European Union, <http://europa.eu.int>.

¹¹⁷ Assembly of the Western European Union, WEU on line http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2000.php last access: 10.09.2008.

full spectrum of instruments, including not only military but a series of non-military instruments as well.¹¹⁸

The ESS suggests on the part of the EU to take more responsibility for the security of its citizens. Hence, the Petersburg tasks were expanded so that military missions deployed by the EU could now include disarmament operations as well as support for third countries in combating terrorism and reforming their security sectors. However the text itself touches only superficially upon the issue of mutual defence and the ESDP is limited to crisis management and conflict prevention. A European collective defence however, was not mentioned, as it was too divisive an issue for the transatlantic relations at the time, given that transatlantic unity was already under test. Therefore, the limitations of the ESS can also be explained by the particular circumstances of its genesis.¹¹⁹

In the European document there remains also a certain lack of coherence over a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. A majority of EU Member States still prefer NATO to Europe as a distinct security power. NATO's credibility is to a very large extent based on the military means of the US from which the EU Member States cannot easily distance themselves.¹²⁰ So, the ESS failed in that sense to advance the ESDP project in real terms.

Nonetheless, the ESS does form an expression of the EU's quest for autonomous decision-shaping and planning capabilities as set down in the 1999 Helsinki declaration.¹²¹ Consequently, the European Council agreed in December 2003 to create a civilian/military planning cell with a view to developing an autonomous operational planning capacity. In that way, the ESS was a further step away from NATO, on whose planning capabilities the EU depended for the implementation of ESDP military missions until then.

Furthermore, the ESS showed the world that the EU was not seeking hegemony or dominance, but rather recognised a responsibility to contribute to global governance. The EU must prepare for long-term engagements and not necessarily only on the Western Balkan periphery of the EU. For Europe possible future areas of intervention include the

¹¹⁸ Alyson Bailes, "The EU and a 'better world': what role for the European Security and Defence Policy?" *International Affairs* Vol. 84, No1, 2008, page 118.

¹¹⁹ Assembly of the Western European Union, WEU on line http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2000.php.

¹²⁰ Alyson Bailes, "The EU and a 'better world': what role for the European Security and Defence Policy?", *International Affairs* Vol 84, No 1, 2008, page 119.

¹²¹ Which itself was inspired by the 1998 Saint Malo agreement between France and the United Kingdom. The Helsinki Council stated that

– modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;

– appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management. See: Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, II, Common European Policy on Security and Defence, paragraph 28.

outstanding list of long conflicts, including the Middle East peace process. New security challenges such as environment, energy, migration or new diseases may make intervention a necessity too.¹²²

Still, the question really is: are EU Member States ready to engage in major military operations under the EU flag?

On this basis it seems that the definition of a European policy is based on European interests and European interests differ because Member States differ - in size, economic power and geographic and historical facts. The different national interests of the EU Member States have often placed constraints on the ESDP and continue to be a problem.¹²³ So, there is a need to define a genuine list of vital interests that goes beyond such examples and take them seriously: terrorism, WMD, failed states, conflict resolution, organised crime, energy supply, open trade routes, migration and coping with new diseases.

So, under this prism, working towards an international order based on effective multilateralism makes it necessary to seek better cooperation with a number of strategic partners. The ESS mentions that *We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.*¹²⁴ Russia's re-emergence on the world scene and China's economic dynamism are key factors for international security today. It is clear that the relationship with Moscow following the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2005 Member States - previously belonging to Warsaw Pact under the direct Russian influence - differ more than in the past. Given the fact that the European Union continues to be the dominant market for Russian energy exports and its geographic closeness, the EU should clarify its attitude towards its biggest neighbour.¹²⁵ Europe needs to gain more energy independence, but bringing at the same time Russia closer as an economic and strategic partner.

The security partnerships with traditional partners such as Japan and Canada or new ones like Brazil and India are mentioned but not well defined. Finally, the difficulties in Iraq were not adequately examined.

¹²² Revision of the European Security Strategy- reply to the annual report of the Council, European Security and Defence Assembly, Document A/2000, 03.06.2008, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2008/2000.php.

¹²³ A further illustration of the impact national interests can have on the implementation of the ESS is the difficulty of getting EU Member States to agree on a common mandate for the negotiations with Russia on a new partnership agreement.

¹²⁴ Mr Sergei Ivanov, the Russian Minister of Defence, ESS p. 14.

¹²⁵ In Munich Conference for Security Policy, Mr Ivanov recognised Russia's need for partners in this endeavour. The EU can offer the kind of partnership Russia is looking for in order to continue successfully its economic and political transformation since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The EU should show greater willingness to go down the road of interdependency and reciprocity, including opening up investment opportunities in a wider range of fields, including energy. Also, Russia's interest in cooperating on ESDP operations should be fully explored. See more Luke March, *Security Strategy and the Russian Problem*, in Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations, Routledge, London 2006.

The ESS did demonstrate the EU's willingness to cooperate with other regional organisations such as the African Union, ASEAN, MERCOSUL, but not how it intends to do so.¹²⁶

As far as ESDP and transatlantic relations are concerned, and as the Ambassador Nuland has pointed out, it is really important for the ESDP that European efforts will be judged by the US through the measurable increase in European defence spending, and on that point it is up to the Europeans *to melt the glaciers of the frozen conflict of both institutions*.¹²⁷

According to Blair's view, the most important changes are mental. European leaders have to understand that more unity means more capability and more influence. So, Europe has to assume its responsibilities as an important global player. And to that end, the ESDP has to preserve a strong partnership with the US and NATO, but at the same time it has to develop stronger military capabilities. This will permit an efficient European answer to international challenges and thus more credibility in the negotiation table.

This claim that an improvement in the EU's collective military capability would boost its influence over American policy draws on an argument made by Robert Cooper.¹²⁸ Indeed, the ESS emphasis on effective multilateralism reflects Cooper's ideas in many ways and subsequently British governmental viewpoints. The ESS recognises globalisation challenges and a need for a global answer to them.

Apparently, the ESS values the transatlantic alliance and America's role in the construction of a European peace.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, Europe continues to be sceptical of using military force. And it is here where the

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 9.

¹²⁷ United States Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland seems to have supported a more functioning relationship between the EU and NATO, http://www.amchamfrance.org/adminamcham/uploads/080222_nuland_paris_speech.pdf.

¹²⁸ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first century*, Atlantic Books, London, 2003. Robert Cooper has been advisor to Tony Blair, Javier Solana and a Director General at the European Council, Robert Cooper has an important influence on the formation of European foreign policy. As a UK official, he was reputed to have been a key influence on Prime Minister Blair's decision to support the development of a European defence policy in 1998. Under the political responsibility of Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Cooper's was the main pen behind the first draft of the European Security Strategy, made public in June 2003. Cooper's influence on the European Security Strategy as a case study of how an individual's ideas can make a difference to policy formation is best analysed in Frank Foley, "Between Force and Legitimacy: the Worldview of Robert Cooper", European University Institute - Department of Political and Social Sciences, EUI-RSCAS Working Paper as part of the project: Pascal Vennesson, ed., "European Worldviews: Ideas and the EU in World Politics", 2007.

¹²⁹ Frank Foley, "Between Force and Legitimacy: the Worldview of Robert Cooper", European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI-RSCAS Working Paper as part of the project: Pascal Vennesson, ed., "European Worldviews: Ideas and the EU in World Politics", 2007/07, http://www.wiue.it/SPS/People/Faculty/CurrentProfessors/PDFFiles/VennessonPDFfiles/Foley_RSCAS_WP_2007.pdf.

gap between US and Europe lies; is not just about capability — it is also about will. And it is here that Europe has to understand that it is essential to find the will to defend its own people. It is not correct that over 450 million Europeans rely on 290 million Americans for their security.

4.3. National Security Strategy and European Security Strategy

Comparing now the two security documents, NSS and ESS, one can easily distinguish the key features of the European document, most of which distinguish it from US approaches to security: i) Conflict prevention through the long-term delivery of global public goods, ii) integration of policy instruments and resources, iii) reliance on dialogue, bargaining, and iv) cooperation and institutionalised, rules-based, effective multilateralism.

In a more detailed way, Biscop finds that the key features that differentiate the ESS from NSS are:

- Integration: integration between the political, military, developmental and humanitarian policy instruments as the best way to crisis response.
- Prevention: A preventive strategy considers the delivery of public goods throughout the world to be the only way to bring stability and well-being globally.
- Global scope: The ESS states that Europe has to share its responsibility for global security and that the first line of defence will often be abroad.
- Multilateralism: Effective Multilateralism requires the integration of all fields of EU external action under the common agenda of the promotion of global public goods, fostering global governance. Coercion is not excluded.
- New definition of power: The word *power* is absent from the ESS. A power that wants to change the course of world affairs, in such a way, that will favour rich and poor at the same time, seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, with solidarity and sustainable development.¹³⁰

Europe analyses the threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMD destruction similarly to the American way; however, the ways in which Europe addresses them are different. For Europe the fight against these threats cannot be limited to military force alone. The EU intends to combine the political and the economic approaches to fight these threats and regarding terrorism, any effective solution will have to be global.

The EU does recognise that bad governance is a major source of instability. Yet, the EU advocates the extension of good governance rather than regime change. This implies greater responsibility for Europe. It presupposes that an effort to improve European capabilities will continue.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Sven Biscop, “The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture”, Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels, October, 2007.

¹³¹ Jean-Yves Haine, “From Laeken to Copenhagen: European Defence Core

The EU document is not as clear as its US equivalent, stressing the complex foundations behind international terrorism and recalling the destabilising effects of regional conflicts, feeding terrorism, WMD, state failure, and international criminality; for instance, in Kashmir, the Great Lakes, and the Korean peninsula.¹³²

More specifically, American and European leaders and experts do agree that the emergence of international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD represent an unprecedented threat to both sides of the Atlantic, a common threat to their common interests.¹³³ The US National Strategy for Homeland Security declares that *Unless we act to prevent it, a new wave of terrorism potentially involving the world's most destructive weapons, looms in America's future. It is a challenge as formidable as any ever faced by our Nation.*¹³⁴ The ESS calls international terrorism a *strategic threat which ... puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it threatens the openness and tolerance of our societies,*¹³⁵ and recognises the WMD as the most important threat to peace and security among nations.

While the NSS calls for combating terrorism with a global reach, the ESS speaks for terrorism's global scale but both documents see Middle East as a priority zone and political challenge. The America's emphasis on a balance of power that favours freedom, on the other hand, finds no equivalent phrase in the ESS. Yet, one of the most outstanding differences in comparing the two documents lies in the lack of any discussion about military preemption in the European strategy, contrary to the American one.

Moreover, the emphasis in the ESS on multilateralism and international law presents also a contrast between the documents. The European Commission in August 2003 cautioned that *an active commitment to an effective multilateralism means more than rhetorical professions of faith* (Communication, 2003).¹³⁶ The US is not against this approach verbally, America supports also multilateralism and international cooperation. In October, George Bush and Tony Blair made a joint declaration that their policies were driven by just such a commitment: *effective multilateralism, and neither unilateralism nor international paralysis, will guide our approach* (Blair and Bush, 2003).¹³⁷

Documents", *Challot Papers*, No 57, February 2003, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai57e.pdf> last access: 16.04.2007.

¹³² European Council, "A Secure Europe in A Better World - The European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12.12.2003, p. 4.

¹³³ Craig Eisendrath and Melvin Goodman, *Bush League Diplomacy: How the Neo-conservatives are putting the World at Risk*, Prometheus Books, New York, 2004; Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, Oxford University Press, 2002.

¹³⁴ National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, p. vii, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf last access: 01.07.2007.

¹³⁵ ESS, p.p. 3 and 5.

¹³⁶ Quoted in Richard Gowan, "The EU's Security Strategy and the United Nations", Paper for 48th Annual ISA Convention, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, Chicago, 28.02.2007, [http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Gowan_EUUN_ISA\[1\].doc](http://www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/Gowan_EUUN_ISA[1].doc).

¹³⁷ The White House, US/UK Joint Statement on Multilateralism, 20.11.2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031120.html>.

Yet, in practice, and especially during the Iraq war the American and British political options put such statements into question.

Furthermore, the ESS supports that socio-economic means as the most critical forces of change. A Study Group, however, in September 2004, chaired by Professor Mary Kaldor, produced a report, 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe'.¹³⁸ The Doctrine was closely in tune with the ESS themes, addressing violence and calling for the creation of a deployable human security force. It specified that this proposed force's primary purpose would be to uphold human rights and support law and order. However, the Doctrine's ambition remains largely unimplemented today.¹³⁹

As far as whether the ESS and NSS confirm the view that the Atlantic is growing wider or not, what really marks EU and US is their need for transformation for facing the new challenges. In both documents, America and Europe are presented as examples of stability, prosperity and human freedom and as agents of transformation for others. Howorth argues that the NSS demonstrates a change in US policy from supporting pro-Western authoritarian regimes towards supporting democratic government.¹⁴⁰ Meanwhile America's support to democratisation includes dealing with non-democratic governments in states of strategic importance, such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others.

Wyllie argues that NSS and ESS reflect differing paradigms of ideology in International Relations. The NSS document is realistic, seeking a *balance of power that favours freedom*, a goal demanding US preeminence in the world scene. This is overlaid with a Wilsonian commitment to expand freedom, promoted in all cases by the neoconservative administration.¹⁴¹ The ESS promotes, on the other hand, a liberal internationalism view, supporting that socio-economic means are the most important factors of change. The fact that US and Europe represent different types of powers is also a significant factor of divergence. Cooper argues that the NSS was decided by the Bush administration and reflects the strategic ambitions of it.¹⁴² In contrast, the ESS was the outcome of an intergovernmental agreement, where consensus was reached among various and very different nation-states.

As far as the documents response to the emerging powers of Russia and China, neither document meets the challenge posed by these states nor do they present a definite formula for defeating international

¹³⁸ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2007, p. 201.

¹³⁹ John Kotsopoulos, *A Human Security Agenda for the EU?*, EPC Issue Paper, No 48, June 2006.

¹⁴⁰ Jolyon Howorth, "The US National Security Strategy, European Reactions", in Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson, *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, Routledge, London 2006.

¹⁴¹ James W H. Wyllie, "Measuring up: The strategies as strategy", in Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson, *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, Routledge, London 2006.

¹⁴² Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first century*, Atlantic Books, London, 2003.

terrorism.¹⁴³ International Institute of Strategic Studies even concludes that the two documents reflect a mutual weakness in a world that is no longer a transatlantic world, if ever it was.¹⁴⁴

Still, both documents advocate American and European policies on the democratic values of freedom, respect for human rights, liberty and free market. So, those values link the two sides of the Atlantic together, not allowing drifts like the one over the Iraq war to set them apart irreversibly. There is also, as we saw above, a common recognition of threats between the ESS and NSS. In essence, both documents place their emphasis on the importance of globalisation, the need for transformation and provide similar strategic threat assessments.

Divergences, nonetheless, do emerge when the means and tools for implementing their strategic objectives are discussed. Europeans became sceptical of the tone of the American document, making friends and allies somehow marginalised and demonstrated the US determination to act alone when necessary. Americans, on the other hand, question Europe's rhetorical spirit, not sufficiently attached to its military obligations.¹⁴⁵

As has always been the case for cooperation on matters of grand strategy, the most difficult obstacle to transatlantic foreign and security policy decisions has been national interest. Both sides of the Atlantic do share common interests as well as values. So there is no reason to believe that occasional drifts can change allies into competitors seeking to counterbalance one another. The long term challenge is to commonly define those interests and the areas where transatlantic cooperation is mostly needed and to provide in this way a relevant institutional framework; achieving, in that way, a durable and institutionalised alliance, a force for good in the world.

5. UK Defence Vision - Delivering Security in a Changing World

The UK may not have a national security strategy like the US and EU but it does have an official counterterrorism strategy and a Defence strategy. The counterterrorism strategy identifies four P's - Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare - which have become the organising categories of much British governmental thinking in this area.¹⁴⁶ However, the most

¹⁴³ See Luke March, "Security Strategy and the Russian Problem" and Alyson J. K. Bailes "China and security strategy", in Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson, *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, Routledge, London 2006.

¹⁴⁴ Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson, *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, Routledge, London 2006, p. 184.

¹⁴⁵ Ronald Asmus, "The European Security Strategy an American View", in Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson, *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, Routledge, London 2006.

¹⁴⁶ Dr Jason Ralph Tony Blair's 'new doctrine of international community' and the UK decision to invade Iraq", *POLIS Working Paper* No 20, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, August 2005.

important point to see is how the doctrine of international community presents itself in the British Defence White Paper of 2003, published after the Iraq War, the same year as the ESS.

In the Defence White Paper¹⁴⁷ the British government highlights the following key principles as providing the basis of national Defence.

- Defending the United Kingdom and its interests
- Strengthening international peace and stability
- A force for good in the world

More generally the UK has a range of global interests including economic prosperity based around trade, overseas and foreign investment, and the continuing free flow of natural resources, with responsibilities for numerous overseas territories. Thus the main values to be preserved, for British interests to be secure, are peace, freedom and economic development, forces for good within the international community. The capacity to deliver effective military force in peace support and intervention operations, alongside EU and NATO allies, is a vital component of British security policy.

The importance of NATO is also highlighted; particularly the need for NATO's enlargement and modernisation, *from large static forces to smaller response forces, able to undertake operations beyond the NATO area itself*.¹⁴⁸ Most importantly though and in line with Blair's vision and leadership, the emergence of European Security and Defence Policy and its first operations, the beginnings of a strategic relationship with Russia, more widespread proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction¹⁴⁹ and related technologies and the development of new concepts and technologies including Network Enabled Capability (NEC)¹⁵⁰ are also highlighted.

The UK remains committed to a plan for a secure Europe and to a vital transatlantic relation, supporting international institutions. The UK aims at *the security and stability of Europe and the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship remain fundamental to its security and defence policy*.¹⁵¹ The UK remains a leading player in the world scene; being a permanent member of UN Security Council, a leading military contributor to the NATO Alliance and the ESDP.

¹⁴⁷ British Ministry of Defence, "Delivering Security in a Changing World - Defence White Paper - The Defence Vision", December 2003, <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/UnitedKingdom-2003.pdf> last access: 24.01.2008.

¹⁴⁸ Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, Saint Helena (including Ascension, Tristan da Cunha), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Turks and Caicos Islands.

¹⁴⁹ The phrase *Weapons Of Mass Destruction* is generally held to refer to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

¹⁵⁰ Network Centric Capability (NEC) has evolved as the UK's term for the capability enhancement achieved through the effective linkage of platforms and people through a network. It replaces the expression NEC used in the SDR New Chapter.

¹⁵¹ Defence White Paper, p. 4.

5.1. The British Defence White Paper in comparison with ESS and NSS documents

The British Defence White Paper of 2003 states that a series of significant developments have taken place the last years. Numerous crises of a wider range and in a wider geographical area; for example Kosovo, FYROM, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Congo. Iraq demonstrated that the global security environment is more uncertain than it was some years ago and the increased threat from international terrorism requires a response both at home and overseas – as global challenges require global responses.

The importance of globalisation, as stated by Blair, the new era in world politics is highlighted in the paper too. It states clearly that as *the world's population continues to grow (particularly in North Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and much of Asia), demographic pressures will have more of an impact on international security. Religious and ethnic tensions, environmental pressures and increased competition for limited natural resources may cause tensions and conflict – both within and between states. The UK may not remain immune from such developments; regional disputes can swiftly become internationalised, and may have a major impact on the global economy, energy security, and our allies and partners.*¹⁵²

Both international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD are presented as the most direct threats to today's peace and security in the British document. Failing States are recognised also as an increasing problem for the stability of several regions especially on NATO's borders and in Africa. The Defence White Paper does include also the integration principle that is also present in the ESS. Today's threats, along with the proliferation of WMD, are global and the fight against them should include a wide range of tools available; political, economic and military. We must also be able to manage the consequences of attacks at home. Most importantly this approach is reflected also in the proposed solidarity clause in the new European Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon, which provides *that the Union will mobilise all the instruments at its disposal (including the military resources made available by Member States) in response to the request of a member state that has fallen victim to a terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster, as well as in our strong commitment to deal with these new threats alongside the US and our other international partners.*¹⁵³

Interestingly, the importance of bringing and preserving stability to Europe's borders is present in both, the British Defence Paper as well as in the ESS. Europe and those regions immediately neighbouring – the Near East, North Africa and the Gulf – are likely to continue to have the most significant bearing on both the national and wider Western security interests. And again, social, political, and economic problems need answers and demand not only proactive engagement in conflict prevention,

¹⁵² *Ibid*, p. 5.

¹⁵³ Treaty of Lisbon, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306, Vol. 50, 17.12.2007, full text of the Treaty <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML>.

but the capacity to respond quickly to emerging crises too. For this to be achieved European power projection is required.

The UK supports multilateralism, a vital element in a globalised world for the best protection of the UK's national interest. However, a coalition of the willing is included as a specific answer to specific circumstances. The US in 2002, enlisting the support of the international community, clearly states that the United States will act alone if necessary.¹⁵⁴ *The UK's national security and economic interests are best protected through working closely with other members of the international community. While Iraq exposed differing views within the UN Security Council, NATO and the EU over the handling of that crisis, it does not undermine our continued commitment to the development of these organisations. But we also need the flexibility to build coalitions of the willing to deal with specific threats when necessary.*¹⁵⁵

Although no doctrine of preemption is mentioned in the British Defence Paper, it is affirmed that the country will engage proactively in shaping the international response to international events that impact on the country's security interests and on security widely.¹⁵⁶ The tension provoked by US preemptive doctrine is apparent in the British Defence Paper. The UN is sited as the forum through which the international community will debate the handling of major security crises. UK will seek to strengthen the Council and will support efforts to improve the UN's performance. But, for the British government realism is needed when proactive military intervention is concerned. UN does face difficulties in achieving broad consensus on military interventions, especially when different national interests are at stake. And Britain chooses nation state leadership before international forum debate.

As far as ESDP and NATO relations are concerned, as we shall see in detail in Chapter 3, the UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military capability to complement NATO, not competing with it. The arrangements known as *Berlin Plus* provide for the use of NATO planning resources and other assets.¹⁵⁷ The EU can be an important global player; it has already established an operational Common Security and Defence Policy and the military structures required to support it. 60,000 soldiers have been available since the 1st of January of 2007, which are deployable

¹⁵⁴ The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> last access: 01.11.2005.

¹⁵⁵ Defence White Paper, p. 5.

¹⁵⁶ Defence White Paper, p. 5.

¹⁵⁷ The Berlin Plus agreement is the short title of a comprehensive package of agreements made between NATO and the EU on the 16th of December 2002. These agreements were based on the conclusions of NATO's 1999 Washington summit (where the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO was also enhanced; the Defence Capabilities Initiative and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative was launched; the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Mediterranean Dialogue was strengthened), and allowed the EU to draw on some of NATO's military assets in its own peacekeeping operations

Berlin Plus agreement, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm last access: 04.12.2007.

for at least a year. However, a lot of work still has to be done and important issues remain to be met, mainly connected to the EU's budget and intergovernmental nature.¹⁵⁸

The UK has strongly promoted the European defence agency too - the ESDP body set up on 12 July 2004 - to energise the development of capabilities and coordinate associated policies. The UK clearly supports a stronger Europe, particularly in developing relevant and credible capabilities.¹⁵⁹

More specifically the UK envisions its role in the world scene as pivotal, *ensuring that UK forces remain amongst the finest in the world*, involved in peacekeeping, humanitarian support and confidence building operations through to counterterrorist and large-scale combat operations. This requires *flexible and responsive, multi-rolled and able to reconfigure to achieve the desired outcome* forces.¹⁶⁰ Strangely, this could apply to Europe's forces at large especially in meeting its global obligations.

The UK can expect to work with allies US, NATO, EU, and UN or other forces. However the major focus remains on interoperability with US forces. UK needs to respond to the changing strategic environment and the British strategic culture places clearly its focus on continuous improvement and adaptation. *We will base our future direction on: Providing strategy that matches new threats and instabilities. We face new challenges and unpredictable new conditions. Our strategy must evolve to reflect these new realities.*¹⁶¹

Compared with the NSS and ESS, the British Defence Paper additionally gives a description and a guide to current problems; it includes security notions and elements that draw clear picture on changes and future policy plans for the Blair government and beyond. Both international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD are presented as the most direct threats to today's peace and security. Failing States are recognised too as an increasing problem for the stability of several regions especially on NATO's borders and in Africa. The British Defence Paper is more common to the American NSS as a governmental document presenting the vision and goals of a sole sovereign nation state. It mentions the word *power* (including technical terms) ten times while the ESS does not mention it at all and the NSS mentions it thirty-four times.

¹⁵⁸ Helsinki Headline Goal for 2003 – European Council: Helsinki, 1999:

The Helsinki declaration caused some concerns in the United States, as it continues to stress the need for EU autonomy over the involvement of non-EU states in decision making. Although it argues that *NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members and will continue to have an important role in crisis management*, this does not imply necessarily that NATO will endure as Europe's pivotal security organisation. In 2004, the EU entered a new stage in strengthening military capabilities, with the announcement of the new Headline Goal 2010: The Headline Goal 2010 (June 2004) calls for the establishment of high readiness battle groups of roughly 1,500 troops, capable of deploying 15 days after an EU decision to launch an operation.

¹⁵⁹ British Defence White Paper, p. 6 - 7.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 1.

¹⁶¹ Defence vision, p. 20.

The British paper gives emphasis on the use of political, military, developmental and humanitarian policy instruments. It also has an eminent global scope. The ESS states that Europe has to share its responsibility for global security and that the first line of defence will often be abroad. Multilateralism is distinguished in both documents too.

Democracy promotion as such, though, is not present. The British Defence Paper is closer to *a force for good in the world* notion of the American policy and to *the public services delivery* of the European Security Strategy. However, concepts such as *coalitions of the willing* when proactive military intervention is concerned, as in the case of Iraq war, seem inconsistent with the institutional norms of a security community. In reality it is inconsistent with the international legitimacy required to make foreign policy effective.

The importance of the British Defence Paper lies in its decisive language, that of a strong civilian and military power stressing particularly the importance of the transatlantic partnership as well as of Europe enforcement to facing our world greatest challenges. The British Defence Paper is clearly a distinct paper from both the European and the American. British policy looks for various forms of international cooperation to compensate security deficits. The UN, NATO, Europe — and last but not least the special relationship with the United States — are seen as the main areas for cooperation. The British do not consider the United States the main target of multilateralism but rather the indispensable power without which the global community cannot pursue a multilateralist approach to world problems.

In 2004 Blair generated resources to strengthen the front line through comprehensive efficiency plans, the benefits of which will be ploughed back into the defence budget. The 2004 paper notes that the result will ensure that the resources the Government commits to Defence are deployed to best effect.¹⁶² Blair set clearly his stance that dictators should not be unchallenged and any sign of imminent or actual genocide should lead to international intervention, or, as Blair calls it, liberal intervention. Britain can play a leading role in the international stage as a pivotal power.

6. Blair's theories and conceptual response to 9/11

A concept of community is at the core of Blair's political beliefs. Such concepts do not easily incorporate into the nations state political arena, where national interests and power politics are often thought to dominate. Yet the idea of rights and responsibilities did find their way into the discourse of British foreign policy after Labour was elected to government in 1997.¹⁶³ The new doctrine of international community

¹⁶² British Ministry of Defence, "Delivering Security in a Changing World - Defence White Paper - The Defence Vision", December 2003, <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/UnitedKingdom-2003.pdf> last access: 24.01.2008.

¹⁶³ David Coates and Joel Krieger (with Rhiannon Vickers), *Blair's War*, Polity,

was defined in his speech in Chicago on 22nd of April 1999.¹⁶⁴ And the Kosovo campaign came to give added definition to the ethical dimension of British policy, mainly through the principle of liberal interventionism.

Blair's Chicago speech was delivered at the height of NATO's bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to John Kampfner, Blair had denounced the view held by UN peacekeeping forces, which saw the violence in the Balkans as a civil war.¹⁶⁵ Blair was thus predisposed to the then Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright's view that NATO should act to stop further atrocities in the Balkans even if the Security Council could not agree that military action was appropriate.

For Blair then NATO's cause in Kosovo was just. To his Chicago audience said *We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed.* Yet Blair claimed universal legitimacy with the label of international community. Blair's words did not imply action on behalf of a European, transatlantic or any other regional community. Rather it claimed universal legitimacy despite the fact that Russia, China and India amongst others opposed the action. It was clear then that for Blair the international community was not synonymous with the United Nations Security Council.

States would, or at least should respond to the increased interdependence of globalisation by defining their particular interests in terms of the wider international interest, but there was little indication of how that idea of the common good would be formulated or who would speak for it.¹⁶⁶

For Blair, the question was not whether he had the right to communicate universal values but whether states would incorporate those self-evident values into their foreign policy. He argued that *in the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our interests too. The spread of*

2004, p.p.9-21. See also Mark Curtis, "Britain's Real Foreign Policy and the Failure of British Academia", *International Relations* Vol.18, No.3, September 2004, pp.275-288.

¹⁶⁴ Tony Blair, *Doctrine of the International Community*, Chicago Speech, 24.04.1999, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297>.

¹⁶⁵ John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, The Free Press, London, 2003, p.37. For the report see United Nations, 1999, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General-Assembly Resolution 53/35. The Fall of Srebrenica. Found at: <http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf> Kampfner gives the impression Blair had read the report before the action in Kosovo. If this is the case he would have had access to it before its general distribution date of 15 November, 1999.

¹⁶⁶ Andrew Linklater, *Political Loyalty and the Nation-State* (edited with Michael Waller), Routledge, 2003. Andrew Linklater touches on this problem when describing Blair's five tests for a legitimate intervention, as set out in the Chicago speech. Blair stated that states should ask before intervening, are we sure of our case? Have we exhausted all other options? Is the proposed course of action workable? Are we committed to the region for the long term? Are national interests involved? A sixth test, Linklater suggested, might be are others sure of our case, our competence and our motives?

*our values makes us safer.*¹⁶⁷ For Blair, then, the main problem with international society was not how and by whom it was defined. Rather the main problem was getting states, in particular the US, to commit to what he said it represented.

However, the role played by the UN in his new doctrine of international community was problematic. On the one hand it was the only organisation of universal reach that could articulate the values of an international society, but on the other hand the Security Council had shown itself to act with little efficiency responding to human rights abuses and atrocities around the world.

As we shall see below, Blair made a similar attempt to reconcile the invasion of Iraq with the doctrine of international community, but this time the Security Council was far from being inefficient. Rather it was Blair's specific argument on Iraq that was deeply questioned. The threat posed by Iraq did not justify a repeat of his Kosovo argument that under exceptional circumstances states could use force without Security Council authorisation and still claim to be acting on behalf of the international community.

Concerning Blair's response to 9/11, it seems Blair's early impression of the Bush administration was accompanied by a fear of US foreign policy neo-isolationism. The unilateralism that followed – the withdrawal from the Kyoto regime on environmental change, the policy of opposing the new International Criminal Court and the tariffs on imported steel – was clearly inconsistent with the idea of nations working together to address common problems.

Blair saw opportunities in the post 9/11 period. He perceived very early that the actions of Al-Qaeda may easily set off what Huntington called the class of civilisations¹⁶⁸. But he distinguished between Islam and Al-Qaeda building on his belief of a liberal and multicultural British community. Another contribution was the moral dimension to the war that was given by Blair, contrary to the unconditional kind of dichotomist *or you are with us or against us* promoted by the Bush administration. Yet his aim was to revive the doctrine of international community, which he had introduced at the height of the Kosovo crisis, as we examined above.

For Blair, America could not retreat into isolationism. But, as the attack on Pearl Harbor marked the beginning of a sixty year commitment to internationalism, so the terrorist attacks of 9/11 removed any doubts about a resurgent American isolationism. Blair thus sought that a power of community is revealing itself. Indeed, after 9/11, a growing cosmopolitan awareness was emerging from *the realisation of how fragile are our frontiers in the face of the world's new challenges.*¹⁶⁹

For Blair, the issue at stake is how we use the power of community to combine it with justice and by justice he meant more accessibility

¹⁶⁷ Tony Blair, Doctrine of the International Community Chicago Speech, 24.04.1999, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297>.

¹⁶⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.

¹⁶⁹ Philip Stephens, *Tony Blair. The Making of a World Leader*, Viking, 2004, p.p. 7-8.

of those same values of democracy and freedom to people round the world. Repeatedly for Blair freedom meant the economic and social freedom for people to develop their potential to the full. The starving, the homeless, the ignorant, those living in want, became a common cause.

In Afghanistan, more specifically, Blair saw the implementation of progressive politics. The UK would stand shoulder-to-shoulder alongside the US.¹⁷⁰ The power of community, solidarity, and the communal ability to further the state's interests are at the centre of British decisions at the time,¹⁷¹ as American work with the international community in defeating terrorism is a good thing for the security of all. Kosovo and Sierra Leone confirmed Blair's belief on liberal intervention aiming to liberty from long tyrannies that massacre its own people and threatens world peace.

As for Blair's approach to European partners, it might not have been the best way of achieving harmony between the two sides of the Atlantic neither inside Europe itself. But, in reality, there were other options available than approaching firstly the two main military and economic powers inside Europe, the French and the Germans. In fact, there is no supra-national institution inside the EU capable of deciding on security and defence issues and though the European Council could be considered the most adequate forum for such themes to be advanced, one can easily imagine how time consuming and unpredictable in terms of results such a move could have been. Secondly, the Franco-German engine was always the one that was pushing forward European integration. So, France and Germany, founders of the EU, big powers of Europe, politically, militarily and economically were contacted at first instance by Blair. One cannot forget that security and defence policy in Europe remains still in the hands of nation states and plans for a security and defence union and a common European army are still in very early stages.

Blair's ambitious foreign policy agenda also included bringing Europe and America closer together serving as a bridge. His form of internationalism aims to reconnect Britain to its European counterparts, to help modernise the EU adapting to its new responsibilities and duties in a globalised world, while always staying faithful in words and in action to his Anglo-American Special Relationship.

7. The Anglo-American Special Relationship and Tony Blair

The post 9/11 British conceptual approach to the events is also based in the well known Anglo-American Special Relationship. Britain

¹⁷⁰ Riddell, Hug them Close, p.129.

¹⁷¹ John Kampfner writes that Blair chose not to pressure Bush on the rebuilding of Afghanistan. *Afghanistan was now nothing more than encumbrance to the US. This would become a familiar pattern, with Blair entreating Bush to engage in a process of nation-building that was alien to him. It mattered little to the American President. He had moved on. It mattered a great deal to the British Prime Minister. But he would have to settle for much less.* Kampfner, Blair's War's pp.146-151.

is in some ways a lighthouse between America and the rest of Europe. It resembles its transatlantic cousin in its open and flexible markets, but it shares its commitment to social safety nets with its European partners. The choice, in either way, lies between engagement and isolationism; openness and protectionism.¹⁷²

Yet, the Anglo-American Special Relationship has been of great importance to both sides. The US has in Britain its only militarily and politically reliable global ally. The Special Relationship with Britain supports America's operation as a global superpower too. The UK, on the other hand, also gains, as its economy gets a boost; its interests are protected; its security is increased – mainly, through essential intelligence sharing – and thus its presence in the world overall is enhanced. The expression: Special Relationship has always implied close practical collaboration in security and military affairs.¹⁷³

It was Winston Churchill, in his famous 1946 Sinews of Peace address in Fulton, Missouri, who gave solid formulation to this concept. He spoke of shared democratic values, that should be exported globally and which he saw as threatened by the ambitions of Soviet communism. He defined these values, as would Margaret Thatcher half a century later, as deriving from a continuous tradition of Anglo–American liberty.

*We must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, and the English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declaration of Independence.*¹⁷⁴

*Our two governments must understand each other's points of view and do all we can to work together for the common cause, trusting we will be able to build up that common understanding and intimacy which enabled us to go through safely in the past and without which no full settlement of new problems can be reached.*¹⁷⁵

Still, the most important point of the Relationship is that the two nations share common values. These particular values are quite distinctive and explain both the Anglo–Saxon political, social, and economic model's success and its creative applicability to the modern world. And as Professor Carlos Espada put it, at the centre of these virtues of the

¹⁷² Robin Harris, "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations", The Heritage Foundation, 24.05.2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>, last access: 24.06.2007.

¹⁷³ John Charmley, *Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57*, Harvest Books, 1996.

¹⁷⁴ Winston Churchill, "Sinews of Peace," Speech delivered at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 05.03.1946, at www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=429, last access: 01.12.2006.

¹⁷⁵ Winston Churchill, "1952: Churchill renews 'special relationship'", 05.01.1952, BBC on line, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/5/newsid_3304000/3304505.stm, last access: 01.12.2006, p. 27.

Anglo-American tradition there exists *a consciência da impossibilidade de alcançar soluções perfeitas*.¹⁷⁶ Thus respect and openness, love to liberty is at the core of the Anglo-American tradition. They also make America supremely well-equipped for action in favour of democracy and human dignity.

Churchill assumed that Britain and America, whatever their particular national interests, were also the two nations where liberty was most secure and which could thus, in the final analysis, be best guaranteed to fight to defend it. At this point Churchill touched directly on strategies for security, and he made it clear that the latter were his central concern—*the crux*, as he put it, of his message:

*Neither the prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation [i.e., the United Nations] will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the US. This is no time for generalities, and I will venture to be precise.*¹⁷⁷

In particular, vital to the Relationship itself has also been across time the personal relations between leaders and the enduring national interest. Indeed, the US-UK links depend in part on good personal relations between American Presidents and British Prime Ministers, as between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.¹⁷⁸ But above all the Anglo-American liaison worked primarily because of the two nations' shared goals, above all of communism failure.¹⁷⁹ And at no stage did either Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan forget their own countries' national interests.

In the same way, Blair was right to invest so much effort in revitalising this alliance when he came to power, initially with President Clinton and then with President Bush. He supported strongly the American government in the wake of 9/11 and in the war on terror. Yet the terms on which he did so and the means he employed have, unfortunately, not shown any significant influence imposed to his American counterpart.¹⁸⁰

However, America's commitment to liberty is so bound up with the American nation's conception of its very identity that American power

¹⁷⁶ João Carlos Espada, *A Tradição Anglo-Americana Um Olhar Europeu*, Principia, 2008.

¹⁷⁷ Winston Churchill, "Sinews of Peace," speech delivered at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 05.03.1946, at www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=429, last access: 01.12.2006.

¹⁷⁸ Robin Harris, "The State of the Special Relationship", *Policy Review*, June-July 2002, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460326.html> last access: 24.06.2007.

¹⁷⁹ See: John O' Sullivan, *O Presidente, o Papa e a Primeira Ministra*, Aletheia Editores, 2006.

¹⁸⁰ Timothy Garton Ash, "A Blair's bridge. A strategic choice to stay close to the United States led us to Iraq. Was it worth it?" *The Guardian*, Thursday 04.09.2003; Timothy Garton Ash, "Brown must learn the lessons from Blair's three big mistakes" *The Guardian*, Thursday, 10.05.2007; Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West*, Penguin Books, London 2005.

does not pose a threat to the liberty of other nations. For this reason, among others related to capacity, stability, and security, Blair welcomes the global preeminence of the American superpower. As the former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, probably the most distinguished and the most enthusiastic proponent of the Special Relationship between the US and Britain did too. *We must not be paralysed by false modesty or even good manners. Promoting the values that find their expression in America isn't imperialism, it's liberation.*¹⁸¹

And most importantly Blair, as Churchill five decades before, viewed the Relationship as a road for wider international cooperation through the United Nations. The Relationship would be embodied in the closest possible defence cooperation, stretching from the use of bases through weapons procurement and beyond, to common operational missions.¹⁸²

Nonetheless, what one country sacrifices for another is more significant than what a leader says to another. For instance, after World War II, the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee was able to obtain a hearing from President Harry Truman, including a crucial assurance on the mooted use of the atomic weapon, because British troops were fighting alongside the US in Korea at the time. Harold Wilson, though, had no significant influence over American policy under Johnson because he refused to send British troops to Vietnam. *Commitments of blood and treasure always, in the end, speak louder than words.*¹⁸³ This is something which we should remember regarding Blair's willingness to commit British troops in Iraq. Independently of Blair's ways to use the influence gained; just a general expression of support, even formal support in the UN Security Council, would not have provided the influence that military engagement made available to the British government.

Hence, personal and political closeness between leaders is most important when it supplements the perceived interests of the two countries. Good personal relations have indeed allowed secondary or short-term obstacles to be overcome and they have also accelerated decisions.¹⁸⁴ Blair had determined to build a close relationship with President Bush. He was pursuing a well-established strategy of *bug them close*, much like

¹⁸¹ Margaret Thatcher, Speech at the Hoover Institution "A Time for Leadership", 19.06.2000, Thatcher Foundation: press release, <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=108388> last access: 01.12.2006; see also: Margaret Thatcher, *Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World*, HarperCollins, 2002, p.p. 19–62.

¹⁸² Richard Rose, *The Prime Minister in a Shrinking World*, Polity 2001; Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005, 2nd edition.

¹⁸³ Robin Harris, "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Chapter Two: Perspectives on the Past", *The Heritage Foundation*, 24.05.2006, <http://www.heritage.org/research/europe/wm1091Ch2.cfm?renderforprint=1> last access: 24.06.2007.

¹⁸⁴ Helle C. Dale, "Blair and Bush", The Heritage Foundation, 01.06.2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed060106b.cfm> last access: 04.12.2007; BBC News, "Bush-Blair Iraq war memo revealed", BBC News Online, 2006-03-27, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4849744.stm> last access: 14.12.2007.

that which his successful predecessors adopted toward whoever was in the White House.¹⁸⁵ Thus, he persuaded Bush, quite against the actual contents of the EU agreement signed at Nice in December 2000, that European defence plans posed no threat to NATO. Blair's response after 9/11 attacks also secured him the President's and the American people's gratefulness and admiration. Bush declared that America had *no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause - so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America. Thank you for coming, friend.*¹⁸⁶

Britain never stood higher in American affections than at that time. British troops subsequently participated in the American-led campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan despite the various protests from the British military and foreign policy establishment. The President's *axis of evil* speech again tested Blair's courage;¹⁸⁷ but once more, despite criticism in the British media and remarks from his own Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, Blair endorsed both the analysis of the danger and the strategy of preemption which lay behind it.¹⁸⁸

Yet, the period of the build-up to the war in Iraq was the most difficult for Blair. It was at that point that his broader political approach began to fail and many of his own and, more significantly, the Anglo-American Relationship's problems flow.

The bridge perception

President Bush had proclaimed in addressing Congress after 9/11, *Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or with you are with the terrorists.*¹⁸⁹ But Blair, for all his eagerness in supporting America, did not really see the world in these terms. He was the result of a sort of compromise between Left and Right. He always had an instinctive preference for compromise. So, despite the clear message from Washington, he continued to regard Britain's best international role as that of a bridge between US and Europe.

¹⁸⁵ Peter Riddell, *Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the "Special Relationship"*, London Politico's, 2003.

¹⁸⁶ At the President addressed Congress after the attacks, see: Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20.11.2001, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, last access: 11.11.2005.

¹⁸⁷ The White House, President Delivers State of the Union Address, 29.01.2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> last access: 30.11.2005.

¹⁸⁸ See critics: Clare Short, *An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power*, Free Press, 2005, 2nd edition; Peter Riddell, *The Unfulfilled Prime Minister: Tony Blair and the End of Optimism*, Politico's Publishing, 2004; James Naughtie, *The Rivals: The Intimate Story of a Political Marriage. Fourth Estate*, 2002, 2nd edition; Francis Beckett & David Hencke, *The Blairs and Their Court*, Aurum Press, 2004.

¹⁸⁹ The White House, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html> last access: 11.11.2005.

Most of the European countries were certainly not with America in the sense of accepting American strategic goals in the war against terrorism. In the same way, despite China and Russia's own problems with Islamic militants, neither would go along with America's analysis in any manner.¹⁹⁰

Considering power shifting to the East, not just to China and eventually to India but also to the Middle East and to Russia, Blair wanted good relations with Russia, where he had hoped to recreate with Vladimir Putin Mrs. Thatcher's relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev. During his premiership, he made a greater effort to approach Putin than any other world leader despite international criticism of the war in Chechnya. He wanted also to work with China. Furthermore, he spent his first political term proclaiming the need to strengthen the United Nations.¹⁹¹

Interestingly, Blair, in the beginning of his term, had been proclaiming acceptance of US plans for ballistic missile defence but not participation in it; action against Afghanistan but not Iraq; then action against Iraq but only with UN approval and as part of a wider coalition.¹⁹² However, Blair did support the war in Iraq based on Saddam Hussein's continued possession of WMD. So, when it was clear that there were no WMD and that the supporting evidence was wrong, his credibility with the British and international public as a war leader was injured, and with it his capacity to lead public opinion in support of America. In the same way, most Labour MPs, like their electors, had the greatest sympathy with the American people after 9/11 but that situation did not remove their deep suspicion of American policy.¹⁹³

At this point the famous analogy of Britain as a bridge between the US and Europe becomes a less reassuring image. Bridges fall when the ground they are built on is not solid enough to keep them up. Yet Blair defended the idea strongly by engaging in an extraordinary campaign of diplomacy, first to gain support for attacking Afghanistan and then, and much less successfully, for the war against Iraq. *Forget the talk of Anti-Americanism in Europe. Yes, if you call a demonstration, you will get the slogans and the insults. But people know Europe needs America, and I believe America needs Europe too.*¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Tony Blair, "What I've learned", *The Economist*, 31.05.2007, http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9257593, last access: 01.06.2007; Tony Blair, "A Battle for Global Values", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 1, January-February 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html> last access: 01.03.2007; *The Economist*, "Tony Blair: The great performer leaves the stage", 10.05.2007, www.economist.com, last access: 11.05.2007; *The Economist*, Tony Blair: How will history judge him?, 10.05.2007, www.economist.com, 11.05.2007.

¹⁹¹ Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005, 2nd edition.

¹⁹² Sarah Lyall, "Ex-aide to Blair details early years", *Herald Tribune*, 09.06.2007, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/09/sports/diary.php> last access: 10.07.2007.

¹⁹³ Even Nelson Mandela referred to him disapprovingly as the foreign minister of the United States, James K. Wither, "British Bulldog or Bush's Poodle? Anglo-American Relations and the Iraq War", *Parameters*, Vol 33, 2003.

¹⁹⁴ Blair in George H. W. Bush Presidential Library in Texas, 07.04.2002 http://www.georgebushfoundation.org/articles/Tony_Blair last access: 08.05.2007.

Blair will have an enormous political legacy. There can be no doubt about that. And the defining moment will certainly be the Iraq war. On his last visit to Iraq as Prime Minister, he said he has no regrets about his part in the US-led invasion that removed Saddam Hussein.¹⁹⁵ However, still today, the situation in Iraq remains very much unsettled, sectarian violence is undermining the state. In fact, the last verdict over Blair's legacy in history is yet to be given, for Blair the challenge in Iraq remains part of a wider struggle against democracy.

¹⁹⁵ Matt Robinson, "Blair tells Iraq no regrets in final visit", Reuters, 19.05.2007 <http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN1847374120070519> last access: 30.10.2007.

Chapter II

IRAQ: THE BIGGEST TEST

LESSONS TO AVOID AND LESSONS TO TAKE ON

1. Iraq: Defining event in transatlantic relations

In 2002, President Bush argued that the vulnerability of the United States following the 9/11 attacks, combined with Iraq's suspected continued possession and manufacture of WMD and its support for terrorist groups made disarming Iraq an urgent priority. UN Security Council Resolution 1441, passed on 8th of November 2002, demanded that Iraq readmit inspectors and comply with all previous resolutions. In early 2003 President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that Iraq was actually continuing to hinder UN inspections and that it still retained illegal weapons. Other leaders, such as French President at the time Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor at the time Gerhard Schröder, sought to extend inspections and give Iraq more time to comply with them. However, on March 17, seeking no further UN resolutions, Bush declared an end to diplomacy and issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, giving the Iraqi President 48 hours to leave Iraq. The leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and other countries objected to this build-up toward war. Saddam Hussein refused to leave Iraq, US and allied forces¹⁹⁶ launched an attack on the morning on 20th of March 2003.¹⁹⁷

Iraq - though not the main focus of the current study - requires a special analysis and attention. Iraq forms the defining event and the practical experiment of the new international parameters: globalisation, urging threats of terrorism and WMD and American and European political reactions. Blair played a special role in the war, supporting the US unconditionally in Iraq. His decision was consistent with his policy of *bug them close* relations with America, his history of antagonism with Saddam Hussein and his vision of an international community with global values.

¹⁹⁶ Four countries participated with troops during the initial invasion phase, which lasted from March 20 to May 1. These were the United States (250,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), and Poland (194).

¹⁹⁷ Encyclopædia Britannica Online, "Iraq War", <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/870845/Iraq-War>.

There has been significant opposition to the Iraq War across the world, both before and during the initial 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States (backed by the United Kingdom and smaller contingents from other nations), and throughout the subsequent occupation.

2. US Hegemony

America followed a unilateral approach in launching war against Iraq. Though explained by its supremacy as the world's sole superpower, it did reveal also some important lessons that the US needs to learn for the future: America cannot solve all the world's issues alone. In our era, an era of interdependence, nations need each other and especially the Western World that shares the same values and subsequently the same interests (freedom, respect for human rights and free economy), need to cooperate in order to be more efficient and successful in the world stage. Hard power is not enough and indeed winning peace is much harder than winning a war. Alliances do offer the legitimacy required for such international endeavours as the Iraq War to be a success.

Why Iraq?

The justification for invading Iraq predated the war on terror; it was more linked to the broader view of American interests that had prevailed in the Clinton years and during the Cold War too.¹⁹⁸ Until 1990, Cold War administrations from Carter to Bush (the father) viewed Saddam as a bad leader but useful asset in a region very rich in mineral resources.¹⁹⁹

Interestingly, since then American vital interests in the Middle East have largely remained the same: consistent access to oil supplies at reasonable prices; the combating of state-sponsored, and non-state sponsored terrorism; peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; regional stability and the reduction and elimination of inter- and intra-state warfare.

In the 1990's, however, a wide gap opened up between the United Kingdom and the United States on one side, which favoured containing Iraq with sanctions and military pressure, and China, France, Russia, and most other nations on the other hand, which favoured an end to containment. The Clinton administration had launched military action against Iraq in 1998 warning that *The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government - a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors,*

¹⁹⁸ Senator at the time, Hillary Clinton and many other Democrats and moderate Republicans in Congress authorized the use of force in October 2002, producing the lopsided Senate vote of 77-23. See: US Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress - 2nd Session, Measure Title: "A joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq", US Senate on-line: http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00237 last access: 16.12.2007.

¹⁹⁹ Saddam offered a crucial and essentially secular support against Iranian radicalism and Tehran's export of Islamist revolution. Only with the end of the Cold War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 did US policy began to shift towards treating Iraq as a serious regional security problem and a potentially destabilizing influence on the provision (and cost) of oil supplies to the West. See: Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War*, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 2000.

a government that respects the rights of its people.²⁰⁰ That was why personalities such as Richard Armitage, Francis Fukuyama, and Robert Zoellick could sign a letter in 1998 calling for Saddam's forceful removal.²⁰¹

By the early months of 2001, the willingness to prioritise tough action against rogue states was prominent in Bush's administration stance. The administration's Nuclear Posture Review (January 2002) and the National Security Strategy of the United States document (September 2002), analysed in the previous chapter, together confirmed the importance of the new approach.²⁰² These documents proved that the administration was examining the possibility of using preemptive strikes with nuclear weapons against states such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya and crystallised, at the same time, the emerging Bush Doctrine of preemptive and preventive war.

It did not seem to represent abandonment of Cold War-style deterrence, however, but a supplement to it within the new security architecture of the post-9/11 world. Iraq can be viewed not as some sudden US adventurism but rather as the first act in a lengthy performance of preventive and disciplinary strategic action.²⁰³

Iraq offers a test case that served multiple purposes for the US administration. Beyond confirming that the US is willing and able to perform preventive and preemptive war, a successful Iraqi reconstruction can serve as an example of democracy-building yet, limits exist, particularly what Joseph Nye calls *the limits of American power*:²⁰⁴ there is a limited effectiveness of US military power. Yet, the administration shared also

²⁰⁰ CNN on-line, "Clinton: Iraq has abused its last chance", 16.12.1998, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9812/16/clinton.iraq.speech/> last access: 16.12.2007.

²⁰¹ Discussed in Robert Kagan article "The September 12 Paradigm, America, the World, and George W. Bush" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 87, No 5, September/October 2008 (The United States Senate confirmed Richard Armitage, as Deputy Secretary of State on March 23, 2001. He left the post on February 22, 2005, and Robert Zoellick succeeded the office. Francis Fukuyama, philosopher, political economist, and author, was also among forty co-signers of William Kristol's the 20th of September 2001 letter to President George W. Bush after the 9/11 attacks that suggested the US capture or kill Osama bin Laden, and to destroy his network of associates', and *provide full military and financial support to the Iraqi opposition* for the purpose of removing Saddam Hussein from power even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack). For more see: Letter to President Bush on the War on Terrorism, 20.09.2001, Project for the New American Century, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm> last access: 01.07.2008.

²⁰² Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001, 08.01.2002, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm> last access: 08.12.2007.

²⁰³ Before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the council authorized the use of force beyond traditional peacekeeping operations on only two occasions (Korea and the Congo).

²⁰⁴ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Oxford University Press, 2002; Joseph S. Nye, "Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org> last access: 02.12.2007.

a conviction that the US has the capacity to set free peoples long oppressed. In an odd way though Iraq qualified, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan did not.²⁰⁵

Still, by 2003, nations were not easily moved by the urgency of the war on terror, by humanitarian concerns in Iraq, or by a desire to see the US once again lead an international campaign to bring order by force, as it had in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Hence, many states could only explain the war as a war for oil, or for US imperialism, or as anything but what its supporters across the US political spectrum thought it was - a war that was both in the United States' interests and in the interests of the humanity, a war for democracy.²⁰⁶

Indeed, Iraq has the second largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia, with 11% of the world's oil. The US consumes 26% of the world's oil, but possesses only 2% of the world's oil reserves. The US imports 9.8 million barrels of oil a day, more than half of its 19.5 million barrels day consumption. Outside the US, the oil motivation is more openly discussed. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw acknowledged in a speech to British ambassadors that oil is the main motivation for Blair's support for Bush's war, much more than any threat of WMD.²⁰⁷

Donald Rumsfeld on the other hand called suggestions that the US is really after Iraq's oil, nonsense. *We don't take our forces and go around the world and try to take other people's real estate or other people's resources, their oil. That's just not what the United States does. We never have, and we never will. That's not how democracies behave.*²⁰⁸

Still, the Iraqi constitution of 2005, greatly influenced by US advisors, contains language that guarantees a major role for foreign companies - first the Parliament must pass a new oil sector investment law allowing foreign companies to assume a major role in the country.²⁰⁹ Although the Iraqi cabinet endorsed the draft law in July 2007, Parliament balked at the legislation. Most Iraqis favour continued control by a national company

²⁰⁵ Rice has noted that the US rejects the view that Muslims somehow do not share in the desire to be free.

²⁰⁶ Robert Kagan "The September 12 Paradigm, America, the World, and George W. Bush", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 87, No 5, September-October 2008; Michael Hirsh, "Bush and the World", *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 02.12.2007.

²⁰⁷ Green Party, "U.S. Oil Interests Are Driving the Invasion of Iraq, Say Greens" <http://www.progress.org/2003/greenp19.htm> last access: 14.12.2007.

²⁰⁸ Quoted in Kathleen T. Rhem, "U.S. not Interested in Iraqi Oil, Rumsfeld Tells Arab World", American Forces Press Service, 26.02.2003, <http://usgovinfo.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/n02262003%5F200302267.html>.

²⁰⁹ The final draft (September 2005), which was approved by referendum, contains 139 articles. All the mentioned translations slightly differ from each other; between brackets for comparison, the word used in article 2.A stating that no law may contradict "the established/fixed/undisputed rules of Islam" on the website of the Middle East Review of International Affairs <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/Iraqiconstitution/constitution.html> last access: 14.12.2007.

and the powerful oil workers union strongly opposes de-nationalisation. Iraq's political future is very much in flux, but oil remains the central feature of the political landscape. Oil is Iraq's economy and its management will determine at large the country's future.

Iraq War - Preemption, democracy promotion, and nation building

The language used by the Bush administration before and after the invasion was formed basically around the notions of preemption, democracy promotion and nation building.

Preemption is not a new strategic notion for American defence policy. Over more than two centuries, US has conducted dozens of military campaigns, only two of which were in response to attacks on US soil.²¹⁰ The United States has always been keen to employ force to protect itself, its allies, and its interests. With the NSS, America preserved this principle in an openly proclaimed national doctrine. Yet, other nations cannot easily excuse America for unprovoked use of force in all cases.²¹¹

Like preemption, democracy promotion is not a new element in US foreign policy, on the contrary. After World War II, the United States established strong democracies in Japan and Germany and supported democratisation throughout Western Europe, employing a combination of military power, economic assistance, and strategic communications. In more recent decades, all of central and most of eastern Europe, nearly all of Latin America, much of East Asia, and some of Africa have become democratic with active US encouragement.

Nation building, a dominant notion in the America post 9/11 discourses, did not come with Iraq neither. US cannot but feel that the occupation of Iraq and the nation-building mission have so far only problems to face. And, although the Bush administration's reaction to setbacks in Iraq has been a determination to do better next time, Americans seem more inclined to avoid any such future enterprises.²¹²

In any case, the main lesson to draw is that rebuilding a failed state takes an enormous commitment of human lives, money, and time. This realisation may have come too late to rescue the US venture in Iraq, but, it should definitely serve as a cautionary guide to such undertakings in the future.²¹³

²¹⁰ Since 1991 and 17 UN Security Council resolutions, the decision to war has taken longer than the 3,075 days of US involvement in World Wars I, II and Korea combined.

²¹¹ Rodric Braithwaite, "End of the Affair," *Prospect*, May 2003.

²¹² Through the 1990s, the Clinton administration slowly learned how costly and time-consuming such missions could be. In Somalia, the United States turned away at the first sign of opposition. In Haiti, it set an early departure deadline, thereby ensuring that any improvements it introduced would be short-lived. In Bosnia, Clinton set an even shorter timeline, promising to have all US troops out of the country within 12 months.

²¹³ James Dobbins, "Who Lost Iraq?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 5, September/October 2007.

American unilateralism

The contemporary debate and literature regarding the transatlantic crisis, and especially the Iraq war, is full of references to the changing politics of the 21st century and to American unilateralism.²¹⁴ Despite almost fifty years of primarily multilateral American leadership, American actions after 9/11 have caused some to fear a return of the US to a primarily unilateralist foreign policy. While this concern is understandable given the preeminence of US power and recent actions of the US, this attitude is somehow unjustifiable. The events of 9/11 were such a shock to the Americans that the US was bound to take dramatic steps, with or without the assistance of its allies.²¹⁵

So why do France, Germany and much of the rest of the world, including other major powers such as Russia and China, worry about American hegemony? The answer is that in international politics states struggle for power. States are always worried about their security. Thus when one state becomes overwhelmingly powerful others fear for their survival in all terms, political, economic and security terms.

It is true that the US today has an overwhelming hard power, especially military power, and indeed there is no state or coalition capable of restraining America from exercising that power. This situation can easily create great incentives for geopolitical interests' expansion. Yet, over time, with wars in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and the war on terror and possible future wars against North Korea, Iran, Syria, or China over Taiwan, US power could only be weakened and America knows that very well.

At the end of the day, hegemonic decline results from an over-extension abroad and domestic economic weakness. This is what America faces somehow today.²¹⁶ In addition, with US seeking control in the Persian Gulf region, France and Germany, Russia and China, too, will have strong incentives for collaborating to ensure their own strategic and commercial interests in the region.

Nevertheless, the Iraq war has marked a turning point in transatlantic relations, and in respect to American hegemony, is that despite

²¹⁴ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America vs Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf, New York, 2003; Phillip H. Gordon, *Allies at war: America, Europe and the Iraq Crisis*, MacGraw Hill, New York, 2004; Elizabeth Pond, *Friendly Fire. The near death of transatlantic Alliance*, European Union Studies Association, Pennsylvania, 2004; John Peterson, Mark A. Pollack, *Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty First Century*, Routledge, 2003 Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West*, Penguin Books, London 2005; Stefan Ganzle, Allen G. Sens, *The changing Politics of European Security. Europe Alone?*, Palgarve Macmillan press, New York, 2007.

²¹⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Oxford University Press, 2002; Joseph S. Nye, "Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org> last access: 02.12.2007.

²¹⁶ General Wesley Clark discussed America's economic crisis and national security problems. In New American Foundation discussion, www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpPUupWOriU.

widespread predictions that they would agree on a second UN resolution, France, Germany and Russia did not. Contrary to what Britain and France did at Suez, they refused to fall into line behind Washington. This somehow suggests that a hegemon so clearly confronted maybe a hegemon in trouble.²¹⁷

Yet, it is important to be mentioned also that, the US even before invading Iraq, in the aftermath of the invasion, consistently returned to the Security Council in search of international legitimacy and resources. The Bush Administration's sponsorship of UN Security Council Resolutions 1483, 1500, 1511, and 1546 does not represent the actions of an extremely unilateralist power determined to abandon international institutions such as the UN.²¹⁸ These resolutions demonstrate the appreciation for the legitimacy and resources that only the UN can provide.

In the defining moment, taking the decision to go to war in Iraq, the Bush Administration demonstrated a preference for dealing with individual nations rather than with institutions as a whole such as the EU or NATO and without the support of the UN. There are, though, some important reasons for that. The most significant is the memory of the lessons learned in the Balkans. William Wallace notes that *The Pentagon saw the Kosovo Campaign as the successful application of precision airpower, hindered by consultations with hesitant European allies.*²¹⁹ America decided that military action is more efficient when the European nations are organised under American strategy and action. However, this approach avoids the debates among European nations and NATO actions. Joseph Nye also put forth several considerations and recommendations in taking the decision between unilateral versus multilateral action. He advocates caution when approaching multilateral agreements that interfere with America's ability to maintain peace in unstable areas. He states that the US should reject any multilateral initiatives that are likely to lead to inaction. Unilateral action should not be ruled out in cases where the survival of American national interests are at stake, although international support should be sought whenever possible.²²⁰

Indeed, in multilateral actions, the benefit of economies of scale and the spreading of costs are often offset by a troubled decision making

²¹⁷ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, 2003; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001; Zelikow and Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, MA: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.p. 169-70; Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*, Columbia University Press, New York 2002, p. 290; Josef Joffe, "Continental Divides", *The National Interest*, Spring 2003; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited", *The National Interest*, Winter 2002/03.

²¹⁸ Seems to be no major effort though to lay the groundwork for the possibility that Saddam would partially comply with Resolution 1441.

²¹⁹ William Wallace, "As viewed From Europe: Transatlantic Sympathies, Transatlantic Fears," *International Relations* 16, No. 2, August 2002, p. 282.

²²⁰ Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the Worlds Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, Chap. 5.

process and technological gaps can render joint action cumbersome and ineffective.²²¹

Iraq was a catalyst for transatlantic dispute, but, importantly, this transatlantic crisis has been about American power—specifically about American hegemony rather than a rift in the realm of culture, values and ideology.²²² John J. Mearsheimer argues that the United States is not a global hegemon. Rather, because of what he describes as the *stopping power of water*, US is a hegemon only in its own region (the Western hemisphere), and acts as an offshore balancer toward Europe. Mearsheimer predicts that America will soon end its continental engagement because there is no European hegemon looming on the geopolitical horizon. As an offshore balancer, Mearsheimer says, the United States will not remain in Europe merely to play the role of regional stabiliser or pacifier.²²³

But if American strategy toward Europe is indeed one of counter-hegemonic off-shore balancing, it should have been over for the United States with the end of the Cold War and NATO should have been dead rather than undergoing two rounds of expansion. Europe and NATO is still alive and flourishing because the Soviet Union's containment was never the sole driving force behind America's post-World War II commitment to Europe. NATO was created to *keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in*. NATO is still in business to advance long-standing American objectives that existed independently of the Cold War and hence survived the Soviet Union's collapse, as we shall examine thoroughly in the following chapter.

For the US, foreign policy is mainly about security - from the proliferation of WMD, the growing power of terrorist groups and other non-state actors, and the increasing vulnerability of US society to direct attack. Asia appears to be the dominant consideration. The encouragement for missile defence that has characterised the Bush administration was driven largely by the perceived threat from North Korea and China. The end of America's Eurocentrism should not be seen as a sign that America, under the Bush or any other administration, no longer cares about Europe. There exists indeed a re-prioritisation of US foreign policy towards Asia.

On the other hand, for Europe, the foreign policy agenda is much broader, including dealing with actual threats to human security resulting from food diseases and intemperate weather, addressing a new set of challenges arising in a globalised world and building on new opportunities

²²¹ For further analysis, see Ruth Wedgwood, "Unilateral Action in a Multilateral World" in *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, eds. Stewart Patrick, and Shepard Forman, Lynne Rienner Publishers, inc., Boulder, 2002, p.p. 167-189.

²²² Christopher Layne, "America as European hegemony, Until now, perhaps?" *The National Interest*, 06.22.2003.

²²³ Interview with John J. Mearsheimer, *Foreign Affairs*, September 2001 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901faupdate10416/john-j-mearsheimer/interview-with-the-author.html>.

to consolidate democracy in Europe and beyond.²²⁴ Yet, what really has been creating tensions across the Atlantic is mainly the predominant approach to American foreign policy during Bush based on a traditionalist view of international politics—a zero-sum struggle for power between the United States and those that could threaten its territory, allies, friends or interests.²²⁵

This is a view that places military–security issues at the top of the US foreign policy agenda and focuses on threats to security as the main rationale for American engagement abroad.²²⁶ Iraq crystallised these trends.

The United States, under assault from terrorists and under potential assault from rogue states, was not likely to allow European unity to become a constraint on its actions. William Kristol, editor of the *Weekly Standard* and a leading neo-conservative close to the Bush Administration, puts it as follows: *Any serious policymaker cannot simply say Well, as a matter of theology, we believe in a united Europe (...) and therefore that's going to drive our policy. It would be irresponsible.*²²⁷

It seems that some disengagement from European integration is now gradually established as the US looks beyond Europe to the challenges of a dangerous world.²²⁸ In Iraq, clearly, Europe was split between two camps, the supporters and the opponents of the Iraq war. Indeed, at the end of January 2003, the leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic signed a letter urging Europe and the international community to unite behind Washington's Iraq policy. This letter was notable especially because it illustrated that the United States is having some success in using the *New Europe* concept to balance against the *Old Franco-German* core.²²⁹

²²⁴ For a concise statement of this view, see the interview with then Vice President Dick Cheney in Nicholas Lemann, "The quiet man?", *New Yorker*, 07.05.2001, p. 59; Ann Scott Tyson, "Rumsfeld's worldview: a ruthless place", *Christian Science Monitor*, 17.05.2001, p. 1; William Wallace, "Europe, the necessary partner", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 80, No 3, May–June 2001, p.p. 22–3.

²²⁵ There is a well-known theory of games called *Zero-Sum* in which there is a winner on the plus side mirrored precisely by a loser on the other. In International Relations *Zero-sum* describes also a situation in which a participant's gain or loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the other participant(s). There is another approach: the *Non-Zero Sum Game*, often referred to as a *Win - Win* situation, whereby both parties are winners.

²²⁶ Gerard Baker "Does the United States Have a European Policy?" *National Interest*, Issue 74, Winter 2003.

²²⁷ Quoted in the Brookings institution, Center on the United States and France, "The United States and France after the War in Iraq" Washington, D.C. Monday, 12.06.2003, Transcript by: Federal news service, Washington, D.C www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20030512panel_2.pdf.

²²⁸ Gerard Baker "Does the United States Have a European Policy?" *National Interest*, Issue: 74, Winter 2003.

²²⁹ In the destinations for that first trip, there was an intriguing sign of the already shifting priorities in the Bush team's approach to Europe. Bush chose not to go to France or Germany, the pillars of what would soon be derided as *Old Europe*, but to Spain, Sweden, Poland and Slovenia - with a day trip to Brussels for a NATO summit.

America sees that states such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania will not only line up behind the United States within NATO, but as representing Atlanticist interests over European ones within the EU itself. So Europe matters to America. But Europe today can and has to be the protagonist of its own future. As Julian Lindley-French stated ... *want us, they need us. We are merely haggling over the price, now the price is legitimate ... needs a capable Europe.*

2.1. America and its Allies. The real utility of partners

Before 9/11, in 2000, Bush campaign advisor at the time Condoleeza Rice was disregarding those who are *uncomfortable with the notions of power politics, great powers, and power balances*. She expressed the strongest disrespect for those who believe that the legitimate exercise of American power derives from the support of other states or international institutions, concluding that the foreign policy of a Republican administration would *proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community*.²³⁰

Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay use the term *hegemonist* to describe this approach, which holds that *America's immense power and willingness to wield it, even over the objections of others, is the key to securing America's interests in a Hobbesian world*.²³¹

With the election of Bush and the events of 9/11 and especially with the Iraq war, many of the principles and perspectives expressed during the campaign would be transformed into real actions. The decision to go to war in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban provided the first case. The administration chose not to accept offers of military assistance from NATO and sought instead to put together a coalition providing specific elements of support for the US operation, as permission for over flight and basing rights in Central Asia.

Bush asserted that *the best way that we hold this coalition together is to be clear on your objectives and to be clear that we are determined to achieve them*.²³² In late 2001, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld reinforced the message that the United States might not choose to rely on mechanisms built during the Cold War to meet new security challenges, stating clearly that *The worst thing you can do is to allow a coalition to determine what your mission (...) It's the mission that determines the coalition*.²³³ Thus began the effort to establish an ad hoc group of countries willing to fight the war on terror as defined by the US.

²³⁰ Condoleeza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 79, No 1, January/February 2000, pp. 46-47. See also Condoleeza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest, American Realism for a New World", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 87, No 4, July-August 2008.

²³¹ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy", *Brookings Institution Press*, Washington, DC, 2003, p. 40.

²³² Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, Simon & Schuster, New York 2002, p. 281.

²³³ Secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld, interview by Larry King, Larry King Live, CNN, 05.12.2001, US Department of Defense: <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1692> last access: 06.12.2007.

In addition to its fundamental mistrust of ties that bind American power in pursuit of the interests of others, the Bush administration became alarmed about the practical problems of relying on others to conduct wars. Emphasising the importance of being quick and responsive in real time, Bush announced in 2004 with reference to the UN that *America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country*.²³⁴ This resistance to subjecting American national security policy to the analysis of an international organisation was extended to allies too.

A typical example of cumbersome multinational decision making processes that troubled US diplomatic and military effectiveness was NATO's campaign in Bosnia and Kosovo.²³⁵ Furthermore, there have also been some tactical challenges of operating alongside allies who were not as technologically advanced as American forces, as well as some difficulties of preventing the abuse of intelligence information in such a multinational environment.²³⁶ Charles Krauthammer talked about the death of grand alliances *The grand alliances are dead. With a few trusted friends, America must carry on alone*.²³⁷

Anyhow, a wordy alteration comes in the second term of the Bush administration. Bush and his senior advisors have signalled a renewed appreciation of the utility of partners in pursuing American foreign and defence policy goals, including the transition of responsibility for some sectors of Afghanistan from US forces to NATO forces and a qualified endorsement of the EU diplomatic approach to addressing the Iranian nuclear program. Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed this change in her article on National Interest by claiming that *As before, our alliances in the Americas, Europe, and Asia remain the pillars of the international order, and we are now transforming them to meet the challenges of a new era. What has changed is, most broadly, how we view the relationship between the dynamics within states and the distribution of power among them*.²³⁸

Indeed, some bilateral alliance relationships also have been strengthened, most notably ties between US and Japan.²³⁹ However, to meet the future requirements of its national security, the United States needs to move beyond case-by-case actions toward the strategic recognition that

²³⁴ President's George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," 20.01.2004.

²³⁵ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, Public Affairs, New York, 2001.

²³⁶ James P. Thomas, "The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions", *Adelphi Paper* No. 333, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (IISS), London, May 2000, p. 53.

²³⁷ Charles Krauthammer, "A Farewell to Allies", *Time International* 05.01.2004, <http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,570738,00.html>.

²³⁸ Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest, American Realism for a New World", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 87, No 4, July-August 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faessay87401-p0/condoleezza-ric/rethinking-the-national-interest.html> last access: 01.09.2008.

²³⁹ Elizabeth D. Sherwood-Randall, "Alliances and American National Security Report", *Strategic Studies Institute*, October 2006, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2131/alliances_and_american_national_security.html?breadcrumb=%2Fproject%2F2%2Fpreventive_defense_project last access: 08.06.2008.

alliances are a net benefit to it. Long-term policies must be established to support and grow American alliances.

But what does America get from allies?

America gets from allies a more secure power. The Iraq war often is cited as an example of why traditional alliance relationships are no longer required or useful. However, the involvement of some NATO allies on a national basis provided important (though not decisive) military support and significant post war assistance.

Another factor of truth though is that NATO was split over the decision to go to war. Key NATO allies such as France and Germany were unwilling to join in the military campaign. This reality ensured that the US would not have broad multinational support and assistance of the effort unconditionally.²⁴⁰

Nonetheless, the Iraq war is not likely to be the paradigmatic example for the engagement of US military power in the 21st century. The short list of major threats which US cannot neither prevent nor respond to alone includes attacks by terrorists armed with nuclear and/or biological weapons; widespread proliferation of WMD and long-range delivery vehicles, including to nonstate actors who have no return address and therefore cannot be deterred in traditional terms; a growing number of failed states; and the rise of new transnational security challenges such as climate change and pandemic diseases.²⁴¹

In order to act preventively rather than reacting only after catastrophe, America needs access to an expanded toolkit that fully engages the capabilities of other countries as well as its own. Thus the US cannot respond effectively to these challenges without the sustained support of allies and partners, as it cannot close its borders and isolate itself within them.²⁴²

Similarly important is the fact that alliances are cooperative relationships between or among nations with interoperable military capabilities that enhance prevention, provide deterrence, and contribute to effective defence. All of these are key-factors missing in the Iraq war. So, an alliance has to be capable to undertake combined strategic planning. In these planning two or more nations conduct threat assessments, anticipate future security needs, and commit to the development and implementation of a common program to meet the requirements generated

²⁴⁰ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, DC: Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2003, p.p. 40-45; James P. Thomas, "The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions", *Adelphi Paper* No. 333, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (IISS), London, May 2000, p. 53; Gerard Baker "Does the United States Have a European Policy?" *National Interest*, Issue 74, Winter 2003.

²⁴¹ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Managing the Pentagon's International Relations," in Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, eds., *Keeping the Edge: Managing defence for the Future*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, p.p. 235-264; Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Alliances and American National Security", October 2006, <http://www.Strategic-StudiesInstitute.army.mil/> last access: 04.12.2007.

²⁴² Ariel E. Levite and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "The Case for Discriminate Force," *Survival*, Vol 44, No 4, Winter 2002-03.

by this process. On this basis a Europe stronger, coherent and more efficient in military terms is welcomed by America, as it can lead to an even more successful security cooperation between the two partners.

In addition, an alliance of the future will necessitate the collaboration of national security institutions, not just defence and military ones. America and Europe have to invest on that too.²⁴³ Yet it is not in the American interest for its allies to lack capabilities, to use such a deficit as an excuse not to join in military action, or to be such a burden on the US military that it resists taking allies along (as was the case in Afghanistan in 2001). Thus the US needs to lead a continuing effort to make such co-ordination possible, working through established mechanisms provided by its alliance relationships.²⁴⁴

Moreover, creating a basis of legitimacy for the exercise of American power is essential for its survival. And the lack of legitimacy was apparent in the Iraq war. Without legitimacy, it will not be feasible for US to make and sustain the alliance relationships that American national security requires. For this to happen is essential to plan and use American power in a multinational context, ensuring that US actions are legitimate. Acting through its alliances, the US can dry the hegemonic edge of American leadership, share costs and risks, and increase the prospects of success. Revealingly, President Bush's closest ally in the war on terror, Tony Blair, called his American friends to take a more cooperative approach, asserting that America must be part of the Allies' agenda too.

Is important to point out also that when America's power becomes more dominant, a growing inclination, even among its closest allies, is to seek means of constraining US unilateralism and averting the impulse to counterbalance American power.²⁴⁵ The current effort to generate EU foreign and defence policy competencies in part reflects the impulse to create a counterweight.

Indeed, across history, states have formed alliances to enhance their power. American realists, as Hans Morgenthau, argued that states act, based on interests—which largely are motivated by the quest for power and national stature—and therefore seek to establish alliances not as a matter of *principle, but of expediency*. By contrast, he argued, a nation will *shun alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or if the obligations of partnership outweigh the benefits*.²⁴⁶ However, the more unbalanced America's strength, the more its alliances serve its purposes.

²⁴³ Condoleezza Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest, American Realism for a New World", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 87, No 4, July-August 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faessay87401-p0/condoleezza-ric/rethinking-the-national-interest.html>.

²⁴⁴ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Alliances and American National Security", October 2006, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>.

²⁴⁵ Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1968.

²⁴⁶ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2005, 7th edition, p. 193.

America needs the support of others to pursue its global goals; as Richard Haass has said *leadership implies followership*.²⁴⁷

Is true that, US may prefer to be unconstrained by obligations to others and not having to accommodate the views of allies or to act in their interest, but their cooperation is critical to meeting the security challenges of the 21st century. In this context, shunning alliances is actually contrary to Morgenthau's realist belief. Zbigniew Brzezinski has criticised US administration by claiming that since the tragedy of 9/11, US has increasingly embraced at the highest official level a paranoid view of the world.²⁴⁸ A view crystallised through the Iraq crisis. Summarised in a phrase repeatedly used at the highest level, *be who is not with us is against us*. War on terrorism defines the central preoccupation of the US in the world today, and it does reflect a rather narrow and extremist vision of foreign policy of the world's first superpower and a great democracy with really idealistic traditions.²⁴⁹

So, in the case of Iraq, US has indeed experienced a crisis of credibility and a state of isolation due to an invasion which reside from an unprecedented intelligence failure – no WMD were found - and absence of a clearly, sharply defined perception of what is emerging abroad.²⁵⁰ America's top officials talked about a broad phenomenon, terrorism, as the enemy. But terrorism is a technique for killing people too. Deep analysis and understanding of the enemy is crucial.

America, above all, did not seek alliances' support and faced a divided Europe. So, neither of these facts helped its mission. America as we have seen should seek to cooperate with Europe, not to divide Europe to invented new and old camps. In some parts of the world Europeans have more experience and more knowledge than Americans and certain important interests that have to be taken into account.²⁵¹ In addition, America could not forget that part of the process of building a larger zone of peace involves engaging Russia too and drawing it into a closer

²⁴⁷ Richard Haass, *The Opportunity*, New York: Public Affairs, 2005, p. 26.

²⁴⁸ Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski Speech, 28.10.2003, at New American Strategies for Security and Peace, a conference co-sponsored by the Prospect in Washington, D.C. <http://www.newamericanstrategies.org/transcripts/Brzezinski.asp> last access: 08.05.2008.

²⁴⁹ James Dobbins, "Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 84, No 1, January-February 2005.

²⁵⁰ Top officials in Washington and London genuinely believed that such evidence would be uncovered. Had the evidence emerged, support for war would have materialized. See the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group (ISG) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-report_vol1_rsi-06.htm): ISG has not found evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but the available evidence from its investigation—including detainee interviews and document exploitation—leaves open the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq although not of a militarily significant capability.

²⁵¹ Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski on October 28, 2003 at New American Strategies for Security and Peace, a conference co-sponsored by the Prospect in Washington, D.C. <http://www.newamericanstrategies.org/transcripts/Brzezinski.asp> last access: 08.05.2008.

relationship simultaneously with Europe and with the Euro-Atlantic community.²⁵² Likewise, this is a mission that requires European support.

America's strategic doctrine and strategic commitment involves trying to deal with nuclear proliferation, and the Iraq war demonstrates clearly that US cannot deal with that problem when it comes to North Korea or to Iran without the cooperation with other major powers, including Europe. With pre-emptory action, US have reinforced the worst tendencies in the theocratic fundamentalist regime, not to speak about the widening of the zone of conflict in the Middle East.²⁵³ But beyond that, the question of how to respond to the new conditions of uncertainty, the new threats of terrorism and WMD available to terrorist groups was not responded by the world sole superpower.

In the end America had to realise what Zbigniew Brzezinski has claimed *We are going to live in an insecure world. It cannot be avoided. We have to learn to live in it with dignity, with idealism, with steadfastness.*²⁵⁴ The United States did not win the Cold War alone; the transatlantic alliance did, in concert with partners around the world. The transatlantic ties in terms of history, values, and interests are unique. Unfortunately, they have passed and they are still passing through difficult tests. However, this time the future of this relationship lies in confronting the challenges of this century worldwide and on this basis, US foreign policy should reflect a greater appreciation for its allies and a greater importance placed on its main asset, the ideals of liberty and freedom. The Iraq war has shown clearly that America's future foreign policy principles must consider also the cost of war. *Courage is also soldiers fighting.*²⁵⁵ And, without doubt, all other means of conflict resolution have to be drained before a country decides to go to war.

2.2. America's guiding principles

The power of ideas, the costs of war, and the limits of military power are key principals for a successful American foreign policy.²⁵⁶

²⁵² M. Steven Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2005; The Economist, "Russia's new leadership Spot the president", 13.12.2007.

²⁵³ There have been many attacks on Iraqi minorities such as the Yezidis, Mandean, Assyrians and others. Although violence has declined from the summer of 2007, the U.N. reported of a cholera outbreak in Iraq. The mandate of the multinational force in Iraq, last extended by UN resolution 1790, will end on December 31, 2008. The Independent has reported that the US is seeking a "strategic alliance" giving US forces broad freedom in continuing to operate in Iraq. See more: CNN on-line, "U.N. reports cholera outbreak in northern Iraq" <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/08/29/iraq.cholera/index.html> last access: 16.12.2007; BBC News "Warnings of Iraq refugee crisis", http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6286129.stm 22.01.2007 last access: 14.12.2007; Iraq Body Count website: <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/#position>.

²⁵⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski Speech, at New American Strategies for Security and Peace Conference, 28.10.2003, <http://www.newamericanstrategies.org/transcripts/Brzezinski.asp>.

²⁵⁵ Interview with Ambassador Mr. Alexis Ellis.

²⁵⁶ Bradley L. Bowman, *Resolving the Transatlantic Crisis*, Yale University, 09.05.2004.

i) the influence of values, democracy and liberty

America's greatest asset is not its great military power or its enormous GDP. Rather, America's greatest asset is its ideas. A recent survey of 16,000 people in 20 countries and the Palestinian Authority found broad support for ideas that America espouses such as democracy and free markets. Even in Islamic countries with soaring anti-Americanism, there exists a broad appetite for democracy and free markets.²⁵⁷

There is a deep rooted and universal desire for individual liberty, economic well-being, and representative government. The greatest failures in US foreign policy occur when America subordinates its founding ideals in the name of short-term stability or economic gain. When America supports undemocratic and oppressive regimes to promote stability or gain access to resources, America betrays its most deeply held principles and loses international credibility. The US need for oil has led to a dependence on Middle Eastern oil and has ignored the authoritarian and oppressive regimes in this region. If America peacefully, assertively, and consistently promotes the long-term global transition to liberty, free trade, and representative government, then it will be possible to indefinitely maintain American predominance and security, while simultaneously promoting the peaceful evolution towards a more Kantian ideal.²⁵⁸

As John Gaddis points out, *one of the reasons the US was seen as the lesser of two evils was related to the US history of establishing domestic security and prosperity without the tendency or need to establish global dominance on the backs of other nations.*²⁵⁹

ii) the costs of war

Bush has asked for \$505 billion for the peacetime US military establishment in 2008 - almost exactly the amount, in real dollars, that President Ronald Reagan sought in 1988.²⁶⁰ The current strains on resources and forces are due, of course, to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the costs of those wars are not included in the figure noted above. A supplemental request for an extra \$142 billion covers them, bringing the total

²⁵⁷ Pew Research Center, "Views of a Changing World 2003: War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics", 03.06.2003, <http://people-press.org/report/185/views-of-a-changing-world-2003> last access: 09.05.2008.

²⁵⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2002; Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain", *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2003; Joseph S. Nye, "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq", *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2003; John Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.

²⁵⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, "Bush Preemption Doctrine The Most Dramatic Policy Shift Since Cold War", Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, 06.02.2004 <http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=6755>, last access: 06.12.2007; see also John Lewis Gaddis, "Affairs Grand Strategy in the Second Term", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 84, No 1, January-February 2005, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 11.11.2006.

²⁶⁰ White House, Department of Defence, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/defense.html>.

2008 military budget request to a \$647 billion - a budget more than 25 percent larger, in real terms, than the one for 1968, at the height of combat in Vietnam, a bigger and bloodier conflict than any the United States has seen since. And even that total figure does not include the \$46 billion budget of the Department of Homeland Security, whose functions would be handled by the defence Ministry in many other countries.²⁶¹

A thorough appreciation of the costs and consequences of war must be another essential guiding principle for American foreign policy.²⁶²

iii) Appreciation for the limits of military power

The Iraq experience has exposed the limits of raw military power too. As Max Hastings claimed *It would be naive to suggest that an abrupt American departure would now promise the country a happy future. But there seems no purpose in a continued US military presence, save within the context of new regional policies vastly different from those that prevail today.*²⁶³

US foreign policy in order to heal the transatlantic rift and defeat international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD has to show appreciation for the limits of military power. This lesson may be especially difficult for the US to internalise given the enormous capabilities of the US military. If anyone doubted the ability of the US to translate its enormous defence expenditures into combat effectiveness, the performance of the US military in Afghanistan and Iraq dispelled any uncertainties. In both countries, the US projected military power to the other side of the globe and overthrew deep-rooted governments in a matter of weeks. However, these same operations also highlighted the limitations of military force. *Winning a peace is much harder than winning a war.*²⁶⁴

America must be willing to listen to democratic allies. A strategic approach to American alliances will enable America to translate its unique power into effective global influence that enhances its national security.²⁶⁵ International action presupposes that friends can be persuaded; but US should be open to be persuaded by friends and allies too.

For half a century, Europe has willingly followed America's lead. If the US does not engage, respect, and utilise Europe, the US may find itself alone and thus weakened. In the end, the best hope may be to

²⁶¹ Richard K. Betts, "A Disciplined Defense, How to Regain Strategic Solvency", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No 6, November-December 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 11.01.2008.

²⁶² However, any student of classical strategy understands that war and occupation exact a high price from any nation that participates in it. An examination of classical theorists such as Thucydides reveals this important fact.

²⁶³ Max Hastings "The Iraq experience has laid bare the limits of raw military power", *The Guardian*, 17.03.2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/mar/17/iraq.usa> last access: 17.11.2007.

²⁶⁴ Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, No 4, July-August, 2003, p.74.

²⁶⁵ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Alliances and American National Security", October 2006, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>.

promote the above mentioned principles and attempt to elect leaders that have an appreciation for these values too. In the debate leading up to the US-led invasion of Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell compared the relationship between Europe and the US to that of a troubled marriage. This analogy seems especially appropriate given the common interests and continual disputes that have characterised the transatlantic relationship since the end of World War II.

Today, Europe and the US face an equally grave danger in the form of international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD and they must act together in a responsible and coherent manner. US has to recognise its limitations as a power not strong enough to be able to solve all world issues alone. Appreciation for the limits of military power, the overwhelmingly high costs of war and the importance of legitimacy for its actions have to be America's guiding principles. Democracy promotion is a welcomed thing but global dominance is not. In this context, alliances matter.

Europe also has to overcome its own phantasms and learn the lesson that the Iraq invasion has to offer. EU has to resolve its lack of credibility as an international player which demonstrates itself once again in the Iraq war, harming, as we shall see in the following section, not only European states' interests but the power of Europe as a whole.

3. EU – Dis-Unity

3.1. Franco-British crisis of confidence

The Franco-British crisis of confidence over the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma is really connected to the European dis-unity in its approach towards Iraq.²⁶⁶ Already, in the weeks after 9/11, officials in Paris were confused by Blair's actions and especially his somehow transformation to a US ambassador.²⁶⁷ Yet, the Franco-British military cooperation which had been discovered in Bosnia in the early 1990s, and which had helped create the Saint-Malo process, was continuing to function in Kosovo²⁶⁸, were French forces were facing serious resistance from Albanian irregulars due to their perceived pro-Serb sympathies.

On that basis, UK proposed to France a merger of their respective military sectors in the summer of 2002. France eagerly embraced the

²⁶⁶ Jolyon Howorth "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain, and the ESDP", Yale University, 2005, <http://www.cap.lmu.de/transatlantic/download/howorth2.doc> last access: 16.04.2007. The original dilemma was about determining the most effective method for guaranteeing US commitment to European security. The new Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma is about how to relate to American global strategy without tearing apart the European Union.

²⁶⁷ Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005.

²⁶⁸ Where, by early 2002, France with a reinforced infantry brigade based in the northern sector at Mitrovica, and the UK with a reinforced armored brigade based in the central sector at Pristina were holding the most sensitive sectors in KFOR.

proposal but, in April 2002, UK defence secretary Geoff Hoon announced a unilateral British withdrawal of all but few troops from Kosovo. The withdrawal was rationalised in terms of the success of the Kosovo Force mission, but the preparation and training of the UK troops for service in Iraq was also coinciding.

For France, this was a breach of confidence, a clear UK demonstration of British preference for fighting alongside the US and an abandonment of the multilateralism, which had recently characterised every aspect of the ESDP relationship. It followed the postponement of the annual Franco-British Summit scheduled for November 2002²⁶⁹.

On the other side, the Franco-German positions were in general harmonised during the Iraq war and latterly during the Convention on the Future of Europe.²⁷⁰ France and Germany had worked together for engineering a majority against the US-UK *second resolution* authorising war against Iraq and within ESDP by organising a controversial quadripartite Summit on 29 April 2003 at which the notion of a European Union of Security and Defence (EUSD) was launched, establishing an EU vanguard group which aspired to accelerate ESDP policy in the name of the entire EU.²⁷¹ Nevertheless, Germany has had a long-standing close relationship with the United States, and the Schröder breach may very well be an irregularity rather than a new trend. Also, many countries in eastern and central Europe, most notably Poland, have strong ethnic and political ties and sympathies with the United States.

Chirac's and Blair's relations though were becoming more and more tense. Blair admitted he had been furious with Chirac for putting British troops at risk by sabotaging UN action against Iraq. *If the UN had given a strong and unified ultimatum to Saddam it is possible we could have avoided conflict.*²⁷² This truly was the lowest point of the Franco-British security relationship. Yet, the original Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma had been replaced by a dilemma on the choice about European commitment to US grand strategy and not on the issue of US engagement in or commitment to Europe.

Yet, it seems that both countries had pursued what they considered to be their clear national interests: for the UK, support for the sole superpower in a critical conflict, as well as experience of high intensity combat

²⁶⁹ The pretext for the row was the deal between Chirac and Schroeder over the retention of spending levels in the Common Agricultural Policy until 2006, but defence clashes were also just beneath the surface. Officials in Paris and London confirm that the personal chemistry between Chirac and Blair remains very poor.

²⁷⁰ Prior to that moment, Chirac had carefully distinguished France's position (France might join the military coalition against Iraq but will decide at the last moment) from that of Germany (no German participation under any circumstances).

²⁷¹ Jolyon Howorth, "The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the Future of the European Defence Initiative: A Question of Flexibility", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2004, www.cap.lmu.de/transatlantic/download/howorth.pdf last access: 11.03.2008.

²⁷² Tony Blair in *The Sun*, "PM: My job was on the line", <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article158912.ece>.

alongside American forces;²⁷³ for France, rejection of a war believed capable of destabilising the entire Middle East and rejection of automatic alignment with America. Still, neither of those positions is incompatible with ongoing cooperation on ESDP.

As Jolyon Howorth states in February 2003, the postponed Franco-British Summit took place at Le Touquet and it was regarded by both sides successful, as agreement was reached on joint projects²⁷⁴:

- A special agreement on cooperation in Africa and a commitment to expand the scope of EU peacekeeping missions in the Balkans concretised by a late February 2003 Franco-British proposal on taking over NATO's mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- The development of military capacity. Proposals were to include new quantitative and qualitative indicators to ensure the achievement of the Helsinki Headline Goal, and the establishment of a new intergovernmental procurement agency.
- A statement of solidarity and mutual assistance based on the notion of the identity of strategic interests between the two countries and prioritisation of Rapid Reaction capabilities, including initial deployment of air and sea forces within 5 to 10 days.
- The December 2002 award to a Franco-British consortium of BAES and Thales of the contract for the development of the UK's two aircraft carriers was seen as the first step towards the joint procurement of air-naval groups.²⁷⁵

So, the paradox of cooperation/confrontation seems to lay on the ongoing resolution of the original Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma.²⁷⁶ For the UK, so long as the EU was not ready for engagement in military missions, dialogue over operationality of a combat role in the Balkans was deemed deemed to be irresponsible for Europe and also for the US. The worst of all scenarios for NATO and US allies would be if Europe took on a mission prematurely, made a mess of it and subsequently obliged the allies to step into a deteriorating crisis to pick up the pieces.

²⁷³ See Dr. Daniel Marston, "Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare: The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future", Discussion Paper, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2004, www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2004_05_25_papers/force_structure.pdf last access: 12.05.2008; Thomas Donnelly "Hail Britannia", National Security Outlook, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on line, Washington, 01.09.2003, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19092/pub_detail.asp last access: 11.08.2007.

²⁷⁴ Jolyon Howorth "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain, and the ESDP", Yale University, 2005, <http://www.cap.lmu.de/transatlantic/download/howorth2.doc>.

²⁷⁵ Franco-British summit - Declaration on Franco-British cooperation in Africa, Le Touquet 04.02.2003, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Franco-British-summit-Declaration,4972.html> last access: 20.07.2007.

²⁷⁶ Jolyon Howorth "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain, and the ESDP", Yale University, 2005, <http://www.cap.lmu.de/transatlantic/download/howorth2.doc>.

For the UK, which had always seen *Berlin Plus* as the safety-net behind any EU missions, it was not until the resolution of the Berlin Plus conundrum in December 2002 that any EU missions were even conceivable.²⁷⁷ However, since the Berlin Plus agreement, UK seemed to believe that the moment had come to promote the new and necessary division of labour between NATO/the US and the EU/ESDP and to promote a stronger defence for Europe. It was not accidental that all of Le Touquet proposals sought to facilitate the development of serious military capacity. Hereafter, the EU was to be called to act upon.

For France, the main objective was to progress the ESDP project. Because France had long believed that the US would accept the reality and not disengage from Europe. Besides, far from constituting an attack on NATO, the Summit Declaration stressed, in its opening paragraph, that the shared values and ideas that constituted the transatlantic partnership, itself characterised a strategic priority for Europe.²⁷⁸ The main focus of the two leaders in the Summit was the proposal to create a European Union of Security and Defence (EUSD) involving a number of objectives on the part of its members, most of which were not controversial, but which included an EU operational planning unit to be located at Tervuren near Brussels.

It was around this last proposal that controversy arose. A number of other initiatives were proposed, most of which also appeared in the Franco-British proposals of February – and were subsequently to find themselves written into the June 2004 Constitutional Draft.²⁷⁹ Although the detail remained vague the thinking behind EUSD seemed modelled on economic and monetary union: a core group of countries would forge ahead (including in the preparation of military operations) and would leave others with the choice of joining or being left out. Thus given the troubled international environment, this was considered easily as exclusionary, and difficult to believe that it would actually enhance the role of NATO.

3.2. European Division and the War in Iraq

Turning now to Europe's position as a single entity towards the war in Iraq, it is clear that the EU unity has been injured by the Iraq crisis.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Berlin Plus agreement, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm.

²⁷⁸ The aim of the summit was explicitly stated as being to reinforce European military capacity in order to give the Atlantic Alliance a new vitality. Chancellor Schroeder and Prime Minister Verhofstadt both insisted that the summit was in no way undermining of NATO.

²⁷⁹ Enhanced cooperation in defence, including the possibility for participating states to take on additional responsibilities; a *solidarity clause*; additional Petersberg Tasks; a European Defence Agency; a European Defence College. Only the latter failed to make it into the Constitutional Draft.

²⁸⁰ Jolyon Howorth, "Reconcilable Differences: Europe dis-unity, the U.S., and the War in Iraq", *The Politic*, Vol. IV/II, 2003, p.p.26-28.

Europe was not characterised by agreement whatsoever. Divergences in approach were apparent since the beginning, not only between France and UK as we examined above but among all EU members which were divided in two camps, the supporters and the opponents to the Iraqi war.

Tony Blair had been the driving force behind ESDP in its early years from 1998 to 2001. However, after 9/11, Blair became convinced that, while still important, European security autonomy was a second-order priority behind the global war on terror. Blair believed that Britain could act as a pivotal force between the European Union and the United States in this new global campaign. Blair was prepared both to take risks and to stick to his principles. Convinced, like his US counterpart, that the most dangerous threat in the post-9/11 world is terrorism and WMD, he appears to have decided earlier than 2003 that war with Iraq was probably inescapable.²⁸¹

President Jacques Chirac, Blair's co-sponsor of the ESDP project, was also concerned about WMD and, in the mid-1990s, had been forced to directly address Islamic terrorism.²⁸² Chirac had also been the first foreign head of state to visit the White House, exactly one week after 9/11, to express in person what the newspaper *Le Monde* had proclaimed editorially on 12th of September 2001 *We are all Americans*.²⁸³ French fighter pilots were the only foreign aviators to join US forces over Afghanistan in November 2001. But, Chirac became increasingly concerned about the broader implications of the new US doctrine of preemption. A real French concern was that with Muslims making up nearly 10 percent of France's population, anything which enflames fundamentalism could have a first and direct impact.²⁸⁴ Chirac, though, supported the view that Iraq must disarm, overseen by the United Nations via a new inspections regime. But France could not endorse regime change as a political objective and stuck to these stated principles throughout the crisis.

Within Europe, France's opposition to military action in Iraq is of great importance.²⁸⁵ But Chirac also criticised the candidate's position at the time, their support for Bush's plan to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Chirac said that the EU candidate countries of the former Soviet Union *have not been very well behaved* and that they have been *reckless of the*

²⁸¹ Jolyon Howarth, «Tony Blair: a First Strategic Evaluation», 21.09.2007, *Politique Étrangère*, 3, 2007 http://www.ifri.org/frontDispatcher/ifri/recherche_resultats last access: 04.12.2008. See also Ian Hargreaves, «The Blair Project», *The American Prospect*, 19.11.2001, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_blair_project&gId=5975 last access: 23.06.2007.

²⁸² James P. Rubin, «Stumbling Into War», *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, No 5, September-October 2003, www.foreignaffairs.org/ last access: 15.11.2007.

²⁸³ *Le Monde*, «Nous sommes tous Américains», 13.11.2001, p. 1.

²⁸⁴ Jim Bittermann, CNN Senior Correspondent «Chirac no 'yes' man on Iraq», *Wednesday*, 26.02.2003, CNN Com World, on-line: <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/26/sprj.irq.france.chirac/> last access: 17.02.2007.

²⁸⁵ *The Economist*, «Against America? Moi?» 15.03.2003, p. 47.

*danger of aligning themselves too rapidly with the American position.*²⁸⁶ This created further tensions inside the EU.

On the other hand, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in October 2001 authorised the deployment of German combat troops to Afghanistan. On that occasion, he showed eagerness to establish Germany as a major player on the international scene. Indeed, the Regional Command North is led by Germany. However, during September's 2012 election, candidate Schroeder, fought for his political survival, basing his political campaign on an absolute opposition to war in Iraq. The fact that he won by only the narrowest of margins meant that he would afterwards remain a prisoner of German anti-war culture.

These three policies were reconciled later, the 8th of November 2002 in a Security Council Resolution: 1441. The 1441 Resolution contained two contradictory logics: it was both a legitimisation of military action should inspections prove to be a dead end and an alternative to military action. UN recalled, in that context, that the Council had repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face "serious consequences" as a result of continued violations.²⁸⁷ Thereafter, under the pressure of a rapidly escalating crisis, on the 22nd of January 2003 at the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of Franco-German reconciliation, Chirac appeared to narrow the gap between himself and Schroeder by declaring that the two countries had a common position on the Iraq crisis and any decision on how to disarm Iraq should remain that of the UN Security Council and that war should be considered the worst of all solutions.

One week later, Blair, together with seven other European leaders (henceforth known as the *Gang of Eight*) published an open letter stating their attachment to the transatlantic historical links and friendship.²⁸⁸ The statement gave centre stage to the Security Council, but stressed the community of values between Europe and the United States and the need to ensure respect for UN resolutions. So, countries seemed to team up with each other, depending on issue and circumstances. As Lord Palmerston, a British prime minister of the Victorian era, put it, *there are no permanent alliances, only permanent interests.*²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ The outright threat was against Romania and Bulgaria who were at the time still in the process of negotiations with the EU - now members of the EU. Chirac said that "if they wanted to diminish their chance of joining the EU, they could not have chosen a better way." *The Economist*, "L'Europe c'est moi" 22.02.2003, p. 46.

²⁸⁷ United Nation's Security Council, Resolution 1441, UN Document S/Res/1441, 08.11.2002, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf> last access: 16.04.2007.

²⁸⁸ José María Aznar, Spain, José Manuel Durão Barroso, Portugal, Silvio Berlusconi, Italy, Tony Blair, United Kingdom, Václav Havel, Czech Republic, Peter Medgyessy, Hungary, Leszek Miller, Poland, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark, available in *Times On Line*: "Europe and America must stand united", <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/article858456.ece> last access: 11.11.2007.

²⁸⁹ Quoted in *The Economist* Charlemagne "Who speaks for Europe?" 06.02.2003, <http://www.faculty.de.gcsu.edu/~hedmonds/European%20Union/reserve%20reading%20EU/Who%20Speaks%20for%20Europe/Who%20Speaks.htm> last access: 11.11.2007.

However, it should also be noted that neither of these positions was incompatible with the conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels on the 17th of February 2003:²⁹⁰ European Union determination to deal effectively with the threat of WMD proliferation; commitment to the United Nations remaining at the centre of the international order; commitment to full and effective disarmament of Iraq in accordance with Resolution 1441 and full support for the UN inspectors who should be given the time and resources they need, without continuing indefinitely in the absence of Iraqi cooperation.

The point though over the *force should only be used as a last resort*, is treated differently among the European capitals. The major basis of disagreement among the EU Member States and accession candidates was placed largely around the timing of that last point. During the negotiation of Resolution 1441 in the fall of 2002, the American administration repeatedly argued that a second resolution authorising force would not be necessary. That remained its view for months, until February 2003, when Blair convinced Bush to seeking a second resolution. Given Blair's staunch support up until that point, Bush understandably decided to switch his stance.²⁹¹

About the same time, the French also reversed their position. After insisting from the beginning that war would require a second vote to authorise it, suddenly France began scrambling to avoid a showdown with the United States. But the main problem remained the interpretation of the 1441 Security Council resolution. For the Americans, the resolution could be easily interpreted, as a justification to war but for the French was a chance to a diplomatic solution.

On that crucial issue, their margin of negotiation was finally removed on the 19th of March 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, (the actual invasion lasted from the 20th of March to 1st of May 2003). Four countries participated with troops during the initial invasion phase, the United States (250,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), and Poland (194). A number of other countries were involved in its aftermath.²⁹²

Yet, inside Europe, strong political mistakes have been charged on Blair. Blair was accused of having paid too little attention to the construction of a common European view and of having failed to gain from his support for President Bush - notably on a continuing commitment to the UN process and on a Middle East peace pledge.²⁹³

²⁹⁰ Council of the European Union, Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 17.02.2003, 6466/03, Polgen 7, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cc/74554.pdf last access: 03.12.2008.

²⁹¹ Michael Hirsh, "Bush and the World", *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2002, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org>, last access: 02.12.2007; James Dobbins, "Who Lost Iraq?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 5, September/October 2007.

²⁹² James P. Rubin, "Stumbling Into War", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, No 5, September-October 2003, www.foreignaffairs.org/ last access: 15.11.2007.

²⁹³ See critics: Clare Short, *An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power*, Free Press, 2005, 2nd edition; Peter Riddell, *The Unfulfilled Prime Minister: Tony Blair and the End of Optimism*, Politico's Publishing, 2004; James Naughtie,

Moreover, Blair's apparent recognition in the House of Commons debate on the 18th March 2003 that the European Union could have exerted far more effective influence over the US can be read as a prime ministerial mea culpa.²⁹⁴ Blair knows that influence in US comes more effectively via a united European Union than via any single national voice, even that of the United Kingdom.

James P. Rubin claims that *Chirac's mistake, however, was to think that he could limit the United States' role to supporting his own favoured policy for Iraq: containment through aggressive inspections. The administration simply did not care very much whether it had international backing or not, and the Europeans knew it.*²⁹⁵

Schroeder seemed careless in using the anti-war card as an opportunistic route to re-election, and then effectively opting out of the entire diplomatic process at a time when Germany chaired the Security Council in February.²⁹⁶

Further complicating the EU's situation were the neutral countries position — Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland — who emphasised that the EU has no authority in military matters.²⁹⁷

The Iraq war had once again exposed the limitations of a common European approach to global challenges. Iraq demonstrated in practice that European weak approach to important international crisis is bad for Europe and the world. And most importantly it gave Europe a lesson that had to be taken seriously. Strengthening European defence should be top list priority for the EU and it can only succeed based on leadership and courage at the European national level, a credible security and defence policy and a creative and dynamic transatlantic relation.

3.3. EU/ ESDP breakthroughs after 9/11 and the Iraq War

The beginning of the 21st century offered Europe an opportunity and a reason to change.

It is interesting to see that since 9/11, the EU made some important breakthroughs. The first concerned a common Action Plan to fight against the proliferation of WMD.²⁹⁸ This document spells out a

The Rivals: The Intimate Story of a Political Marriage. Fourth Estate, 2002, 2nd edition; Francis Beckett & David Hencke, *The Blairs and Their Court*, Aurum Press, 2004.

²⁹⁴ Blair's Iraq speech in Commons, 18.03.2003: ...*Europe ... should have said: we understand your strategic anxiety over terrorism and WMD and we will help you meet it... but in return we ask two things of you: that the US should choose the UN path and you should recognise the fundamental overriding importance of re-starting the MEPP (Middle East Peace Process), which we will hold you to.* The Speech is available on line in *The Guardian* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/mar/18/foreignpolicy.iraq1>.

²⁹⁵ James P. Rubin, "Stumbling Into War", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, No 5, September/October 2003, www.foreignaffairs.org/ last access: 15.11.2007.

²⁹⁶ Karen Donfried, "Germany After the Elections: Implications for U.S.–German Relations", 11.09.2005, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=151>.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁸ Council of the European Union, "Fight against the proliferation of Weapons Of Mass Destruction - EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass

European strategy against proliferation. Among the measures adopted in June 2003, the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)²⁹⁹ regime regarding verification, a stronger role for the UN Security Council in this matter and the creation of an observatory on WMD disarmament and non-proliferation constitute considerable progress too. The EU also framed a common strategic concept, the European Security Strategy.³⁰⁰ The Iraq crisis produced a common awareness among Europe's leaders of the need for strategic thinking on international security issues. One of the major reasons why the EU was so divided in the case of Iraq was its lack of strategic reasoning. There is also the general recognition that a divided Europe is powerless. This document could constitute the first awakening of Europe to unpleasant world realities.

The EU was also involved, for the first time, outside Europe in a peacekeeping intervention in Africa. When a series of massacres in Ituri, Congo, followed the withdrawal of Ugandan troops in spring 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for an immediate intervention. The EU responded under the leadership of France. The military intervention of 1,800 troops was prepared in a very short period of time, involving all the EU members in the decision-making process regarding planning and rules of engagement.³⁰¹ Cooperation on the ground between participating nations, especially France and Sweden, was efficient. Artemis was an undeniable success from a military point of view. Further than the military intervention, the EU decided to help disarm, demobilise and reintegrate armed groups, particularly children; to prepare a socio-economic rehabilitation programme to back up the interim administration, including grassroots reconciliation; and to give an immediate €200m aid package from its European Development Fund (EDF) in order to set up an ethnically mixed police force. Working closely with the UN, the EU has transferred the authority back to a reinforced Mission des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC).³⁰²

The Artemis operation was successful in stabilising the situation in Bunia and enforcing the UN presence in the DRC. In September 2003, responsibility for the security of the region was handed over to the MONUC mission. Artemis was the first autonomous EU military mission outside Europe - an important milestone in the development of European Security and Defence Policy. This was also the case with FYROM

Destruction", No 15656/03, Brussels, 10.12.2003, http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/eu_wmd.html last access: 23.12.2008.

²⁹⁹ Official Site: <http://www.iaea.org/>.

³⁰⁰ For a lengthy analysis of the ESS see chapter 1 of the current work.

³⁰¹ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2007.

³⁰² Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, UN Peace keeping Best Practices http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/PUBLIC/ViewDocument.aspx?docid=572&menukey=_5_2_4 See also: Jolyon Howorth, "The Significance of ESDP's Fifteen Missions: an initial evaluation", Paper to IR Seminar, Yale University, Series, February 2006.

where Operation Concordia was followed by a police mission on the model of what has been achieved in Bosnia.³⁰³ ESDP has changed its dimension. From a tool of crisis-management in the Balkans, it has become a necessary device to enhance Europe's role in the world.

The Convention also introduced the *structured cooperation*, involving a *form of closer cooperation between Member States, open to all Member States wishing to carry out the most demanding tasks and fulfilling the requirements for such a commitment to be credible*.³⁰⁴ For Atlanticists this wording seemed worrying as it looked like a *self-electing club* and like one which intended to try to embark on autonomous military operations in the name of the EU, yet with little or no control by non-participating states. These features, real or imaginary, nevertheless also made their way – along with the new term *structured cooperation* – into the Convention's June 2003 Draft Constitutional Treaty (Article III-213), despite attempts by up to thirty Convention members (from the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Latvia) to delete the entire article.³⁰⁵

The expected Franco-British collision did not happen. Over the course of the summer 2003, both sides moved towards one another. British enthusiasm for developing military capacity, for early warning systems and for appropriate planning facilities were all entirely compatible with the main EUSD proposals. The British concern over *structured cooperation* was more linked to the fact that a small number of states could short-circuit decision-making and that the initiative was really designed as an alternative to NATO³⁰⁶. At the same time, France desired to have the UK involved, as Berlin did for different reasons. So, after a successful meeting of Defence Ministers in Rome on 29 August 2003, during which a number of misperceptions were dispelled, Blair, Chirac and Schroeder worked on a trilateral compromise which was duly agreed at a Summit in Berlin on the 20th of September, 2003.³⁰⁷

³⁰³ Council of the European Union, EU Military Operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM/CONCORDIA), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=594%E2%8C%A9=en&mode=g last access: 03.03.2006.

See also: Guy Wilson-Roberts, *ESDP: an overview* Jean-Yves HAINE *European Security after 9/11*, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 2004.

³⁰⁴ The European Convention, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18.07.2003, CONV 850/03, <http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf>.

³⁰⁵ Treaty of Lisbon, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm see also "Reviving European defence cooperation", Charles Grant examines the evolution of Europe's Security and Defence Policy and its impact on NATO and transatlantic relations. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art2.html> last access: 05.02.2006.

³⁰⁶ Antonio Missiroli (ed.), *From Copenhagen to Brussels. European Defence: Core Documents*, Paris EU-ISS, 2004, Chaillot Paper 67, p.p.204-207. The paper is suspicious of the need to go beyond enhanced cooperation (which it claimed could work well "at 25") and embrace something even more integrative called structured cooperation.

³⁰⁷ CNN on-line, "Europe leaders tackle Iraq rift Saturday", 20.09.2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/09/19/berlin.summit/> last access: 16.12.2007.

Although differences over Iraq policy were prevailing, the real significance of the trilateral Summit came on ESDP. In exchange for reassurances from Chirac and Schroeder that structured cooperation would be neither exclusionary nor inimical to NATO, Blair dropped his opposition both to the proposal itself and to the EU operational planning cell. For their part, Chirac and Schroeder agreed to focus structured cooperation on capabilities rather than on politics. More specifically, the European military policy planning cell agreed on in 2003 has been embedded in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), developments with the Western European Union (WEU) have been blocked, and provisions - which ran contrary to upholding the status of NATO - have been excluded from the now defunct European Constitution.³⁰⁸

So it could be said that ESDP witnessed real progress in 2004. The British proposal to concentrate on military capacity through quality (Headline Goal 2010) rather than quantity (Helsinki Headline Goal) focused on a longer term vision beyond 2010 with the objective of identifying trends in future capability developments and requirements and increasing convergence and coherence. This in practice meant battle-groups: formations of around 1,500 troops trained for high intensity combat in jungle, mountain or desert terrain. This was a proposal, which was immediately endorsed by France, which had appreciated the virtues of just such a force in the 2003 mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and subsequently by Germany.³⁰⁹ In the spring and summer of 2004 UK concentrated its efforts persuading the new accession Member States that this was a project they could participate in either as a national or as part of a multinational formation. The aim was to maximise European quality capacity. It is very important to see that in this context British objectives (pragmatic assumption of necessary missions in Europe's near-abroad) complemented French objectives (the principled build-up of Europe's strength).

Similarly, the 2004 decision to go ahead immediately with the creation of a European Defence Agency (EDA),³¹⁰ which initially brought on significant competition between France and the UK over the appointment of the CEO, was resolved to both sides' satisfaction in spring 2004.³¹¹ The EDA has been created to promote harmonisation of equipment, research and development policy, and common European procurement

³⁰⁸ Alan P. Dobson, "The Atlantic Alliance and Blair's Pivotal Power: Trying To Make All Things Special", Colloquium Report Edited by Richard A. Chilcoat Joseph R. Cerami Patrick B. Baetjer Sept. 2006, <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>.

³⁰⁹ Council of the European Union, Helsinki Headline Goal, Brussels, 07.06.2001, 9704/01, Limite COSDP 155, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st09/09704en1.pdf>; Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17.05.2004, endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18.06.2004, [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010 Headline Goal.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf).

³¹⁰ Official Site: <http://www.eda.europa.eu/>.

³¹¹ Chaillot Papers, "EU Security and Defence, Core documents 2004", Vol V, February 2005, No 75, Institute for Security Studies, www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp075e.pdf last access: 05.02.2006.

policies. It also encouraged EU governments to spend defence budgets on meeting tomorrow's challenges, helping them to identify common needs and promoting collaboration to provide common solutions. Nevertheless under the pragmatic British chairmanship of Nick Witney it was directed to the resolution of pressing problems: forging linkages between the various EU defence agendas; acting as a catalyst and a generator of new thinking; providing input to the overall armaments transformation process; emphasis on sustainability, flexibility, deployability, interoperability; bringing together civilian and military activities and research; and above all, information sharing across the entire defence sector.

Hence, these new developments and the concentration on combined aspects of internal and external security, on tackling the problems of the new security environment particularly terrorism and WMD³¹² and of coordinating European policy towards the Middle East allows for a pragmatic problem-solving approach which meets the objectives of both France and the UK. It is also not incompatible – at least at the level of principles – with US objectives.

The disunity of 2003 could have been fatal for ESDP but it not. After 9/11, traditional attitudes towards the original Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma generated contradictory reflexes within the EU, and particularly between the UK and France, with respect to the appropriate response to US pro-activism – which in fact posed a new and different dilemma. But with time, as policy preferences came to be set within a more global context, both sides came to see that there was more convergence than divergence in their positions.³¹³

France and the UK want both stronger military capacities for the EU and intend the EU to intervene regularly in fighting regional and possibly even global wars. Each knows that unity is needed and that objectively their mission is shared by the United States, whatever the confusion and/or mistakes which may have attended the Bush administration's handling of the Iraq crisis. Each recognizes that the transatlantic relationship remains vital, even though one partner may see it as more constraining than the other. And that relationship will continue to be managed, where security is concerned, largely through NATO.

However, differences are likely to persist too. On some issues (Iran, Greater Middle East), the EU is likely to stick together while on others, like the relations with China, Member States may agree to differ. As we shall see in detail in the following chapter, a division of labour will have to be carved out between NATO and ESDP as well. The cold shower of 2003 brought forth the encouraging cooperation of 2004.

³¹² Solana's Speech to the EU/ ISS, Paris, 09.09.2004.

³¹³ It is not even certain that the crisis of 2003 was inexorable. Until January 2003, the possibility remained open that the UK and France would both join the US campaign against Iraq. In March 2003, the European Council issued a five point statement on the Iraq crisis which was signed unanimously by all Member States. The quarrel was as much over timing as over principles. Lessons have been learned in both capitals.

3.4. Euro-Atlantic lessons and the Iraq war

The main lessons that derive from the failure of the Iraq War have to serve as a guide to both American and European future action, in order to avoid such lamentable international missions in the future.

From the Bush Administration's insistence on unilateral and preemptive action for self-defence derives the most important concern and core disagreement over the Iraq War.

With its 2002 National Security Strategy, and influenced heavily by the shock of 9/11, the Bush Administration, as is well known, embraced preemption and unilateralism. In doing so with no emphasis on diplomacy, it undermined its own legitimacy abroad. This policy harms the ability of the US to convert its overwhelming power into legitimate authority. Subsequently, it makes US accomplishment of its own stated foreign policy goals – promotion of democracy, prevention of terrorism – more difficult.³¹⁴

Indeed, such a change would be hard for allies to accept. Instead, much of the world demonstrates scepticism when it comes to any US stated good intentions. As the British historian Tony Judt has pointed out, the putative beneficiaries of US power in the world reject somehow the fact that American hegemony really is a net good for everyone beyond any doubt.³¹⁵ The policy of strategic restraint allowed the US to overcome that rejection and provide leadership without having to pay the costs of inflicting it on unwilling subjects; however, the policy of preemption does not. For instance, the public struggle in the Security Council of UN over the second resolution was about more than just Iraq. The opponents of the American and British resolution say they were fighting a White House that they believed threatened to undermine international order.³¹⁶

Viewed through this lens, the war in Iraq looked less like a way to uphold UN Security Council resolutions than like the manifestation of a new American approach. As Gaddis shows in his book *Surprise, Security and the American Experience*, the shock of 9/11 convinced the Bush administration that a new world had arrived and any old strategy had to be replaced by a new one.³¹⁷ But had it?

It is not surprising that Americans should think that it had failed, given the horror they witnessed on 9/11. As former State Department official Dan Hamilton has pointed out, *the US still living in a 9/11 world*

³¹⁴ Jolyon Howorth, 'France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis', *Survival* 45, 2003 p.p. 173-92; John G. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001; John G. Ikenberry, 'Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order', *Foreign Affairs*, 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org> last access: 04.12.2007.

³¹⁵ Tony Judt, 'Dreams of Empire', *New York Review of Books*, 04.11.2004, p.p. 38-41.

³¹⁶ James P. Rubin, 'Stumbling Into War', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, No 5, September/October 2003, www.foreignaffairs.org/ last access: 15.11.2007.

³¹⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004.

while Europe lives in a post 1989 world. This view explains the different approaches to the events among Americans and Europeans. While the end of the Cold War promises peace and new possibilities for stability and security, the post-9/11 era brings a sense of new dangers, and a sense that the worst is yet to come.³¹⁸

So, while it is understandable that the US should feel that the shock of 9/11 requires some kind of dramatic new response, it is also a case to be tested. On 20 January 2005, President Bush declared that it was *the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world*.³¹⁹ The US cannot redefine global political order by ending tyranny, alone. They need precisely the international institutions and the alliances that somehow rejected. The passing of the Cold War shows that it is more necessary than ever, and would have better chances than ever of helping the US to achieve its stated policy goal: ending tyranny and promoting democracy.

At a time when the United States is excessively powerful, it adopted a grand strategy that does not reflect these crucial lessons. The combination of the two has rightly made European political leaders very nervous about the direction that the United States grand strategy.³²⁰

Furthermore, there are several advantages and disadvantages to both unilateral and multilateral action that influence decision-making. By citing exterior political commitments that could not be ignored, multilateral action aids policy makers in justification of their decisions at both the national and international level.³²¹ However, the inverse is also true. In multilateral actions, the benefit of economies of scale and the dispersal of costs are often offset by a complex decision process. Technological gaps can render joint action cumbersome and ineffective. Further complicating the issue is multilateral action resulting from the wishes of a single nation. This was the case with the actions of the UN, undertaken at the request of the United States, which led to the 1991 Gulf War. Initiated at the request of the United States, the Gulf War remained under American command, and, in such a case, one could argue that the action is multilateral, while the policy is unilateral.³²²

In addition, a significant and persisting factor in America's preference for unilateral action is the military capabilities gap between the two sides of the Atlantic. America's 'smart weapons' have proven much more

³¹⁸ Daniel S. Hamilton, "Reconciling November 9 and September 11", in Visions in Christina V. Balis; Simon Serfaty *Visions of America and Europe: September 11, Iraq, and Transatlantic relations*, CSIS, 2004, p. 73.

³¹⁹ Bush 2005, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html>.

³²⁰ William Wallace, "As viewed From Europe: Transatlantic Sympathies, Transatlantic Fears," *International Relations* 16, No 2, August 2002, p. 282.

³²¹ Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, Oxford University Press, 2002, Chap. 5.

³²² For further analysis, see Ruth Wedgwood, "Unilateral Action in a Multilateral World" in *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement*, Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman eds., Lynne Rienner Publishers, inc., Boulder, 2002, p.p. 167-189.

effective than the majority of Europe's weapons.³²³ The precision with which they reach their targets minimises collateral damage and the loss of innocent lives, which has proven critical in maintaining international support for military action and minimising the cost and duration of reconstruction. At a more basic level, European nations lack the heavy lift capability that is necessary to project their forces over medium and long distances in a reasonable amount of time.

So, the European capabilities gap has led NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, to call upon European nations to invest in their militaries. Even Britain, the most technologically advanced of European armies, is no match for America's size and advanced weaponry, including its command and control structures. In a speech in Salen, Sweden, Lord Robertson referred to Europe as a *military pygmy*, and stated that the *American critics of Europe's military capability are right*.³²⁴ Yet, one cannot say that America does not need Europe as an ally.

Indeed, today, although the two continents' social and cultural differences in important issues remain,³²⁵ their economies become more and more closely linked. EU and US are working together in places such as Afghanistan, Kosovo and Lebanon too.³²⁶ And on issues, such as trade, they plan to tear down non-tariff barriers. In short, America and Europe are less viewed as Mars and Venus.³²⁷ Transatlantic relations have improved during the second Bush administration. Both sides have shown moderation in dealing with third countries. For example, France, Spain and Italy want to resume direct aid to the Palestinian Authority; America, Britain and Germany do not. But all have agreed to impose sanctions on Hamas. Similarly, few Europeans would countenance military action against Iran and Americans just might. Yet America has supported the European three (Britain, France and Germany) in their diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear-weapons ambitions.

European and American companies have billions of dollars of assets invested in each other's markets. Some 14m jobs depend on transatlantic

³²³ The term *dumb weapons* is commonly used in relation to conventional weapons that have rudimentary or no guidance system as opposed to *smart weapons* or *precision weapons* that are guided by advanced electronic systems such as GPS or satellites. See: Tom Baldwin, and Roy Watson, "France accused of creating a new Yalta in Europe," *The Times*, London, 14.03.2003.

³²⁴ Lord Robertson, "The Transatlantic Link," Speech given at the Annual Conference of the defence and Society, 21.01.2002, Salen, Sweden, available online, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/sp2002.htm>.

³²⁵ America's openness to new technology conflicts with Europe's instinctive suspicion of genetically modified organisms, for example: Europeans complain that America still does not work on climate change problems; Americans think Europeans are too addicted to generous social welfare. Europeans complain that Americans step on private rights in the war on terror, not just in Guantánamo Bay but when demanding passenger data from airlines; Americans say that timidity over rules of engagement makes some European troops in Afghanistan useless.

³²⁶ *The Economist*, Charlemagne, "Transatlantic Tensions Today", 07.04.2007.

³²⁷ See Figure 4 below, over EU-US Trade, p. 335.

trade and investment. But apart from this reality, Americans and Europeans have a common duty, as the democratic, developed Western World, to nurture their relationship, which requires a serious debate about values, methods, and capabilities. The two sides of the Atlantic do need to build a common and cooperative approach to the complex and challenging global environment and a response to the threats of terrorism and WMD. To that extent their values interconnect just as their economies do.

The potential repercussions of Bush's unilateral action are important.³²⁸ There may be a decrease in future support for US military action. As Lord Robertson has said, *Even superpowers need allies and coalitions*. Yet he acknowledges *if we (European nations) are to ensure that the US moves neither towards unilateralism nor isolationism, all European countries must show a new willingness to develop new crisis management capabilities*.³²⁹ The divisions within the EU over military action in Iraq — British participation, Dutch, Danish, Finnish, Spanish, and Italian support, German refusal, and France's abstention unless WMD are used — ensure that the ESDP needs strong impetus.

At this time it is unlikely that Europeans would withdrawal from NATO and take on the expense of providing for their own defence for both economic political reasons. Even the recent agreement between France, Germany, and Britain to procure greater military heavy-lift capabilities and European nations' participation in the Joint Strike Fighter are not enough to overcome Europe's capabilities gap.³³⁰

If America is to analyse and overcome the divergence of transatlantic relations, an important first step is to identify the common characteristics of the EU Member States. This task is currently overwhelming in light of Great Britain's history of American support, France's Gaullist tradition, Denmark's refusal to participate in a European security force, and the other neutral EU members previously mentioned.

Additionally, with the accession of new members to the EU in the last years, one could argue that there is not, nor will there ever be, a common cultural denominator in the EU. This, coupled with NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO's recent offer of admission talks to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia implies that NATO will remain the dominate security organisation in Europe, and therefore the CFSP does not need to grow more. Additionally, these aspiring EU members are likely to prefer an increase in the structural funds budget of the EU rather than a costly CFSP, since their membership, current or pending, in NATO guarantees their security.³³¹

³²⁸ Charles Krauthammer, "The New Unilateralism," *Washington Post*, 08.06.2001, p. A29.

³²⁹ Lord Robertson, Speech Given at the First Magazine Dinner, Claridge's Hotel, London, 24.01.2002, available from www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020124a.htm.

³³⁰ The Joint Strike Fighter is a joint fighter jet project that includes the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States.

³³¹ Gale A. Mattox, "The United States: Stability Through Engagement and Enlargement," in Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, eds., *Enlarging NATO: The*

Likewise, as the EU expands its territory and population, its ability to protect its members declines. Economic integration has been in process for over fifty years and has made its greatest progress in the last fifteen but today Europe suffers again from the worst international economic crisis since 1929. If the past is any indicator of the future, and the EU is serious about ESDP, then the expansion or 'widening' of the EU should be careful to permit the fruition of common values and the modification of ESDP. Once an expanded and American-independent ESDI is agreed upon, new members of the EU would have to accept it.³³²

On the other side of the Atlantic, the US needs to be more sensitive to European opinions in international affairs. Whether or not America is going to take its own decisions in the end, the continuation of an open dialogue with, and an understanding of, not necessarily agreement with, European nations is necessary. In addition, one must not overlook that, although Britain remains America's strongest ally in Western Europe, the past dissention in the Labor Party over Prime Minister Tony Blair's support of the US could be a sign to the Bush Administration that British citizens feel they have repaid their outstanding debt to America, and that British gratitude for American involvement in the two World Wars is fading.³³³

The EU's tendency to grow in economic and not on military terms imply that Europeans ability to influence transatlantic relations is weakening. French and Russian opposition to the Iraqi invasion prevented the United States and Great Britain from seeking UN sanction for their invasion. In the long-term, the strong position of France and Germany may prove the decisive moment in Europe's security and defence development.³³⁴

Furthermore, Europe's inability to initiate military action without American leadership has been proven over the last decade. Likewise, the negotiations required to remove the EU's institutionalised dependence on NATO is likely to be a drawn-out and difficult process—as most treaty negotiations are.³³⁵

National Debates, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2001, p.p. 19-20; James P. Thomas, "The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions", *Adelphi Paper*, No.333, London: IISS, 2000, p. 47; Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, *Global NATO*, Foreign Affairs, Vol 85, No 5, September-October 2006; Richard E Rupp, *NATO after 9/11 : an alliance in continuing decline*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, 2nd Edition.

³³² Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 85, No 5, September-October 2006; Richard E Rupp, *NATO after 9/11 : an alliance in continuing decline*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, 2nd Edition; Dimitris Chrysoschoou, Kostas Ifantis, Stelios Stavridis, Michael J. Tsinisizelis, *Theory and Reform in the European Union (Europe in Change)*, Manchester University Press, 2003.

³³³ Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005, 2nd edition; Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty First Century*, Atlantic, New York, 2003.

³³⁴ The Economist, "Britain, America and Iraq. Blair's big risk", 05.09.2002; Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, No. 113, June-July 2002; Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf; 1st edition, 2003.

³³⁵ The Economist "Tackling a Hydra," 01.02.2003; Steven Yost, "Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe." *International Affairs*, 78, No. 2, 2002, p.p. 277-300.

Furthermore, it is unimaginable that the US would go to war with Europe over economic differences, and Europe is unlikely to withdraw from the security that it is provided by the United States through NATO. So, it is difficult to argue that a world in which Europe and America are more and more uncooperative or even at odds on security matters will be more stable or responsive to regional and global threats. A security breakdown between the two sides of the Atlantic would mean the end of the stability and cooperative security environment in which the Western World has relied since 1989.

Britain has persistently relied on Euro-Atlantic relations. Due to its military potential, including nuclear weapons, and historical experiences, Britain is a European political-military power, playing an important role in the North Atlantic Alliance alongside the US. Blair does consider America the indispensable power without which the global community cannot pursue a multilateralist approach to world problems. This is where Europe must also be; a leader in ideas and in influence, cooperating with friends, balanced between objective facts and subjective perceptions. Blair faithfully believed in this relationship and made it more than clear supporting US till the end in the Iraq war. This leadership stance also has some very important lessons to teach us.

4. Blair's vision and role in Iraq

Britain has persistently relied on Euro-Atlantic relations. Due to its military potential, including nuclear weapons, and historical experiences, Britain is a European political-military power, playing an important role in the North Atlantic Alliance alongside the US. Though traditionally distant to European affairs, Britain has been among the leading countries cooperating in European Security and Defence Identity initiative while examining a number of problems and constraints, such as the balance of forces, relations with America and European NATO partners, presence in security institutions (such as the Western European Union, EDA and the European Union).

Iraq was destined to fail given the serious mistakes that have been made concerning the planning and the execution of the mission. In addition, the reasons to go to war were not justified neither before (no UN resolution backing up the mission) nor in the aftermath of the war. No WMD were to be found neither evidence of linkage between Saddam and Al-Qaeda.³³⁶

³³⁶ Butler was commissioned by Blair in February to investigate the intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, following the failure to find any such arms. His inquiry said when ministers started to consider military action against Iraq in March 2002, the intelligence was *insufficiently robust* to justify claims that Iraq was in breach of UN resolutions requiring it to disarm. But Butler said the dossier published on September of that year on the threat posed by former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein pushed the government's case to the limits of available intelligence.

The results of the removal of Saddam's regime, an autocratic, inhumane to its own people and to its neighbour ruler, will be clearer in the long term. For the time being though it is easy to see that terrorism is not over, neither rogue states have been less keen to address threatening policies. US faced a strong crisis of legitimacy and Britain has also paid a high price of low popularity both in Europe and abroad alongside America.

4.1. Why Blair supported the Bush Administration, especially in the Iraq war?

Blair's decision to support US war in Iraq after the end of the Afghan war was consistent with his policy of the importance given to the Anglo-American Special Relationship and his history of antagonism with Saddam Hussein. Blair was in line with his ideals of freedom and justice against a regime which was violating human rights in the worst way. With the passage of time and with the evolution of events, the evolution of his own ideas about humanitarian intervention and globalisation (Kosovo and Chicago Speech) and US pressure, he came to link Saddam to one of the major threats to international peace.

Iraq followed 9/11, and the war in Afghanistan. For Blair, Saddam was a serious threat to world peace, as we shall see, long before 2003. Blair believes that the combination of Weapons of Mass Destruction; rogue states and terrorism constitute one of the greatest new security threats of our time and transatlantic unity is indispensable for wining these threats. And on this, he is right.

Blair said. If we are wrong, we will have destroyed a threat that at its least is responsible for inhuman carnage and suffering. That is something I am confident history will forgive. But if our critics are wrong (...) and we do not act, then we will have hesitated in the face of this menace when we should have given leadership. That is something history will not forgive. If Europe and America are together, the others will work with us.

If we split, the rest will play around, play us off, and nothing but mischief will be the result of it. To be a serious partner, Europe must take on and defeat the anti-Americanism that sometimes passes for its political discourse. And what America must do is show that this is a partnership built on persuasion, not command.³³⁷

Blair also noted that new nations in central and eastern Europe that have already joined and others that are set to join the European Union are strong supporters of the transatlantic alliance. Blair pledged his

Iraq WMD claims *seriously flawed* CNN, on-line, "Spy chief should keep job, says report", Wednesday, July 14, 2004 <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/07/14/butler.blair/index.html> last access: 02.03.2007.

³³⁷ Tony Blair, "What I've learned", 31.05.2007, The Economist, www.economist.com; Tony Blair, "A Battle for Global Values", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 1, January-February 2007 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html> last access: 01.03.2007.

strong support for the Anglo-American alliance, particularly when it comes to fighting what he called the new and deadly virus of international terrorism. He also said that the United States should and must be the leader of that fight. *It is dangerous because it is not rivalry, but partnership, we need - a common will and a shared purpose in the face of a common threat.*³³⁸

Indeed there are long-term benefits for Britain in staying close to the US; and there are long-term benefits for Europe and the world in having this English-speaking liberal internationalist making the case for multilateralism in America. Europe can never build a liberal international order against the US. So it's a defensible strategic choice. On this he was also right.

Saddam's Iraq would not have been top of any objective shortlist of danger points: North Korea was (and is) more advanced in developing nuclear weapons; Saudi Arabia had a lot more to do with Al-Qaeda than Iraq did. But no other serving leader had used chemical weapons against his neighbours and his own people, and no one else had violated so many UN disarmament resolutions.

Secondly, Saddam ran a brutal dictatorship - and Blair has strong religious instincts being a liberal interventionist at the same time.³³⁹ Blair supports the idea that the West should try consistently to promote respect for human rights, pluralism, democracy. And he's actually more of a liberal interventionist than George Bush is. Thus, he could not expect that no significant WMD would be found five months after the toppling of Saddam. Nor could he have easily anticipated that the US would make such an unholy mess of the post-war occupation.

The conscious strategic choice to remain close to the United States was not an alternative to Britain's ties with Europe but the precondition for Britain being a *bridge* between Europe and the US.³⁴⁰ That strategy had developed during the Clinton years; it informed his unexpected embrace of George Bush in 2001; it was greatly reinforced by the 9/11 attacks; but then faced its hardest test.

³³⁸ CNN, Blair, Bush defend war, Friday, 18.06.2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/07/17/blair/>; see also Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty First Century*, Atlantic, New York, 2003.

³³⁹ The principles of a *just war* originated with classical Greek and Roman philosophers, but in the Christian tradition it was St. Augustine (354-430), and later St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who laid the modern foundations of just war theory. Essentially just war theory argues that a war is only a just war if it is both justified (*ius ad bellum*) and conducted in an ethical manner (*ius in bello*). Two of the essential conditions for the waging of a just war is that it must be for a just cause and fought with good intentions. Traditionally the only just causes were in response to an armed attack or to redress a grave wrong suffered. In addition, only a war lawfully declared by a government of a sovereign state could be considered a just war. See more on Chris Abbott, "Rights and Responsibilities The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention", Oxford Research Group, October 2004 <http://www.reclaimourun.org/RightandResponsibilities.htm>; <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blair/liberal/ash.html>.

³⁴⁰ Peter Riddell, "Tony Blair Needs a Hug", *Foreign Policy*, No 139, November-December 2003, p. 90; Paul Rogers, "Reviewing Britains Security", *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No 1, January 1998, p.p. 105-118.

A close security partnership with the United States has been and remains a corner stone of British foreign and defence policies. Though, there was considerable unease in the UK over the Bush Administration's actions on a wide range of issues as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court and in the past, British governments have distanced themselves from the United States when the short-term national interests of the two countries have clashed,³⁴¹ this was not the case with Iraq. The leadership in both countries shared a common perception of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime and had a mutual interest in countering it.

4.1.1. Weapons of Mass Destruction – Between a new world order and global chaos

As we discussed already, the British government's stance on Iraq for many years has been characterised by a suspicion that Saddam Hussein was continuing to develop WMD, a concern reinforced by his refusal to comply with the cease-fire conditions mandated after the Gulf War and its unwillingness to cooperate unconditionally with UN weapons inspectors. The joint press statement released after Blair's first meeting with George Bush in February 2001 emphasised the determination of both leaders to oppose the development and use of WMD by Iraq.³⁴²

So clearly for Blair *if people say: why should Britain care? I answer: because there is no way that this man, in this region above all regions, could begin a conflict using such weapons and the consequences not engulf the whole world.*³⁴³ Thus, given the great importance of the military and political risks, not least to Blair's reputation domestically and internationally, it is hard not to conclude that government policy was ultimately driven by a real conviction that Saddam Hussein posed a real and continuing threat to Britain's security.

4.1.2. Blair's vision of Britain as a pivotal power

Blair had his own philosophy for confronting the problem of Iraq too.

*My objectives must be to pull the Americans towards a strategy that is sensible in Iraq, contemplate military action only in the right circumstances and broaden strategy so that it is about the wider world, including the Middle East peace process, Africa, staying and seeing it through in Afghanistan.*³⁴⁴

³⁴¹ Early in its term, the Bush administration declared war on all outstanding international treaties. First he repudiated the Kyoto Protocol on the environment. Then came Washington's withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and its repudiation of the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. Just as unpopular was the US policy on the International Criminal Court. The ICC accord may have its flaws, but the Bush team broke new legal ground when it declared Clinton's signature of the treaty null and void.

³⁴² The White House, "Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair," Office of the Press Secretary, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>.

³⁴³ Prime Minister's Iraq statement to Parliament, 24.09.2002, <http://www.number10.gov.uk>.

³⁴⁴ Interview, quoted in Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005, p. 572.

Well before 9/11 and the war with Iraq, Blair also confirmed a continuing commitment to an international role when he expressed his vision of the UK's place in the world. *It is to use the strengths of our history to build our future not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future. Engaged, open, dynamic, a partner and, where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence, that is where Britain must be.*³⁴⁵

He saw the Iraq crisis as an opportunity to reinforce the UK's image as a uniquely reliable ally, as well as its status as Europe's most significant diplomatic and military power on the world stage. In these circumstances, the UK might yet be able to remain both a leading player in Europe and a special partner of the United States and thus realise Blair's vision of Britain as a pivotal power.

4.1.3. The threat of pushing Americans into a unilateralist position

Blair believed that a widening split caused by the divergence between America and Europe over Iraq would have disastrous consequences for world stability³⁴⁶. Besides, the British government was anxious to control the unilateralist instincts of the Bush Administration.

*What I say to France and Germany and all my other European Union colleagues is take care, because just as America helps to define and influence our politics so what we do in Europe helps to define and influence American politics. We will reap a whirlwind if we push the Americans into a unilateralist position in which they are at the centre of this unipolar world.*³⁴⁷

For Blair, *US unilateralism was perceived as a potential threat to Britain's special security partnership and could have wider, unpredictable international consequences. Thus the only way to influence American Foreign Policy was to establish a constructive relationship with its policy makers.*³⁴⁸ This is what he tried to do following the events of 9/11 terrorists attacks and the Iraq crisis. He hoped for US support in pursuing his own national aims of external policy; such as seeking peace in the Middle East and bringing greater prosperity to Africa.

4.1.4. Why doing it without the back up of UN

It has been widely speculated that Blair, and to a lesser extent other foreign leaders, convinced a reluctant Bush to take the UN route. Undoubtedly, Blair favoured this option for both strategic and domestic political

³⁴⁵ Speech by Tony Blair, at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, Guildhall, London, 22 November 1999, <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.

³⁴⁶ The Economist, "Britain, America and Iraq. Blair's big risk", 05.09.2002.

³⁴⁷ UK Parliament House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, "Iraq", column 173, 04.03.2003 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cm-hansrd/vo030108/debtext/30108-04.htm> last access: 01.07.2007.

³⁴⁸ Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005.

reasons. In a late summer 2002 survey by British ICM Research, 71 per cent of the respondents opposed UK *involvement in an invasion of Iraq*.³⁴⁹

Blair, of course, was hardly the only international leader to have strong views on Iraq and the UN. Indeed, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President Jacques Chirac called for a cohesive European front against unilateral US military action against Baghdad at that point.³⁵⁰ However, Blair tried forcefully to achieve a second resolution³⁵¹, but he failed. Blair and his diplomats worked hard to craft this compromise, but Washington's inflexibility doomed the effort. Instead, either because of the military timetable or because he was frustrated with the diplomatic process, Bush offered a one-week extension to mid-March - no compromise at all, since that was when military operations ultimately commenced anyway. Merely offering several more weeks would likely have yielded ten votes for the British resolution, but Bush refused. Obtaining a majority simply was not a high priority for the White House, which believed that it would be vindicated by military success. So long as Blair believed a good faith effort to compromise had been made, the Americans considered that good enough.³⁵²

Could then Blair retreat at this stage? It would have been very difficult not only because the British troops were already deployed in the region but for technical reasons as well. Bush had offered the opportunity for British troops coming in after the end of the conflict as peacekeepers, fearing Blair's failure in the up-coming elections. Blair denied. He believed wisely or not that he had to stay by America's side, pursuing his country's interests.³⁵³

4.1.5. Idealism thus becomes realpolitik

Blair thinks that American power is fundamentally a force for good in the world, best engaged positively and treated with sympathy rather than suspicion. This is the clearest difference between Blair and his critics.³⁵⁴ Critics view American power as a threat that must be limited by

³⁴⁹ Glenn Frankel, "Blair Assails Hussein, Backs Bush on Iraq; Pro-U.S. Stance Taken Despite Criticism at Home", *Washington Post*, 04.09.2002, p. A16.

³⁵⁰ David Cracknell and Nicholas Rufford, "Blair and Bush Warn of Iraq Threat to UK" *Sunday Times*, 08.09.2002.

³⁵¹ Paul Waugh, "Blair: It Is Our Duty to Support US over Iraq", *The Independent*, 04.09.2002.

³⁵² James P. Rubin, "Stumbling Into War", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, No 5, September-October 2003, www.foreignaffairs.org/ last access: 15.11.2007.

³⁵³ Characteristic is his response on the matter of a second resolution to a question posed by Con Coughlin (see: Con Coughlin, *American Ally*, Politico's, US 2006 p. 384). *Look, I would have liked a second resolution. Of course I would have. It would have made life a lot easier for me. But we couldn't get the second resolution, not because the objectives had changed in Iraq, but because there was a political disagreement. So, then, at the end you have to decide: Are you going to do this thing or not do it, and to have walked away at that point would just have been a real failure of courage.*

³⁵⁴ Clare Short, *An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power*, Free Press, 2005, 2nd edition; Peter Riddell, *The Unfulfilled Prime Minister: Tony Blair and the End of Optimism*, Politico's Publishing, 2004; James Naughtie, *The Rivals: The Intimate*

multilateralism and international law. For Britain, foreign policy goals, such as security and stability in the Middle East, are subject to America's willingness to use its power. The EU does not possess the power to be a substitute. So, Blair aimed to monitor, influence and restrain America's actions, remaining both a leading player in Europe and realising his vision of enhanced Britain's power in the world scene.

Blair has claimed:

For all our differences, we should be very clear. Europe and America share the same values. We should stick together. That requires a strong transatlantic alliance. It also means a strong, effective and capable EU. A weak Europe is a poor ally. That is why we need closer co-operation between the nations of the EU and effective European institutions. In a world in which China and India will each have a population three times that of the EU, anything else is completely out of date.

This new terrorism has an ideology. It is based on an total perversion of the proper faith of Islam. But it uses a sense of victimhood and grievance in the Muslim world. Its world view is completely reactionary. But its understanding of terrorism and its power in an era of globalisation is arrestingly sophisticated and strategic. Many disagree with its methods. But too many share some of its sentiments.³⁵⁵

This requires, across the board, an active foreign policy of engagement, not isolation. And it cannot be achieved without a strong alliance, with the United States and Europe at its core. The necessary alliance does not end there, but it does begin there.³⁵⁶

4.2. Lessons to avoid

Blair's supported America in Iraq, right or wrong. But personal good will cannot be a substitute for getting the arguments right. Arguments and subsequent explanations have to be based on the foundations of national interest, in order to gain public support.³⁵⁷

Britain gained no preferential treatment³⁵⁸. Of course, Blair is still popular in America, and he will be able to put that popularity to good

Story of a Political Marriage, Fourth Estate, 2002; Francis Beckett & David Hencke, *The Blairs and Their Court*, Aurum Press, 2004.

³⁵⁵ Tony Blair, "A Battle for Global Values", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 1, January-February 2007 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html> last access: 01.03.2007.

³⁵⁶ Tony Blair, "A Battle for Global Values", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 1, January-February 2007 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html> last access: 01.03.2007.

³⁵⁷ Works of Tony Blair, *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government*, Diane Publishing, 2003; *The Courage of Our Convictions*, Fabian Society, 2003; *Superpower: Not Superstate?*, Federal Trust European Essays, Federal Trust for Education & Research, 2000; *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century*, Fabian Society, 1998.

³⁵⁸ Even when it came to handing out contracts for Iraqi construction over competitor countries that had spent years bankrolling Saddam and had ferociously opposed the war; See Robin Harris, "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations", The Heritage Foundation, 24.05.2006, <http://www.heritage.org/research/europe/wm1091Ch2.cfm?renderforprint=1> last access: 24.06.2007.

use for years to come. Britain even seems, on occasion, to be able to influence American policy. The Administration's shift in favour of aid to Africa reflects one of Blair's private obsessions. The US has taken a marginally more favourable view of the Palestinians, at least until the election of Hamas, because of British press. Above all, American attitudes toward the European project have become more favourable too.

Nevertheless, concerning Blair's bridge project, the result of Blair's relationship with Bush is that its very closeness has brought America's standing in Britain low. Even support for the US war against terrorism has dropped since 2002 from almost 70 per cent to barely 50 per cent. The British, like the other main European nations, now support a more distant foreign and security relationship with the US. They give higher ratings to Germany, France, Japan, and even China than to the US.³⁵⁹

Blair believes that history will give the verdict on Iraq, but so far Iraq has been a failure case in contacting war:³⁶⁰ No legitimate reasoning behind the endeavour, neither from the U.N nor from public opinion, the motivations of WMD possession and links with Al Qaeda of the Saddam regime were to be found and last but not least, no planning for the aftermath reconstruction and stabilisation of the country. The Shia-Sunni gap has been wider across the Muslim world. The situation in Iran has been more aggressive.³⁶¹ The popularity of the US and Britain is at low levels.

Iraq also exposed the weakness of Blairite foreign policy, working privately in Washington, while avoiding all public disagreement. This is what Timothy Garton Ash calls the Jeeves school of diplomacy. For Timothy Garton Ash, this school has failed, as Britain alone is no longer big enough to influence United States, especially when Americans take British support for granted. US needs more than Britain alone. Needs a friend big enough as a strong EU, speaking with a single voice could be. To achieve that European voice requires the full commitment of Germany, France and Britain.³⁶²

Blair has ended up with terrific ties to America and frayed ones to Europe. So his bridge did not seem attached safely to both sides.

³⁵⁹ The Pew Research, Survey Reports, "A Year After Iraq War. Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists", <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=796>, last access: 01.02.2006.

³⁶⁰ Timothy Garton Ash, "A Blair's bridge. A strategic choice to stay close to the United States led us to Iraq. Was it worth it?" *The Guardian*, Thursday 04.09.2003; Timothy Garton Ash, "Brown must learn the lessons from Blair's three big mistakes" *The Guardian*, Thursday, 10.05.2007; Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West*, Penguin Books, London 2005.

³⁶¹ Nazila Fathi and Michael Slackman, "Unrest in Iran Sharply Deepens Rift Among Clerics", *New York Times*, 21.06.2009.

³⁶² Timothy Garton Ash, "Iraq looms large in Tony Blair's legacy, What are the lessons from the outgoing British prime minister's foreign policy?", *Los Angeles Times*, 10.05.2007, <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-ash10may10,0,1429434.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions> last access: 01.07.2007.

4.3. Lessons to take on

Europeans should answer Kagan's Mars and Venus differences between US and Europe, by examining their future policy.³⁶³ It is unsatisfactory that millions of Europeans rely solely on Americans to defend them. There is no such thing as a free defence. Europeans have to find a way to pay for these arrangements.

Blair supports a stronger European defence. It is easy to maintain a consensus with the United States when there is a common, visible threat focussed on European territory but is difficult to maintain a coincidence of interests in a world of more distant threats. Europeans should develop a joint strategy with the US; yet the US will be interested in a joint strategy only to the extent that the Europeans bring some assets to the table.

Blair was right to see as dangerous both for the world and for Washington itself acting entirely on its own as a superpower. For the US to find itself dominant but isolated will serve nobody's interests.³⁶⁴

Indeed, the possibility of deploying European force would have an impact on relations with the US. It would also make a difference to European foreign policy. European military capabilities would bring a more serious European approach to foreign policy. Precisely, as Churchill argued almost a century ago and Kagan reinforces the argument, power brings responsibility. In a complex and dangerous world, for Europe not to use its full potential amounts to irresponsibility.³⁶⁵

To sum up, as Tony Blair has affirmed and proved with his stance in Iraq, the United States can be a difficult friend to have. *But the strain of anti-American feeling in parts of Europe is madness when set against the long-term interests of the world we believe in. The danger with the United States today is not that it is too involved in the world. The danger is that it might pull up the drawbridge and disengage. The world needs it involved. The world wants it engaged. The reality is that none of the problems that press in on us can be resolved or even approached*

³⁶³ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, No. 113, June-July 2002; Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf, 1st edition, 2003.

³⁶⁴ Ronald D. Asmus, "United We'll Stand", *Washington Post*, 06.05.2002; Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, Public Affairs, New York, 2001; Wesley Clark, *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire*, Public Affairs New York, 2004; Robert J. Lieber, "No Transatlantic Divorce in the Offing", *Orbis* 44, No. 4, 2000; Robert J. Lieber, *The American Era: Power & Strategy for 21st Century*, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2007; Antony J. Blinken, "The False Crisis over the Atlantic," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 80, No 3, May-June 2001, p.p.35-48; Christian Tusschoff, "The Ties That Bind: Allied Commitments and NATO Before and After September 11," in Esther Brimmer, Benjamin Schreer, and Christian Tusschoff, *Contemporary Perspectives on European Security*, German Issues 27, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 2002, p.p.71-95.

³⁶⁵ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", *Policy Review*, No 113, June-July 2002; Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf, 1st edition, 2003.

*without it.*³⁶⁶ It is indeed easier to exercise influence as a friend than as an enemy.

Action in Iraq was also consistent with Blair's belief that deadly and unpredictable new ways of war and threats with no face, such as terrorism and WMD, are one of the most serious challenges in our era of interdependence and low predictability.³⁶⁷ So, we must act for what we believe in, showing doubtless leadership in times that decisions and action have to be taken.

³⁶⁶ Tony Blair, "A Battle for Global Values", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 86, No 1, January-February 2007 <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay86106/tony-blair/a-battle-for-global-values.html> last access: 01.03.2007.

³⁶⁷ Tony Blair's answer to question endorsed by the current author in the 10^o Almoço Conferência, Diário Digital "Desafios políticos, económicos energéticos para 2009", 19.09.2008, Hotel Altis, Lisbon. Question: What is the future face of ESDP, in our era of "low predictability", and to what extent a European common voice is a feasible project?

Chapter III

NATO, ESDP AND THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

1. NATO's adaptation in times of uncertainty

1.1. NATO's breakthroughs

For NATO, between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a war against international terrorism, the decade from 1991 to 9/11, 2001, constituted a period of profound adjustment and change.³⁶⁸

Indeed, at the beginning of the 90's, NATO witnessed the end of the forty-year struggle between Soviet communism and Western democracy. However, by the end of 1995, NATO was called again to intervene in a peacekeeping mission in the Balkans, extended latterly to Kosovo and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. After 9/11, September the 12th, NATO was again challenged, invoking for the first time its Article 5 of collective defence clause³⁶⁹. Although, the role of the alliance in the war against terrorism was not well defined, NATO was forced to embark on another period of organisational adjustments to best meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

After the end of the Cold War, NATO has successfully pursued cooperation, partnership, and even offered some of the Central and Eastern European states membership in the alliance. NATO grew to 26 Member States in 2004 with the accession of the Baltic States and other ex-East Bloc states; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.³⁷⁰ This is very important because NATO's membership has been a powerful force in getting these states to undertake political, economic and military reforms that they would not otherwise have made. NATO's new states have gained the ultimate defence insurances and guarantees for prosperity.³⁷¹ NATO has also tried to create a unique

³⁶⁸ Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, Allen G. Sens, *NATO and European Security Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism*, Praeger, Westport, 2003.

³⁶⁹ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949: Article 5, parag. 1, NATO on-line library: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm> last access: 30.07.2008.

³⁷⁰ Albania and Croatia, which were invited to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, formally became members too when the accession process was completed on 1st April 2009. Today NATO has 28 member countries.

³⁷¹ Ronald D. Asmus, "Europe's Eastern Promise Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 87, No 1, January-February 2008, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/> last access: 12.03.2008; General John Shalikashvili, *NATO, the*

relationship with Russia, considering the country's weight in European security.³⁷² So, today NATO's frontiers face Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia itself. Prague's definition of NATO as a focal point of any multinational military response to terrorism was given too considerable credibility.³⁷³

With the end of the Cold War, NATO also faced the desire of Western European countries to have more power over security and defence policies. The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) with competence in foreign and security policy as well as in homeland defence: in organised crime, refugee flows, illegal migration, drugs and arms trafficking. Agreements, as we shall see, followed at Maastricht (1991), Amsterdam (1997), and Helsinki (1999), Nice (2001), Lisbon (2007) placing the European Union forward both in political jurisdiction and in military capability.³⁷⁴

NATO responded to Europe's new defence developments by constructing a European identity within the alliance and by reorganising its command structures and military plans: it created Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) as a means to allow various coalitions of European and or Partnership for Peace³⁷⁵ countries to contribute to peace support operations.³⁷⁶

Since 1998, with the Saint Malo initiative, European allies have dedicated a good deal of resources and planning to create an autonomous capacity to undertake crisis management operations.³⁷⁷ And Britain has joined its European partners, supporting a reinvestment in security and defence that will actually benefit NATO in the long run and keep the United States fully engaged.

NATO and EU have worked together to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts in Europe and beyond where NATO has been and

European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005, edition 2nd.

³⁷² The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO; formally launched on 10-11 January 1994, NATO summit in Brussels, Belgium. Most of the states that have joined the PfP (see Figure 2 of the current work, p. 331) especially from Central and Eastern Europe, have indicated a desire to join NATO. See NATO on-line: <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/>.

³⁷³ Michael Ruhle, "NATO after Prague: learning the lessons of 9/11", *Parameters*, 06.22.2003, <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-102835192.html>, last access: 05.01.2006.

³⁷⁴ Steven McGuire and Michael Smith, *The European Union and the United States Competition and Convergence in the Global Arena*, The European Union Series, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.

³⁷⁵ Membership: Figure 2 of the current document.

³⁷⁶ Michael Firlie, "A New Approach. NATO Standing Combined Joint Task Forces", *JFQ* / Autumn-Winter 1999-2000, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0823.pdf last access: 06.03.2007.

³⁷⁷ Margarita Mathiopoulos and István Gyarmati, "Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense", The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 22, No 4, 1999, p.p. 65-76.

continues to be the most important security organisation. EU-NATO cooperation evolving at the highest levels under the direction of Javier Solana and Lord Robertson in the operation Essential Harvest³⁷⁸. When François Léotard, EU Special Envoy at the time, proposed in early September 2001 that Europe's emerging Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)³⁷⁹ should deploy in FYROM to protect the monitors that will be sent by the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EU's foreign ministers, including France dismissed the idea as premature, as they strongly considered America's continuing involvement, through NATO, vital.³⁸⁰

9/11 terrorists attacks in New York and Washington took NATO by surprise. The attacks once again presented NATO with new challenges and responsibilities as a multilateral organisation, a forum for new ideas without which the goal of defeating terrorism could be hardly pursued. As NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson put it on the 28th of September: *The events of September 11 have changed the world. Like the attack on Pearl Harbor 60 years ago, they have seared deeply and unforgettably into our consciousness (...) We know that the struggle against terrorism will be difficult and prolonged. NATO will be a vital component of this new coalition. As a provider of capabilities. As a vehicle for coalition cohesion. And as a forum for the new ideas without which, we will not stay the course.*³⁸¹

Interestingly, though, the United States and the United Kingdom, not NATO, would bear the responsibility for the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. One day after the attacks, the 12th of September 2001, the Bush administration rejected any direct NATO involvement in military operations in Afghanistan. However, US later realised that such involvement was necessary to help it meet the challenges of the global age, particularly because the deployment of forces to Iraq left the United States needing more help in securing and rebuilding Afghanistan.³⁸²

In August 2003, NATO formally took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)³⁸³, which is tasked with helping to

³⁷⁸ In late September 2001, NATO allies agreed to replace Operation Essential Harvest with Operation Amber Fox. This roughly 1,000-strong NATO operation led by the Germans and with strong French participation will provide the military back-up to secure the safety of the international monitors finalizing the implementation of the peace and disarmament accord.

³⁷⁹ RRF's purpose is to intervene in crises before they become full-scale wars, and to release NATO from participating in some military interventions.

³⁸⁰ Alexander Moens, "NATO's Latest Challenges", *Policy Options*, April 2002, p.p.38-45.

³⁸¹ Lord Robertson, Speech by the then NATO Secretary General, NATO Official Site, on-line, <http://www.nato.int/docu/sp-prg/sp-prg-eng.pdf> last access: 29.01.2007.

³⁸² Richard E. Rupp, *NATO AFTER 9/11, An Alliance in Continuing Decline*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

³⁸³ ISAF: see NATO on-line: <http://www.nato.int/isaf/> ; ISAF Contribution by State – Iraq: see Figure 1 below, p. 330.

provide security in post-Taliban Afghanistan.³⁸⁴ Although the ISAF initially operated in the relative safety of the capital and its surroundings, the forces has gradually expanded its responsibility and reach throughout Afghanistan, including into the dangerous southern section of the country. Military presence in the country has grown from 5,000 troops at the beginning of operations to, by October 2008, an estimated 50,700 troops from 40 countries, with NATO members providing the core of the force³⁸⁵.

NATO's command of the operation in Afghanistan is not the only example of its involvement outside of Europe. NATO forces have trained Iraqi military officers and coordinated the delivery of essential military equipment to Iraq's security forces. From 2001 till 2007, US trained over 215,000 Iraqi and over 82,000 Afghan security forces, in partnership with Coalition forces.³⁸⁶ From June 2005 to the end of 2007, NATO helped the African Union (AU) expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel.³⁸⁷ Hence, as NATO's geographic range has expanded, so has the scope of its operations; the alliance now is involved in operations that are no longer strictly related to territorial integrity but to international stability too.³⁸⁸

³⁸⁴ NATO's engagement is three-fold:

- through leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an international force of some 43,250 troops (including National Support Elements) that assists the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating the conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction;

- a Senior Civilian Representative, responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the Alliance's commitment to the country, who works closely with ISAF, liaises with the Afghan government and other international organisations, and maintains contacts with neighbouring countries.

- a substantial programme of cooperation with Afghanistan, concentrating on defence reform, defence institution-building and the military aspects of security sector reform.

See also Paul Cornish, "Afghanistan Again", *World Today*, Vol. 62, No. 8 - 9, August /September 2006, p. p. 13-15.

³⁸⁵ Note: The number of *boots-on-the-ground* are approximations due to regular unit rotations and the different ways in which the US Joint Staff and ISAF account for personnel.

See: Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance", Order Code RL33627, 19.04.2009, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf last access: 19.05.2009.

³⁸⁶ US Department of Defence, <http://www.defense.gov/> last access: 11.06.2008.

³⁸⁷ NATO's support to the African Union started in 2005 with assistance to the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This was the Alliance's first mission on the African continent and as such represents a landmark decision by the North Atlantic Council. Since then, NATO has committed to support other AU missions and objectives. See "NATO's assistance to the African Union for Darfur", NATO's Official Site: <http://www.nato.int/issues/darfur/practice.html> last access: 01.02.2008.

³⁸⁸ The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is a 24/7 focal point for coordinating disaster relief efforts among NATO member and

The end of the Cold War eliminated one of the main rationales for NATO and many—the estrangers school, in particular—predicted its downfall.³⁸⁹ The establishment school, on the other hand, point out that NATO had been through many crises before but had survived them all.³⁹⁰ The establishment also insisted that an organisation that in 1999 had admitted three new members and in 2004 admitted seven more could not be called declining.³⁹¹ NATO continues to be the biggest security organisation in the transatlantic region.³⁹²

partner countries. For example, NATO airlifted 3,500 tons of supplies donated by alliance members and other countries into the earthquake-stricken region of Kashmir and provided medical and other relief. It also responded to the tsunami in Indonesia by donating material that was used in the construction of four new bridges, and it supplied relief items, such as food, water-purification units, generators, and helicopters, to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States.

³⁸⁹ In the first chapter we discussed thoroughly these two schools of thought on transatlantic relations and crisis, that dominated the academic discussion agenda on the issue. See, for example, Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” *Policy Review*, No.113, June-July 2002; Charles Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No.2, Fall 1998, p.p.40-79; Julian Lindley-French, “Terms of Engagement: The Paradox of American Power and the Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 September”, *Institute for Security Studies, Chailot Papers*, May 2002, No.52; Jessica Matthews, “Estranged Allies,” *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2001, p.p. 48-53; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the cold war,” *International Security*, Vol 15, No 1, Summer 1990, p.p. 5-56; John J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacificer,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 5, September-October 2001, p.p. 46-61; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2001; Stephen M. Walt, “The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart,” *The National Interest*, Winter 1989/99, p.p.3-11.

³⁹⁰ Government and NATO representatives are typical spokespersons of this school of thought. See, Ronald D. Asmus, “United We’ll Stand,” *Washington Post*, 06.05.2002; Debate, Ronald Asmus vs. Charles Grant: “Can NATO Remain an Effective Military and Political Alliance if it Keeps Growing,” *NATO Review*, Spring 2002; Antony J. Blinken, “The False Crisis over the Atlantic,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 80, No 3, May-June 2001, pp. 35-48; Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War*, Public Affairs, New York 2001; Wesley Clark, Chas Freeman, Jr., Max Cleland and Gordon Smith, *Permanent Alliance? NATO’s Prague Summit and Beyond*, The Atlantic Council, Report of the Atlantic Council Working Group on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance, Washington D.C. April 2001; Christian Tusschoff, “The Ties That Bind: Allied Commitments and NATO Before and After September 11,” in Esther Brimmer, Benjamin Schreer, and Christian Tusschoff, *Contemporary Perspectives on European Security*, Washington D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, *German Issues* 27, 2002, p.p.71-95. Some members of the establishment school also considered that NATO continued to be a useful hedge against a possible resurgence of the Russian threat. See, for example, Robert J. Lieber, “No Transatlantic Divorce in the Offing,” *Orbis*, Fall 2000, p.p. 571-584.

³⁹¹ Note: Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, joined NATO in the Alliance’s first post-Cold War round of enlargement in 1999. On 29 March 2004, seven new countries formally joined the Alliance: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

³⁹² Colin Powell, “Os EUA vão ter um papel de liderança”, Simone Duarte interview in Filadélfia, Publica, 14.06.2009, p.17.

Indeed, NATO facilitated German integration into Western Europe by reassuring Germany's neighbours that its military ambitions would be controlled. In 1989 the US had 325,000 troops in Europe. In 2002, the number of US troops had come down to 100,000.³⁹³

NATO has always been more than just a military alliance. NATO has been a vehicle that prevented regional hegemonic temptations from taking control over Western Europe. Most importantly, pointing to Article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty, NATO has been a political alliance, which had stressed commitment to democracy and economic collaboration between its members.³⁹⁴

Nonetheless, NATO has also suffered major shortcomings. Burden sharing and power sharing, always overarching issues for the alliance, are becoming more and more a source of conflict and how NATO addresses these issues could very well determine its prospects for survival.

Though NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the mid and late 1990s were successful undertakings, they revealed major constraints in European military capabilities. Kosovo, NATO's first combat mission, also revealed the shortcomings of NATO's integrated command structure. Soon after the war started, NATO had to give up its operational role to the US task force Noble Anvil once its initial plan—a short bombing campaign—failed to threaten Slobodan Milosevic.³⁹⁵ The invocation of Article 5 by the North Atlantic Council on the 12th of September was not an American initiative, and it was not followed by any significant NATO military action. America as the world's sole superpower³⁹⁶ plays a major role in the international security scene, acting unilaterally when necessary. From the American point of view, as we shall see in detail later, NATO seemed more of a cumbersome ally than facilitator to US ventures in the post 9/11 period.

Indeed, after 9/11, not only NATO's problem areas became more evident but new challenges emerge too. First, NATO is not well prepared to deal with the two key security threats that US and Europe face today — terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. These new threats are undefined and military responses to them require highly mobile and flexible forces. Most European countries have insignificant power-projection capabilities. In addition, as pointed out by President Bush, *deterrence—the*

³⁹³ Quoted in "United in Disarray," *Washington Post*, 29.05.2002. See also, Celeste Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the cold war," *International Organisation*, Vol. 54, No. 4, Autumn 2000, p.p. 705-735.

³⁹⁴ Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

³⁹⁵ James P. Thomas, "The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions", *Adelphi Paper* London: IISS, No.333, 2000, p. 47.

³⁹⁶ The word "Superpower" is used in this work defining the power that has all the means: economic, political, and military combined.

*promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.*³⁹⁷ Similarly, the preemptive missions the American administration was envisaging for these new threats require offensive capabilities³⁹⁸ and an offensive warfighting doctrine. NATO does not have these types of capabilities and orientations.³⁹⁹

In the same way, the war against terrorism requires good intelligence, but NATO lacks effective intelligence capabilities. In the Kosovo war the US met approximately 95 percent of NATO's intelligence requirements. Intelligence sharing within NATO has also proved to be extremely difficult and national governments are usually hesitant to share their intelligence assessments. This impedes multilateral military action too.⁴⁰⁰

In fact after 9/11, priority has been given to better intelligence sharing relating to the threat from terrorism, strengthening cooperation and partnership with other countries outside NATO. Priority has also been given in reinforcing the role of NATO's Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre in contributing to military awareness to counter WMD threats and adapting forces structures, and improving military capabilities in other relevant areas.⁴⁰¹

NATO's consultation and decision-making procedures are also slow and inflexible. NATO is not set up to make rapid decisions. Besides, making decisions quickly and confidentially, essential requirements for a preemptive type of operations, is almost impossible in multilateral organisations.⁴⁰²

On this basis, the directions of NATO's Reform shall be mainly three. Firstly, NATO must find a new balance between addressing its traditional, Euro-centric missions and tackling the new global threats, such as terrorism and WMD. Secondly, it must acquire the military capabilities to fulfil its new missions. And, finally, it must learn to react quickly and flexibly to new challenges.

³⁹⁷ Remarks by President Bush at West Point, June 1, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

³⁹⁸ Meaning nuclear and conventional offensive strike forces, cyber capabilities as offensive computer warfare, and clever but closely controlled technological demonstrations of force which might deflect aggression aimed at Europe and US, etc.

³⁹⁹ Celeste Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the cold war," *International Organisation*, Vol 54, No 4, Autumn 2000, p.p. 705-735.

⁴⁰⁰ Thomas E. Ricks and Vernon Loeb, "Bush Developing Military Policy of Striking First: New Doctrine Addresses Terrorism," *Washington Post*, 10.06.20002.

⁴⁰¹ Military Capabilities are improved through the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism and in the field of terrorism consequence management assistance, including the implementation of a civil emergency planning (CEP) action plan for civil preparedness against possible attacks involving chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents. The mandate given to the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, created after the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001, was made permanent and extended to include analysis of terrorist threats as a whole in addition to those more specifically aimed at NATO. Source: NATO Handbook on-line, NATO 2006, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/hb-en-2006.pdf.

⁴⁰² Stenn Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, Praeger, 1st edition 2004.

More specifically, the first fundamental change for NATO to adopt is the new roles in countering terrorism and dealing with WMD. By this way it shall gain more importance for the transatlantic cooperation. Otherwise it could become completely detached from the US security agenda and subsequently it may lose its importance as powerful military organisation. This would also deprive the transatlantic community and, above all, it would isolate what is in reality the world's most effective facilitator of military coalitions.⁴⁰³

Under this prism and in practical terms, in Prague, the first NATO Summit after 9/11 dealt with three important facts.⁴⁰⁴ Firstly, the fact that in NATO there is no real consensus on how to tackle the new threats. Secondly, the United States felt that the Europeans simply did not possess enough useful capabilities to justify going through NATO to Afghanistan. And, finally, some in US saw NATO as an organisation much too tedious and cumbersome to subject American policy to it. As the transatlantic relationship enters another period of fundamental transition, NATO's Prague Summit demonstrated that the institutional underpinnings of this relationship remain solid.⁴⁰⁵

The approach taken with respect to WMD and their means of delivery was signalling a new era for NATO operations too. The Prague Summit presented an entirely different picture.⁴⁰⁶ The key Summit achievement in this respect, however, may well have been the Prague Capabilities Commitment. These commitments would quadruple the number of outsize aircraft in Europe; establish a pool of air-to-air refuelling aircraft until additional new tankers will be available; ensure that most of NATO's deployable high-readiness forces will have chemical, radiological, biological, and nuclear defence equipment; and significantly increase the non-US stocks of air-delivered, precision-guided munitions.⁴⁰⁷

Technically, these initiatives, which range from enhanced detection capabilities to developing a Prototype Deployable NBC Analytical Laboratory, may not seem great developments. Yet politically are very important. They indicate a heightened awareness of a common threat, and a determination to not let the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction becoming a major transatlantic fault line.

⁴⁰³ Margaret Thatcher, *Statecraft: Strategies for Changing World*, HarperCollins, 2002; Richard E Rupp, *NATO after 9/11 : an alliance in continuing decline*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, 2nd Edition.

⁴⁰⁴ Prague Summit Declaration, 21-22 November 2002, NATO's Official Site <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>.

See also Michael Ruhle, "NATO after Prague: learning the lessons of 9/11", *Parameters*, 06.22.2003, <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-102835192.html> last access: 05.01.2006.

⁴⁰⁵ Richard E Rupp, *NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in continuing decline*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, 2nd Edition.

⁴⁰⁶ Prague Summit Declaration, 21-22 November 2002, NATO's Official Site <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

The Prague Summit further defined NATO's role in combating terrorism with the development of a military concept against terrorism, specific military capabilities to implement this new mission, agreement on a Partnership Action Plan against terrorism, and a stated willingness to act in support of the international community.⁴⁰⁸ These decisions taken preceding and at the Prague Summit put NATO firmly back on track. By claiming a distinct role in combating terrorism, and by giving much more importance to issues related to WMD, NATO has readjusted its agenda in line with both the emerging strategic environment post-9/11, and with the two dominant US security concerns: terrorism and WMD.

In the Prague Summit, the Alliance also set in train a reform of its command structure, which will result in more functionally oriented commands and adopted the US proposal to create a NATO Response Force. This was a catalyst to help Europeans accelerate their force transformation, and a sign of a continued US willingness to view NATO as an important military tool.

If nations persist in these commitments, both NATO and the EU will have made a major step forward to meeting today's news challenges and also strengthening the transatlantic relationship and the European Security and defence Policy project.

Another area of Alliance reform, as we have mentioned before, concerned the organisation itself. Although the Alliance has 28 members, the organisation's working methods have remained largely unchanged from those developed in the early 1950s for an Alliance of 12. As NATO is enlarging both its membership⁴⁰⁹ and its mandate, its working methods cannot be left unaffected. NATO needs to be less bureaucratic and more flexible.

Again the Prague Summit made a good beginning on these issues. Heads of state and government agreed to reduce the numbers of NATO committees (currently 467) by 30 percent. More decisions will be pushed

⁴⁰⁸ *The principal conclusions of the Concept are:*

NATO and its member nations face a real threat from terrorism and countering this threat will, in most circumstances, be time critical.

Nations have the primary responsibility for defence of their populations and infrastructures; therefore NATO should be prepared to augment nations' efforts.

There are 4 roles for NATO's military operations for defence against terrorism. These roles are Anti-Terrorism; Consequence Management; Counter-Terrorism; and Military Cooperation. NATO's Counter Terrorism operations could be either with NATO in the lead, or with NATO in support. Force Protection needs to be considered in all military operations to defend against terrorism.

The Alliance needs to be prepared to conduct military operations to engage terrorist groups and their capabilities, as and where required, as decided by the North Atlantic Council.

Source: NATO on-line, "NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism", <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm> last access: 21.07.2006.

⁴⁰⁹ For a discussion of NATO enlargement, see Gale A. Mattox, "The United States: Stability Through Engagement and Enlargement," in Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, eds., *Enlarging NATO: The National Debates*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2001, p.p.19-20; James P. Thomas, "The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions", Adelphi Paper, No. 333, London: IISS, 2000, p. 47.

towards subordinate committees, leaving the North Atlantic Council room to discuss strategic issues.⁴¹⁰ The procedures for ministerial meetings have been modernised as well, sacrificing formality in order to gain time for decision-making. These changes seek to lead to a less clunky, more efficient working environment inside NATO.⁴¹¹

Concerning decision making, it seems necessary, especially after 9/11, that a modification of NATO's working culture that includes the possibility of setting up flexible coalitions, or that includes the possibility of constructive abstention seems necessary. Yet, a modification to majority voting in the organisation remains for the time being out of question, given the differences in NATO members' interests. States do not seem keen to make sacrifices over their absolute power over national defence decisions.

The idea of NATO acting on occasion as a toolbox, which provides the coalitions of the willing with specific capabilities, continues strong. After 9/11, the need to look at how a toolbox approach can be reconciled with the continuing need for political cohesion seems more pressing than ever.⁴¹² An EU drawing on NATO assets is little else but a coalition of the willing drawing on the NATO toolbox. A NATO thus modernised could deliver a range of capabilities to deal with a range of new challenges. And even on the issue of preemption, which requires rapid decision-taking on a potentially controversial case, one should not assume a priori that NATO would be too awkward to deliver.⁴¹³

Recapitulating Prague Summit, the efforts of NATO are clear, though not surprisingly innovative, to transform itself to best meeting the new threats of the 21st century. US continues engaged in Europe marking Europe's continuing weight in the world stage. Moreover, NATO is the only security organisation working for common values and interests across the Atlantic. Away from this organisation one cannot find many examples of valuable alternatives. Europe on the other hand, does not have the capacity to defend itself alone, dependant totally on European power. This fact makes NATO, at least for the near future, the real deal for Europe too.

So, Prague Adoption of its Prague Capabilities Commitment (awareness of a common threat, and a determination to not let the issue of WMD become a major transatlantic fault line), the NATO Response Force and the reformation of the military command structure, the

⁴¹⁰ Summit Declaration, 21-22 November 2002, NATO's Official Site <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>, last access: 25.011.2002.

⁴¹¹ Hamilton, Daniel S., *Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century*, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, 2004; Paul Cornish, "NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation", *International Affairs*, Vol 80, No 1, January 2004, p.p. 63-74; Rupert Pengelley, "NATO's Transformation: Moving from Uselessness to Useability", *International defence Review*, Vol 37, January 2004, p.p. 34-39.

⁴¹² Alain de Neve, "Les directives politiques globales et l'avenir de la transformation de l'OTAN: vers une vision commune?" *Institut Royal Supérieur de Defense*, Bruxelles, 2006.

⁴¹³ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 85, No 5, September/October 2006; Richard E Rupp, *NATO after 9/11: An alliance in continuing decline*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, 2nd Edition.

adoption of a Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, the decision to support NATO member countries in Afghanistan and the endorsement of a package of initiatives to forge new relationships with partners, all form helpful examples of this reality.

Furthermore, and in the same line of transformation, Riga and Istanbul Summits formed a continuation of the transformation process that begun in the 2002 Prague Summit, which hoped to create a shift from a Cold War alliance against Soviet aggression to a new century coalition against out-of-area security threats. US once more are proved to be engaged in Europe and in supporting the alliance in its new adventure. Europe remains relative to the Americans and Europe needs US support in advancing its new global agenda. NATO continues engaged in both Afghanistan and Iraq and committed to work towards best defending the transatlantic community from the two most alarming security threats: terrorism and WMD.

Istanbul Summit was held between 28th and 29th of June 2004 with some symbolic importance. First of all, it was the first NATO Summit between the leaders of the North-American and Western European states, and Eastern European states, states that were finally, after decades of Cold War tensions, together in the same alliance.⁴¹⁴ The participation of seven new members to the event Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia is also worth noting. Similarly, it is the first NATO Summit after the beginning of the Iraq war.

Moreover, the holding of the Summit in Istanbul marked the increasingly key role played by Turkey. The Summit made clear that NATO's security concerns had shifted towards the southeastern part of the European continent. By shifting eastwards, the Alliance's centre of gravity ventured into very different areas from those on which the Cold War military NATO had focused.⁴¹⁵ In June 2004, shortly before the Summit, NATO issued two fact sheets on nuclear policy, portraying the developments within NATO in a favourable light in the run up to the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.⁴¹⁶ However, no real changes were made to Alliance nuclear policy.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁴ Jean Dufourcq, "Introduction" in *After Istanbul: A Preliminary Assessment*, NATO defence College, 2004, p.p. 12-17, Nicola Butler, "Deep Divisions over Iraq at NATO's Istanbul Summit", *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 2004, p. 78.

⁴¹⁵ NATO, Istanbul Summit website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/home.htm>.

⁴¹⁶ At the 2005 Review Conference, States parties examined the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 2000. The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. See more on: <http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/background.html>.

⁴¹⁷ At the Washington Summit meeting in April 1999, the NATO Allies approved a strategy to equip the Alliance for the security challenges and opportunities of the

The expansion of NATO's operation in Afghanistan and Iraq was also agreed in Istanbul,⁴¹⁸ maintaining support for stability in the Balkans, and the decision to change NATO's defence-planning, strengthening contributions to the fight against terrorism, including WMD aspects. Last but not least, it was agreed to strengthen cooperation with partners and launch the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with countries from the broader Middle East region.

In the same spirit, the Riga Summit or the 19th NATO Summit held from 28th of November to 29th of November 2006.⁴¹⁹ The most important topics discussed were the war in Afghanistan and the future role and borders of the alliance. NATO also committed itself to extend further membership invitations in the 2008 Bucharest Summit. This Summit was the first NATO Summit held on a territory of a former Soviet republic.

In the Bucharest Summit, Croatia and Albania were invited to join the alliance.⁴²⁰ It was also taken the decision to review Georgia's and Ukraine's request to join the NATO Membership Action Plan. The Communiqué of the Summit covers issues as: an agreement to work on the development of options for comprehensive missile defence architecture, the role of arms control, and principles of the Allied approach to energy security. A new policy on cyber defence, a very innovative and refreshing idea for a considered old alliance, was also discussed.⁴²¹

1.2. Grounds to Save NATO in relation to transatlantic unity

NATO remains the most important security mechanism in Europe. The alliance is now seeking to bring stability to other parts of the world. In the process, it is extending both its geographic reach and the range of its operations.

In terms of missions, in recent years, NATO has played peacekeeper in Afghanistan, trained security forces in Iraq, and given logistical support to the African Union's mission in Darfur. It assisted the tsunami relief effort in Indonesia and ferried supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United States and to those of a massive earthquake in

21st century and to guide its future political and military development. The new Strategic Concept comprises the following elements:

The preservation of the transatlantic link.

The maintenance of effective military capabilities.

The development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance.

NATO Handbook, on-line, The Strategic Concept of the Alliance, Chapter 2: The Transformation of the Alliance. <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0203.htm>.

⁴¹⁸ On NATO training missions in Iraq see also Francisco Proença Garcia, "A Participação Portuguesa nas Missões Militares: Iraque, Afeganistão, e Líbano", *Nação e Defesa*, Outono/Inverno, 2008, no 121, 3^a serie, p.p. 177-209.

⁴¹⁹ NATO Riga Summit Declaration- 28-29 November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2006/0611-riga/index.htm>.

⁴²⁰ Note: FYROM was not invited due to its ongoing naming dispute with Greece.

⁴²¹ Bucharest Summit Declaration, Bucharest, 03.04.2008, http://www.summit-bucharest.ro/en/doc_201.html.

Pakistan.⁴²² At the same time, NATO is becoming a less cohesive security arrangement.

NATO remains the primary vehicle for keeping the United States engaged in European security affairs. Yet, after a century that saw two world wars starting in Europe, it would seem more prudent for the US to remain engaged until the continent's future - including that of Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe - is clearer.⁴²³

NATO remains essential to the continent's integration and stabilisation process through enlargement. The incentive of NATO membership has been a powerful force in getting candidates throughout Central and Eastern Europe to undertake political, economic and military reforms that they would not otherwise have made. Building peace through the development of stable, cooperative allies represent a great contribution to European security. NATO enlargement is making major contributions toward the integration of all European states into the Western security community.

Similarly, through the Partnership for Peace, NATO has promoted military cooperation with partners as far away as Central Asia. These newly independent states build military ties, political contacts, institutional links and promise of better relations with the West promoted by the PfP. Building on these relationships, several of America's Central Asian partners ended up making essential contributions to the campaign in Afghanistan.⁴²⁴

NATO is also ensuring peace in the Balkans, where NATO deploys troops in Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, and former Republic of Yugoslavia. And though Europeans under the ESDP is taking over the Balkan mission, NATO's role will be indispensable for at least the next several years. No other organisation can effectively plan and coordinate the diverse military forces from all the contributing countries, including the American military presence.⁴²⁵

Last but not least, NATO remains an essential peace preparation organisation. The European members of NATO do have considerable military resources at their disposal, and they are often willing to undertake missions in which the United States does not want to be directly involved. European contributions to NATO's Bosnia and Kosovo

⁴²² Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 85, No 5, September-October 2006.

⁴²³ Margaret Thatcher, *Statecraft: Strategies for Changing World*, HarperCollins, 2002.

⁴²⁴ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have all provided some form of support to the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan. See more on NATO on-line Library, "Backgrounder - Partners in Central Asia - Key areas of cooperation", http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/backgrounder/partners_central_asia/html_en/azie04.html.

⁴²⁵ Note: NATO is helping to bring stability to the Balkans by leading a peace-keeping mission in Kosovo and assisting the governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in reforming their armed forces.

For more see: Dana H Allin, *NATO's Balkan Interventions*, Adelphi papers, Oxford University Press, 2002; Ciascai, Gheorghe Teodor, *Quelle approche pour l'OTAN dans les Balkans a la lumiere des evolutions de la securite dans la region?* NATO defence College, Rome, 2005.

campaigns were indispensable to the success of those operations, and today European NATO members (and Partners) are providing the overwhelming majority of Balkan peacekeeping forces, using NATO doctrines, tactics, procedures and interoperable equipment.⁴²⁶

NATO can make important military contributions even in operations where the Alliance as such is not involved. This was the case, for example, during the Gulf War and in parts of the operation in and around Afghanistan. NATO was not formally involved in either case, but in both cases Allied forces, bases and cooperation among NATO militaries were critical. In the Afghan campaign, most NATO allies were excluded from the initial operations for understandable reasons, but have become really involved over time.⁴²⁷

Interestingly, when it was time to organise an international security force for Afghanistan to provide stability once victory was won, European NATO allies provided the vast majority of the forces. By summer 2002 nearly half of the 13,000 foreign troops there came from NATO allies other than the United States. In the long run, NATO itself may prove to be the best option for the maintenance of a long-term, Western-led security force in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the Alliance provided for its own security by training Iraqi military personnel, supporting the development of the country's security institutions, and coordinating the delivery of equipment.⁴²⁸

In short, NATO is no longer the warfighting institution it was during the Cold War, but a community of democracies with common values and interests, and a community that is determined to maintain the political relationships and military tools to protect those interests, it is most certainly worth preserving. Surely, if it may be granted that the United States is wise to seek allies; there is no imaginable substitute for the capacities, military and otherwise, that America's NATO allies can provide.⁴²⁹

1.3. American unilateralism and NATO

*We have never faced a greater threat than we do today, living in a world of weapons of mass destruction of unimaginable power. The divide before us, between unilateralism and multilateralism, is at the end of the day a divide between action and inaction. Now is the time for action, unilaterally if necessary.*⁴³⁰

⁴²⁶ Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War", *International Studies Quarterly*, 48, 2004, p.p. 269-292.

⁴²⁷ <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/> Joshua Partlow, "List of 'Willing' U.S. Allies Shrinks Steadily in Iraq Nations Still There Toil in Relative Obscurity", *Washington Post* Foreign Service Saturday, 08.12.2007.

⁴²⁸ Press Release: "NATO ambassadors see progress in Afghanistan", <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/02-february/e0220a.html> last access: 17.12.2007.

⁴²⁹ Nicely argued by John O' Sullivan, "With Friends Like ... Whom?" *National Review*, 01.06.2002.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*

The world has never known a power such as the US, combining the political, economical and military power to impose its will worldwide. Consequently, US could be either broadly unilateralist, open to the counsel of allies, or narrowly unilateralist, closed and dismissive of others, reflecting an America that prefers to use its power to export domestic policy rather than construct and engaged foreign and security policy.⁴³¹

9/11, as we have analysed throughout this work, has reinforced the trend towards narrow unilateralism and a narrow concept of engagement that it has undermined transatlantic security relations.⁴³² But the United States is not by any means unilateral by definition neither does it pose a threat to international stability and peace. Quite the contrary, US does act to defend its national interest – provocatively at times – but is a country with strong democratic liberal tradition, a force for good in the world, a power without which the Western World cannot pursue its common goals and cannot face the new emerging threats of our century. Accordingly US still plays a significant role in NATO and Europe and US are also broadly comparable in economic terms and in trade. Indeed, the United States is still the EU's largest trade partner, and vice versa.⁴³³

The US still supports the development of a more regulated common foreign and security policy for the EU, albeit within limits and in the context of NATO. Furthermore, Europe is much more effective as a strong partner alongside Washington in its fight against global terrorism.

Our world is strongly influenced by globalisation and international institutions and new power are emerging, such as China, India, Brazil, Southeast Asia, and the EU. Nonetheless, the EU and its Member States must be in a position to support the objectives of US foreign policy after 9/11, in order to avoid America behaving in a worryingly unilateral way.⁴³⁴

NATO was always ground for controversial debates over strategic issues. Instead there is a strong analytical argument to be made in favour of NATO continuity. The argument is composed of both power and purpose. In terms of power, the United States has the power to sustain NATO, while Europeans lack the power to challenge NATO. In terms of purpose, there are enough values and interests to sustain the choice for alliance continuity, although it will take continued political leadership to realise this choice.⁴³⁵

⁴³¹ Extract of the speech delivered by Charles Krauthammer at the third annual Hillsdale College Dinner, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, 04.12.2002; Charles Krauthammer, "American Unilateralism", *Hillsdale College*, Vol 32, No 1, January 2003.

⁴³² Charles Krauthammer, *Democratic Realism, An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World*, American Enterprise Institute Press, Washington, D. C. 2004.

⁴³³ Steven McGuire and Michael Smith, *The European Union and the United States Competition and Convergence in the Global Arena*, The European Union Series, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008; Lindley-French, Julian, "Terms of Engagement", *EU-ISS Chaillot Papers* 52, May 2002, <http://aei.pitt.edu/514/01/cha152e.pdf>.

⁴³⁴ Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled: The future of the Balance of Power*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2002.

⁴³⁵ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, Praeger, 1st edition 2004.

America and Europe have ample reason to stand united in the face of new challenges linked to the political order in the middle East, issues of proliferation and missile defence, and finally and significantly, the emergence of China and also India as new major players on the global chessboard let alone climate concerns and dangers.

Recapitulating, the US unilateralism has been guided by US independent judgment, both about its interests and about global interests. This is true especially on questions of national security, war making, and freedom of action in the deployment of power. Yet, the prudent exercise of power requires occasional concessions on issues of common principles and interests. Allies and alliances do matter.

Europe has to seriously take on this lesson.

2. ESDP's adaptation in times of uncertainty

2.1. ESDP's Genesis and Transformation

EU has also been transforming itself since the end of the Cold War and particularly since 9/11 and especially in relation to its security and defence policy. In the post Cold War era, as an answer to external events, ESDP has been moving forward modestly yet significantly, given Europe's special nature of divergence – a lot of times – national interests.⁴³⁶

At first, the weakness of the EU during the Balkan crisis and the military campaign in Kosovo played an essential role in the EU's necessity to complete a Common Foreign and Security Policy with a defence dimension and give the EU more coherence in its foreign policy. A European military capability was also considered necessary to compensate for the new uncertainty over US military involvement in crisis management in Europe (both the French and the British learned this from their experience in Bosnia). It could also help to strengthen NATO by strengthening European military capabilities.⁴³⁷

On this basis, the substantial changes to the European Community undertaken at Maastricht European Council included the first formal identity for the EC in security policy. Mainly, Common Foreign and Security Policy were brought formally into a new pillar of European Union competence.

In the Treaty on the European Union, members of the European Union were invited to consent to the Western European Union (WEU) or to become observers, and other European members of NATO were invited to become associate members of the WEU.⁴³⁸ However, European

⁴³⁶ See more on chapter 2 of the current work. France and Britain have yet to resolve a basic question underlying their common project, the ESDP – namely, how to tie the United States to European affairs.

⁴³⁷ Nicole Gnesotto, "ESDP: A European View", IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 2001.

⁴³⁸ Note: The WEU became the primary defence institution of the European Union in the 1990s, though it gave up that role in 2001.

Union leaders emphasised that NATO remained the foundation of the collective defence of its members and would continue to have an important role in crisis management. More importantly, the development of the ESDP may be without prejudice either to the commitments of member countries under Article 5 of the Washington (NATO) Treaty⁴³⁹ or to Article 5 of the Brussels (WEU) Treaty.⁴⁴⁰

Thus the challenge was to form a common policy that would bind Europe's security future into the structures and laws of the European Union. However this proved a difficult task as many EU members were not keen to transfer decision making powers to a supranational level. Decisions did continue to be taken at an intergovernmental level.⁴⁴¹ However, further steps were to be taken and on 19th of June 1992 when the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU issued the Petersberg Declaration.

The Petersberg Declaration defined the rights and obligations of those states, which are members of the European Union and NATO, future members, observers or associate members, the so-called *Petersberg missions: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking*.⁴⁴² Still, the Petersberg Declaration did not form a substitute for a coherent European military set of principles and without such a doctrine it seems impossible to define requirements in terms of forces and equipment.

The European Union was only provided with access to an operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg missions, by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on the 2nd of October 1997, entered into force the 1st May 1999.⁴⁴³ Article J.7 seemed to work as an operational bridge

WEU: association of 10 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom). Associate members: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey). Observer countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, and associate partners: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

⁴³⁹ Article 5, NATO on-line library: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm> last access: 30.07.2008.

⁴⁴⁰ Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, The Brussels Treaty, 17.03.1948, NATO on line Library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b480317a.htm> amended by the "Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty" Signed at Paris on 23.10.1954, Article V

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

⁴⁴¹ Michael Welsh, *Europe United*, Macmillan Press, London 1996.

⁴⁴² Petersberg Declaration, 1992, II on strengthening WEU's operational role, paragraph 4, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_petersberg.php.

⁴⁴³ Particularly, Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, 21, Paragraph 1 states: *The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2 ... And paragraph 2 states: Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.* Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, 10.11.1997, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/treaties_other.htm.

between the CFSP and WEU decision-making procedures. However, the Treaty did not bring at the time into the EU the hard security aspect of the WEU acquis. Last but not least, the Amsterdam Treaty endorsed three forms of flexibility: enabling clauses, case-by-case and pre-defined flexibility.⁴⁴⁴ But even these forms of flexibility seem to serve *primarily as deterrents to boycotting by individual countries and to forming exclusive groupings rather than as ways of deepening integration among the willing and able, as originally envisaged.*⁴⁴⁵

Further steps in the implementation of the CFSP and particularly of the ESDP were taken at the British-French Summit at St. Malo in December 1998; a declaration was signed in which the UK and France agreed the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces.⁴⁴⁶

The ESDP was further strengthened at subsequent European Council meetings. Mainly, the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 placed the Petersberg tasks at the core of European common security and defence policy and agreed to give the EU the capacity to implement them.⁴⁴⁷ Importantly also, in December 1999, at Helsinki, the European Council established the common European Headline Goal for developing by 2003, European military capabilities to deploy within 60 days, and to sustain for at least one year, operationally capable forces of up to 60 000 troops (the European Rapid Reaction Force - ERRF).⁴⁴⁸ The European Council underlined its determination *to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.*⁴⁴⁹

Important for the ESDP was also the meeting of the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira, in Portugal, in June 2000, where the

⁴⁴⁴ Enabling clauses, *closer cooperation* is the mode of integration which enables willing and able Member States to pursue further integration; case-by-case flexibility is the mode of integration which allows a member state the possibility of abstaining from voting on a decision by formally declaring that it will not contribute to the decision, whilst at the same time accepting that the decision commits the entire EU - it applies only to the second pillar (Art. 23 consol. TEU); pre-defined flexibility is the mode of integration that covers a specific field, is pre-defined in all its elements (including its objective and scope), and is automatically applicable as soon as the Treaty enters into force.

⁴⁴⁵ Antonio Missiroli, "CFSP, Defence and Flexibility", *Chaillot Paper* 38, February 2000, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chaill38e.html> last access: 01.02.2007.

⁴⁴⁶ Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense, Saint Malo, 04.12. 1998, Presidency Conclusions, European Council, December 2003, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/1998/stmalo.asp> last access: 29.01.2006.

⁴⁴⁷ Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 - 4 June 1999, AN-NEX III Declaration of the European Council and Presidency report on strengthening the European common policy on security and defence, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3.

⁴⁴⁸ Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 - 11 December 1999, II. Common European Policy on Security and Defence, paragraph 28, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid*, Helsinki European Council.

European Union leaders defined the priority areas in civilian crisis management (police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration, and civil protection) and the principles on the basis of which consultation and cooperation with NATO should be developed.⁴⁵⁰ The Council officially set up the EU Military Committee, the Military Staff and the Political and Security Committee (COPS), and in May of the same year – a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. It set up 4 EU-NATO working groups (with COPS leading for the EU) on: security, capability goals, EU access to NATO assets/capabilities and linking arrangements. EU decided to hold a commitments conference to pledge assets to a combined force.⁴⁵¹

The European Council in Nice, in December 2000, and in Göteborg, Sweden in June 2001 further developed the ESDP, including with respect to relations with NATO and with non-EU European allies.⁴⁵² The Treaty of Nice, which was signed in February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003⁴⁵³ contains new CFSP provisions and notably increases the areas, which fall under qualified majority voting and enhances the role of the Political and Security Committee in crisis management operations; amends Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union by removing the provisions defining the relations between the Union and the WEU; introduced the possibility of establishing enhanced cooperation in the area of common foreign and security policy for the implementation of joint action or a common position.

Still enlargement – from Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 - dictated another revision of the institutional framework. This fact gave birth to the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003) which produced the Constitutional Treaty in 2004,⁴⁵⁴ under the umbrella of

⁴⁵⁰ Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Santa Maria da Feira, 19 and 20 of June 2002, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Feira%20European%20Council-Presidency%20conclusions.pdf>.

⁴⁵¹ At the Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels in November 2000, EU and Partner countries defence Ministers pledged substantial forces to the future European Rapid Reaction Force: 100,000 troops, 400 fighter aircraft and 100 naval ships at the disposal of the EU from 2003. Germany pledged 13,500 troops, UK 12,500, France 12,000, Italy & Spain 6,000, and Netherlands 5,000. Denmark refused to participate. 'The Member States' commitments have been set out in a Helsinki Forces Catalogue (HFC), <http://www.cdi.org/mrp/ue.cfm>.

⁴⁵² Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Nice, 7, 8 and 9 of December 2000, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Nice%20European%20Council%20-%20Presidency%20conclusions%20-%20201V.pdf>.

⁴⁵³ Treaty of Nice, Official Journal C 80, 10.03.2001, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf.

⁴⁵⁴ Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18.07.2003, <http://european-convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN> last access: 18.07.2006.

The European Union by its Constitution would be removing powers from Member States and concentrating many of them in Brussels. Also, the EU constitution would create a legal personality, an unelected president, a foreign minister and diplomatic service, a judicial system, recognized external borders, a military capacity and a police force.

the new security environment that 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Iraq crisis had created. And though Iraq did demonstrate a high degree of dis-unity among EU Member States, significant progress was achieved on both security and defence policy areas in the same period.

First, the Constitutional Treaty, though not ratified is interesting to see which measures are highlighted as important at the time and to what extent the ESDP was perceived to be needing advancement. Importantly too, most provisions are included in the Lisbon Treaty. So, firstly, the Constitutional Treaty updates the Petersberg tasks adding to Article 17 (2) TEU some other missions, such as joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation. The Constitution also states that all these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism.⁴⁵⁵ Secondly, Article I-43 of the Constitution introduces a solidarity clause whereby the other Member States will provide assistance if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. In this case, the Union will mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, in order to assist the Member State concerned. This is in addition to the new provision on civil protection.⁴⁵⁶

Finally, Article I-41(7) of the Constitution introduces a mutual defence clause binding all the Member States. This obligation means that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States will give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power. It does not affect the neutrality of certain Member States. The obligation will be implemented in close cooperation with NATO.⁴⁵⁷

The EU budget expenditure will continue to be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product.⁴⁵⁸ However, the Constitution provides for the Council to adopt a European decision guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations for the urgent financing of preparatory activities for the Petersberg tasks. In addition, a start-up fund made up of Member States' contributions is to be established to finance preparatory activities for Petersberg tasks which are not charged to the Union budget. The procedures for operating this fund will be laid down by the Council of Ministers acting by qualified majority.⁴⁵⁹

As far as US-Europe relations are concerned, the Constitution's impact has to do with NATO's future. It directly affects NATO defence issues among European Member States, and thus all major transatlantic foreign and defence policy decisions. The Constitution includes defence-related clauses increasing EU's legally binding power in security matters. First of all, the EU mutual defence commitment is included as well as a provision setting the rule that an armed aggression against one EU Member State would demand an instant and unequivocal response.

⁴⁵⁵ Article III-309, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

⁴⁵⁶ Article III-284, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid*, Article I-41(7).

⁴⁵⁸ See Figure 3, p. 333.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid*, Article III-313.

An EU military alliance and common foreign policy would also cut across the obligations of the EU's NATO members, while ending the neutrality of its non-NATO ones.⁴⁶⁰

However, the Constitution was rejected by French and Dutch voters. The European Heads of States and Government were once again gathered, in Lisbon this time, in an effort to write an acceptable to all Member States Treaty, and not Constitution. The last Treaty signed in Lisbon 13 of December 2007 aimed at overcoming the deadlock that the Constitution's rejection had provoked to the EU's integrational progress.⁴⁶¹ However the Treaty of Lisbon was too rejected, this time by the Irish referendum⁴⁶². However, the Lisbon Treaty does include the core articles on security and defence areas and paradoxically the areas where the progress was most consensual.⁴⁶³

On this basis, the Lisbon Treaty similarly to the Constitutional Treaty further defines the Petersberg tasks to include Joint Disarmament Operations and Security Sector Reform. These new civilian and military roles effectively widens the scope of the EU peacekeeping and state-building objectives. For the Americans, such developments are a welcomed thing as serving to strengthen European capabilities, but this has to be done in conjunction to similar efforts undertaken in NATO.

Two further elements of the Lisbon Treaty significant for the future of European Union's Security and Defence policy included also in the Constitution were: Firstly, the establishment of the new *Solidarity Clause*, whereby the *Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available*⁴⁶⁴ in order to provide assistance to another EU country in the event of a terrorist attack or disaster. Such a formulation explicitly institutionalises the concept of collective assistance between EU Member States, and arguably paves the way for an EU common defence clause at some stage in the future. Secondly, with the

⁴⁶⁰ "Be Wary of the EU Constitution", *The Washington Times*, 02.03.2005.

⁴⁶¹ Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13.12.2007, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306, Vol 50, 17.12.2007, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML>.

⁴⁶² The main reason for the Irish "No" are placed in the economic field. Indeed, The EU's free trade policies move forward partly by means of harmonising laws and there is talk of tax harmonisation. Part of Ireland's economic success has been the result of its very attractive corporation tax rate. Any risk, even in the longer term, that Irish competitive advantage here would be forcibly removed by the EU is a genuine concern for the Irish.

See more on: Tom Peterkin, "EU referendum: Ireland rejects Lisbon Treaty: Irish voters have thrown the EU into disarray by rejecting the Lisbon Treaty, the government conceded", *Telegraph*, 13.07.2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/europe/2122654/EU-referendum-Ireland-rejects-Lisbon-Treaty.html>.

⁴⁶³ Joe Kirwin, "EU Leaders Sign New Treaty", 19.10.2007, *Time* in partnership with CNN website: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1673765,00.html> last access: 23.10.2007.

⁴⁶⁴ Article 2 176 of the Lisbon Treaty, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML>.

opportunity for Permanent Structured Co-operation in the defence field - a framework by which a group of nations can decide to forge closer relations and co-operation - a prospect is offered too for the Member States to move ahead at different paces.⁴⁶⁵

Yet, the intergovernmental nature of ESDP remains intact, as enhanced cooperation of this kind cannot be used for issues which have military implications or which affect defence matters. The authorisation for enhanced cooperation is given by the Council after receiving the opinion of the Commission. The Council will decide by qualified majority but each Member State may ask that the matter be referred to the European Council for the purposes of a unanimous decision (*emergency brake*).

All of these developments, indeed, demonstrate that security and defence issues inside EU remain very sensitive for nation states. Decisions are taken not only based on external events but as servers of national interests and security goals too. These interests can diverge or converge. This certifies the special nature of the EU and subsequently of its ESDP project and its uncertainty concerning its final formulation.

More specifically, European integration is a complex process which marries intergovernmental and federal views and processes.⁴⁶⁶ It is not by chance, that the decisive change in the traditional attitudes vis-à-vis giving the EU a defence component – British Prime Minister Tony Blair's 'initiative' of autumn 1998 – occurred as a consequence of the unfolding of the Kosovo crisis and the need for Britain to take political action in this field.⁴⁶⁷ It is not by chance also that 9/11 appears to have provided substantial additional impetus to the ESDP.⁴⁶⁸

Indeed, *If there is any institution in the world that can demonstrate the benefits of multilateralism, of arguing about fish quotas or budgets, rather than murdering one another, it is the European Union.*⁴⁶⁹ This implies greater responsibility for Europe, based on more active, consistent and capable involvement. It calls for diplomatic cohesion and synergy in the field of strategic and military intelligence, and it presupposes that an effort to improve European capabilities will continue.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid*, ToL, Article 28E and the *Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation* of the Lisbon Treaty.

⁴⁶⁶ Jolyon Howorth, *The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?", WEU Institute for Security Studies, *Chaillot Papers* 43, November 2000, pp. 28-30; Dimitris Chrysochoou, Kostas Ifantis, Stelios Stavridis, Michael J. Tsinisizelis, *Theory and Reform in the European Union (Europe in Change)*, Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 161.

⁴⁶⁷ Robert Peston, "Premier Tiptoes through EU Defence Minefield", *Financial Times*, 01.10.1998, p. 12; Robert Peston and Andrew Parker, "UK Prepares Radical Plans for Europe", *Financial Times*, 02.10.1998.

⁴⁶⁸ Gateway to the European Union, <http://europa.eu.int>.

⁴⁶⁹ Speech by Chris Patten, Commission statement on the situation in Afghanistan, European Parliament - Plenary session - Strasbourg, 02.10.2001, Speech/01/429, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/patten/sp01_429.htm last access: 02.02.2007.

2.2. The Response of the EU to 9/11: Strategy and Missions

The response of the EU to the 9/11 attacks was one of solidarity with the American people. The transatlantic relationship is very close and interdependent but it also has its antagonisms, as clearly the Iraq crisis has revealed.⁴⁷⁰ Yet, in regard to ESDP, the EU-NATO cooperation following the Berlin Plus agreement of December 2002⁴⁷¹ remained unaffected.

Focusing on the aftermath of 9/11, the EU did achieve some further important developments concerning the ESDP. Mainly, the common Action Plan to fight against the proliferation of WMD which forms a real European strategy against proliferation⁴⁷². This document provides for the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regime regarding verification, a stronger role for the UN Security Council in this matter and the creation of an observatory on WMD disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Iraq crisis also produced a common awareness that a divided Europe is powerless. At the same time, an enlarged Europe cannot escape its obligations and responsibilities in the world.⁴⁷³ And this was the premise of the Solana document, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, published in June for the Thessaloniki Summit.⁴⁷⁴ Europe's strategy, as we saw in detail in chapter 1, is based on three pillars: extending the security zone around Europe; establishing effective multilateralism based on the UN, while reaffirming the need to become involved in a preventive way and act when the rules are infringed; and responding to the global threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD and organised crime by recognising that the first line of defence now lies abroad.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁰ Bulent Gokay and R. B. J. Walker, "11 September 2001: War, terror, and judgment", Frank Cass, London 2003.

⁴⁷¹ Comprised of the following major parts:

a. NATO - EU Security Agreement
b. Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO)

c. Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO

d. Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities

e. Terms Of Reference for DSACEUR and European Command Options for NATO

f. EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities

g. Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements.

⁴⁷² Gateway to the European Union, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf>, 16.04.2007.

⁴⁷³ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, Praeger, 1st edition 2004.

⁴⁷⁴ European Council, "A Secure Europe in A Better World - The European Security Strategy", Brussels on 12 December 2003.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

Europe may analyse the threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMD in a similar to that of Washington way; however, the ways in which Europe addresses them are different. For Europe the fight against these threats cannot be limited to military force alone, a combination of political and economic approaches is vital and any effective solution will have to be global.

Furthermore, the EU promotes the extension of good governance rather than regime change. Based on the principles of international law, this implies greater responsibility for Europe, based on more active, consistent and capable involvement. It calls for diplomatic cohesion and synergy in the field of strategic and military intelligence. Thus a strong effort to improve European capabilities has to persist.⁴⁷⁶ Indeed, there have been serious claims that the EU cannot be a fully-fledged international security player unless it acquires credible military capabilities.⁴⁷⁷

At the same time, the EU was marking some significant success on the peacekeeping operation field. Since January 2003, the EU has conducted 16 missions civil and military in three different continents, Europe, Asia and Africa. ESDP from a tool of crisis-management in the Balkans, became a necessary tool to enhance Europe's role globally.

With the exception of purely military operations, which have mobilised several thousand troops (Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina mobilized 7,000 troops) the majority of these missions have mobilised all in all 1,500 troops. The Artemis operation thus was the first concrete step towards implementing a new security doctrine, by taking a much longer-term view on crisis management and conflict prevention.⁴⁷⁸

EU was involved, for the first time, outside Europe in a peacekeeping intervention in Africa. When a series of massacres in Ituri, Congo, as we already discussed, followed the withdrawal of Ugandan troops in spring 2003, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for an immediate intervention. His call was answered by the EU under the leadership of France. The military intervention of 1,800 troops, was prepared in a very short period of time, involving all the EU members in the decision-making process regarding planning and rules of engagement.⁴⁷⁹ Cooperation on the ground between participating nations, especially France

⁴⁷⁶ Jean-Yves Haine, "ESDP: an overview", *Challot Papers* 38, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004, <http://www.iss-cu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf>, last access: 04.12.2007.

⁴⁷⁷ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2003; Lawrence Freedman, "Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine?", in Steven Events et al. ii, *A European Way of War*, CER, London, p.p.13-26; Trevor Salmon, "The European Security and Defence Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, 2005, p.p. 359-79.

⁴⁷⁸ United Nations documents on-line, "Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force" Department of Peacekeeping Operations: http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/PUBLIC/ViewDocument.aspx?docid=572&menukey=_5_2_4.

⁴⁷⁹ Contributing nations: Military forces: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom Headquarters staff: Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.

and Sweden, was efficient. Although limited in time and scope, Artemis was an undeniable success from a military point of view.

The EU's three-pronged strategy for Ituri beyond the military strategy was very important. Specifically, first, to help disarm, demobilise and reintegrate armed groups, particularly children; second, to prepare a socio-economic rehabilitation programme to back up the interim administration, including grassroots reconciliation; and third, to give an immediate €200m aid package from its European Development Fund (EDF) in order to set up an ethnically mixed police force.⁴⁸⁰ The EU has transferred the authority back to a reinforced United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), working closely with the UN⁴⁸¹.

The most distant and the only operation in Asia is the Aceh Monitoring Mission. The Mission has since September 2005 supervised the peace agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement, which put an end to 30 years of civil war.

EU's missions have been limited in scope and have been often criticised by those who see Europe as a possible world player with much more military involvement.⁴⁸² Still, as Howorth has pointed out, the military instrument is not the primary instrument of the ESDP. ESDP is a political and strategic project characterised by coordinated and increasingly integrated security and defence policy initiatives.⁴⁸³

ESDP has been transforming itself, marking some important success in responding to global emergencies. But, EU is far from being a super state or a military superpower. This is mainly due to Europe's unique character, a Union of independent nation states with different historical and cultural backgrounds.

2.3. ESDP's Weaknesses and Challenges

EU states are split on various issues, on funding the ESDP, on best decision making procedures, in relation to the transatlantic cooperation, even on war and peace issues, as the Iraq crisis has clearly revealed. Member States decide based on their national interests, which do not always coincide.

Firstly, EU states are split on funding for ESDP. Some states — France, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, and Belgium — want a greater share of ESDP to be assigned as common costs — that is, covered by

⁴⁸⁰ The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main instrument for providing Community aid for development cooperation in the ACP States, (African, Caribbean Pacific) and Overseas Countries And Territories (OCT), <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12102.htm>.

⁴⁸¹ For more, see: United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/index.html>.

⁴⁸² Jean -Yves Haïne and Bastien Giegerich, "In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation", *International Herald Tribune*, 13.06.2006.

⁴⁸³ Jolyon Howorth, *The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 1.

all EU members on a pro rata basis. These states argue that if ESDP missions are going to be common European operations there should be maximum solidarity over expenditure. Germany, the UK, and the neutral countries support the idea of costs where they fall—that is, a system similar to NATO's, whereby each country pays for its own forces.⁴⁸⁴ Germany, in particular, is opposed to cost calculations based on gross domestic product. The UK and the neutrals are keen to keep decisions on defence spending for EU missions in national hands. The fact that there is great uncertainty about the costs of ESDP does not help in finding a solution to this problem.⁴⁸⁵

Most European states do not have the capabilities to mobilise troops quickly and efficiently. Howorth has pointed out to operational overstretch. Combat support capabilities—particularly air-lift, sea-lift, and air-to air refuelling—precision-guided munitions, command and control, interoperable secure communications and intelligence are among the chronic deficiencies of European military organisations.⁴⁸⁶ Given the unlikelihood of significant increases in Western European defence budgets, it is difficult to see how the capability problem can be solved in the near future.

In addition, it is not clear where and when EU's RRF would intervene.⁴⁸⁷ France and Italy argue in favour of more expansive Petersberg tasks.⁴⁸⁸ The UK and the Netherlands recognise the need for the RRF to have real combat power, while Germany and Sweden would prefer to focus on peacekeeping.⁴⁸⁹

After 9/11 a sophisticated piece of literature has addressed the question of whether development in ESDP is leading or not to a common strategic culture that would ultimately unite Europe also in security and defence.⁴⁹⁰ Opinions have been colored by internal EU divisions over Iraq.

⁴⁸⁴ These countries realize that there need to be some common cost elements. They agree that common costs could include: barracks, transport, interpreters, back-up for military headquarters and EU insignia on soldiers' uniforms.

⁴⁸⁵ Judy Dempsey, "EU States split on funding for ESDP," *Financial Times*, 02.06.2008.

⁴⁸⁶ The International Institute for Strategic Studies agrees, IISS, *Military Balance 2001-2002*, London, 2001, p. 29.

⁴⁸⁷ In the Balkans, for example, conflicts appear to be winding down. Even if an outside military and police presence is needed to keep the peace, this is not the *high end* type of military mission as envisaged by some for an EU RRF.

⁴⁸⁸ Contributing to the fight against terrorism, yet, little agreement exists among EU members as to whether terrorism should be part of the Petersberg tasks.

⁴⁸⁹ Jolyon Howorth, *The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

⁴⁹⁰ Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "Beyond the WEU-NATO dichotomy: the beginning of a European Strategic Culture", *International Affairs*, Vol 77, No 3, 2001; Asle Toje, "Special Issue on European Strategic Culture", *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, Vol 2, No 1, March 2005; Helene Sjørnsen, "Special Issue on "What Kind of Power", European Foreign Policy in Perspective, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol 13, No 2, March 2006.

As noted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, throughout 2001 and early 2002 *strong political guidance on ESDP was nowhere to be found. Even the British government, which launched the ESDP initiative in 1998, was uninterested.*⁴⁹¹ The lack of strong support from the major European powers for ESDP points to its weakness. European governments should therefore acknowledge that ESDP has limited objectives. This would remove a dark side in US-European security relations.⁴⁹²

But as Solana has pointed out there is a broadening transatlantic consensus that the quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. Whereas the security threats of the past century came from strong states, those of the 21st century come from weak and failing ones. Addressing these new threats requires a mix of instruments best deployed as part of a collaborative international undertaking.⁴⁹³

In Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq a change of command for the stabilisation force, with responsibility passed from NATO to the EU is very important. This is a highlight for both Bosnia, as a sign of steady progress towards a normalised, European future and for the EU, as a sign of its increasing maturity as a security actor.

ESDP has to work building on the following foundations: EU has to acquire serious defence capabilities in order to project true power and defend its own population of over 450 million people. In this way Europe can be a valuable ally, worth listening for the US and a valuable world player. For Europe this means, above all, leadership and power. Member States do face common threats and it is in their common interest to overcome traditional, out of date attitudes in order to fight these threats. And global threats require global solutions. The transatlantic relation has managed to ease its strong crisis over the Iraq War; however, strong leadership is required in both sides of the Atlantic and a serious recognition of what Blair defines as commonality between values and interests. EU and US share common interests because they share common values of free market, respect for human rights, and liberty in all its forms.⁴⁹⁴

ESDP is not made to challenge the American power, it is simply an answer to external events and a necessity for an economic giant, world's greatest trade power and America's first economic and political ally to have a respected political voice in the world. And a tough voice can better

⁴⁹¹ See IISS, Strategic Survey 2001/2002 (London: IISS, May 2002), p.134; AICGS Seminar Papers, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2002, www.aicgs.org/file_manager/streamfile.aspx?path=&name=oudraat.pdf.

⁴⁹² For a good overview of these concerns, see Stephen F. Larrabee, "The European Security and defence Identity (ESDI) and American Interests", Statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-Committee on European Affairs, United States Senate, RAND, CT-168, March 2000; Julian Lindley-French and William Hopkinson, "Arming for the Future," *International Herald Tribune*, 20.02.2002.

⁴⁹³ NATO Speech at the Library of Congress, by then NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, 22.02.1996, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s960222a.htm>.

⁴⁹⁴ Tony Blair, Speech at the 10^o Almoço Conferência, Diário Digital "Desafios políticos, económicos energéticos para 2009", 19.09.2008, Hotel Altis, Lisbon.

been heard coming from a muscular body, a militarily strong body. So, today more than ever, it is vital for the EU to work on a muscular body too.

But to what extent could such an endeavour damage NATO and more broadly the transatlantic partnership?

2.4. ESDP and US Reactions

US attitudes towards European defence initiatives and integration have always been ambivalent. Although, the US has supported the European defence initiatives, US concern over a loss of American predominance has been always present. US fears that Europe would create a more independent and autonomous path in the global scene.

There are in US many leading analysts who see ESDP positively and a more balanced alliance as both necessary and desirable.⁴⁹⁵ Others including the former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton consider that further deepening of the European integration is a threat to NATO and to US interests.⁴⁹⁶

For almost sixty years though Europeans have been speaking of the enhancement of their defence capacity. For almost sixty years Americans had been asking Europeans to increase their defence capacity.⁴⁹⁷ This was even a prerequisite for the US acceptance to the creation of NATO and a more active European participation has been a constant point of the American policy.

European countries did define a realistic and quite ambitious project of a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troops deployable within sixty days and sustainable for one year.⁴⁹⁸ One should have thought that

⁴⁹⁵ Ivo H Daalder, "A US View of European Security and Defence Policy", Brookings, March 2001, Kori Schake, "The United States, ESDP and constructive Duplication", in Howarth and Keeler, 2003, Merry E. Wayne "Therapy 's End: Thinking Beyond NATO", *The National Interest*, No 75, Winter 2003-2004, pp. 43-50, Leslie S. Lebl, "European Union Defence Policy: An American Perspective" *Policy Analysis*, Vol 506, 24.06.2004; Philip H. Gordon, "Letter to Europe-2", *Prospect*, July 2004; Simon Serfaty, *The United States, the European Union and NATO - After the Cold War and Beyond NATO*, CSIS Report, Washington 2005; Charles Kupchan, "The Transatlantic Turnaround", *Current History*, Vol 107, March 2008 p.p. 139-141. See also Howarth's four categories of US approaches towards ESDP: 1. Yes, but; 2. Yes, please, 3. No way, 4. Oh yeah? in Jolyon Howarth, *The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.p. 136-146.

⁴⁹⁶ John Bolton, Risking NATO 's Future? *Washington Times*, 15.12.1999; Peter Rodman, "The World's Resentment: Anti-Americanism as a Global Phenomenon", *The National Interest*, Summer, 2000; John C. Hulsman, "The Conservative Case for NATO Reform", 08.06.2002, Heritage Lecture 744, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/HL744.cfm>; Sally McNamara The European Security and defence Policy: A Challenge to the Transatlantic Security Alliance 18.07.2007, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2053.cfm>.

⁴⁹⁷ Pascal Boniface, European Security and Transatlanticism in the Twenty-first Century, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 24, No 3 p.p. 155-162.

⁴⁹⁸ Helsinki Headline Goal

The Helsinki declaration is a cause for some concern for the United States, as it continues to stress the need for EU autonomy over the involvement of non-EU

such a result meets the requirements of the whole Western World and NATO. But ironically, the more frequent question that is heard about this project is whether the ESDP could damage instead of strengthen NATO.

In fact a European defence capacity is completely new and changes the old practices and rules. States and governments fear change and clearly prefer stability. Subsequently, this process requires an enormous adaptation of the Atlantic alliance in spirit and methods. Most importantly, ESDI would have to develop as a friend and facilitator of US interests and not in competition with US hegemonic stance.

On this basis, the response by the Clinton administration to the European plans for autonomous capacity in security and defence has been to insist on the so-called Three Ds. of the Secretary of State, at the time, Madeleine Albright. She called for *no duplication* of military structures between NATO and the new military staff planned at the European Union; *no discrimination* of non-European Union NATO members; and finally *no decoupling* of Europe's security from that of its North American allies.⁴⁹⁹

For US the initiative should avoid preempting Alliance decision-making by de-linking ESDP from NATO. Albright insisted that European decision making should not be build apart from broader NATO decision making. This warning implied a real lack of trust and the *would not allow* seemed more as a threat to some observers.⁵⁰⁰

ESDP should avoid also duplicating existing efforts, meaning resources and assets with already existing ones inside NATO. 9/11 demonstrated clearly that a beneficial for both parties duplication in case of scarcity - in logistics, commands and control, transportation systems - could fill the gap without being damaging.⁵⁰¹

As far as the fears of discrimination against non-EU members are concerned, are focused more specifically on Turkey and Norway. These two vital NATO allies are excluded from ESDP making by definition, as no members of EU. This concern caused a lot of problems in NATO-ESDP relations over the years and still occupies the discussions over the future of both institutions. Yet Turkey forms a specific case to be resolved for the best functioning of both institutions and the future political re-accommodations in the region.⁵⁰²

states in decision making. Although it argues that *NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members and will continue to have an important role in crisis management*, this does not imply that NATO will endure as Europe's pivotal security organisation.

In 2004, the EU entered a new stage in strengthening military capabilities, with the announcement of the new Headline Goal 2010: The Headline Goal 2010 (June 2004) calls for the establishment of high readiness battle groups of roughly 1,500 troops, capable of deploying 15 days after an EU decision to launch an operation.

⁴⁹⁹ Madeleine Albright, "The right Balance will Secure NATO's Future", *Financial Times*, 07.12.1998; Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, Miramax, 2005.

⁵⁰⁰ Kori Schake, "The United States, ESDP and constructive Duplication", in Howorth and Keeler, 2003.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰² Turkey though not the focus of this study is particularly interesting case as it is the epicentre between the turbulent Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus. Turkey used

The preferred model of the ESDP was expressed also with determination by Strobe Talbott, a former US Deputy Secretary of State: *ESDI has gone from being an esoteric bit of Euro-jargon to becoming very much part of the American vocabulary in thinking and talking about the future of NATO. We're in favour of ESDI. But while our support for the concept is sincere, it is not unqualified. ESDI is, in one respect, like EMU: to work, it must reconcile the goal of European identity and integration on the one hand with the imperative of transatlantic solidarity on the other; it must reinforce, not duplicate or dilute the role of the Alliance as a whole – and it certainly must not attenuate the bonds between our defence and your own.*⁵⁰³

*We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO. That's a long-term concern, obviously, but NATO, after all, is about the long-term*⁵⁰⁴.

Talbott's warning reflects clearly US concerns that the EU may develop an integrated command structure that duplicates that of NATO; discriminating, against European NATO allies that were not EU members. Americans also worry that demands for ESDP capabilities could undercut the NATO defence Capability Initiative (DCI).⁵⁰⁵ Indeed, 70 percent of Defence Capability Initiative (DCI) efforts—such as precision guided munitions, ground surveillance systems, improved air and sea lift, command and control—overlap with ESDP initiatives. In any event, most of these military assets remain in national hands, and are only released on a case-by-case basis.

Some of America's doubt and unease over Europe's new defence initiatives do not spring from political worries concerning NATO's future role, but rather are a result of business worries – and a realisation that European countries will buy fewer American weapons in the future.⁵⁰⁶

its membership in the North Atlantic Council to veto the Berlin Plus process. Yet after a series of negotiations and compromises – including EU guarantees to Turkey on non-aggression and consultation, that ESDP missions would not be deployed in the Aegean sea, that an EU force would not attack a NATO member state, and that Cyprus would not be allowed to participate in ESDP missions - the resolution of the dispute allowed the EU and NATO to make their common declaration, see Box 1.

⁵⁰³ Deputy Secretary Talbott, Address on Euro-Atlantic Community and NATO Summit, "The New Europe and the New NATO," 04.02.1999, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/newnato.htm> last access: 16.04.2007.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁵ Note: The 1999 defence Capabilities Initiative identified a wide range of military shortcomings to be addressed, but by 2004 few had been met. It was succeeded by the Prague Capabilities Commitment, which narrowed the list of priorities, but few observers have noted any real progress. Perhaps the most significant step NATO has taken toward developing better capabilities has been the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), and its future is now of central importance for both symbolic and practical reasons.

⁵⁰⁶ Note: Europe's drive to consolidate its defence industry comes at a time when American defence companies are exploring their business opportunities in Europe and elsewhere with even more vigor. It is possible that defence alliances on opposite sides of the Atlantic will compete. The conflict experienced here may well spill over

Since the war in Kosovo, the US has called its European allies to spend more on defence. The recent series of pan-European defence-industrial mergers has upset American policy makers and analysts, because the EU's ESDP is now likely to be built on a solid, European defence-industrial base in which the US only plays a marginal role.⁵⁰⁷

Since the year 2000, the US has increased its spending on defence R&D (research and development) by over 9 percent a year; collectively, Europeans have increased by less than 1.5 percent. Only six or seven EU nations have ever gone in for defence R&T. Thus, Europeans have to raise their participation in defence. On the industrial side too, Europe needs to succeed if there is to be any sort of European defence. Even for America a stronger EU will further contribute to transatlantic common security. The EU-NATO relationship must build on the Berlin-plus arrangements, reaching common solutions through a strategic dialogue that confirms the roles and functions of the two organisations which remain ill defined.⁵⁰⁸

However, the long-term American fear is about leadership and power. It seems to be that the efforts to develop the ESDP will take place at the expense of commitments to NATO. So, the US do reject the case of the EU becoming a competitor to NATO rather than a friendly ally. And though, are Europe's military weakness and not its strengths, which have left the US with having to take on the military task largely on its own; the ESDP is not advantageous to the US if it undermines US leadership.⁵⁰⁹ For US, Europe cannot have it both ways if NATO is to remain the essential institution cementing the transatlantic security partnership.⁵¹⁰

Indeed a strong and autonomous EU would take some of the military weight off America's shoulders; but the long-term implications could

into the political arena and add to the transatlantic strain. But, unless Washington changes its attitude toward the transfer of technology to its NATO allies—technology transfer remains strictly controlled—it is difficult to foresee an expansion of transatlantic defence partnerships.

For more, see: "American Military Power: Future Needs, Future Choices", U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Background Paper, OTA-BP-ISC-80, Washington, DC: U.S. Government, October 1991, <http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1991/9106/9106.PDF> last access: 12.12.2007; Terrence Guay and Robert Callum, "The transformation and Future Prospect Of Europe's Defence Industry", *International Affairs*, Vol 78, No 4, 2002, p.p. 757-776; Soeren Kern, "Why Europe Needs a Hard Power Reality Check", *The Brussels Journal*, 21.10.2007, <http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/2581> last access: 03.03.2008.

⁵⁰⁷ Peter van Ham, "Europe's New defence Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia", The Marshall Center Papers, 2001, http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-mcpapers-1/static/xdocs/coll/static/mcpapers/mc-paper_1-en.pdf.

⁵⁰⁸ The Berlin Plus agreement 16.12.2002, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm.

⁵⁰⁹ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2006, electronic edition, www.foreignaffairs.org, 16.04.2007.

⁵¹⁰ Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl, "Getting to 'Yes' on Missile Defense: The Need to Rebalance US Priorities & The Prospects of Transatlantic Cooperation", Center for Transatlantic Relations 44, 2004, p. 30.

be huge. The EU's combined economic, political, and military influence could transform Europe into a serious challenger to the US on the world stage. EU foreign policy objectives would overlap, but would certainly not be identical to those of the US.⁵¹¹ Many European states worry that this will not only set off another global arms race, but may also decouple the strategic interests within NATO, when the US becomes less vulnerable to missile attacks. In any case, this global/regional dichotomy is bound to increase transatlantic tensions and to exacerbate US concern over Europe's defence ambitions.

Still for easing US concerns came the three *Ds* amendment by NATO Secretary General George Robertson in 1999 when he introduced the idea of the 3 "Is" which ESDP should put up with: improvement (in European defence capabilities), indivisibility (of transatlantic security) and inclusiveness (of all Allies).⁵¹²

Placing ESDP in perspective, one should mention that ESDP is primarily a military-technical facility that allows the EU to borrow essential NATO assets and capabilities. It does imply a European independence, which inevitably could lead to a European *shaping of a common defence policy, which eventually could lead to a common defence*⁵¹³, but such a plan given the nature of the EU, the internal divisions and stalemates seems utopist. Europeans do not have the capabilities to undertake a major operation on their own, and it is unlikely they will acquire such capabilities and the indispensable political will to back up such operations. As a result, it is difficult to imagine the Europeans engaging in a major operation without the US or against it.⁵¹⁴

For the EU, the ESDP concerns a lot less than developing a common defence; but also a lot more than just borrowing essential NATO assets. Europe needs to develop true power projection capabilities. NATO and the EU need to develop mechanisms to allow rapid response in time of crisis. Hence, the Americans must recognise that the EU is becoming

⁵¹¹ In the site of the European Commission, External Relations (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/index_en.htm) is stated that: *The Member States have committed themselves to a Common Foreign Security Policy for the European Union. The European Security and Defence Policy aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. To influence policies violating international law or human rights, or policies disrespectful of the rule of law or democratic principles, the EU has designed sanctions of a diplomatic or economic nature. The EU is also a leading international actor in the fight against illicit accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.*

For a deep analysis on the subject see also: Neill Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, The European Union Series, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

⁵¹² See Jolyon Howorth, "The European Security Conundrum: Prospects for ESDP after September 11, 2001", Groupement d' Etudes et de Recherches, Notre Europe, *Policy Paper*, No.1, March 2002, p. 9.

⁵¹³ EU 1991: Title V, Art. J.4, paragraph 1.

⁵¹⁴ Steven Everts, "Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe: Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy", Working Paper, Centre for European Reform, London, February 2001.

an increasingly political security actor.⁵¹⁵ Only an alliance of equals can work, and military power is the only coin that matters.

For the European side, given their supposedly Venusian inclinations,⁵¹⁶ many Europeans find defence cooperation attractive. Nearly 75 percent of the European public favours the notion. The governments of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg called a Summit to discuss the creation of a group to coordinate European defence procurement, establish a common military headquarters, and construct a unified force.⁵¹⁷

Common European force with the capacity to wage high-intensity, low-casualty war around the globe remains a dream. Though, the diplomacy of hesitance and dis-unity stands as a guide for what to avoid—and what to seek — the next time around.

Julian Lindley-French and William Hopkinson, correctly observe that, *for too long the European Union has focused on the institutional structures of defence rather than the threats in the world beyond.* They observe that, *the West has thus found itself with several security ‘products’ that do not serve the threat ‘market.’ Worse, except for the US, it has not thought about what it does need to respond to the actual threats.*⁵¹⁸

EU’s record as a global actor today is not really remarkable. And one of the great problems of Europe in developing a strategy of a global security player remains its relation with US.

3. EU-NATO synergy – to what extent?

The main practical transatlantic concerns focus on funding, military capabilities burden sharing and decision making process are all linked to power projection concerns. Both the US and the European states have an interest in preventing competition and strains in their relationship.⁵¹⁹ At the heart of the NATO – ESDP relationship lies the complex web of the entire US-EU relationship with its cooperation and antagonism over the years. However, the ESDP cannot compete neither weaken the strategic efforts of the Atlantic community. It is in the interest of both NATO and EU to construct an effective framework to safeguard the valuable treasure that they have in common, freedom, peace and prosperity.

⁵¹⁵ Stephen F. Larrabee, “The United States and the European Security and defence Policy, Old Fears and New Approaches”, 2006, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1232/>.

⁵¹⁶ Kagan claims Americans being from Mars, as supporters of hard power and Europeans being from Venus, as supporters of multilateral policy making. For more on this discussion see chapter 1 of the current work.

⁵¹⁷ Andrew Moravcsik, “The World Is Bipolar After All”, *Newsweek International*, 05.05.2003, <http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/bipolar.pdf>.

⁵¹⁸ See Julian Lindley-French and William Hopkinson, “Arming for the Future,” *International Herald Tribune*, 20.02.2002.

⁵¹⁹ Christian-Marius Stryken, “Make a European SACEUR ESDP and NATO after 9-11”, Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), Copenhagen 2002.

ESDP has, since the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP 2002, a formal working arrangement. The Declaration not only reaffirmed access by the EU to NATO's planning capabilities for its own military operations but also reiterated the core principles of the NATO-EU strategic partnership, including, effective mutual consultation, and equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO.⁵²⁰

Europeans are seen as being successful in taking over certain missions—most notably the Balkan missions. Since 2003 the EU has mounted various civil-military missions in three different continents. As Howorth points out ESDP seems to have become more usable than NATO. On this basis American demonstration of disengagement is expected to also increase.

However, ESDP cannot address alone and effectively the security threats of the early twenty-first century.⁵²¹ In the spring of 1991 US President George H. Bush told French President François Mitterrand that, *if Europe had another solution [for European defense] out of NATO, American public opinion would immediately withdraw its support of NATO and our staying in Europe.*⁵²² But Europe has not that solution, at least not yet.

Although, the Helsinki decisions are inspiring, the EU's military infrastructure will remain rather modest. NATO military staff will continue avant-garde. Indeed, Europeans are not particularly energetic in responding to US demands for increasing their defence expenditures.⁵²³ The European Defence Agency was created with the purpose of supporting the Member States in their efforts to improve their defence capabilities for crisis management operations. To address this wide-ranging agenda, EDA has an annual budget of around €10 million. In 2008, under its Common Foreign And Security Policy, the EU was to provide € 285 million for managing civilian crises, with a special emphasis on Kosovo (€ 165 million), promoting a multi-ethnic society and negotiating solutions in conflict regions. Under the European neighbourhood policy, € 300 million were targeted to help Palestinian institutions to provide better public services and address urgent needs.⁵²⁴ Nonetheless, National Defence Ministers keep the decision-making authority on

⁵²⁰ See Box 1, below, p. 327.

⁵²¹ James Kitfield, "Foreign Affairs: Pox Americana," *National Journal*, 06.04.2002.

⁵²² Quoted in Frederic Bozo, "Continuity or Change: The View from Europe," in Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. Rubin, eds., *NATO After Fifty Years*, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, DE, 2001, p. 58.

⁵²³ Giovanna Bono, "European Security and Defence Policy: Theoretical Approaches, the Nice Summit and Hot Issues", Research and Training Network: Bridging the Accountability Gap in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/ESDP and Democracy, February 2002, p.34; Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "Bosnia," in Donald C. F. Daniel, and Bradd C. Hayes, with Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1999, p.p.41-78; Robert E. Hunter, *The European Security and defence Policy: NATO's Companion-or Competitor?*, Alexandria, Va.: Rand, 2002.

⁵²⁴ EU Budget 2008 in Figures, The Gateway of the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/budget_in_fig/dep_eu_budg_2008_en.pdf.

money and actions in the EU. So Member States have to agree to spend their defence budgets, they choose the time and place according to their national interests, there is no supranational authority.

On the other hand, America's threats that it would do less for Europe's defence unless the Europeans did more were always regarded in Europe as a bluff.⁵²⁵ The EU's defence plans, at least not for the near future, do not involve setting up European armed forces with a permanent multinational command. But, it will be difficult to foresee a serious ESDP that does not acquire better defence technology, better-trained and deployable troops, as well as at least some parallel military structure. It is on this point that it seems evident that EU Member States at present do not wish to allocate sufficient funds on defence, varying from intelligence gathering equipment, precision-guided weapons, and electronic warfare capabilities, to search and rescue forces).⁵²⁶

Lord Robertson argued that *if you've got a budget that is 60 per cent of the American budget and is probably turning out 10 per cent of the capability then that is your first big problem (...) you can actually spend more money quite easily and get zero increase in capability.*⁵²⁷

On the other hand, the US is calling upon its European allies to take on a bigger share of the defence burden within NATO. In December 1999, US Secretary of defence William Cohen criticised Germany for spending too little on defence, arguing that this has a *profound and lasting impact on the capabilities, not only of Germany, but also of the alliance as a whole.*⁵²⁸

Ambassador Burns said that President Bush received \$376 billion from the US Congress for the US defence budget in 2003. But the US 18 allies in NATO combined in 2003 would spend \$140 billion. He also emphasised that this huge capabilities gap in spending has existed in the Alliance since 1949, adding that this is. adding that this is a true crisis in the alliance and it has to be closed.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁵ Christopher Layne, "Death Knell for NATO?: The Bush Administration Confronts the European Security and defence Policy", CATO Institute, *Policy Analysis*, No 394, April 2001, p. 6.75.

⁵²⁶ The Kosovo war exposed Europe's weaknesses. Despite having two million people in uniform, NATO's European members were hardly able to place 40,000 troops in position in time to fight a regional war. Most European troops are still designed to keep away a Soviet ground attack, rather than to rapidly deploy troops to nearby crisis situations.

⁵²⁷ Quoted in p. 18, Peter van Ham, "Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia", The Marshall Center Papers, 2001, http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-mcpapers-1/static/xdocs/coll/static/mcpapers/mc-paper_1-en.pdf.

⁵²⁸ William Drozdiak "Cohen Says Europe Must Boost defence Spending", *Washington Post*, Wednesday, 01.12.1999, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/pmextra/dec99/1/cohen.htm>.

⁵²⁹ 'Burns Outlines NATO's Future in the Greater Middle East', Nicholas Burns Speech in Prague, Washington File, 19.10.2003, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/10/mil-031023-usia01.htm>.

According to NATO figures, the US spends about 3.2 per cent of its GDP on defence (down from 6 per cent during the Cold War), while France and the United Kingdom spend 2.8 and 2.6 per cent, respectively; Germany (1.5) and Spain (1.4) find themselves at the low end of the spectrum. On average, defence spending by NATO's European members has dropped by 22 per cent since 1992.⁵³⁰

The EU has, therefore, accepted that some duplication of effort and organisation is foreseeable. If Europe's new defence ambitions were to provide Europeans with more military capabilities (i.e., more strategic transport and intelligence capabilities), thereby duplicating what the US already has available; this would be the type of duplication all NATO allies could happily live with.⁵³¹

Economically, Europe continues its moderate and slow path.⁵³² In fact, Europe is mired in a mid-life crisis. Its biggest problem is economic. More than anything, what drove the no votes in ratifying the Constitution and latterly the Lisbon Treaty was the EU's poor economic performance and uncertain long term prospects. Although measures of economic well-being vary significantly among European states, Europe has consistently suffered from a serious growth deficit vis-à-vis the US and continues to present slow growth, high unemployment, and public deficits. Europe's unpopularity derives also from high democratic deficit, social questions and enlargement concerns.

On this basis EU still needs NATO. And NATO can benefit from Europe too. Sharing costs can be used in a more efficient and productive way for the main institutional bodies of transatlantic defence. Today more than ever with the new threats of terrorism and WMD, in a globalised world, interventions are costly; require funds, in trained personnel and intelligence forces. A harmonisation in actions of both institutions, thus, seems vital.

Yet, questions of whether NATO has to be consulted first, before any independent European military action will be undertaken and have clearly to be clarified. Thus apart from funding questions and military capabilities, the decision making process of NATO and ESDP forms a significant part of the debate over EU-NATO synergy or competition.

In the lead up to the Helsinki Summit, US made it clear that before the EU decides to act on its own in a crisis situation— with or without the use of NATO assets— NATO should be given a first option, or a right of first refusal, to intervene. This problem of the order is important, because at NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999 it was

⁵³⁰ NATO's Official Site, on-line, <http://www.nato.int> last access: 11.03.2006.

⁵³¹ Peter van Ham, "Europe's New defence Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia," *The Marshall Center Papers*, 2001, http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-mcpapers-1/static/xdocs/coll/static/mcpapers/mc-paper_1-en.pdf.

⁵³² Paul Gallis, "NATO's Decision-Making Procedure", Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 05.05.2003, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21510.pdf> last access: 06.09.2006.

agreed that the EU would have a presumed access to Alliance assets should US troops not become involved in a specific military operation.⁵³³

It is, therefore, difficult to foresee how the EU would undertake any serious operation without at least the consent of the US. But, it is the continuing uncertainty of the operational details of the EU's military structure and its future missions that cause concern across the Atlantic. The EU has proposed to offer key NATO military representatives permanent seats, or observer status, in the EU's standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) and Military Committee (MC). Another EU proposal offers NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) to participate.⁵³⁴

However, for the time being, Europe's ESDP is bound to have limited, regional ambitions. The EU debate focuses on Petersberg missions and not on territorial or collective defence. Europe's military strategic planning will, therefore, focus on regional concerns though aspiring global role.⁵³⁵ In 2003, EU leaders adopted the European Security Strategy. It acknowledges that Europe has a responsibility to take a greater share of the burden of sustaining global security. And it asserts without equivocation this position: "*The Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together the European Union and the US can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.*"⁵³⁶

And we are ultimately working with the grain – the Member States want to do the right thing, even if, like Saint Augustine, they may not always want to do it right now.⁵³⁷

*Berlin-Plus arrangements with NATO will continue to be the main basis for this cooperation as they worked out and they allowed the alliance to support EU-led operations – with intelligence cooperation and the loan of equipment and facilities – in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.*⁵³⁸

Another often overlooked aspect in the debate on transatlantic security affairs is the degree to which flexible security cooperation has made its entry into both NATO and the EU. Alongside, NATO nations

⁵³³ NATO Handbook, The Washington Summit - April 1999, NATO'S Official Site, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb010303.htm>.

⁵³⁴ For a general discussion of the problem of rising expectations and moderate adaptations of capabilities see: Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol 31, No 3, September 1993, pp. 305–328.

⁵³⁵ European Council, "A Secure Europe in A Better World - The European Security Strategy", Brussels on 12 December 2003.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁷ Nick Witney "Europe Is Not in a Zero-Sum Game with NATO", *European Affairs*, defence Summer/Fall 2007, http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2007_summer_fall/2007_summer_fall_13.php4.

⁵³⁸ Nick Witney "Europe Is Not in a Zero-Sum Game with NATO", *European Affairs*, defence Summer/Fall 2007, http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2007_summer_fall/2007_summer_fall_13.php4.

have come to recognise that operations will not involve the Alliance as a whole, given the nature of campaigns in far-away places. NATO partners will likely be involved; and some NATO nations will likely abstain. Flexible coalitions thus part of NATO's evolution, and it became so before Rumsfeld outlined his *coalition-of-the-willing* vision in 2002.⁵³⁹

Flexibility marks the ESDP in important new ways too.⁵⁴⁰ Structured cooperation was initially suggested by France as a means to create a political avant-garde but it became, as a consequence of the Treaty negotiations, a capability producing mechanism – mainly because France agreed to this change of focus in order to obtain Britain's backing for the principle of flexible cooperation.⁵⁴¹ Nevertheless, military forces remain in national hands and the most capable nations now have the institutional means to prepare themselves for operational coalition-making and thus executive leadership.

Zbigniew Brzezinski does mention Europe and even labels it America's best ally in Middle Eastern questions. The wake of the Iraq war has revealed a common awareness of shared values and interests; yet, friction continues to occur in relation to flexible designs for cooperation and rogue states and because Europe lacks the habit of thinking in global strategic terms. NATO will survive only if it is reformed to reflect political pluralism, and a strengthened Alliance must be united in order to handle common problems. So, the Western World must unite in order to form the core of such a concert.

Post 9/11, interests not only diverged across NATO, but also, the alliance was overwhelmed by serious differences in the capabilities of the Member States. The US has decided to proceed in its war against terrorism with various bilateral agreements. The emerging US defence policy, particularly concerning the upheaval in military affairs, missile defence, arms control, and responses to proliferation and regional conflicts, challenged transatlantic unity.

A stronger EU would not always have to be in full agreement with the US on many important global political issues. And indeed, Europeans, for example, remain less fixated on China and on issues of proliferation of WMD. They are more concerned with legitimising their policies by international law and a UN Security Council mandate and less hostile to *rogue states*. However, the likelihood of autonomous, EU-led military operations is remote. A new Euro-force remains a modest plan. Thus,

⁵³⁹ A New Kind of War, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Washington, D.C., September 27, 2001, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/rumsfeld_9-27.htm.

⁵⁴⁰ Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?" WEU Institute for Security Studies, *Chaillot Papers* 43, November 2000, pp. 28-30; Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European defence Initiative, *Survival*, Vol 42, No 2, Summer 2000, p.p. 34-35; and Charles G. Cogan, *The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989-2000* Westport, Praeger, Connecticut 2001, p.p.97-100.

⁵⁴¹ These were created to form part of the Constitutional Treaty, and the reforms are being implemented in spite of the Treaty's failure.

any European-led military operation will remain highly dependent on NATO command structures as well as on US intelligence and logistics.⁵⁴²

In a theoretical context, Structural Realists agree that the structure of world politics is changing: the world has for little more than a decade been unipolar, but this condition will not last. Unipolarity is slowly but surely eroding and a new era of multipolarity is coming into being. In the short run this may not be of great consequence for NATO because the leader of the Alliance, the US, is motivated to maintain NATO. First, when defence Secretary Rumsfeld in early 2002 outlined his vision of the principle that *the mission will shape the coalition*, he failed to mention NATO in his article and this in spite of the fact that he simultaneously was intimately involved in the creation of a new rapid reaction force in NATO – the NRF. The Bush administration also announced a new force deployment structure, the implication of which is the redeployment of American troops and infrastructure from old theatres like Europe to new regions of concern.⁵⁴³

Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer thus agree that it is in the US' interests to maintain NATO for a while. However, in the long run, they agree, the US will weaken its commitment and the *raison d'être* of NATO will disappear.⁵⁴⁴

Mearsheimer does not believe that recent developments and controversies impact on his main conclusion: that the US will withdraw and Europe will descend into an era of internal balancing. Kenneth Waltz likewise commented on why NATO did not as predicted disappear in the immediate wake of the end of the Cold War. Waltz has argued that the reason is influence. The US always seeks to maintain its importance on the foreign and security policies of European allies, and NATO is the best means for doing so. The unipolar power is thus determined to capitalise on its power.

Waltz claims that the US is intoxicated by power and is out of geopolitical control⁵⁴⁵. Still, in June 2004 the allies came into agreement and supported the G8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), the same month as the allies reached agreement on NATO's (admittedly limited) involvement in Iraq.⁵⁴⁶ BMENA and the Iraqi engagement align

⁵⁴² See Jolyon Howorth, "The European Security Conundrum: Prospects for ESDP after September 11, 2001", Groupement d' Etudes et de Recherches, Notre Europe, Policy Paper, No.1, March 2002, p.9.

⁵⁴³ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*, Praeger, 1st edition 2004.

⁵⁴⁴ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959; *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw-Hill, New York: 1979; *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2003; and John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton, New York, 2001; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "An unnecessary war", *Foreign Policy*, January-February 2003; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping Saddam in a Box", *New York Times*, 02.02.2003.

⁵⁴⁵ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping Saddam in a Box", *New York Times*, 02.02.2003.

⁵⁴⁶ Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: <http://usinfo.state.gov/ci/Archive/2004/Jun/09-319840.html>.

with the EU's effort since the early 1990s to develop partnerships, economic liberalisation, and collective security reforms in the Mediterranean – an effort encapsulated in the so-called Barcelona process.

In the same way, Stanley Hoffmann argues that US is intoxicated by its disproportionate level of power and thus has forgotten the realist lesson of prudence: even if an empire has the power to impose direct rule, it will be threatened by rebellion and rising costs.⁵⁴⁷

Zbigniew Brzezinski sees in the Middle East the most dangerous region of the world and he sets out to identify reliable partners for the US in the quest to bring stability to the region. Brzezinski examines potential allies such as Turkey, Israel, India, and Russia, and arrives at the conclusion that America has one real partner in coping with world issues, and this is Europe.⁵⁴⁸

The transatlantic relation remains for both sides a first order priority; though the military aspect of that relationship, a central one during the Cold War, has become a second priority in the post Cold War era. At this point lies the central problem of that relationship. Yet, the transatlantic community still enjoys the vibrant economic, political and cultural alliance that has been proven to be bullet proof in time. And though both EU and US are evolved in the game of power, it is in their interest to see the real threats to that power and the best way to confront them. These threats do not come from each others extra power. It comes from a faceless set of enemies that should be the real focus and solution. On this reality of globalisation and new threats, Blair also places the importance of transatlantic unity and mainly the importance of a functioning working relationship between NATO and ESDP.

4. ESDP-NATO Relations and European Viewpoints

Most EU Member States support close NATO-EU links, but also view the ESDP as a means of more options for dealing with crises, especially in cases in which the US may be reluctant to become involved. France continues to favour a more autonomous EU defence identity. This aspiration has been demonstrated strongly after 9/11 in disputes with the US over how or whether to engage international institutions, such as the United Nations, on security matters and over the weight given to political versus military instruments in resolving international crises, for instance in Iraq. For Howorth *France presents the greatest puzzle*.⁵⁴⁹ France has fought alongside US in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. But, as Kupchan has argued, over

⁵⁴⁷ Stanley Hoffmann, *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era*, Updated ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

⁵⁴⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, Basic Books, 2004; *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*, Basic Books, March 2007.

⁵⁴⁹ Jolyon Howorth, *The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 154.

the 2003 Iraq War, France allowed its oldest ally, US, to perceive its interests unilaterally, denying it the blessing of the UN.⁵⁵⁰ France views NATO as a strong force multiplier but not as configured to assume a global role.⁵⁵¹

France needs to project global power, independent when necessary from the American influence. The power alternative is Europe and more specifically ESDP project, a rules-based, multilateral forum of solidarity to manage global challenges where France has played and continues to play a central role.⁵⁵²

Central and Eastern European countries have long worried that divisions created by the ESDP might lead America to abandon its interests on the European continent. Because of their communist past, they have been the first to recognise the strategic threat to Europe. NATO has been a direct guarantor of their safety and security for most of the 20th century, balancing the power of the Soviet Union.⁵⁵³

Most EU members claim that EU efforts to boost defence capabilities should complement — not compete with — those of NATO. Countries such as the UK, Italy, and Spain continue to hope that bringing more and better military hardware to the table will give the European allies a bigger role in NATO's decision-making. Newer EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland, the Czech Republic and the three Baltic states, both sides have staked enormous political capital on shoring up their bilateral alliances with the US and make a solid contribution to NATO. They also back ESDP but maintain that it must not weaken NATO or the transatlantic link.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵⁰ Charles Kupchan, "The Fourth Age: The Next Era In Transatlantic Relations", *the National Interest*, Fall 77-83.

⁵⁵¹ Although new French President Sarkozy, like Chirac, views France's role in the EU as French enhancing influence and power worldwide, he has downplayed building up ESDP as a way to counterbalance the United States and as an alternative to NATO. Sarkozy suggested that France may draw closer to NATO by rejoining NATO's integrated military command structure, and has supported improving NATO-EU cooperation. At the same time, Sarkozy has asserted that the EU should develop a full command and planning structure of its own. U.S. officials contend that such a structure would rival NATO's large planning cell and be a wasteful duplication of resources. Sarkozy counters that EU missions will only be more effective if the EU improves its planning capabilities further. The UK and several other EU countries, however, also remain opposed to Sarkozy's proposal. See more: "La France Veut Profiter de sa Présidence de l'UE pour Relancer la Défense, Européenne," *Le Monde*, October 17, 2007.

⁵⁵² Anand Menon, *France, NATO And The Limits of Independence*, Basington, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000; Bruno Tertrais, "L'inevitable reconciliation franco-américaine", *Le Figaro*, 26.05.2003.

⁵⁵³ Jolyon Howorth, "ESDP-NATO; wedlock or deadlock?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol 38, No 3, p.p. 235-54, Rapport Annuel Mondial sur le system Economique et les Strategies, Paris IFRI, 2003; Jolyon Howorth, «Tony Blair: a First Strategic Evaluation», 21.09.2007, *Politique étrangère*, 3, 2007 http://www.ifri.org/frontDispatcher/ifri/recherche_resultats last access: 04.12.2008.

⁵⁵⁴ Stephen Hadley, "European Defence Policy: A Political Analysis," *New Zealand International Review*, Vol 30, No 6, 01.11.2005; Liam Fox, "Security and Defense: Making Sense of the Special Relationship," Heritage Foundation Lecture, No 939, 27.04.2006, www.heritage.org/research/europe/hl939.cfm; Margaret Thatcher,

Germany has been pursuing a foreign policy of cooperation and respect towards its American ally. On the other hand, Germany given its size and wealth is considered as very important player in the process of developing the ESDP.⁵⁵⁵ Still, it has played a rather passive role in much of ESDP's progresses. In the transatlantic dispute over Iraq in 2003, the then-German government of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder appeared more open to efforts to forge a European defence arm independent of NATO. Since the April 2003 meeting of French, German, Belgian, and Luxembourg leaders to discuss creating a separate European military headquarters, planning staff, and armaments agency - Germany has backed away from this stance, repairing ties with the US post-Iraq.⁵⁵⁶

Denmark is considered to be in the other extreme, in relation to its approach to NATO-ESDP relationship. Denmark is the only country with an opt-out from the ESDP and clearly considers NATO as the only worthy organisation to be a member of. The four neutrals on the other hand, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland have been more distant to NATO, with a stand off over Iraq; but they have gradually integrated the security aspect of the ESDP – though no supporting a common defence.⁵⁵⁷ However, all four are committed in participating in ESDP new battle groups configurations.

Belgium and Luxembourg and other small states as Portugal and Greece have sought to avoid making a choice between NATO and ESDP.⁵⁵⁸ Small countries cannot afford breaking their bridges with neither America nor Europe. Spain in the same way has supported the importance of both institutions. During the Iraq crisis Spain openly supported Bush's administration policies, distancing itself from Europe; yet, the public opposition – following the terrorists' attacks in Madrid in 2004 - forced a change of guard, leading to a more Europeanist stance of the country.

Under Tony Blair, UK, the most Atlanticist country in the EU because of its special Anglo-American relation, makes a more worth-noting and elaborating point over the NATO-ESDP relations and the global challenges of the 21st century.

Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World, HarperCollins, New York, 2002, p. 354; Nile Gardiner, "Trends in the European Union and Russia: Implications for the United States," Heritage Foundation Lecture, No 996, 28.10.2006, www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/hl996.cfm.

⁵⁵⁵ Tom Dyson, German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph Of Domestic Constraints over International Opportunity, *European Security*, Vol 14, No 3, 2005, p.p. 361-386; Jolyon Howorth, *The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 153.

⁵⁵⁶ The present German Chancellor Angela Merkel has made improving US-German relations and the broader transatlantic partnership a cornerstone of her foreign policy agenda.

⁵⁵⁷ Daniel Keohane, *Realigning Neutrality: Irish Defence Policy and the EU*, WEU-ISS, Occasional Paper 24, 2001; Hanna Ojanen, *Participation and Influence: Finland and Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP*, Occasional Paper 11, 2000.

⁵⁵⁸ Janusz Bugajski and Iliona Teleki, *Atlantic Bridges: Americas New European Allies*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, UK, 2007.

5. Blair: Globalisation and New World Order

Britain consistently struggled to establish a permanent transatlantic alliance, since Winston Churchill's three spheres strategy for British foreign policy—the Commonwealth, the US, and Europe.⁵⁵⁹ In 1999 Blair declared his aim of establishing Britain as *a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future*⁵⁶⁰ - a pivotal role between the US and Europe, with Blair trying to mediate between them and hold things together.

The British vision of Europe, particularly of a European security role, is more compatible with American views than those of any of its European partners; consequently, it clashes with the visions of other leading Member States, most notably with France's. France represents the most challenging European position for the US and for the continuation of a strong transatlantic security arrangement. France is determined to develop a strong European independent defence capability.⁵⁶¹

The US on the other hand has the following priorities: it wants Europe to share more of the defence obligations and increase its military capabilities; it wants NATO to remain the dominant defence organisation for Europe and the Atlantic region and to develop out-of-area capabilities; and it wants EU no independent-minded in security matters. These positions represent substantial challenges for those who want to maintain and strengthen the transatlantic alliance. And the policies of the Bush administration - its affinity for unilateralism, its insistence on the universalism of American democratic and free-market values, and its strategy of preventative strike - have not made the situation any easier.

Nonetheless, there is an Anglo-American Special Relationship that might provide a model for future transatlantic developments.⁵⁶² Blair and his successors are to accomplish this project not alone, but supported by other states which has had a long-standing close relationship with the US, as Germany, and also, many countries in eastern and central Europe, most notably Poland, have strong ethnic and political ties and sympathies with the US, as we examined above.⁵⁶³

With the St. Malo rapprochement between Blair and Chirac in 1998 and the launch of the ESDP, Blair was confronted with American warnings of undermining NATO. In late February 2001, Blair extracted agreements from Bush and his advisers that they would support the European Defence Initiative launched at St. Malo, providing it did not

⁵⁵⁹ John Charmley, *Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57*, Harvest Books, 1996.

⁵⁶⁰ Blair's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, 22.11.1999.

⁵⁶¹ Lindley-French, Julian, "Terms of Engagement", *EU-ISS Chailot Papers* 52, May 2002, <http://aei.pitt.edu/514/01/chai52e.pdf>.

⁵⁶² John Charmley, *Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-57*, Harvest Books, 1996.

⁵⁶³ Janusz Bugajski and Iliona Teleki, *Atlantic Bridges: Americas New European Allies*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, UK, 2007.

compromise NATO, in return for UK support, albeit muted, for the US National Missile defence System and agreement to allow the US to upgrade its facilities at Fylingdales as part of that program.⁵⁶⁴

At the same time, there have been developments in NATO, strongly backed by the UK, which are in accord with American defence desires. Out-of-area operations are proliferating, and the expansion of NATO has provided forward positions for the US in its posture vis-à-vis the Middle East and oil-rich and strategically placed central Asian republics.⁵⁶⁵ The NATO main undertakings since the end of the Cold War, such as intervention in the Balkans, expansion to former Warsaw Pact states, political co-existence with Russia, and, more recently, the handing over of peace-keeping responsibilities in Bosnia and FYROM to the European Union are profoundly intertwined with US strategic interests.⁵⁶⁶ One, as Blair does and rightly, should add that they are intertwined with Europe's as well.

UK has adopted a very pragmatic approach towards ESDP and NATO.

Blair is aware of the need for Europeans to assume responsibility for their own security and the security of their neighbourhood, but not a highly ambitious one. Blair's vision of the ESDP is designed to accomplish only the Petersberg tasks without disturbing and duplicating the role of NATO where the country plays the most important role after the US and which is still considered irreplaceable by the UK. Thus, the ESDP should not aim at a total independence from NATO but the EU should be a smart client of NATO's military services.⁵⁶⁷

Importantly, Blair followed UK's long standing position in favour of enlargement but against the EU defence hard core or avant-garde vision – based on the fear of UK exclusion and not inclusion in the decision making process; repeating the need for openness of structured co-operation in defence for other states that would like to join.¹¹⁸ Also important is the fact that the British role in ESDP is that of a leader, given Britain's weight and military capacities.

And as a leader Blair risked his political life to support the US-led war in Iraq, doing the right thing, as he had argued; and preserving UK's role in the world as a pivotal power. On 9/11, just hours after the collapse of the World Trade Center, Blair pledged his solidarity with the US. *Here in the United Kingdom, we stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our*

⁵⁶⁴ Geir Lundestad, "Towards Atlantic Drift," and Georges-Henri Soutou, "Three Rifts, Two Reconciliations: Franco-American Relations during the Fifth Republic," David M. Andrews, ed., *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US-European Relations After Iraq*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 9-30, 102-128.

⁵⁶⁵ Luca Ratti, "Post-Cold War NATO and International Relations Theory: The Case for Neo-Classical Realism," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol 4, No 1, Spring 2006.

⁵⁶⁶ Anthony Seldon et al., *Blair*, Free Press, London, 2005, p. 612.

⁵⁶⁷ Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005; Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty First Century*, Atlantic, New York, 2003; Margaret Thatcher, *Statecraft: Strategies for Changing World*, HarperCollins, 2002.

world.⁵⁶⁸ That commitment was in line with a long-established principle of British foreign policy: the UK should nurture a special relationship with the US in the hope of shaping the exercise of US power.

Unlike other heads of government who framed their promises more carefully, Blair loyally followed Bush into Afghanistan and then into an unpopular and, as it turns out, troubled campaign in Iraq.⁵⁶⁹ Indeed, Blair in 1997 in his election date took on the great unresolved issues of the second half of the twentieth century and defined a fairly coherent grand strategy to face them. In foreign policy, at stake was how to develop a new relationship with Europe in which the UK would play a central role, and how to balance ties to Europe and the special relationship with the US.⁵⁷⁰

Blair has persistently and fervently made the case that UK and Europe need good relations with the US. Blair has supported the idea that EU-NATO relations have to continue to be strong. In the West today more than ever, in our era of high unpredictability we should stay together based on our common values and confronting, united – which seems the most effective way – our common threats, terrorism and WMD – clearly underlined in both ESS and NSS documents.⁵⁷¹

Recent European interventions in Congo, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire, none of which the US had any interest in joining, have saved many lives and supported American interests in a troubled part of the world. Americans should want to see more such actions and reduce US troops in the Balkans. A more coherent and capable European partner, one that can share in the burdens of global management, is not only desirable, but probably necessary.⁵⁷²

For a long time, UK has given special preference to its Special Relationship with the US. Yet, UK plays a key role in the ESDP project too. UK's political weight in the world, its position vis-à-vis the US, and its military capacities are indispensable for ESDP, is also a country that has been able to adapt its military force to new challenges and has been approaching the US with its technologies and operability of its force deployable anywhere in the world most of all the other NATO states.⁵⁷³

⁵⁶⁸ US State Department, U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair on Terrorist Attacks on U.S., "Blair Says Britain Stands "Shoulder to Shoulder" with America" http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Transcript_Blair_Says_Britain_Stands_Shoulder_to_Shoulder_with_America.html.

⁵⁶⁹ The former British ambassador to Washington recently lamented that Blair had even failed to insist on proper preparations for the occupation of Iraq. Other critics have gone so far as to unfavourably compare Blair's record with that of Harold Wilson, who, although rarely remembered very favourably as prime minister, at least resisted President Lyndon Johnson's requests that British troops join U.S. Forces in Vietnam.

⁵⁷⁰ Steven Philip Kramer, "Blair's Britain After Iraq", *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2003.

⁵⁷¹ See ESS and NSS analysis of the present work, Chapter 1, above.

⁵⁷² Philip H. Gordon, "Holding NATO together: Blair could use some U.S. loyalty", *International Herald Tribune*, 06.11.2003.

⁵⁷³ British strategy and armed forces were adapted on the basis of their Strategic Defence Review in 1998, European Security and Defence Policy in the Light of Transatlantic Relations Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM, June 2005.

At the same time, UK has been opposing European defence parallel with NATO. Led by Blair, however, UK has been actively involved in the European integration process, chiefly on the intergovernmental level though. Along with France, Britain has become the main initiator and the driving force of ESDP. Some authors claim that Blair is using ESDP as a negotiation skill even towards the US, to show that Britain is not that dependent on America only and the other way round – as not being dependent totally on Europe either. ESDP is also a tool used in trying to influence decision making in the other side of the Atlantic,⁵⁷⁴ though one might doubt UK's real influence on decision-making in US.

The 1998 Anglo-French declaration in St. Malo stated: *The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. (...) To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.*⁵⁷⁵

Blair's initiative took many by surprise and marked a significant change in the British position towards European defence issues. Indeed, the UK had maintained for most of the 1990s that any attempt by Europeans to organise their own defence would drive the US away from Europe and lead to the collapse of NATO.⁵⁷⁶ But Blair seems to capture the necessity for Europe to be capable of sharing the burden of defending Western values, ideas and interests, consistently with a working transatlantic relation.

However, British policy becomes more concerned about the US commitment to European defence. US congressional demands for burden sharing were increasingly enthusiastic. Blair believed that a strong ESDP would reinforce US engagement in Europe⁵⁷⁷ and by the end of 1998 Blair was calling for military action in Kosovo. British and French military were collaborating closely on a *Kosovo extraction* force. This made the British military more enthusiastic about the idea of a European defence. Last but not least, much Blair initiative was a way for him to show his European credentials, after having opted out of both the Schengen

⁵⁷⁴ Lukáš Pachta, "European Security and Defence Policy in the Light of the Transatlantic Relationship", Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, June 2005, www.europeum.org.

⁵⁷⁵ See Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense, Saint Malo, December 4, 1998, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/1998/stmalo.asp>.

⁵⁷⁶ This was why the UK had vetoed the WEU-EU merger in 1997. It may be noted that only the French had pushed hard for a WEU-EU merger. Germany had never been enthusiastic supporter of the WEU — an organisation that had been created in 1954 to control its armament.

⁵⁷⁷ See Jolyon Howorth, "European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?", WEU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers 43, November 2000, p.p. 28-30; Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, France and the European defence Initiative, Survival, Vol 42, No 2, Summer 2000, p.p. 34-35; and Charles G. Cogan, *The Third Option: The Emancipation of European Defense, 1989-2000*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001, p.p.97-100.

agreement and the euro.⁵⁷⁸ Reactions to the St. Malo declaration were not long in coming. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright set down the *do not* criteria, as we saw earlier, for judging the initiative.

For Blair EU should be agreeing on practical measures to enhance European defence capability; be prepared to take on more missions of peacekeeping and enforcement; develop the capability, with NATO or where NATO does not want to be engaged outside it; to be able to intervene quickly and effectively in support of conflict resolution. *We are world leaders in development and proud of it. We should be leading the way on promoting a new multi-lateral trade agreement which will increase trade for all, especially the poorest nations. We are leading the debate on climate change and developing pan-European policies to tackle it. (...) But my point is very simple. A strong Europe would be an active player in foreign policy, a good partner of course to the US, but also capable of demonstrating its own capacity to shape and move the world forward.*⁵⁷⁹

The Iraq crisis challenged the cornerstone of Blair's grand strategy - that the United Kingdom could act as a bridge across the Atlantic. It damaged the new relationship with France established by Blair in 1998. It raised questions about the wisdom of the Special Relationship with the US. And it even threatened the survival of Blair's premiership.

However, what remains still thriving and alive is Blair's unconventional thinking in international relations, his support of both NATO and ESDP based on the importance of transatlantic relation as the core relationship for the West in confronting future challenges against new global challenges. Common values are not different from common interests and both organisations, and both sides of the Atlantic have common gain in keeping them alive, transformed and up-dated.

Europe has to take up its responsibilities, it cannot hesitate any longer. *There is a constant need for the EU to take responsibility in its own neighborhood and to ensure its values in this vital space before acting internationally. This is where the effort should be focused in order to develop a healthy, active and prosperous ESDP.*⁵⁸⁰ The ESDP should not aim at a total independence from NATO but should be a smart client of NATO's military services. For Blair, *A strong Europe would be an active player in foreign policy, a good partner of course to the U.S., but also capable of demonstrating its own capacity to shape and move the world forward.*⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁸ Giovanna Bono, European Security and Defence Policy: Theoretical Approaches, the Nice Summit and Hot Issues, Research and Training Network: Bridging the Accountability Gap in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)/ ESDP and Democracy, Berlin, February 2002.

⁵⁷⁹ "Blair's Vision for Europe: Economic Modernization Can Save our Societies", *European Affairs*, Vol 8, No 2-3, Summer/Fall 2007, http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2007_summer_fall/2007_summer_fall_03.php4.

⁵⁸⁰ Interview with Ms Anni Podimata.

⁵⁸¹ Blair's Vision for Europe: Economic Modernization Can Save our Societies", *European Affairs*, Vol 8, No 2-3, Summer/Fall 2007, http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2007_summer_fall/2007_summer_fall_03.php4.

6. Some Thoughts and Remarks on Future Perspectives

A reformed NATO must be re-structured to enable good organisation of the US and European strategic perceptions and policy. A reformed NATO will remain for the foreseeable future the cornerstone of Europe's collective defence and the platform for the projection of European, higher-intensity military capability worldwide. At the political level, it seems also that a reformed NATO will remain the most important forum for transatlantic security policy co-ordination.

In addition, it remains to be seen whether NATO as an organisational entity engaged in anti-terrorist activities will be able to find a suitable role for itself between US unilateralist trends and the increasing assertiveness of a more self-confident European Union, which is endeavouring to enhance its own profile in the areas of foreign policy and security. Forster and Wallace argued that US policy makers *want NATO to serve both as a framework for European security and as a vehicle for supporting US strategy in the rest of the world. These two objectives may well prove irreconcilable*⁵⁸²

The 1999 Strategic Concept does not take into account the 9/11, 2001 events and NATO's subsequent engagement in Afghanistan; it does not take into account neither the fact that today the organisation has nine new members, expanded from nineteen in 1999 to twenty eight member countries today. NATO needs thus a new global vision. As Stefanie Babst discussed in the International Meeting of Political Studies in Estoril, Portugal in 2009, *without such a global vision, the Allies will not be in a position to take the necessary political decisions, to prioritize among the many tasks at hand and to identify the military resources required to fulfill them.*⁵⁸³

It is true that the Cold War is over, and there has been a resurgence of US unilateralism, a neo-conservative ideology in the US and significant changes have taken place in Europe. Still, one wonders whether these developments are any more significant than the Suez Crisis, European integration from the 1950s to the 1990s, or the unilateralism made manifest in the waging of a war in Vietnam. Despite all the difficulties that the NATO Alliance has faced it has survived.

NATO has developed since the end of the Cold War and now provides new security pay-offs for all its members: stability for the ex-communist states in a democratic Europe supported by the expansion of the EU; a powerful voice in world affairs⁵⁸⁴. NATO now conducts out-of-area operations that are quite significant security wise and NATO expansion has enhanced the alliance's posture with regard to strategically sensitive areas, like Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. NATO is capable of a strong role providing security within Europe and abroad

⁵⁸² Anthony Forster, and Wallace William, "What is NATO for?", *Survival*, Vol 43, No 4, Winter 2001.

⁵⁸³ Stefanie Babst, Speech at the International Meeting of Political Studies, UCP/IEP, in Estoril, 25.06.2009.

⁵⁸⁴ Often forgotten is that the only time Article 5's all-for-one and one-for-all principle has been invoked was to help the United States in the aftermath of 9/11.

as well. 9/11 has shown that EU-US still faces existential threats to their societies and security -- and that these threats largely come from beyond Europe.

As far as Europe is concerned, is experiencing a crisis of leadership. The prime challenge of that political leadership today is to define the substance and direction of the West, and there is a continuing need for this to be done. *The nature of the threat to NATO Europe may have changed, while the central role of the Atlantic Alliance as the guarantor of European security has not.*⁵⁸⁵

ESDP has been developed modestly and in a way that is largely acceptable to the US and European partners. French might be in favour of developing an independent European military capability, everybody knows that it would not be credible without British participation.⁵⁸⁶ France's re-evaluation of NATO's integrated military structure and the renewed interest of France to be part of it both strengthen NATO's power and image.

In addition, there are strong economic ties and benefits deriving from this relation from both sides of the Atlantic, as Timothy Garton Ash has emphasised. Mutual economic benefits to be derived by both transatlantic sides.⁵⁸⁷ Each side has over \$3 trillion of assets in the other.⁵⁸⁸ So, it seems that Blair was right in attempting to renew and widen the Special Relationship that has bound the US and Europe so closely together since 1945.⁵⁸⁹ Indeed, there is no clear cut dichotomy between interests and affections. If Europe and the US are to move ahead together in an ever closer union, then policies that reflect common affections and interests must be cultivated in order to allow tolerance of differences of interests.

Thus, it seems that this opportunity to create a new transatlantic understanding cannot be lost. America is engaged in a difficult and dangerous war, and needs allies to win it. Those alliances can no longer be bounded by artificial geographic boundaries. If NATO is not up to the challenge of becoming effective in the new war against terrorism, then leaders may be inclined to search for something else that will answer this need.

⁵⁸⁵ British Foreign Secretary Rifkind put his country's position briefly, quoted in Jeffrey A. Larsen "NATO counterproliferation policy: A case study in alliance politics", November 1997, Air Force Academy Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper 17 <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/ocp17.htm> last access: 09.05.2007.

⁵⁸⁶ That requires some compromise and shift in French policies, both of which having been in evidence in recent years.

⁵⁸⁷ Steven McGuire and Michael Smith, *The European Union and the United States Competition and Convergence in the Global Arena*, The European Union Series, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.

⁵⁸⁸ Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World*, Penguin Books, London 2005.

⁵⁸⁹ See discussion over Blair's future role in Europe: European Union, 12.01.2008, "Speculation Grows Over Blair's Ambitions for EU President Role", <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3054779,00.html>.

NATO has prevented war in Europe for more than fifty years. That, in itself, is a remarkable accomplishment. Now NATO has to tackle the most pressing security threat today, a threat that is existential because it involves Weapons of Mass Destruction. This is the moment for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to focus on their common rich heritage of economical, cultural and political cooperation.

With the Iraq war was created a political rift between EU and US and what is often cynically described as the Old Europe, namely France, Germany, and Belgium and New Europe namely new Central and Eastern European Member States. However, there has been a rapprochement between the countries that supported the Iraq war and the countries that did not. Moreover there has been amelioration in the EU-US relations too.

Concerning the most important institutional relation in the transatlantic community, between NATO and ESDP shall remain more one of convergence than divergence. The EU-US relation remains for both sides a priority. ESDP needs NATO to acquire an autonomous military capacity and NATO needs ESDP for nation building and post conflict reconstruction. And, although there are not conflicting issues between the two projects, there have been and they will continue to be incompatible policy preferences. It is up to the political leaders in both parties to be able to tackle the problems and take the decisions required; safeguarding in the best way what their common transatlantic values stand for.

Chapter IV

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 9/11: BLAIR'S VISION

1. Blair – The leader

Blair faithfully believed that Weapons of Mass Destruction were one of the most serious threats to the future security of the entire world. He also believed that if the US were allowed to go it alone it would be seriously dangerous for world peace. Blair believes that American power is a force for good in the world. He also recognises that Britain's foreign-policy aims, such as progress in the Middle East peace process, need American support and power. The EU cannot be a substitute.

Hence by taking US side, Blair aimed to monitor, influence and restrain America's actions, remaining both a leading player in Europe and a special partner of the US and thus realising his vision of Britain as a pivotal power.

Blair set out his moral position in practice during the Kosovo crisis, and after 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq. Testing Blair's doctrine in practice one should ask first, what is really the *Blair doctrine*? How the "Blair doctrine" does compare to the "Bush doctrine"? To what extent can actual interventions – such as those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq – be understood as successful applications of the *Blair doctrine*? What lessons need to be learned for the future? Blair's vision *Engaged, open, dynamic, a partner and, where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence, for a Britain*⁵⁹⁰, is where Europe's must also be.

This shall mean that EU should continue to demonstrate the values of liberal democracy to the rest of the world rather than trying to impose them. Where it is necessary to intervene in order to prevent atrocities, Europe's military and civilian capabilities need to be modernised and harmonised so that the EU can deliver on its humanitarian promises. But above all Europeans should demonstrate the strong political will needed to shape their own future.

2. Doctrine of International Community Tested

2.1. The Doctrine

Leaving office in 2007, Blair did not withdraw anything he said in his Chicago speech, on 22 April 1999, with its liberal interventionist *doctrine*

⁵⁹⁰ Tony Blair On Britain's New Global Role, Speech given at the Lord Mayor of London's Banquet, 22.11.1999, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 42, December 1999, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/42blair.htm> last access: 20.04.2007.

of *international community*.⁵⁹¹ Starting from the reality of interdependence in an age of globalisation, a world where events in a far away place can have immediate effect on our own country and acting according to certain values, Blair defends his doctrine with pride.

*The fact that we are engaged is the result of a wide range of changes - the end of the Cold War; changing technology; the spread of democracy. But it is bigger than that I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way. Globalisation has transformed our economies and our working practices. But globalisation is not just economic. It is also a political and security phenomenon (...) We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. By this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavour. Just as within domestic politics, the notion of community - the belief that partnership and co-operation are essential to advance self-interest - is coming into its own; so it needs to find its own international echo. Global financial markets, the global environment, global security and disarmament issues: none of these can be solved without intense international co-operation.*⁵⁹²

In his Chicago speech - when NATO was in the middle of its military action aimed at removing Slobodan Milosevic's Serb army and police from the disputed territory of Kosovo – Blair also offered to the *doctrine of the international community* a set of criteria for deciding when and how to intervene militarily in the affairs of another country: He proposed that five major questions should be asked: Are we sure of our case? Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Are we prepared for the long term? Do we have national interests involved? These proposals have become known as the *Blair doctrine*.⁵⁹³

Blair outlined this doctrine aiming at halting or preventing humanitarian disasters such as genocide or ethnic cleansing. Blair was attempting to build a new paradigm by which to conduct international relations. His influential role in defeating Milosevic over his attacks on Kosovo, and his decisive intervention in Sierra Leone encouraged Blair to continue. After 9/11, the two further interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in the demise of the Taliban. However, the subsequent violent resistance against intervention forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq has provided pause for thought.

⁵⁹¹ Tony Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community" Speech at the Economic Club of Chicago, 10 Downing Street website, 24.04.1999, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297>.

⁵⁹² Extract of Blair's Chicago Speech, *Ibid*.

⁵⁹³ Chris Abbott and John Sloboda, "The 'Blair doctrine' and after: five years of humanitarian intervention", *OpenDemocracy.net* 21.04.2004 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/article_1857.jsp last access: 12.03.2007.

In September 2000 the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS published its conclusions in a December 2001 report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* which comprises three specific responsibilities: to prevent, to react and to rebuild and four precautionary measures: right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects.⁵⁹⁴

Blair's support of the present military engagements thus is based on his doctrine of international community. Blair's determination to act was also apparent in his speech to his own Labor Party conference 20 days after the atrocities in New York and Washington. In addition to the moral justification for engaging militarily, Blair outlined that though *nations act in their own self-interest, the lesson of the financial markets, climate change, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation or world trade is that our self-interest and our mutual interests are today inextricably woven together*.⁵⁹⁵ For Blair, 9/11 seems to confirm his vision, validating his philosophy. Thus, Blair has emerged as such a driving figure in world events since then.

But how does Blair compare to Bush, or more specifically, how does the *Blair doctrine* compare to the *Bush doctrine*?

The Bush doctrine of preemption and Blair's liberal interventionism may coincide at times to justify military action, but the underlying approaches are very different. The Blair's doctrine is internationalist in origin, thinking globally; while the Bush doctrine is pro national, based on national defence interests purely.⁵⁹⁶ In his Lord Mayor's Banquet speech, Blair in contrast to President Bush's *axis of evil* speech the following January, clearly distinguishes Iraq from Syria, Iran and other nations in the same position.⁵⁹⁷

What Blair calls *the doctrine of international community* predates the Bush doctrine also. It was born out of the turmoil in the Balkans in the 1990s and out of Western guilt over the genocide in Rwanda.⁵⁹⁸ Blair has argued

⁵⁹⁴ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) concludes that the most appropriate body to authorise such intervention is the United Nations Security Council, and that the task is to make the Security Council work better recommending that the General Assembly adopts a draft declaratory resolution embodying the basic principles of the responsibility to protect, and that the Security Council should seek to reach an agreement on a set of guidelines embracing the principles laid out in the report. The UN has not formally adopted its recommendations. See Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect", December 2001, <http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp> last access: 01.07.2008.

⁵⁹⁵ Tony Blair, Speech at the Labour Party Conference published in Guardian, Tuesday 02.10.2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour6> last access: 01.15.2008.

⁵⁹⁶ Peter Riddell, "Tony Blair Needs a Hug", *Progressive Politics*, Vol 2, No 2, Summer 2003, London.

⁵⁹⁷ Tony Blair, Speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet - 12 November 2001, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1661.asp>.

⁵⁹⁸ Blair in his Labour Party Conference Speech in October 2001, said clearly that *if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993 [sic.], when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to act there also...* <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour6> last access: 02.05.2007

that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of nation-states must be qualified. Indeed, acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter and massive flows of refugees, which can unsettle other countries, are indeed threats to international peace and security.⁵⁹⁹ On this basis, for Blair, military intervention can be justified not only to end conflicts but also to create more democratic and thus more secure societies—the very nation building notion that Bush had disapproved before 9/11.⁶⁰⁰

Gareth Evans has underlined the gap between liberal interventionism and the Bush doctrine and argues that *the concern is not just that military action may be taken too often for insufficient reasons. It is that it will be taken too rarely for the right ones. We know from the 1990s how difficult it is to mobilise domestic or international support for intervention, even against the most egregious human rights violations. That may be why so many liberal internationalists - starting with Tony Blair, the UK prime minister - wanted to believe in the legitimacy of the Iraq war.*⁶⁰¹

However, Blair's response to the Bush doctrine has been not to highlight differences with Washington (as the French have done) but to emphasise similarities. Blair has adopted the famous *hug them close*, as we have seen throughout this book, approach.⁶⁰² The US must lead any significant military effort. Blair believes that allowing the US to act alone will only reinforce unilateralist pressures within the administration and undermine the international order Blair is trying to create.

2.2. Recent humanitarian interventions and Blair's doctrine

Even before 9/11, a concept of community is at the core of Blair's political beliefs. The so-called *third-way* envisioned a society whose members have rights and responsibilities to act and be engaged when necessary in order to preserve and exploit peace and security.

For an indication of the different worldviews compare Blair's statement on Rwanda, with Bush's answer to the question of what he would do if another Rwanda occurred. *We should not, he stated, send our troops to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide in nations outside our strategic interests....I don't like genocide and I don't like ethnic cleansing, but the president must set clear parameters as to where troops ought to be used and when they ought to be used.* George W. Bush, speaking on ABC's This Week 23.01.2000. Quoted in Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, 2003, p.37.

⁵⁹⁹ Speech in Labour Party Conference, 2001.

⁶⁰⁰ See: Campaign 2000 on C-SPAN with Bush talking about Nation Building, on line: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BqiBwsjAa2s> Bush said: *...a military is meant to fight and win war...I think what we have to do is convince people who live in the land to build their nations...*; in his 2000 Presidential Campaign Speech, available on line http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGDwvAbx_fg, he also stated that *If we don't stop extending our troops all around the world in nation-building missions then we're going to have a serious problem coming down the road, and I'm going to prevent that.*

⁶⁰¹ Gareth Evans, "Humanity Did Not Justify This War," *Financial Times*, 15.05.2003 (Evans is president of the International Crisis Group and was foreign minister of Australia, 1988-96).

⁶⁰² Peter Riddell, *Hug Them Close*, Politicos Pub, 2004.

2.2.1. Kosovo

The NATO intervention in Kosovo in March 1999 was designed to prevent ethnic cleansing and to protect the Kosovar Albanians who formed the large majority of the population of the Serb-ruled province. The intervention was successful in forcing the Serbian military out of Kosovo, and ending the repression and killing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbs.⁶⁰³ As a genuine liberal intervention to prevent genocide or massively life-threatening behaviour within the borders of another state, Kosovo was justified and seems the clearest example of the Blair doctrine at work.

However, many opponents of the intervention foresaw the multiple dangers that might result from supporting one side in what had many of the characteristics of a civil war.⁶⁰⁴ In backing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), NATO gave legitimacy and power to an organisation that has continued to promote anti-Serb violence in the region.⁶⁰⁵ However, the alternative, to ignore until somehow a legal basis and instruments are built for intervention, seems paradoxical. For Blair NATO's cause in Kosovo was just. *We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed*, he told his Chicago speech.⁶⁰⁶

However, the lack of authorisation from a properly constituted public authority, like the UN, was never really addressed.⁶⁰⁷ And for Blair the *international community* was not synonymous with the United Nations Security Council.⁶⁰⁸ Indeed, Russia, China and India amongst others opposed

⁶⁰³ John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, The Free Press; The Fall of Srebrenica. Found at: <http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf>.

⁶⁰⁴ Roberto Belloni, "Is Humanitarianism Part of the Problem? Nine Theses", Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Discussion Paper 2005-03, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 2005, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/belloni.pdf> last access: 09.06.2007.

⁶⁰⁵ The most recent: communal violence in Kosovo – in which nineteen people were killed and 3,000 Serb civilians forcibly removed from their remaining centres of settlement – underline how far from stability the territory still is. See for instance: Reuters, "Border violence mars Kosovo's new start", 19.02.2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSHAM93900920080219?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&sp=true>.

⁶⁰⁶ Tony Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community" Speech at the Economic Club of Chicago, 10 *Downing Street* website, 24.04.1999, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297>.

⁶⁰⁷ The UN itself is also trying to redefine intervention. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (Article 2 of the UN Charter).

⁶⁰⁸ *The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken*, it states. This article means that the UN can take its own collective preemptive action - and of a military kind. It could declare what country is a *threat to the peace*. That is really what Bush and Blair arguing that If the UN does not act then individual states may *do so themselves*. *That in turn would be a long way from Article 2 of the UN Charter which says: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state*. See more: Paul Reynolds, "Blair's 'international community' doctrine", BBC News, Updated: 06.03.2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3539125.stm.

the action. States do not always define their particular interests in terms of the wider international interest and certainly there is no specific indication of how the common good would be formulated by each country. Yet, Blair had argued then, in Chicago, as after the events of 9/11 that *in the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer.*⁶⁰⁹

So, the legal argument offered at the time suggests NATO had gained implicit authorisation⁶¹⁰ from the UN Security Council to use force against Milosevic. For Blair, the existence of an international community beyond the state, and indeed beyond the United Nations, was self-evident. In addition, resolution 1199 of the 23 September 1998, for instance, had warned of an impending humanitarian catastrophe and decided that further action should be taken. More concrete measures were also demanded in Resolution 1160 the previous March⁶¹¹ and in Chapter VII resolution, which was passed in October 1998⁶¹².

Blair's recognition that the Kosovo intervention had highlighted the need to reform the UN Security Council is also worth noting. Andrew Linklater suggests that *one of the qualities of the good international citizen is the willingness to challenge the legitimacy of the veto by irresponsible powers that are prepared to block international action to prevent human rights violations.*⁶¹³ Still, the role that the UN played in Blair's doctrine of international community seems already questionable.

Blair insisted that the war in Kosovo was a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values and led the way in forging an international action to reverse a genocide being perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic against the mainly Muslim Kosovar Albanians. And today, Kosovo is anchored in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process, the EU policy which applies to the Western Balkans, and is designed to prepare potential candidates for EU membership. Both Serbian and Kosovan warlords are prosecuted in Hague. As Timothy Garton Ash put it *For a liberal interventionist, Kosovo was Blair's finest hour.*⁶¹⁴

⁶⁰⁹ See also Advisory Council on International Affairs of the Netherlands, "Humanitarian Intervention", Advisory Report, No 13, 2000 <http://www.aiv-advice.nl/>, last access: 11.04.2007.

⁶¹⁰ Chicago speech.

⁶¹¹ UN Security Council Resolutions – 1998, on line, documents S/Res/1199, 23.11.1998 and S/Res/1160, 31.03.1998, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm>.

⁶¹² UN Security Council Resolutions, S/Res/1203, 24.10.1998, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm>.

⁶¹³ Andrew Linklater, "The good international citizen and the crisis in Kosovo", in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention*. Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship, United Nations University Press, 2000, p. 494.

⁶¹⁴ Timothy Garton Ash, "Like it or loathe it, after 10 years Blair knows exactly what he stands for", *The Guardian*, 26.04.2007.

2.2.2. 9/11 - War on Terror

The impact of 9/11

After Kosovo and Sierra Leone, Blair's commitment to interventionism intensified further after the 9/11 terrorist attack and the US-led military action against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁶¹⁵ Blair's support for interventionism became increasingly expressed through the paradigms of security and counter-terrorism after 9/11.⁶¹⁶ As we have seen thoroughly in chapter 2, Blair's decision to evolve Britain to the 'war on terror' reflected a sincere belief that Al-Qaeda and its network of supporters posed an existential threat to the Western/universal values that he espoused. For some critics, in taking this position he placed British foreign policy at the service of a neo-conservative Bush administration with a different, more strongly unilateralist view of interventionism based on the doctrine of 'preemptive action'.⁶¹⁷ These commentators asserted that it was this that led to his apparent reluctance to intervene in support of calls for a ceasefire following the Israeli military incursion into southern Lebanon in 2006.

More specifically, John Kampfner claimed that Blair's problems began when Bush and the neoconservatives' administration asserted a doctrine of preemption and US primacy.⁶¹⁸ And Blair's main failure was to overestimate the influence that Britain could bring to bear on US foreign policy as a repayment for its unconditional loyalty.⁶¹⁹

US clearly were more concerned with maintaining its leading position in the world and thus, Bush's foreign policy was concentrated on shaping a balance of power that favours freedom.⁶²⁰ America would remain

⁶¹⁵ Tony Blair committed Britain's armed forces to action more often than any Prime Minister since Winston Churchill: Operation Desert Fox in Iraq (1998); Kosovo (1999); Sierra Leone (2000-3); Afghanistan (2001 – present); Iraq (2003-present).

⁶¹⁶ For further background on the campaign against international terrorism and Afghanistan, see the following House of Commons Library Research Papers and Standard Notes: RP 01/72, 11 September 2001: The Response; RP 01/81, Operation Enduring Freedom and the Conflict in Afghanistan; RP 01/112, The Campaign against International Terrorism: Prospects after the Fall of the Taliban; SN/IA/3831, Afghanistan and Narcotics 04.06.2007, http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_publications_and_archives/research_papers.cfm.

⁶¹⁷ Clare Short, *An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power*, Free Press, 2005; Peter Riddell, *The Unfulfilled Prime Minister: Tony Blair and the End of Optimism*, Politico's Publishing, 2004; James Naughtie, *The Rivals: The Intimate Story of a Political Marriage*, Fourth Estate, 2002, 2nd edition; Francis Beckett & David Hencke, *The Blairs and Their Court*, Aurum Press, 2004.

⁶¹⁸ John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, The Free Press, London, 2003.

⁶¹⁹ See, for example, Philippe Sands, *Lawless World. America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules*, Penguin, London, 2006. For further background, also see House of Commons Library Standard Notes SN/IA/3816, Extraordinary Rendition, 25.06.2007 and SN/IA/3962, Guantanamo Bay: An Update, 18.07.2007, http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_publications_and_archives/research_papers.cfm.

⁶²⁰ President George W. Bush's Inaugural Address, 20.01.2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html>; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

engaged in the world, but this was a realist internationalism based on a much narrower conception of the national interest.

2.2.3. Afghanistan

The Afghanistan intervention was not a humanitarian intervention, but a traditionally justified defensive war to destroy those who caused 9/11 and also an attempt to bring humanitarian benefits to the people of a failed state; and thus received easily UN Security Council approval. Blair's belief in the principle of intervention to overthrow tyrannies which threaten world peace and their own people, was confirmed one more time after Kosovo and Sierra Leone. Yet, US was barely interested in the reconstruction of Afghanistan after invasion and permitted – posing no questions whatsoever – an expansion of British troops as well as the creation of the International Assistance Force (ISAF) led by Britain for its first months. Yet, as it turned out, although the Taliban was routed, al-Qaida was not dealt with decisively and superficial social changes were largely confined to the capital, Kabul. The life of the average Afghan remains insecure.

The international community still has a grave responsibility that must be fulfilled.⁶²¹

For Blair the relief and justification that followed the war in 2001 did not of course mean the end of national foreign policy, but the beginning of a foreign policy based on the realisation that national security is not any more an inside out process – policy originated in the country towards the world – but a reflection and response to global events as well.

2.2.4. Iraq and the New Doctrine of International Community

The Iraq war had no precedent in international law. That is because the Iraq war was not a response to a specific attack neither intended to avert forthcoming genocide or ethnic cleansing, though America and Britain have implicitly or explicitly cited the humanitarian benefits that were said to derive from the removal of a tyrant and the promise of restoration of democracy.

Some argue that the imperialistic view of UK's role was reasserting itself as no UN authorisation was given to the war.⁶²² Yet, for Blair the war was indeed legal.⁶²³ On two occasions prior to reaching that conclusion – in the summer of 2002 and then in February 2003 – it had decided that additional resolutions were in fact needed to give the coalition explicit authorisation to invade Iraq. The failure to achieve this, firstly in

⁶²¹ David Coates and Joel Krieger, *Blair's War*, Polity, 2004, p.p.9-21; Mark Curtis, "Britain's Real Foreign Policy and the Failure of British Academia", *International Relations* Vol 18, No 3, September 2004, p.p. 275-288.

⁶²² See for example David Coates and Joel Krieger, *Blair's War*, Polity, 2004; see also Tim Dunne "When the shooting starts": Atlanticism in British security strategy", *International Affairs*, Vol 80 No 5, October 2004, p.p.893-909.

⁶²³ Christoph Bluth, "The British Road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq", *International Affairs*, Vol 80, No 5 October 2004, p.p. 876-879.

Resolution 1441 of November 2002 and secondly in the non-resolution of March 2003, weakened significantly the British argument.⁶²⁴

The unilateralistic moves that characterised the American policy (for instance, the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, and the policy of opposing the new International Criminal Court) was inconsistent with the idea of nations working together to address common problems. And on Iraq, Condoleezza Rice had stated that it would be an objective *to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers*, but it was last in a list of priorities and as far as Iraq was concerned she seemed happy that it was being contained or would at least be deterred from using WMD.⁶²⁵

Bush started planning for the invasion of Iraq on November 21, 2001, just 72 days after the 9/11 attacks. Blair on the other hand aimed to make sure that international engagement responded to his ideals of international community.⁶²⁶ There was following the events of 9/11 an assertion of the power of community but the discourse over globalisation was less in tune with the perceptions of the new Bush administration at the time. In fact it was positively present in Clinton's policy and the Bush administration had committed itself to policies that were not in tune with Clinton at all.⁶²⁷

For Blair, community means freedom and independence of all. He said *the world coming together with America as a community (...) this is an extraordinary moment for progressive politics. our values are the right ones for this age: the power of community, solidarity, the collective ability to further the individual's interests*.⁶²⁸ Unlike the Chicago speech, Blair made no mention of the United Nations in his Brighton speech⁶²⁹. While Blair did not link Iraq to the 9/11 attacks he had made it clear various times that a broad objective of British policy is to remove Saddam Hussein – even since 1998.⁶³⁰

⁶²⁴ Ewen MacAskill and Julian Borger, "Iraq war was illegal and breached the UN Charter says Annan", *The Guardian* 16.09.2004.

⁶²⁵ Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest", *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2000.

⁶²⁶ Ivo Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy*, Brookings Institution Press, 2003, pp. 5-16.

⁶²⁷ Philip Stephens, *Tony Blair: The Making of a World Leader*, Viking, 2004, p.p.7-8.

⁶²⁸ Tony Blair's speech to the Labour Party Conference, 2 October, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3697434.stm last access: 31.08.2007.

⁶²⁹ Tony Blair, Full text of Blair's Speech to the Labour Party conference in Brighton, 2004, available in BBC on line http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3697434.stm last access: 31.08.2007.

⁶³⁰ *The document released by the Government in 1998, prior to Operation Desert Fox... stated that Some CW agents and munitions remain hidden. The Iraqi chemical industry could produce mustard gas almost immediately, and limited amounts of nerve gas within months ... Saddam almost certainly retains BW production equipment, stocks of agents and weapons. In any case, Iraq has the expertise and equipment to regenerate an offensive BW capability within weeks. If Iraq's nuclear programme had not been halted by the Gulf conflict, Saddam might have had a nuclear weapon by 1993. If Iraq could procure the necessary machinery and materials abroad, it could build a crude air-delivered nuclear device in about five years. Iraq could design a viable nuclear weapon now.* as quoted in House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, "The Decision to Go to War in Iraq", Ninth Report of Session 2002-2003, Vol 1, House of Commons, 813, London, 07.06.2003.

The 3rd of February 2004, the British Government announced an inquiry into the intelligence relating to Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction that played a key part in the Government's decision to invade Iraq (as part of the U.S.-led coalition) in 2003. Butler Report stressed doubts about the effectiveness of the containment regime given the fact that there were no longer weapons inspectors inside the country.⁶³¹ This unsatisfactory situation was exacerbated by the humanitarian condition of the Iraqi people under the sanctions regime.⁶³² To support this view Blair himself notes that he had raised the issue of WMD with President Bush at their first meeting in Camp David in February 2001. However, Blair confessed during the Butler inquiry that terrorism and WMD took a completely different aspect after 9/11. They became more threatening than ever before. *what changed with September 11 was that I thought then you have to change your mindset (...) you have to go out and get after the different aspects of this threat (...) you have to deal this because otherwise the threat will grow (...) you have to take a stand, you have to say Right we are not going to allow the development of WMD in breach of the will of the international community.*⁶³³

But in any case, the vision outlined by Blair in his Sedgefield Resignation speech has little connection to the idealistic vision of 1999; somehow expectable as there is a decade gap between the two speeches. But although a disputed answer to questions about a constant and legitimate *doctrine of the international community* is present in both speeches, important elements remain unchanged. Particularly, what really remains unchanged is Blair's vision is: the UK in the centre of events and globalisation as the essential characteristic of today's world. *Britain is not a follower. It is a leader. It gets the essential characteristic of today's world - its interdependence.*⁶³⁴

Still, Blair was indeed concerned about Iraq before 9/11 and this concern evolved separately from the American planning process.⁶³⁵ However, Blair had to demonstrate that he could work too with the Republican

⁶³¹ See main points on BBC on line: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3892809.stm; Butler Report from BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf last access: 06.09.2008.

⁶³² See Tony Blair Press Conference to Arab journalists – 19.10.2001 <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1634.asp> On the costs of the sanctions regime see: Eric Herring, "Between Iraq and a Hard Place: A critique of the British government's case for UN economic sanctions", Butler Report, parag. 257, quoted in *Review of International Studies*, Vol 28, No 1, January 2002, p.p. 39- 56.

⁶³³ See: Christoph Bluth, "The British Road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq", *International Affairs*, Vol 80, No 5, October 2004, p.p. 871-892 and also Paul Williams, "Who's making UK foreign policy?", *International Affairs*, Vol 80, Issue 5, October 2004, p.p. 911-929.

⁶³⁴ Tony Blair speech to his Sedgefield constituency, resignation speech, justifying military action in Iraq and warning of the continued threat of global terrorism: <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,1162991,00.html>.

⁶³⁵ See for example Edited transcript of an interview given by the Prime Minister Tony Blair for Larry King, CNN - 6 November 2001 at <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1643.asp>

Speech by the Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's Banquet - 12 November 2001, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1661.asp>.

administration in the US. The Atlanticist view, which had been typified by the post-War Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin⁶³⁶ - who believed that the 'Special Relationship' with the US gave Britain increased influence on the world stage, was apparent in Blair's policy options too.

Blair supported war not solely because he wanted to be alongside the Americans as they went into battle but because he continued to believe it was the right thing to do. Blair left the 20th century claiming that *Promoting global security will be one of our biggest challenges at the turn of the millennium how we consign the evil of two world wars, ethnic cleansing and genocide to the millennium we leave behind how we ensure we create a more stable and just world how we deal with the armed conflicts that disrupt the lives and security of millions.*⁶³⁷ Coates and Krieger argue that Blair could not avoid participating to the war and this was evident as early as September 2002.

However, as Lawrence Freedman puts it: *Unlike other heads of government who framed their promises more carefully, Blair loyally followed Bush into Afghanistan and then into an unpopular and, as it turns out, troubled campaign in Iraq. He is now regularly portrayed as Bush's poodle for, according to the charges, slavishly following reckless U.S. policies and proving unable or unwilling to use his political capital to moderate this recklessness.*⁶³⁸ Arguments that Blair should have exercised better judgement in formulating his Iraq policy are justified, but it is not accurate to argue that Blair's decision was a product only of his policy towards the US. Blair did not see any fundamental incompatibility between Atlanticism and internationalism. And Blair sought to justify the invasion in terms of international law and great power responsibility by recalling the idea of an unreasonable veto which had been used to reconcile the intervention in Kosovo with his doctrine of international community.

Hence, it seems that for Blair invading Iraq was not contrary to the international community doctrine. On the contrary though, there are not equally appealing arguments explaining the failure in proving Iraq's WMD possession. Butler Report, had pointed out that *offensive military action against Iraq could only be justified if Iraq were held to be in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which imposed obligations on Iraq in regard to the elimination of its prohibited weapons programmes.*⁶³⁹ WMD are not found. Regime change also has no basis in international law whatsoever.

Saddam's failure to accept international conditions - in this case UN weapons inspections in the face of mounting evidence that he possessed WMD - was to be reason for war. Using the WMD threat as the issue would legally justify and therefore force support for the policy of regime change. Blair claimed that *the legal basis is in any doubt at all. It had been based*

⁶³⁶ David Coates and Joel Krieger, *Blair's War*, Polity, 2004, p.p. 124-129.

⁶³⁷ Tony Blair, "2010 - The Challenges to Global Security", Jane's Information Group, 22.12.1999, http://www.janes.com/defence/news/2010/991222_f_blair.shtml last access: 30.03.2006.

⁶³⁸ Lawrence Freedman, "The Special Relationship, Then and Now", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 85, No 3, 2006, p. 61.

⁶³⁹ The Butler Report, paragraph 266.

on UN resolution 1441, which called on Saddam to co-operate fully with UN weapons inspectors - which he failed to do (...) mass graves had been discovered in Iraq containing the remains of perhaps as many as 300,000 people.⁶⁴⁰

The vulnerability of the strategy was evident in Blair's speech at the Bush presidential library in April 2002.⁶⁴¹ This speech contained many of the earlier themes of international community. On the one hand Blair spoke enthusiastically about regime change, yet on the other he implied that all Saddam Hussein had to do to avoid war was let inspectors back in to the country.⁶⁴² Blair listed three conflicts involving regime change: Milosevic, the Taliban and Sierra Leone.⁶⁴³

Bush's intention to seek another resolution in UN that would give explicit authorisation for the use of force against Iraq was declared in his address to the UN General Assembly in September. This was a victory for Blair. In addition, in November 2002, Blair was able to secure a unanimous vote in favour of what became Resolution 1441 (2002), which warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.⁶⁴⁴ But resolution 1441 only delayed the inevitable showdown, which came in March 2003, when Blair would try for a last time to get explicit authorisation from the Security Council to use force against Iraq.⁶⁴⁵

By the end of November 2002, the diplomatic pressure on Saddam Hussein seemed to work when weapons inspectors were allowed to return to Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld had publicly suggested that the US would be prepared to go to war without the UK if Blair could not persuade Parliament. Blair, however, remained committed to his side of the deal they had made in September at Camp David. Coates and Krieger argue that Blair's previous argument for war had made this decision inevitable. His public statements had locked him and the UK into a path of confrontation. They conclude that the decision to take part in the invasion without having made the case at the Security Council was a betrayal of Blair's own doctrine of the international community.⁶⁴⁶

Yet, authority for the use of force against Iraq it was claimed was contained in Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991) and 1441 (2002).⁶⁴⁷ In a vote on 19th of March, in the British Parliament, in total, 396 MPs

⁶⁴⁰ Quoted in George Jones, "For me, the jury is not out at all, says Blair", *The Telegraph*, 09.07.2003, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1435598/For-me-the-jury-is-not-out-at-all-says-Blair.html>.

⁶⁴¹ Tony Blair, Speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library 07.04.2002, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1712>.

⁶⁴² Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005.

⁶⁴³ Blair told the House of Commons that he detested Saddam's regime, but *even now he can save it by complying with the UN's demand*. Quoted in Peter Riddell, *Hug Them Close*, Politicos Pub, 2004.

⁶⁴⁴ UN Document S/Res/1441, 08.11.2002.

⁶⁴⁵ Anthony Seldon, "Blair", Free Press, UK, 2005, p. 587; Peter Riddell, *Hug Them Close*, Politicos Pub, 2004.

⁶⁴⁶ David Coates and Joel Krieger, *Blair's War*, Polity, 2004, p.p.124-9.

⁶⁴⁷ The Butler Report, para. 386.

supported Blair.⁶⁴⁸ However, questions remained strong concerning the authority to go to war.

As we have seen earlier in this work (in Chapter 2), both Robin Cook as Foreign Secretary and Clare Short as International Development Secretary had supported the use of force against Yugoslavia in 1999 despite its lack of explicit Security Council authorisations. But Short and Cook had grave reservations about going to war against Iraq without the second resolution.⁶⁴⁹ Cook made clear in a devastating resignation speech to the House of Commons, that neither the threat posed by Saddam to regional security nor the humanitarian situation made this an exceptional case. He also claimed that *It is not France alone that wants more time for inspections. Germany wants more time for inspection; Russia wants more time for inspection; indeed, at no time have we signed up even the minimum necessary to carry a second resolution. We delude ourselves if we think that the degree of international hostility is all the result of President Chirac. The reality is that Britain is being asked to embark on a war without agreement in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading partner – not NATO, not the European Union and, non, not the Security Council.*⁶⁵⁰

The fact that no second resolution was voted at the Security Council in 2003 is another reminder that neither Blair nor Bush were able to convince a majority of the members on the Security Council that the war was necessary.⁶⁵¹ Blair insists that the military action remained consistent with a doctrine of international community but his policy failed to gain majority support within the Security Council. Indeed the understanding of intervention should be widened to include methods of conflict prevention and resolution other than the use of military force. Methods of ensuring that full post-intervention reconstruction plans are agreed and properly planned prior to any intervention. If a true international consensus on humanitarian intervention is to be achieved, governments must elaborate a consistent and legitimate doctrine of the international community. As Kofi Annan wrote in the *Economist* the 18th of September 1999: *When fighting stops the international commitment to peace must be as strong as was the commitment to war.*⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁸ Adam Roberts, "Law and the Use of Force after Iraq", *Survival*, Vol 45 No 2 Summer 2003, p. 43.

⁶⁴⁹ Robin Cook, "Why I had to leave the Cabinet", *The Guardian* 18.03. 2003; Clare Short, "How the Prime Minister deceived us", *The New Statesman*, 09.06.2003, p.p. 19-21. Two other ministers John Denham at the Home Office and Lord Hunt, a junior health minister, resigned over the war.

⁶⁵⁰ BBC on line, "Cook's resignation speech", and available video, BBC on line http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2859431.stm.

⁶⁵¹ Robin Cook, "Guiding Humanitarian Intervention", Speech by the then Foreign Secretary at the American Bar Association Lunch, London, 19.07.2000.

⁶⁵² Chris Abbott and John Sloboda, "The "Blair doctrine" and after: five years of humanitarian intervention", *Opendemocracy Net*, 22.04.2004, http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/article_1857.jsp.

2.3. Critiques

The doctrine as a basis of liberal interventionism has both a positive and a negative side. A positive side in terms of having its basis on human rights and the defence of human dignity and a negative side in terms of its critique of the Westphalian system of state sovereignty and non-interventionism principles.⁶⁵³ Most conservative thinkers, for instance, see the idea of human rights as rather vague. In Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution* the idea of humanity is rather abstract. Thus cannot be a basis for foreign policy stance. Today, the rights are interpreted differently in Europe, China or India, where identities are different: cultural, historical, religious and political identities. So, is difficult to pursue an interventionist foreign policy and mobilise populations in favour of it on considerations much less palpable and obvious as self-defence and genocide. For Burk and Hayek too, it is even more difficult to calculate the reactions not just of a government but of the population as well with its special values and traditions to foreigners.⁶⁵⁴ Blair and his supporters however in today's world with globalisation at its core consider the non-intervention principle not a credible policy. However, to right every wrong in this world is not possible; to intervene on such a scale that no country is capable of copying. Rawls's argument in his writing on the *Law of Peoples* in 1999 makes a similar case and Blair too in his Chicago Speech in 1999.⁶⁵⁵ *Looking around the world there are many regimes that are undemocratic and engaged in barbarous acts. If we wanted to right every wrong that we see in the modern world then we would do little else than intervene in the affairs of other countries. We would not be able to cope.*⁶⁵⁶ That is why he set the principles of intervention as seen above.

Broadly speaking, critiques of an interventionist British foreign policy during the Blair premiership fell into three main categories as described analytically in the Research Paper of the House of Commons on 23rd of June 2008 on British foreign policy since 1997.⁶⁵⁷

Firstly, that it was sincerely intended but fundamentally misguided. In terms of this belief that the approach was sincerely intended but fundamentally misguided, the key criticism expressed was that Blair had gone too far during his premiership from the essential objective of British foreign policy, which was the pursuit of UK's national interest, and in reality that there were many contradictions between universal values and

⁶⁵³ Raymont Plant, "Blair's Liberal Interventionism" in Mat Beech and Simon Lee, *Ten Years of New Labour*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.

⁶⁵⁴ See relevant discussion in *Ibid*, Raymont Plant, "Blair's Liberal Interventionism" p. 161.

⁶⁵⁵ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, Harvard University Press, 1999.

⁶⁵⁶ Tony Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community", Speech at the Economic Club of Chicago, 10 *Downing Street* website, 24.04.1999, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297>.

⁶⁵⁷ House of Commons, British Defence Policy since 1997, Library Research Paper 08/57, 27.06.2008, <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-057.pdf> last access: 24.07.2008.

British national interests. Michael Ancram claimed that the British role in the world must be based on national interest and not *on romantic dreams of curing the world, nor on an unquestioning acceptance of US policy*.⁶⁵⁸ Some also argued that Blair had failed to recognise that the political, economic and military will or capability to implement an interventionist approach simply did not exist, whether at the national or international level, and might never to do so, given the nature of the world order.⁶⁵⁹ These assessments are based more on a traditional realist view of foreign policy.

Another group of critics claim that Blair's broad intentions were good and the overall objectives desirable, but the implementation was often misguided or inconsistent. They often began by referring to the positive achievements of the Blair premiership on a wide range of foreign policy issues such as Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the International Criminal Court, African development and climate change.⁶⁶⁰ Then passing to criticism concerning British non-action towards cases of human rights violation in China, Russia or Saudi Arabia.⁶⁶¹ The February 2003 dossier on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction was often quoted as evidence.⁶⁶² In addition, some argued that Blair had also failed to do enough to generate the political, economic and military will and capability to make this approach more possible.

David Marquand claimed, according to this line of thinking that *Blair's fatal flaw was not just that he knew no history. It was that he had no sense of history, that he was constitutionally incapable of thinking historically (...) No one with a sense of history could possibly have thought that 9/11 marked a historical turning-point, that Saddam Hussein posed an unprecedented threat to the world, or that Iraq, of all places, could be transformed, at the point of a gun, into a beacon of western-style democracy*.⁶⁶³

⁶⁵⁸ House of Commons, "Middle East", 20 July 2006. It is also worth noting that these critiques did not correspond in any linear way with political affiliations. For example, there were Conservative 'idealists' as well as traditionally-minded 'realists'. Most critical labour backbenchers were disappointed 'idealists' and/or radical 'realists', Michael Ancram speeches, <http://www.michaelancram.com/recentList.aspx#speeches>.

⁶⁵⁹ "Led Astray, "How Iraq cast a shadow over Blair's foreign policy successes", Financial Times, 11.05.2007.

⁶⁶⁰ House of Commons, "Gleneagles G8 Commitments on Debt Relief and Aid: Two Years On", Library Research Papers and Standard Notes: RP 07/51, 04.06.2007, <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-051.pdf> last access: 24.07.2008.

⁶⁶¹ House of Commons, A Political and Economic Introduction to China, Library Research Papers: 6/36, 19.06.2006, <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-036.pdf> last access: 24.07.2008.

⁶⁶² Clare Short, *An Honourable Deception. New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of Power*, London, 2005. See also House of Commons, "Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the '45 Minutes' Intelligence", Library Standard Note SN/IA/3130, 13.07.2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/search.pl> last access: 24.07.2008.

⁶⁶³ David Marquand, "A man without history", *New Statesman*, 07.06.2007, <http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2007/05/blair-tony-iraq-history-war>.

Several other observers who were otherwise sympathetic to Blair's approach expressed the conviction that the damage suffered to Britain's reputation in the world as a result of Iraq had blocked its ability to achieve other progressive foreign policy objectives, whether in relation to the EU, Darfur and Zimbabwe or to the reform of international institutions.⁶⁶⁴ Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, said: *He was completely off-target in trying to use this as a justification for Iraq when other defences crumbled away. He has helped create a suspicion of neocolonialism.*⁶⁶⁵

In addition, critics of Blair have emphasized long-standing continuities in the Special Relationship between the UK and the US and drew upon more radical approaches to foreign policy. The main US preoccupation was to maintain its global economic and political dominion over the world. According to those espousing these views, the concept of *humanitarian intervention* should more accurately have been called *military humanitarianism*. One example of an extremely disappointed idealist was Carne Ross, the British diplomat who resigned over the war in Iraq. He wrote: *I question whether 'values' have not simply become a more palatable and politically-correct excuse for realist 'business as usual.'*⁶⁶⁶

Many of the leading figures in the UK *Stop the War Coalition* strongly supported an analysis of the war in Iraq that highlighted the issue of energy security:

*US oil policy is shaped by interlocking concerns – to bring down the overall price of oil, since cheap oil powers its economy overall (the US now imports nearly 60 per cent of the oil it uses each year, accounting for more than a quarter of world oil consumption), while maintaining the profits of its big oil companies (...) A US controlled Iraqi oil industry, privatised and turned over to oil corporations from the US and 'friendly' countries, would allow Washington to achieve its long-cherished goal of busting the Opec cartel, which daily commits the unforgivable sin of trying to fix the price of oil in the interests of the producing countries rather than the oil companies. With Iraq out of the cartel, Opec would no longer control sufficient output to fix the world price.*⁶⁶⁷

International energy security can only be accomplished through cooperation on the national and multilateral levels, as well as political

⁶⁶⁴ For further background on Darfur, see House of Commons, Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace, Library Research Paper 06/08, 08.02.2006, <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-008.pdf> last access: 01.02.2006.

⁶⁶⁵ Quoted in Led Astray, "How Iraq cast a shadow over Blair's foreign policy successes", *Financial Times*, 11.05.2007.

⁶⁶⁶ Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat, London, 2007, p.p. 123-4, quoted in House of Commons, Research Paper 08/57, 27.06.2008, <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-057.pdf>.

⁶⁶⁷ Andrew Murray and Lindsey German, *Stop the War. The Story of Britain's Biggest Mass Movement* London, 2005, p.p. 38-9 quoted in House of Commons, Research Paper 08/57 27.06.2008, <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-057.pdf>.

cooperation and mechanisms and a reduction in demand for energy and the development of new technologies. Even if the US deny a connection between American foreign policy in the Middle East – the invasion of Iraq, the strong alliance with Saudi Arabia and the focus in the Persian Gulf – and oil, it is evident that the huge global demand for energy will strengthen the focus on those regions that produce a lot of energy in the 21st century. This dependency on energy not only affects the US but also affects EU Member States that are even more dependent on energy resources in the Gulf. The demand for energy and raw materials rises proportionally even more in developing and third world countries. This is not only because of higher economic growth rates in those countries, but it is also due to a shift of the world's industrial production to countries like China.⁶⁶⁸

Climate change is also associated with this phenomenon. The EU Member States have set ambitious energy conservation goals to increase energy supplies derived from wind, water, solar and thermal power, as well as to reduce CO₂ emissions. Without a doubt, the EU is a forerunner in climate change politics and technologies.⁶⁶⁹ However, an awareness of climate change and a realisation that new innovations can reduce global warming, lead to greater energy independence and new industrial opportunities are materialising in the US as well.

Even British policy on issues such as the International Criminal Court, climate change or African development was not immune. Blair did little to challenge US actions which ensured that American forces enjoyed immunity from the jurisdiction of international tribunals, including the ICC. This unfortunately will be an unwanted legacy of Blair's foreign policy.

Realists argue hence that international law is merely what the great powers say it is. Liberal internationalists, on the other hand, try to argue society only exists so long as it does not conflict with the pre-conceived and non-negotiable interests of the powerful.

Lord Hannay has pointed out rightly that there were different perceptions about what a threat was in different parts of the world. Indeed, to some, poverty and aids were the problem, not terrorism. The belief that today nations should go to war in order to save the lives of peoples threatened by humanitarian disaster, is potentially a noble and inspiring concept.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁸ See Maps 1 & 2, p.p. 195-196.

⁶⁶⁹ Almut Wieland-Karimi, "Transatlantic Relations Together the West is Exploring New Shores, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, June 2007, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05163.pdf> last access: 01.12.2008; Senator Lugar, "The Lugar Energy Initiative. Driving the Future of Energy Security", discussions with former President Jimmy Carter, FedEx President Fred Smith and General Charles F. Wald, United States Air Force, (USAF), <http://lugar.senate.gov/energy> last access: 01.12.2008.

⁶⁷⁰ David Marquand, "Tony Blair and Iraq: a public tragedy", February 2004, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-journalismwar/article_1709.jsp.

Commonly, by equating terrorism with Islamic fundamentalism, criminal acts become victories against western civilisation.⁶⁷¹ Critics of Blair claim that the real problem is Blair's fundamentalism.

*Nothing but blind Blairite fundamentalism can justify sending British troops to south Afghanistan just now. (...) The case for a new "international community" is strong and Blair has often put it clearly. But this community will only come into being if pursued through example and persuasion, not through war. Success lies in culture and capitalism, through the interpenetration of peoples and religions and the liberation of market forces.*⁶⁷²

Subsequently, the attempt to impose Western values on distant states through armed force is doomed to failure. As Francis Fukuyama points out in his latest book, it has betrayed the neoconservative cause as much as the liberal one. It is obviously costly and counter-productive as to be almost beyond debate.⁶⁷³ However, for Blair, the United Nations' principle of non-interference was overruled by genocide, ethnic cleansing and regimes based on minority rule. For Blair, Britain must be active, not reactive and should seek international support and build new institutions.⁶⁷⁴

Blair indeed has something of a mixed record as any leader using military force to achieve policy objectives.⁶⁷⁵ Blair had to deal with many complexities of strategy. There have been some notable successes, such as in Sierra Leona, Kosovo and Afghanistan (although, resurgences of violence make the future of the country still uncertain).⁶⁷⁶ But though he showed courage in the Iraq war, the war itself has been a failure.

Nonetheless, Blair legacy reveals clearly Blair's determination as a leader to fight for what he believed in. For Clausewitz moral courage and determination is what makes a great strategist.⁶⁷⁷ Blair never proclaimed that he does not fight for the British national interest. What he claimed to be the focal point of the foreign policy of our days is globalisation and

⁶⁷¹ They claim that Blair's attempt to bond Al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, Iran's mullahs, the Taliban and Hamas into some giant global conspiracy is both inaccurate and distorts coherent strategy. Among other things it ignores the importance of distinguishing secular and clerical Muslim regimes.

⁶⁷² Simon Jenkins, "Blair's fundamentalism is the real enemy of western values", *The Sunday Times*, 26.03.2006, <http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/Features/Focus/article193646.ece>.

⁶⁷³ Francis Fukuyama, *America At The Crossroads Democracy, Power, And The Neoconservative Legacy*, Yale University Press, 2006.

⁶⁷⁴ Tony Blair, Foreign Policy Speech II, Australian Parliament, 27.03.2006, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page9245.asp>.

⁶⁷⁵ The war in Iraq was the fifth military operation Blair has authorized, after air strikes against Iraq in 1998 and operations in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan. This is not to mention the small contingent the British sent to East Timor.

⁶⁷⁶ David Lonsdale, "Blair's record on Defence", in Mat Beech and Simon Lee, *Ten Years of New Labour*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.

⁶⁷⁷ Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780-1831, *On War*, <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/1946>.

reading with attention his viewpoint one cannot but surely agree with him on that. He does believe that *the defining characteristic of today's world is its interdependence; that whereas the economics of globalisation are well matured, the politics of globalisation are not; and that unless we articulate a common global policy based on common values, we risk chaos threatening our stability, economic and political, through letting extremism, conflict or injustice go unchecked.*⁶⁷⁸ And in practice, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington, 11/03/2004 in Madrid, and 21/07/2005 in London, prove clearly that terrorism can knock our doors, claiming thousands of innocent lives with no previous notice. Blair points to the new threats and challenges that the Western World has to face together, acting together: terrorism and WMD. America and Europe have to fight together for their common values, and common interests. And though interests certainly do not always coincide, the ones that Blair emphasises: freedom, democracy and prosperity do apply to the peoples preferences. One cannot easily argue that an Iraqi or Iranian woman opposes to her liberty rights, just because of her tradition or religion. On this, as we shall examine below in more detail, he is also right. But definitely, there is plenty of evidence that proves we still have to learn some fundamental lessons in pursuing liberal interventionism. And clearly the soundest one, after the Iraq war, is that regimes cannot be imposed, and legitimacy is fundamental to make a cause just.

2.4. Lessons to Learn

First of all, national interest remains a primary concern for states. Thus, in today's interdependent world, states certainly need a wider definition of what constitutes their national interest.⁶⁷⁹ Repairing failed states and deploying peacekeeping forces in far parts of the world can be consistent with protecting the national interest. However, for a country to contribute to such activities requires a detailed national case to be articulated.

Similarly, trying to impose top-down solutions from outside, for instance transposing a complete set of values and approaches into a diversity of countries is destined to failure. Ultimately indigenous people have to find their own best way to run their lives. Hence, a much deeper understanding of the history, culture, and religious divides is indispensable.

Blair's principles of intervention have to be worked out more pragmatically: Are we sure of our case? Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Are we prepared for the long term? Do we have national

⁶⁷⁸ Tony Blair, Foreign Policy Speech II, Australian Parliament, 27.03.2006, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page9245.asp>.

⁶⁷⁹ Tony Blair's answer to question endorsed by the current author in the 10^o Almoço Conferência, Diário Digital "Desafios políticos, económicos energéticos para 2009", 19.09.2008, Hotel Altis, Lisbon. Question: What is the future face of ESDP, in our era of "low predictability", and to what extent a European common voice is a feasible project?

interests involved? In Kosovo, for example, it was fortunate that air strikes worked before the West was placed in the undesirable position of having to threaten the use of land forces that were neither properly prepared nor had widespread political backing. In Iraq also neither operations were prudently undertaken (budgetary overstretch) nor was any preparation about the long term management of the crisis and the post construction period.

Thus a realistic, sophisticated and pragmatic approach towards foreign intervention means for the transatlantic partners continuing to demonstrate the values of liberal democracy to the rest of the world rather than trying to impose them. And where it is necessary to intervene in order to prevent large-scale atrocities means that the cause has to be just and a broad legitimacy secured.

Europe's combination of crisis management instruments, military and diplomatic places Europe in an advantageous way to make its voice heard and respected.

3. Blair and Europe

3.1. Blair and the ESDP

When attempting to understand the British approach to the future model of European security, one should remember several key issues.

- A strong, historical conviction among the British about the need for cooperation with the US, coupled with limited confidence in the efficacy of European arrangements.
- Increased awareness of the importance of the country's own armed forces and its aspiration of Britain as a pivotal power.⁶⁸⁰

Indeed, Britain is among the leading countries cooperating to put flesh on to the involved concept of European Security and Defence Policy⁶⁸¹ – and it has been pursuing this goal while keeping an eye on a number of problems and constraints, such as:

- relations with the US and Europe,
- presence in security and integration institutions (ex the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe).

Blair came to power, with fresh ideas about British foreign policy towards Europe, engaged enthusiastically in EU matters and claimed that

⁶⁸⁰ Peter Riddell, "Tony Blair Needs a Hug", *Progressive Politics*, Vol 2, No 2, Summer 2003, Paul Rogers, "Reviewing British Security", *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No 4, October 1997; Anthony Seldon, "The influence of Ideas on British Foreign Policy: Anthony Seldon Interviews Christopher Hill", *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 10, No 2, 1996; William Wallace, the Collapse of British Foreign Policy, *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No 1 January 2005; Paul Williams, "Who's making UK Foreign Policy?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No 5, October, 2004.

⁶⁸¹ Krzysztof Jazwinski Warsaw, "Poland, The Role of Britain in the Development of the ESDI, and the Transatlantic Link", Institute of International Relations, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/jazwinski.pdf> last access: 05.04.2007.

Britain should be at the centre of Europe, pledging to *give Britain Leadership in Europe*. Putting his word into actions, he ended the British opt-out from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty that the Conservative Government of John Major had guaranteed and signed up the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.

The Amsterdam Treaty made some important improvements in the field of EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. For instance, it provided for the *progressive framing of a defence policy*. And the new WEU tasks (and the Petersberg tasks) were incorporated into the EU Treaty. Also qualified majority voting was applied to joint actions (but not decisions). A right of constructive abstention was though granted, allowing states not to participate in operations if they do not wish. The Amsterdam Treaty provided for the first time the post of a new High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Though this new development did not give decision power to the High Representative - he would be more of a diplomat and spokesman person to the EU - it demonstrated the need for Europe to represent to the external world with a common face. And Blair, although he never gave up his national interest and fought hard to keep CFSP in the intergovernmental level of decision making, said yes to all other developments pushing forward European integration and signing the Treaty.⁶⁸²

Blair also in 1998 took the lead in launching a joint Anglo-French initiative on defence, in St. Malo. The declaration said that the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. So Europe *must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crisis... acting in conformity with our obligations to NATO*.⁶⁸³ Indeed, military capacities, decision mechanisms and readiness to act are what great powers hold and make their voice heard.

At an informal EU Summit in Pörtschach in October 1998, Blair listed other possible institutional options previously opposed by the UK: either a gradual or an outright incorporation of the WEU into NATO.⁶⁸⁴ The British position contained entirely new elements, and it indicated the readiness to discuss flexibly and offensively various scenarios on building the European defence capability.⁶⁸⁵

That brought appreciation from some other EU Member States, including France, thus helping to push forward with a discussion to add details to the ESDI concept. Though questions, as we saw above in Chapter 3, emerged about duplicating the NATO structures and weakening the

⁶⁸² Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, 10.11.1997, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/treaties_other.htm.

⁶⁸³ Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense, Saint Malo, December 4, 1998, <http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/1998/stmalo.asp>.

⁶⁸⁴ Timothy Garden, "European Defence: Is Britain serious this time?", November 1998, www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/older/source01.html.

⁶⁸⁵ The Future of European Defence, Speech by the British Defence Secretary, Lord Robertson, to the WEU, Assembly, Paris, 01.12.1998.

Alliance and the transatlantic ties.⁶⁸⁶ Noticeably, an open problem was the future relationship between EU members and non-EU members of NATO. The US stressed that countries such as Turkey, Norway, Iceland, and also NATO's new members from Central Europe, Poland included, should be brought into decision-making on future European defence. It also urged the European allies to boost defence spending. So, in these circumstances, UK role and policy towards ESDI and transatlantic ties assumes special importance. Due to historical and strategic considerations, the country has an enormous potential for solving various dilemmas involved in European security policy and Euro-Atlantic security, in its broad sense. This special fact has naturally forced Blair as an ambitious leader to view his country as a bridge between America and Europe.

New impulses and challenges were provided by the events of 9/11, the Afghanistan war, and the intervention in Iraq. The new strategic and politico-military situation gave rise to an organisational and programmatic evolution of security institutions. The question of ESDP and Euro-Atlantic relations has doubtless come as one of the main aspects and challenges of the new strategic situation in Europe. Yet, the process of ESDP development has been linked to the evolution of British policy, for instance the Labour Party's electoral victory in 1997, the new priorities in British security policy, as contained in the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and the British approach to European security, as presented by Prime Minister Blair at the EU's informal Summit in Pörttschach on 24-24 October 1998.⁶⁸⁷

At the same time Euro-Atlantic relations had also been evolving. Blair, in his Warsaw speech on 6 October 2000 said that the circumstances of today, *mean it is time to overcome the legacy of Britain's past. Two things have changed. From Europe's perspective, Britain as a key partner in Europe is now a definite plus not a minus. Britain has a powerful economy, an obvious role in defence and foreign policy and there is a genuine respect for Britain's political institutions and stability. Also in a world moving closer together, with new powers emerging, our strength with the US is not just a British asset, it is potentially a European one. Britain can be the bridge between the EU and the US. (...) there is absolutely no doubt in my mind, that our strength with the US is enhanced by our strength with the rest of Europe and vice versa*.⁶⁸⁸

In Blair's opinion, European defence is not about new institutional fixes. It is about new capabilities, both military and diplomatic.⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁶ Lord Robertson, "NATO, Transatlantic Relations – Overcoming New Challenges", Speech, The American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. 07.03.2001 www.uspolicy.be/Issues/Europeandefense/rob.030701.htm.

⁶⁸⁷ Strategic Defence Review, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, July 1998 on the informal European Council see: <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/24-25-october-informal-european-summit,-portschach/37283.aspx>.

⁶⁸⁸ Tony Blair, Europe's Political Future, Speech by the British Prime Minister to the Warsaw Stock Exchange, Warsaw, 06.10.2002, www.dgap.org/english/tip/tiph/Blair061000.html.

⁶⁸⁹ Tony Blair, "NATO, Europe, and our future security", Speech by the British Prime Minister NATO 50th Anniversary conference, Royal United Services Institute,

And while proclaiming a programme to tighten up EU Member States' solidarity, the UK and France confirmed the binding force of their commitments under NATO, which were described as the foundation of Member States' collective defence.⁶⁹⁰ As claimed by the British Defence Secretary, George Robertson, *NATO will remain the cornerstone of European security. (...) Most importantly, there can be no question of undermining NATO or attempting to duplicate the capabilities and structures that we have developed within it over the last 50 years. NATO will remain... We might also consider creating a more distinct European dimension within NATO, building on from the valuable work that has already been undertaken in establishing a European Security and Defence Identity.*⁶⁹¹

And so, as a result of the British position, a new situation developed in the ESDP debate after 1998. The British managed to keep one important arrangement intact: decision-making on defence remained at the intergovernmental level, and no instruments enabling supranational decisions to be introduced. Saint Malo Declaration marked no major change in the country's strategy, no threat to British national sovereignty. However, it was a step far from the point that previous British leaders were placing the country.⁶⁹² The consent to build the European armed forces to tackle crisis management in Europe was coupled with the conviction that NATO would remain the hardcore of Western European defence – and the Balkan developments only strengthened this belief.

However, Blair in the same line of reasoning and foreign policy principles signed the Treaty of Nice in February 2001.⁶⁹³ The Treaty among other provisions introduced the possibility of establishing enhanced cooperation in the area of common foreign and security policy for the implementation of joint action or a common position. In addition, he welcomed the first ever European Security Strategy in 2003. Blair negotiated and signed also the Constitutional Treaty in 2004,⁶⁹⁴ under the umbrella of the new security environment that 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Iraq crisis had created. Blair thus supported European integration from 1997 warmly and proactively many times, yet certifying always that ESDP remains intergovernmental and that NATO remain the cornerstone of European security.

London, 08.03.1999, www.britain.info.org/eu/xq/asp/SarticleType1/Article_ID.713/qx/articles_show.htm.

⁶⁹⁰ London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London 5–6 July 1990 (www.nato.int). WEU Ministerial Council, WEU Council of Ministers Rome Declaration, Rome 27 October 1984; 12 WEU Ministerial Council, Platform on European Security Interests, The Hague 27.10.1987.

⁶⁹¹ Lord Robertson, "The Future of European Defence", Speech by the Defence Secretary to the WEU, Assembly, Paris, 01.12.1998.

⁶⁹² See critic of Margaret Thatcher, *The Statecraft, Strategies for a Changing World*, Harpercollins, New York, 2002, p.p. 354–359.

⁶⁹³ Treaty of Nice, Official Journal C 80 of 10 March 2001, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf.

⁶⁹⁴ Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, <http://european-convention.eu.int/bienvenue.asp?lang=EN> last access: 18.07.2006.

Indeed, the events of 9/11 have reinforced the American pressure on the European allies to assume greater responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict management. With the emergence of these new dimensions and challenges relating to the security architecture and transatlantic relations, a crucial role could be played by Britain, a country both a tested ally of the US and a key element of ESDP.⁶⁹⁵

Blair, presenting his vision of European development during his visit to Warsaw on 6 October 2002, said that Europe must be a superpower, but not a super state.⁶⁹⁶ In a joint newspaper article, Robin Cook and Madaleine Albright wrote:

*Tony Blair's European defence initiative will improve the European Union's crisis management capacity and develop, in co-operation with NATO, a European security and defence policy on the basis of improved European capabilities. (...) Dangers to NATO and the transatlantic link are far more likely to come from European weakness than European strength. We want both a stronger Europe and stronger NATO. That is why we both back this European initiative, which promise to strengthen NATO as well as Europe.*⁶⁹⁷

*We will continue to play a leading role. (...) The clear, and growing imbalance between European and American military capability was one of the primary reasons for launching a new initiative on European defence. The US has long suggested that Europe need to do more, to take a greater share of the security burden. Kosovo showed that we, and they, were right. When it came to the crunch, Europe was unable to pull its weight in its own back yard*⁶⁹⁸

So, with the early 21st century shift in geo-political threats (terrorism and Muslim fundamentalism), a renewed increase in the UK's political and military engagement on a global scale has occurred. This has influenced progress in British support for the development of the European defence system. There can be no doubt that the British-French relations will be decisive for a continued development of ESDP.

The British position is evidently close to the Atlanticist approach, according to which the EU's military dimension with regard to ESDP should also appreciate the function and role of NATO and Blair remain loyal to this approach. Yet he did not see any reason to choose between

⁶⁹⁵ Margarita MATHIOPoulos, "The USA and Europe as Global Players in the Twenty-first Century", *German Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol 49, No 2, 1998, p.p. 36-49.

⁶⁹⁶ Tony Blair, Europe's Political Future, Speech by the British Prime Minister to the Warsaw Stock Exchange, Warsaw, 06.10.2002, www.dgap.org/english/tip/tiph/Blair061000.html.

⁶⁹⁷ Jeff McAllister, "10 Questions for Tony Blair" Times on line, 03.06.2005, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1079478,00.html> last access: 24.07.2006.

⁶⁹⁸ Geoff Hoon, "The globalisation of the defence industry: Policy implications for NATO and ESDI, the UK's role in European defence", Speech to RIIA conference, 29.11.2000, www.britaininfo.org/government/xq/asp/SarticleType.../minister last access: 29.01.2007.

America and Europe, as for Churchill, for Blair the two spheres are not mutually exclusive. Europe has to strengthen its military capabilities and speak with a credible voice. In this way it can make a difference, influencing allies and discouraging enemies wherever necessary. As Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said in July 2002 that the strengthening of European defence in the 21st century should rest on three major foundations:

- NATO's enlargement and modernisation;
- Europe's credible security and defence policy with regard to crisis management operations (with or without NATO);
- EU expansion, lessening the risk of traditional conflicts driven by poverty and ethnic rivalries.

As secretary Straw said in October 2002, *it is time for vision and courageous leadership from all European governments. the prize is great. (...)* we in United Kingdom will play for our part. (...)*I believe Britain can offer leadership in two particular areas: first, European security; second, the creation of a prosperous European economy which delivers jobs and prosperity to all corners of the continent.*⁶⁹⁹

However, in reality, Europe and Britain do experience certain transatlantic strains.

3.2. Blair and transatlantic strains

3.2.1. Facing the realities

Britain because of its history and contacts - the Commonwealth, US - and the quality and capability of its armed forces is a state, which can exercise strategic leadership.⁷⁰⁰ So for Blair, it seemed clear the Britain had to re-vitalise the transatlantic relationship as the cornerstone of Western security and re-establish and establish strategic relations with new partners.

9/11 reinforced American power and American vulnerability at the same time whilst much of Europe either did not feel threatened or chose to distance itself from America. But this fact did not reveal for Blair an aversion to the use of military force by his European partners, as Kagan's thesis claims.

For Blair, *tensions over Iraq did not stop corporate America pumping nearly \$87 billion of direct investment into Europe in 2003, whilst corporate France put over \$4 billion back into the US. I'm not saying America does not make mistakes; does not in its insularity of thinking sometimes seem obstinate to the concerns of the rest of the world.*

⁶⁹⁹ Jack Straw, "Leadership in Europe", Transcript of a speech given by UK Foreign Secretary, German-British Forum, 17.10.2002, www.britaininfo.org/eu/xq/asp/SarticleType.1/Article_ID.2730/qx/articles_show.htm67Ibidem.maner, remembering that political leadership requires a difficult and fascinating balance between objective fact and subjective perceptions. Tony Blair, "Superpower, Not Superstate", The Federal Trust, European Essay No 12, November 2000, http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/Essays/Essay_12.pdf last access: 10.12.2008.

⁷⁰⁰ Julian Lindley-French, British Strategic Leadership: Food for Thought, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Advanced Research and Assessment Group (ARAG), DEFENCE – SECURITY – DEVELOPMENT, Shrivenham Paper, No 2, October 2006.

*American political culture, for example on the death penalty, is different from European culture, and in Britain, in this respect at least, our culture is more European.*⁷⁰¹

In support of Blair's thesis, less than a year later, on the 10th of February 2004, Britain, France and Germany jointly submitted a *Thought Paper* on the battlegroup concept. The Food for Thought paper was about producing a catalogue of high utility force packages that can be tailored rapidly to specific missions. Each package would have about 1 500 personnel with strategic lift and sustainability. Most of the battlegroups' missions would be the authority of the UNSC, although not all of them.⁷⁰²

On Iraq the European states discovered that they had little or no influence on US strategy or even on British decisions. So, Europe seemed to gamble over whether the US system would prove to be wise and generous beyond belief in all times and circumstances. For Blair, however, Europe has to make itself heard. Not in pursuit of some old-fashioned and useless Realpolitik of balancing, but to prevent US isolation or over reaction. Kagan asserts that the US believe that Europeans favour non-military solutions simply because they are militarily weak and that now, European concerns and criticism are also often construed as another sign of anti-Americanism and lack of loyalty to the US in times of crisis.⁷⁰³

Blair observes that the US must use its power wisely and with restraint and Europe (NATO/EU in particular) must make itself more relevant to the US and be both capable and willing to take on the serious military challenge of fighting international terrorism. Thus, for Blair, Europe should be investing more in defence and adopt a more martial attitude to addressing global problems. However, the most difficult point for both sides of the Atlantic to overcome is what many Americans see as a preemptive attack in defence, many Europeans see as risky American military action. As we saw above in detail, Western European leaders are faced with a public opinion which doesn't go along with an American intervention on Iraq in the absence of a clear UN Security Council mandate, and certainly is reluctant to lend the US any concrete military support without such a clear political and legal basis.

NATO and/or ESDP?

Blair's second term was marked by important international crises, which tested Britain's loyalty to Europe and the US. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, while the EU agreed that Al Qaeda had to be eliminated, only the UK played a significant role in the US-led action in Afghanistan. Talks between Britain, Germany and France were criticised by the then European Commission President, Romano Prodi, who found them divisive. Blair's support for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 also

⁷⁰¹ Tony Blair, speech at the World Economic Forum, 27.01.2005, http://www.fc.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2005/01/fco_not_260105_pmwe.f.

⁷⁰² "European security and defence: core documents 2004" (2005) Chaillot Paper No 75, ISS, Paris, p.p. 10–16.

⁷⁰³ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, No. 113, June and July 2002.

conflicted with the majority of opinion among EU leaders, Chirac and Schröder in particular. This event did split Europe into 'old' and 'new' Member States.⁷⁰⁴ Blair has accepted also that an EU planning capability should be established, but with close links to NATO and the EU is not creating a full headquarters but is instead seeking to enhance the EU military staff (EUMS) through a non-permanent cell with civil and military components.⁷⁰⁵

Clearly Blair's own speech gives his view on ESDP future and transatlantic unity *And here am I, told by the pro-Europeans to give up on America and the Atlanticists to forget about Europe. And yet I know Britain must be at the centre of a Europe now 25 nations reunited after centuries of conflict the biggest economic market and most powerful political union in the world and I know that to retreat from its counsels would be utter selfdefeating folly. And I know to cast out the transatlantic alliance would be disastrous for Britain. And I believe so strongly that if Europe and America could only put aside their differences and united around a common cause, the future could be different and better.*⁷⁰⁶

Particularly, discussions on EU Treaty amendments at the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002 took place in a changed and challenging security environment following the 9/11 attacks. In spite of his prominent position in helping to shape EU defence policy, during the drafting of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2003 and 2004, Blair did not propose specific amendments relating to ESDP.

Blair supported the post of EU Foreign Minister (and later, in the Treaty of Lisbon, the High Representative for the CFSP), in particular his/her control via the Council – and therefore governments – of the proposed EU External Action Service, but he opposed any moves to introduce qualified majority voting (QMV) in the CFSP and ESDP beyond existing QMV elements in the TEU (for instance, unanimity for decisions on foreign policy but some QMV for implementation). The focus was on building capabilities and against *an avant guard* of Member States, which could lead to a two speed EU in defence. Blair was more inclined to accept compromise proposals, as long as they concerned capabilities but not operations.⁷⁰⁷

Blair espoused his country's special relationship with the US, resisted major supranational elements in European defence and security fields and insisted that the transatlantic alliance and NATO should remain the cornerstone of European defence. On the other hand, he supported the expansion of the Petersberg Tasks⁷⁰⁸ that did not threaten the role of

⁷⁰⁴ See relevant analysis in Chapter 2 of the current work.

⁷⁰⁵ CFSP Watch 2004 – United Kingdom

Available at: <http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports2004/CFSP%20Watch%20UK.pdf>.

⁷⁰⁶ Speech by Tony Blair to the Labour Party Conference, 28.09.2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3697434.stm.

⁷⁰⁷ CNN on line, "Straw defends UK uranium evidence", 13.07.2003.

⁷⁰⁸ The 'Petersberg tasks' are part of the ESDP under Article 17 TEU. They cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

NATO, and the establishment of a civilian-military cell at the Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS)⁷⁰⁹ provided it was integrated with the NATO framework.⁷¹⁰ In December 2003 Blair confirmed that the planning cell would be set up for humanitarian and peacekeeping aims with no standing operational capability and that it did not need to be covered by the new Treaty.⁷¹¹ Hence, in its White Paper on the EU Constitution the British position was that a flexible, inclusive approach and effective links to NATO are essential to the success of ESDP. *We will not agree to anything which is contradictory to, or would replace, the security guarantee established through NATO.*⁷¹² The British view prevailed and NATO remains the foundation of European collective defence and the instrument for implementing that commitment.

ESDP remains an intergovernmental process distinct from other policy areas and unanimity remains the norm for decision-making. The ESDP provisions will not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formation and conduct of their security policy, or of their national representations in third countries and international organisations.⁷¹³ UK supports in the same way the new European Defence Agency (EDA), a way of improving European capabilities. The EDA was established in 2004 under a British Director, Nick Witney, and achieved full operational status in January 2005.⁷¹⁴

Blair's persuasive power

The 9/11 terrorist attacks swept away any notion that the US could ignore the rest of the world, and the administration responded with the 'Bush doctrine': the US should seek to strengthen its borders and take the battle against terrorism to its enemies abroad, including through preemptive action. James Naughtie claimed that *a wider definition of moral conviction does help to explain how it was that Blair turned the historic closeness of London and Washington into something different in his era, and powerful enough to span two administrations of different political complexions.*⁷¹⁵

Blair viewed his country as a force that could reconcile the difference in perceptions and policies between America and Europe. The bridge

⁷⁰⁹ The EUMS is composed of military experts seconded from Member States to the Council Secretariat and is the source of the EU's military expertise.

⁷¹⁰ Tony Blair confirmed this approach at a meeting on 24 November 2004 with President Jacques Chirac.

⁷¹¹ Charles Grant, "EU can sell its defence plan to Washington", *Financial Times*, 02.12.2003.

⁷¹² Her Majesty's Government (HM), "The European Constitution", Cm 5934, September 2003.

⁷¹³ Intergovernmental Conference, Declaration 30, CIG 3/1/07 REV 1, 5 October 2007, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00003re01en.pdf>.

⁷¹⁴ House of Commons, "European Security and Defence Policy: Developments since 2003", Library Research Paper RP06/32, 08.06.2006, <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-032.pdf>.

⁷¹⁵ James Naughtie, *The Accidental American: Tony Blair and the Presidency*, Basingstoke, 2004, p. 117.

analogy was nowhere more tested than during the Iraq War. Divisions occurred not only between US and Europe but inside the EU as well, as we saw in detail in chapter 2. The decision by French President Jacques Chirac to oppose war regardless of what the inspectors found put Blair's whole diplomatic strategy in risk.⁷¹⁶ France insisted that the US must accept the multilateral constraints of UN approval, and pay as much attention to the Israel-Palestine conflict as to the threat of rogue states. Blair was pursuing essentially similar objectives, but in parallel to the country's active participation in the Iraqi war. However, divergent assumptions and interests about the severity of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime, about the link between the struggle against Islamic terrorism and the Israel-Palestine conflict, about western policy towards the Arab and Muslim worlds as a whole—had led to the worst crisis in transatlantic relations in at least 30 years.⁷¹⁷

Blair invested more efforts working on the Special Relationship than convincing his European counterparts that the war was just. The Anglo-American Special Relationship is important to UK as it is based on the commonality of outlook of the two countries, which is rooted in their history. The two nations share common values, values that explain both the Anglo-Saxon political, social, and economic model's success and its creative applicability to the modern world. They also make America well capable of world leadership. For Blair, because America's commitment to liberty is so bound up with the American nation's conception of its very identity, American power poses no threat to the liberty of other nations.⁷¹⁸ For this reason, among others related to capacity, stability, and security, Blair sees America not as a threat but as an indispensable power for preserving and securing world peace. Still, Blair intended to reconcile traditional assumptions with new identities and to keep different alignments and commitments—especially NATO and the EU, US and the Continent—in concert and, indeed, mutually supportive.⁷¹⁹ But the balance was clearly weighing more on the American side.

Blair though supported by a number of European states was openly opposed by the national and European public opinion. Indeed, an American president who pursues a unilateral and hawkish⁷²⁰ foreign policy

⁷¹⁶ Robin Harris, "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations", The Heritage Foundation, 2006.

⁷¹⁷ Ronald Asmus and Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, "Power, War, and Public Opinion: Looking Behind the 'Transatlantic Divide'", *Policy Review* No 123, February - March 2004.

⁷¹⁸ Interview with John O Sullivan.

⁷¹⁹ Jeremy Black, "Blair, Britain, Europe and International Relations?" Vol 3, No 09, Nov. 2002, <http://www.fpri.org/ww/0309.200211.black.blairbritaineuroperelations.html>.

⁷²⁰ A foreign policy typology: First, Hawks: Members of this school believe that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice and that military power is more important than economic power. They also tend to be wary of international institutions, especially the United Nations. They are not interested in strengthening the U.N. and are willing to bypass it when using force. Second, Pragmatists: Members of this

course may be able to depend on public support in the US, but he would have difficulty to gain public support in Europe. So, even when the world's sole superpower is interested in restoring a viable transatlantic consensus when it comes to the use of force, it must recognise the need to develop grounds for such action that take into account the distinctive requirements of European public opinion.⁷²¹

Blair however adopted some of the language of the war on terror, differing from Bush in his analysis principally in that he wanted to ensure that the US did not go it alone and would as far as possible form alliances and mobilise multilateral institutions, above all the UN. However, as many observers argued, he did not really challenge the US view at crucial moments.⁷²²

Thus the main problem for Blair was persuading reluctant countries of the rightness of a cause in which he believed. Yet, Blair's most important partners in Europe were heading in the opposite direction and were not open to persuasion. Blair argued that opposition across Europe to US policy on Iraq amounted to an attempt to set up Europe in opposition to the US. Opening the 2003 debate in Parliament on the Iraq war, Blair said: *What we have witnessed is indeed the consequence of Europe and the US dividing. (...) The heart of it has been the concept of a world in which there are rival poles of power – the U.S. and its allies in one corner, France, Germany, and Russia and its allies in the other.*⁷²³

But for some commentators Blair did not support US policy on Afghanistan or Iraq as some kind of payback for the privileges of the Special Relationship. Blair is seen as genuinely believing in those policies. Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former British Ambassador to Moscow and former head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was among those who felt that Blair should have insisted upon specific paybacks for this support

school also believe that war is sometimes necessary to obtain justice but that economic power is becoming more important than military power. They tend to assign an important role to international institutions, including the United Nations, and favour strengthening them. They prefer to act with multilateral legitimacy but are also prepared to act without it to defend their national interests if need be. Third, Doves: Members of this school disagree that war is sometimes necessary and believe that economic power is becoming more important than military power. Like Pragmatists, they want to strengthen institutions like the United Nations. Unlike Pragmatists, however, they are very reluctant to use force absent international legitimacy. Fourth, Isolationists: Members of this group believe neither that war is sometimes necessary nor that economic power is becoming more important in world affairs.

References: George Packer, "The Liberal Quandary Over Iraq," *The New York Times Magazine*. 08.12.2002; Anatol Lieven, "Liberal Hawk Down", *The Nation*, 07.10.2004.

⁷²¹ Mat Beech and Simon Lee, *Ten Years of New Labour*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.

⁷²² For example, the administration's decision to sideline NATO from the invasion of Afghanistan was accepted by the Blair government, and the establishment of the internment camp at Guantánamo Bay did not provoke a negative response.

⁷²³ Debate on a motion to approve the actions of Her Majesty's government on Iraq, HC Deb c760-911, 18.03.2003.

and been willing to walk away if they were not offered. He wrote that in *dealing with the Americans we need to follow the basic principle of negotiation: you must always make it clear that you will, if necessary, walk away from the table. That is something that British prime ministers, submariners, and codebreakers have been loath to contemplate.*⁷²⁴

Similarly, in a public lecture entitled *How special is the US-United Kingdom relationship after Iraq?* delivered at Johns Hopkins University in November 2006, Myers said that a comment by Donald Rumsfeld, during the run-up to the war in Iraq, to the effect that the US could undertake the invasion without Britain's help if necessary, had not been gentle, clarifying somehow the true nature of the Special Relationship.⁷²⁵

Bush himself was illuminating when asked how much influence Britain had had over the formulation of US policy after 9/11. He said: *Well, first of all, I understood immediately that we were at war, and I made up my mind that I would use all my power - obviously within the law - to protect the American people and prosecute this war. And so I don't think there was much (...) I'm the kind of guy that when I make up my mind - you know, I appreciate advice and counsel, but we were going.*⁷²⁶

Lawrence Freedman, however, argued that on issues such as Iraq, where the US leadership was divided over US interests and policy, Blair did have some influence over the Bush administration. Working with Secretary of State Colin Powell in August 2002, he persuaded Bush, against the wishes of Secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, to take the Iraq problem to the UN Security Council to give any action more legitimacy.⁷²⁷ But, in Freedman's view, the decision to go to the UN made the case for action more dependent on evidence of Weapons of Mass Destruction that subsequently proved to be wrong.⁷²⁸

Perhaps the main issue on which Blair might have explicitly sought payback was in relation to US policy on promoting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. After 9/11 Blair consistently argued that progress in the Middle East peace process was essential for global security. Indeed, during a visit to the US in November 2001, Blair tried unsuccessfully to persuade Bush to negotiate with Yasser Arafat, whom he considered *a necessary evil. Bush increasingly viewed him as just evil.*⁷²⁹ In 2003, as the US sought to build support for its policy on Iraq, Blair was instrumental in persuading Bush to endorse the roadmap for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

⁷²⁴ Rodric Braithwaite, "End of the Affair", *Prospect*, May 2003, <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk>.

⁷²⁵ "Britain's special relationship 'just a myth'", *Daily Telegraph*, 01.12. 2006.

⁷²⁶ As quoted in Con Coughlin, *American Ally. Tony Blair and the War on Terror*, London, 2006, p. 365.

⁷²⁷ Lawrence Freedman, "The Special Relationship, Then and Now", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 85, No 3, 2006, p.p. 61-73.

⁷²⁸ Lawrence Freedman, "The Special Relationship, Then and Now", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 85, No 3, 2006, p.p. 61-73.

⁷²⁹ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002, p. 297.

However, no concrete American policy decision seems to show that UK concerns influenced really American decisions and actions.

Noticeably, Anatol Lieven wrote in 2003: *As a simple matter of pride, it is (...) of course deeply galling to the British to see the wishes of the Israeli government continually favoured over those of Britain. Despite the Bush administration's increased commitment to the "Road Map for Peace" since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, most of British opinion — including, in private, many British officials— has little faith that this will in fact lead to a just and stable peace.*⁷³⁰ And in the summer of 2006 Blair controversially followed the American line by not calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities in the war between Israel and Hezbollah.⁷³¹ This led some to question whether he had abandoned efforts to persuade the US to be more active in its approach to the Middle East. Conservative backbencher Sir Peter Tapsell went so far as to accuse Blair of...*collusion with President Bush in giving Israel the go-ahead to wage unlimited war for 10 days, not just against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, but against civilians in residential Beirut, drawn from all faiths and nationalities—a war crime grimly reminiscent of the Nazi atrocity on the Jewish quarter of Warsaw.*⁷³²

Blair believed in the need to offer a vision of successful final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians Blair has claimed that a viable Palestinian Government was urgently needed, a vision of how the Roadmap to final status negotiation can happen.⁷³³ And in November 2006, Blair urged Bush to open a dialogue with Iran and Syria on a Middle East settlement. And Blair did not take holidays after the end of his premiership – as Mr Clinton had advised him – but instead took on the job as a special envoy of the UN, devoting time and energy on resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict.⁷³⁴

Another issue on which Blair hoped to influence Bush was climate change. Bush's failure to sign the Kyoto Treaty and his reluctance to accept that human activity was responsible for global warming had frustrated international environmentalists. The Economist reported *American intransigence has been particularly irritating to Tony Blair, because climate change is one of the areas where the British prime minister might have got some reward for his support over Iraq.*⁷³⁵ But, as with the Middle East peace process, movement in Bush's position was slow in coming and failed to convince many doubters when it did arrive.

⁷³⁰ Quoted in the House of Commons, "British Defence Policy since 1997", Research Paper 08/57 27.06.2008, <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2008/rp08-057.pdf>.

⁷³¹ David Wearing, "The UK: hands on in Lebanon", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, in English, 2006, <http://mondediplo.com/2006/09/03uk#nb2>.

⁷³² HC Deb 25 July 2007, c718.

⁷³³ See: Speech on the Middle East to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 01.08.2006, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page9948.asp>.

⁷³⁴ On the day he resigned as Prime Minister and MP, he was appointed official Envoy of the Quartet on the Middle East on behalf of the United Nations, the European Union, the United States and Russia.

⁷³⁵ The Economist, "It may be hot in Washington too - Climate change", 04.11.2006.

However, in 2007 at the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany, Bush signed a statement that indicated a more serious approach to climate change, committing the US to a new process of dialogue that would include key developing countries such as India and China, and aiming to set targets by 2008 for reducing emissions. It might appear that, while Blair had been rejected on climate change in 2005, German chancellor Angela Merkel had subsequently been rewarded, but in reality the foundations for the Heiligendamm success were laid by preparative teamwork by Blair.⁷³⁶

Blair has sought to persuade both the Clinton and Bush administrations that, with British and US forces operating closely together in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, the US should make renewed efforts to share defence technology more freely with UK in order to improve their interoperability.⁷³⁷ The US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) prevents the export of US defence-related technology without the granting of specific licences. However, in June 2007, perhaps as a parting gift to Blair, the US and the UK signed a Treaty which would have the effect of lifting ITAR restrictions on the transfer of military technology to the UK, or at least of significantly mitigating them.⁷³⁸

Overall the British special relation with the US saw many nuances. And Blair has been mostly seen following his American counterpart than the opposite.

The third term

The key issues of the third Blair term were the UK Presidency of the EU and the rejection of the EU constitutional project by France and Netherlands. The 2005 Labour Party election manifesto pledged to *campaign wholeheartedly for a 'Yes' vote to keep Britain a leading nation in Europe*⁷³⁹ by putting the Constitution to a referendum test. Furthermore, Britain took over the EU Presidency in July 2005, making its priorities the future financing of the Union (following the inconclusive outcome of the European Council on 16-17 June 2005) and reform of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP).⁷⁴⁰

Blair declares one more time, outlining the UK Presidency programme to the EP on the 23rd of June 2005, that he is a passionate pro-European, continuing:

⁷³⁶ Bertrand Benoit and Hugh Williamson in Heiligendamm and Andrew Ward in Rostock, "Cheers all round for 'winner' Merkel", *Financial Times*, 08.06.2007.

⁷³⁷ Thomas Donnelly, "The Big Four Alliance: The New Bush Strategy", National Security Outlook, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on line, December 2005, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1533892/posts> last access: 09.06.2007.

⁷³⁸ Robert Hewson, "Accord Secures Multirole future for Typhoon", *Janes Defence Weekly*, Vol 44, Issue 15, 11.04.2007.

⁷³⁹ See: The Labour Party Manifesto, 2005, Preface by Tony Blair, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/13_04_05_labour_manifesto.pdf.

⁷⁴⁰ Latvia, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg and Malta went on to ratify after June 2005.

I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market. (...) To say that is the issue is to escape the real debate and hide in the comfort zone of the things we have always said to each other in times of difficulty. There is not some division between the Europe necessary to succeed economically and social Europe. Political Europe and economic Europe do not live in separate rooms. The purpose of social Europe and economic Europe should be to sustain each other. The purpose of political Europe should be to promote the democratic and effective institutions to develop policy in these two spheres and across the board where we want and need to cooperate in our mutual interest. (...) In our Presidency, we will try to take forward the Budget deal; to resolve some of the hard dossiers, like the Services Directive and Working Time Directive; to carry out the Union's obligations to those like Turkey and Croatia that wait in hope of a future as part of Europe; and to conduct this debate about the future of Europe in an open, inclusive way, giving our own views strongly but fully respectful of the views of others.⁷⁴¹

The UK Presidency did deliver the historic launch of accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia, a long-standing British objective, a number of important pieces of legislation, including the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and restriction of Chemicals (REACH) regulation on chemicals and the Data Retention Directive, an important measure against terrorism. It also worked to strengthen the EU position on climate change and an EU budget deal which is €160 billion cheaper than the original Commission proposals, provides for a huge transfer of spending from the original 15 to the new Member States of eastern Europe, and which preserves the British rebate in full on the CAP and all spending in the EU. However, the British budget rebate and Blair's insistence on renegotiating the CAP led to accusations from other Member States that he was 'non-Communautaire'.⁷⁴²

However, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, speaking as Blair prepared to leave office, took a different view. He thought Blair placed Britain in the mainstream of the European Union. *He has done this by engagement, not by vetoes. He has brought to Europe energy, engagement and ideas and leaves an impressive legacy including his commitment to enlargement, energy policy, his promotion of action against climate change, and for fighting poverty in Africa.*⁷⁴³

3.3. Blair's Legacy

Blair has simultaneously been at the vanguard of the debate in Brussels and in Washington for over 10 years. Yet Blair always refused to

⁷⁴¹ See: Tony Blair, Speech to the Parliament, 23.06.2005, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7714.asp>.

⁷⁴² Gateway to the European Union, Presidency of the EU, <http://europa.eu.int>.

⁷⁴³ Durão Barroso, "Barroso tribute to Tony Blair", European Commission Office in the UK, Press Release, 11.05.2007, http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/frontpage/10052007_en.htm.

choose between Europe and the US. Although widely divergent views have been expressed about whether Blair succeeded in putting Britain at the heart of Europe during his premiership, Blair did take a pragmatic approach towards further EU integration in its dealings with the EU institutions, continuing the long British tradition of preferring voluntary cooperation and intergovernmental approaches, continuing opt-out from the euro, to further integration. Still, Blair premiership did in many respects have more effect on EU policies than that of previous British governments as in the case of ESDP developments, helping to shape the path forward. Until 2003 and the run-up to the war in Iraq, Blair had some success also in bridging the gap between the US and the EU.

In Iraq, Blair took many risks on many fronts by his determination to act and see through the Iraq challenge. The war so far has been a disaster, finding hardly any appliance to the liberal interventionism cause and failing to bring peace to the country many years after it started. And Blair has been criticised not only for drawing his country into this unfortunate adventure but also of widening the gap between America and Europe.⁷⁴⁴

However, one mistreated element and lesson of Blair's actions is the fact that he stood tall in his ideas and he fought for something. He says he is a proud interventionist and supports a values-based international system, based on freedom and prosperity, a system where transatlantic unity is indispensable. In Iraq Blair faithfully believed that terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction were one of the most serious threats to the future security of the entire world. He also believed that if the US were allowed to go it alone it would be seriously dangerous for world peace. Blair believes that America and Europe should work closely together for preserving their common values. Their unity is indispensable for the preservation of their common interests, and system. He also recognises that many of Britain's foreign-policy aims are subject to America's willingness to use its power.

Europe has to seriously take on the lessons that the post 9/11 international events offer: the reality of an interdependent world, the alarming threats of terrorism, WMD and failing states, and last but not least the need of a credible European voice, in cooperation not against the US. And where Britain cannot address those problem successfully Europe has to take a chance. For Timothy Garton Ash, *the EU is capable of addressing these problems than any separate state on its own. A group of states, such as the European Union, is perhaps the smallest unit capable of having a significant impact on them; and even then, only by leading the way to collective action with others.*⁷⁴⁵

EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy asked *how far will Europeans go to defend their rule-based systems? Will we take risks, lose lives and pay more? That's the real question, which we Europeans have carefully organised ourselves not*

⁷⁴⁴ See Timothy Garton Ash, *The Free World*; John O' Sullivan also views Blair's action causing gap instead of bringing together the two sides of the Atlantic: Interview with John O'Sullivan.

⁷⁴⁵ Timothy Garton Ash, "Britain's national security strategy must emphasise prevention abroad", *The Guardian*, 20.12.2007.

to ask.⁷⁴⁶ And here Blair has to be applauded for defending the system he believed in. Blair took the risk, and lost lives and Blair shares the responsibility for involving the UK.

Nevertheless, one cannot limit Blair's policy and action only to Iraq. Blair is a leader with values, ideology and beliefs; he has been a philosopher as well as a leader. He defends that global threats need global responses, will and power, not fear. The western alliance has been an alliance based on the values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. Both America and Europe have an obligation to defend those values beyond their borders, above all for their own security. Blair did shake up conventional thinking in foreign affairs, and his provocative ideas and ideals will long outlast him.

⁷⁴⁶ Quoted in article by Steven Erlanger "America the Invulnerable? The World Looks Again", The New York Times, 21.07.2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/21/weekinreview/the-world-america-the-invulnerable-the-world-looks-again.html>.

Chapter V

CONCLUSIONS

During the Cold War the differences between Europe and America were concealed. Liberty, the rule of law and the free market became the central values and concepts in western ideology. America needed Europe in its struggle against communism and Europe left its heavy defence on the American hands.

Yet with the end of the Cold War, the existential framework of the transatlantic relationship changed significantly. After the dissolution of the bipolar world order, Europe no longer found itself in the centre, neither geographically nor politically, of the conflict between the two superpowers, US and ex Soviet Union. Today, major challenges in the region are located outside EU boundaries, they are global. Additionally, the European integration process has led to an extended cooperation in the area of EU's Security and Defence policy. Both developments have had significant impacts on the transatlantic relationship: US interests shifted from Europe to other regions like the Middle East and Asia. Europe gained more autonomy.

However, following the events of 9/11, the US undertook a significant change in foreign policy. The administration of George W. Bush made the war on terror the new focus of US foreign and defence policy, as was expressed clearly in the NSS in 2002. Similarly, the willingness by the US to *go it alone*, and the formation of the *coalition of the willing* replaced traditional international alliances. According to this new Bush Doctrine, all states that supported terrorism were enemies of the US and subject to military intervention. This signalled the beginning of a crisis into the transatlantic system. The new US strategy was designed to protect US power from global and regional challenges with or without its allies.

Europe on the other hand was facing its own realities. European integration has been a multiform process, which combines intergovernmental and federal ideas and procedures. Thus, naturally its response is the result of various interests and conceptions. Such constraints have to take into account, however, the peculiar nature of security and defence as well. After 9/11 a joint security strategy aimed, thus, to move the EU into the post-9/11 security environment and to advancing Europe's economic and political interests. And on this basis, Europe developed its first European Security Strategy in 2003. EU Strategy aspires to go beyond mere soft power, developing its own hard power to defend its interests and its population.

Europe analyses the threats of terrorism and proliferation of WMD in a similarly to US way, however, the ways in which Europe addresses them are. For Europe the fight against these threats cannot be limited to military force alone. The EU intends to combine the political and the

economic approaches to fight these threats and regarding terrorism, any effective solution will have to be global. Both sides clearly do have different impulses when it comes to how to respond to such threats; mainly, concerning the efficacy and legitimacy of military versus economic power and the role of the United Nations.

Yet US and EU documents are convergent on their basic goals, reflecting democratic values of freedom, respect for human rights, free market, and liberty. So, those values link the two sides of the Atlantic together, not allowing drifts like the one over the Iraq war setting them apart irreversibly. There is also a common recognition of threats between ESS and NSS. Both documents place their emphasis on the importance of globalisation, terrorism, WMD, the need for transformation and do provide similar strategic threat assessments.

So, have the dominant threat perceptions across Europe and the Atlantic changed after 9/11 and to what extent does the transatlantic community remain vital?

The dominant threat perceptions across Europe and the Atlantic after 9/11 have not changed fundamentally. There have been some areas of conceptual divergence; with the American doctrine of military preemption, unilateral action and US primacy on the one hand, and the European strong emphasis on multilateralism, diplomacy and international law on the other. However, the transatlantic relationship remains vital. It is a complementary relationship, and the maintenance of this complementary relationship is important for the maintenance of global peace and stability.

Indeed, as US and EU are both espousing the same values of peace, freedom, democracy, free market, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights it is in their national interests to work together to maintain and export these values. Americans and Europeans continue to see their relations as cooperative and not competitive although the various shortcomings of the past. Americans and Europeans do not live on different planets when it comes to viewing the threats around them.

The most challenging test to the transatlantic relations and Europe's political power and particularly to the Blair's doctrine came with the Iraq War. The transatlantic relationship witnessed some of the greatest debates and differences recorded in US-EU relations, and inside Europe itself. Not surprisingly, this turmoil has also generated a growing debate over the nature and causes of such differences. A number of different views have been advanced. Some explanations as we have discussed suggest that such differences are largely attributable to the policies of the Bush administration, others argue that differences are essentially rooted in widely differing threat perceptions in the US and Europe after 9/11. Kagan argues that the advent of the Bush administration is not a major factor and that the two sides have grown increasingly incompatible as a result of the growing asymmetry in power across the Atlantic.

During the military intervention in Iraq the Bush Doctrine was first put into practice. The Bush administration justified its invasion of Iraq

with fighting the global war on terror and the threat of WMD, having always by its side its most loyal ally, Britain. The rejection though of such a justification by Germany, France and other European states led to one of the most severe crises of confidence within the transatlantic partnership, particularly when the claim of the existence of WMD destruction in Iraq was proven to be incorrect.

Additionally, it is becoming increasingly transparent that there have not been any reasonable political concepts developed for the future of Iraq and Afghanistan that would enable the growth of political stability, the rule of law and strong democratic institutions in these countries. At the same time, the US loss of legitimacy in the world was augmented by the rejection of international treaties and alliances in areas such as disarmament, environmental protection and international law.

Europe, at the same time, was not characterised by agreement whatsoever when faced with the decision to go to war. Divergences in approach were apparent since the beginning, not only between France and UK, the architects of the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma, but among all EU members too. This situation resulted in a weakening of Europe's image worldwide.

So what are the lessons deriving from these decisions and choices for both America and Europe?

First of all, Iraq demonstrated the limits of liberal interventionism. All the many peaceful forms of liberal intervention must first be exhausted before military action is undertaken. For the last resort of military action, states must have just cause based on facts to intervene, proper legal, democratic and multilateral authority and a plan for the aftermath of the war to the best advantage of the people they claim to save. Regimes clearly cannot be imposed neither planted from one country to another. Still, some values are common across the globe, as human values. Respect for human rights, liberty and prosperity are clearly human ideals and cause. And on this basis, the development and promotion of these values across the globe is a duty for any free man and any free nation.

More specifically, the lessons that America took from its adventurism policy and the preemptive action doctrine in Iraq after 9/11 was that no state can go it alone. America cannot be a fighter only, must be a philosopher and a leader as well. The modern world is complex and interdependent. The broad security agenda that states must confront demands the possession of not just military but also economic, diplomatic, and legitimised strength. As Blair advocates the transatlantic ties in terms of history, values, and interests are unique. And this time the future of the transatlantic relationship depends on confronting the challenges of the twenty-first century worldwide.

For Europe, one of the main questions is what to do with an America that is not keen to listen to its former allies, mainly because it does not have to. For historical and geopolitical reasons, EU emphasises the role and value of international law and institutions. This is reflected in different approaches to the United Nations, the Kyoto Protocol,

the International Criminal Court and the security aspects of foreign aid and assistance. Europe needs to develop a credible security and defence policy preserving security and prosperity primarily for its citizens. In this way it can also be a more valuable and influential ally. European differences can also be worked out better when common interests are identified and pursued. Transatlantic unity is indispensable for the preservation of our common interests, and values. So, Britain's special relation with the US is not just a British asset; it is a European one too.

Still, the main lessons deriving from the decisions taken and choices made during the Iraq crisis is that UK alone is no longer strong enough to influence US, especially when Americans take British support for granted. The US needs more than a British friend alone. It needs a consistent and powerful EU partner, speaking with a single voice carrying its own weight, and complementing US actions with its multiform assets. America needs Europe and Europe needs America for transforming victories into lasting successes.

But, how does this reality influence the future of NATO and ESDP? There are important challenges for both NATO and ESDP and clearly a lot of speculation over whether there is room for synergy between the two bodies.

The danger that the ambitions of NATO and the EU could begin to collide became apparent after the end of the Cold War. They became even more urgent following the post 9/11 events, the US refusal of NATO's assistance in the Afghan War and the split in the support of the Iraq war between both the transatlantic community and Europe itself. With the EU deciding to develop further a military capability of its own, diplomats at both NATO and the EU have struggled to make sure that their relations are cooperative rather than competitive. The issue of a separate EU military command is also an important dividing line.

French policy has always supported that the EU must assert its independence of NATO, an organisation it has regarded as ultimately an instrument of American foreign policy. Without an independent European defence force, the French believe there can be no independent European foreign policy. Yet, when the EU has such unfulfilled needs for financial resources, the last thing it needs to do is to spend money duplicating facilities it can already use at NATO.

Even today, Europeans are much more keen to re-invent, modernise and re-structure NATO than the Americans, which again demonstrates that an operational transatlantic security relationship is very more important for Europe too. What matters is whether the US will take NATO and the EU prime partners to negotiate with, or whether it will turn to individual European states. Recent events show clearly that the US prefers to deal with national capitals, rather than with *Brussels*. What also matters is whether key European states will act together (most likely within the appropriate EU fora), formulating their security policies as a group and willing and able to negotiate and cooperate with the US on that basis.

NATO has developed since the end of the Cold War and now provides new security pay-offs for all its members: stability for the ex-communist states in a democratic Europe supported by the expansion of the EU; a powerful voice in world affairs. NATO expansion has also enhanced the alliance's posture with regard to strategically sensitive areas, such as the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. At the same time ESDP has been developed modestly and in an important way that is largely acceptable to the US and European partners. French might be in favour of developing an independent European military capability, but the British participation is vital. As for the community of values and attitudes, while these remain injured by 9/11's aftermath and differences over environmental, social, and economic policies, there also is a growing awareness of the importance of transatlantic ties, with Blair in the front line.

Based on their common values and interests, the NATO and ESDP relationship shall remain more one of convergence than divergence. The EU-US relation remains for both sides a priority. ESDP needs NATO to acquire an autonomous military capacity and NATO needs ESDP for nation building and post conflict reconstruction. And, although there are no crucial differences between the two institutions, there have existed and will continue to exist, differences in policy preferences across the Atlantic. It depends on the political leaders in both America and Europe to be able to tackle the problems and take the decisions required, safeguarding in the best way what their common transatlantic values stand for.

Britain is in some ways a lighthouse between America and the rest of Europe. It resembles its transatlantic cousin in its open and flexible markets, but it shares its commitment to social safety nets with its European partners. Blair developed a doctrine of his own, the famous new *doctrine of the international community*, which claims that our self-interest as states and our mutual interests are today bound together. Europe and America should stay united. For Blair in a world in which China and India will each have a population three times that of the EU, anything else is completely out of date. So, a strong transatlantic alliance and a strong, effective and capable EU is needed more than ever before.

Yet, Blair's decision to go to war in Iraq was significantly tested and criticised, and questions over the motives and reasons behind Blair's decision are still seeking an answer. Blair believes that history will give the verdict on Iraq, but so far Iraq has been a failure. There was no legitimising reasoning behind the endeavour, neither from the UN nor from public opinion. Under the Saddam regime, WMD possession was not proven. There was not planning for the aftermath reconstruction and stabilisation of the country. The Shia-Sunni gap has been wider across the Muslim world. Blair brought the popularity of Britain in low levels. Iraq also exposed the weakness of Blair's foreign policy; particularly when practicing what Timothy Garton Ash calls the Jeeves school of diplomacy.

So, why did Blair support the US in such adventurism? Blair's decision was consistent with his doctrine of the international community,

and his history of antagonism with Saddam Hussein. However, the driving force behind Blair's political decisions over Iraq was mainly the pursuit of Britain's national interest. Blair also faithfully believed that WMD were one of the most serious threats to the future security of the entire world and action had to be taken with no delay. Commonly, he believed that if the US were allowed to go it alone it would be seriously dangerous for world peace.

This is the clearest difference between Blair and his critics. They see the primacy of American power as a threat that must be constrained by multilateralism and international law. He also recognises that many of Britain's foreign-policy aims are subject to America's willingness to use its power and clearly the EU, presently, cannot replace America. Hence by taking US side, Blair aimed to monitor, influence and restrain America's actions, remaining both a leading player in Europe and a special partner of the US and thus realizing his vision of Britain as a pivotal power.

But what was really distinct in Blair's policy?

Today, governments and policy-makers are much more likely to experience their policy-making power as a risk than as an opportunity. This is reflected in the process where political elites are keen to express the moral responsibility in the international sphere but are reluctant to take responsibility for either policy-making or policy outcomes. The difference is distinct in Blair's policy.

Blair stood tall after 9/11 and took a stand elaborating further his 1999 doctrine of international community and taking action diplomatically and militarily defending a progressive view of the world, starting from the reality of interdependence in an age of globalisation, and acting according to certain values. And for Blair, the national interest is better preserved with the realisation of this reality. He pursued an active foreign policy of engagement: with US and Europe at its core.

Many books have been written endorsing similar questions referred to thoroughly in this study and many will be certainly written, going into every detail on the subject, explaining further Blair's vision and role on the global scene. Blair himself believes that in fifty years time the world will be far more interested by his role in extending the EU into the Muslim sphere, than by an early power struggle over the Iraq invasion.

While Blair's place in history remains to be seen, Blair's controversial strategy did definitely offer important lessons, in what to avoid and what to pursue in future endeavours particularly for Europe.

As every year goes by, it becomes clearer that Europe is really far from playing the role of a super state. Europe is a Union of different nation states with individual historical and cultural backgrounds and interests. Europe faces an important demographical decline and is betting more on bringing more prosperity and social security to its citizens rather than acquiring military power stronger or in competition to the US. However, Europe has made progress bringing peace and prosperity to a continent severely injured after two world wars - with Member States now making part of the European family and a lot more wanting to join, and with a

single currency - Europe has the potential of making a difference in the world, by developing stronger military capacity and the power, and will to use it. Europe can be a valuable partner to the US and a power with a strong voice in the world.

Europe has to seriously take on the lessons that the post 9/11 international events offer: the reality of an interdependent world, the alarming threats of terrorism, WMD and failing states, and last but not least the need of a credible European voice, cooperation rather than against the US. Where Britain was not proven able of addressing those problems alone, successfully, Europe has to take a chance. A group of states, such as the European Union, is perhaps the smallest unit capable of having a significant impact on them; and even then, only by leading the way to collective action with others.

So, strengthening European defence should rest on four major foundations: Europe's credible security and defence policy with regard to crisis management operations (with or without NATO); binding Atlanticism with European integration; NATO's enlargement and modernisation and last but not least leadership and courage at European national level.

The US at the same time should adopt a policy of ethical realism that combines moral concern, an acceptance of the reality of power, and prudence in its exercise. The two spheres are not mutually exclusive. Britain should commit to Europe in part because it has so much of value to contribute to the EU. But Britain as a partner may also have a great deal to contribute to the US, including restraint and experience.

In an unpredictable world, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction appear more threatening than ever before. Hence, transatlantic unity remains crucially important for the world stability and peace.

America and Europe face a historical chance to contribute to a safer and more united world. And for this to be achieved political will and leadership is needed more than ever before.

Appendixes

BOX 1

EU-NATO DECLARATION ON ESDP⁷⁴⁷

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION,

- Welcome the strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management, founded on our shared values, the indivisibility of our security and our determination to tackle the challenges of the new Century;
- Welcome the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention, and reaffirm that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members;
- Welcome the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose purpose is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union's disposal for crisis management and conflict-prevention in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis-management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged;
- Reaffirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management;
- Reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities;
- Declare that the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be founded on the following principles:
- Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two organisations are mutually reinforcing, while recognising that the European Union and NATO are organisations of a different nature;
- Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, co-operation and transparency;
- Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO;
- Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;
- Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions;
- Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations.

To this end:

- The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 13 December 2002.
- NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, *inter alia* and in particular, assured access to NATO's planning capabilities, as set out in the NAC decisions on 13 December 2002.
- Both organisations have recognized the need for arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of openness.

⁷⁴⁷ NATO on-line, EU-NATO DECLARATION ON ESDP Press Release, 16.12.2002, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20040217NATO/142en.PDF>.

FIGURE 1 ISAF: COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTION

Figura 3
Contribuição por País em 3 de Março de 2007

	AL	34		FR	1014		NO	429
	AS	553		MK	137		PL	229
	AU	4		GE	2765		PO	165
	UAE			GR	192		RO	758
	AJ	22		HU	214		SI	49
	BE	375		IC	13		LO	61
	BU	89		EI	7		SP	669
	CA	2178		IT	2059		KS	
	HR	158		LG	22		SW	233
	CZ	157		LH	142		CH	2
	DE	399		LU	9		TU	660
	EN	116		NL	2083		UK	3430
	FI	79		NZ	109		US	11438

Total: 34.044

Source: Fransisco Proença Garcia, “A Participação Portuguesa nas Missões Militares: Iraque, Afeganistão, e Líbano”, Nação e Defesa, Outono/Inverno, 2008, no 121, 3ª serie, p.p. 177-209

FIGURE 2
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE⁷⁴⁸

Countries	Signed by	Date
Albania	PDT Sali Berisha	23.02.94
Armenia	FM Vahan Papazian	05.10.94
Austria	FM Alois Mock	10.02.95
Azerbaijan	PDT Geidar Aliyev	04.05.94
Belarus	FM Uladzmir Syanko	11.01.95
Bosnia and Herzegovina	PDT Nebojša Radmanović	14.12.06
Bulgaria (3)	PDT Jelu Jeleu	14.02.94
Croatia	FM Tonino Picula	25.5.00
Czech Republic (2)	PM Vaclav Klaus	10.03.94
Estonia (3)	FM Jüri Luik	03.02.94
Finland	FM Heikki Haavisto	09.05.94
Georgia	FM A.Chikvaidze	23.03.94
Hungary (2)	FM Jeszensky	08.02.94
Ireland	FM Andrews	01.12.99
Kazakhstan	FM Saudabayev	27.05.94
Kyrgyz Republic	PDT Askar Akayev	01.06.94
Latvia (3)	PM Valdis Birkavs	14.02.94
Lithuania (3)	PDT Brazauskas	27.01.94
Moldova	PDT Mircea Snegur	16.03.94
Montenegro	PDT Filip Vujanovic	14.12.06
Poland (2)	PM Pawlak	02.02.94
Romania (3)	FM Melescanu	26.01.94
Russia	FM Andrei Kozyrev	22.06.94
Serbia	PDT Boris Tadić	14.12.06
Slovakia (3)	PM Meciar	09.02.94
Slovenia (3)	PM Janez Drnovsek	30.03.94
Sweden	FM Margaretha Af Ugglas	09.05.94
Switzerland	FM F. Cotti	11.12.96
Tajikistan	AMB. Sharif Rahimov	20.02.02
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1)	Head of Government Crvenkovski Branko	15.11.95
Turkmenistan	DPM B. Shikmuradov	10.05.94
Ukraine	FM Zlenko	08.02.94
Uzbekistan	FM Saidmukhtar Saidkasimov	13.07.94

1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name
2. These countries joined NATO on 16 March 1999
3. These countries joined NATO on 29 March 2004

⁷⁴⁸ From NATO official site, <http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm> last access: 11.03.2008.

FIGURE 3

GDP (PPP) and GDP (PPP) per capita for the European Union and for each of its 27 Member States, sorted by GDP (PPP) per capita⁷⁴⁹

Member States	GDP (PPP) 2006 millions of euros	GDP (PPP) per capita 2006 euros	Percentage of EU27 average GDP (PPP) per capita	GDP (PPP) 2007 millions of euros	GDP (PPP) per capita 2007 euros	Percentage of EU27 average GDP (PPP) per capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Europe.svg European Union	11,557,853	23,500	100%	12,172,536	24,600	100%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Luxembourg.svg Luxembourg	30,183	65,300	278%	31,376	69,900	284%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Ireland.svg Ireland	143,475	33,700	143%	157,070	35,700	147%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_the_Netherlands.svg Netherlands	500,762	31,000	132%	530,564	32,800	133%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Austria.svg Austria	250,247	30,200	129%	264,472	31,900	130%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Denmark.svg Denmark	161,613	29,700	126%	171,298	31,200	127%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Belgium_%28civil%29.svg Belgium	302,570	28,700	122%	319,867	30,200	123%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Sweden.svg Sweden	256,327	28,200	120%	274,499	30,000	122%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg United Kingdom	1,688,660	27,900	119%	1,847,105	29,400	120%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Finland.svg Finland	143,818	27,300	116%	153,595	28,900	117%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Germany.svg Germany	2,184,612	26,700	114%	2,340,372	28,200	115%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_France.svg France	1,673,128	26,500	113%	1,744,444	27,800	113%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Italy.svg Italy	1,432,261	24,300	103%	1,500,475	25,500	104%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Spain.svg Spain	1,053,600	24,000	102%	1,121,961	25,400	103%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Cyprus.svg Cyprus	16,849	21,900	93%	17,773	22,900	93%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag_of_Greece.svg Greece	230,659	20,800	89%	246,671	22,100	90%

⁷⁴⁹ Source: GDP (PPP): Official Statistical Office of the European Communities, Eurostat.

Member States	GDP (PPP) 2006 millions of euros	GDP (PPP) per capita 2006 euros	Percentage of EU27 average GDP (PPP) per capita	GDP (PPP) 2007 millions of euros	GDP (PPP) per capita 2007 euros	Percentage of EU27 average GDP (PPP) per capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Slovenia.svg Slovenia	40,867	20,400	87%	44,040	21,800	89%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of the Czech Republic.svg Czech Republic	191,080	18,600	79%	207,174	20,100	82%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Malta.svg Malta	7,289	17,700	75%	7,824	18,600	76%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Portugal.svg Portugal	185,083	17,500	74%	190,882	18,200	74%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Estonia.svg Estonia	21,170	15,900	68%	23,919	17,900	73%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Hungary.svg Hungary	154,358	15,300	65%	166,031	16,200	66%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Slovakia.svg Slovakia	79,339	14,700	63%	88,602	16,400	67%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Lithuania.svg Lithuania	46,015	13,600	58%	50,241	15,000	61%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Latvia.svg Latvia	29,971	13,100	56%	33,630	14,900	61%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Poland.svg Poland	473,774	12,400	53%	525,277	13,600	55%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Romania.svg Romania	190,657	8,800	37%	208,220	9,700	39%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Bulgaria.svg Bulgaria	66,799	8,700	37%	71,714	9,500	39%
Candidate countries: (not included from EU total above)						
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Croatia.svg Croatia	52,082	11,700	50%	57,948	12,600	51%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Turkey.svg Turkey	503,856	6,900	29%	541,418	7,300	30%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Flag of Macedonia.svg Republic of Macedonia	13,080	6,400	27%	13,897	6,900	28%

FIGURE 4 EU – US TRADE RELATIONS IN 2007

The European Union and the US have the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world.

Trade in goods	Euros (€)
EU good exports to the US in 2007	260 billion
EU goods imports from the US in 2007	180 billion


Trade in services	Euros (€)
EU services exports to the US in 2007	139.0 billion
EU services imports from the US in 2007	127.9 billion

Foreign Direct Investment	Euros (€)
EU investment flows to the US in 2007	112.6 billion
US investment flows to the EU in 2007	144.5 billion

Source: Europa – Trade Issues (Bilateral Trade Relations EU-US):
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/index_en.htm


Maps

MAP 1: OIL AND GAS ROUTES: CENTRAL ASIA



Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, *Le Monde*, Maps, 2005
<http://mondediplo.com/0000/00/about>

MAP 2: ENERGY PRODUCING COUNTRIES EURASIA



Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, Le Monde, June 2007, <http://mondediplo.com/0000/00/about>

MAP 3: MAP OF FREEDOM, 2008



Source: Freedom House, 2008, www.freedomhouse.org

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- Stefanie Babst, "NATO AT 60", Speech given at the International Annual Meeting in Political Studies, Estoril Palace, organised by the Catholic University of Lisbon / Institute of Political Studies, 27.06.2009.
- Ivo H. Daalder, "A US View of European Security and Defence Policy", lecture given at the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR), Senior Leadership Forum, Grafenwohr, Germany, 07-09.03.2001.
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7. Interviews

7.1. Realised by the current author

- Mr. Tony Blair: Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 1997-2007, currently, Special UN Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process
- Question endorsed by the current author in the 10^o Almoço Conferência, Diário Digital "Desafios políticos, económicos energéticos para 2009", 19.09.2008, Hotel Altis, Lisbon:

Question: What is the future face of ESDP, in our era of *low predictability*, and to what extent is a European common voice a feasible project?

Mr. Alex Ellis: Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Lisbon (phone interview), 12.09.2008 at 09:00 o'clock

Question: According to Mr Blair's speech given at the Lord Mayor of London's Banquet, in 1999, Britain should be *Engaged, open, dynamic, a partner and, where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence, that is where Britain must be*. In your opinion, to what extent is this the best place for Europe to be?

Ms. Anni Podimata: Greek Member of the European Parliament (re-elected 2009), Socialist Group (answer send via e-mail on 23.06.2009)

Question: Should Europe develop urgently its European Defence and Security Policy given the new emerging threat of the 21st century; namely, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction?

Mr. Anthony o Hear: Weston Professor of Philosophy, Director: Royal Institute of Philosophy, Editor: *Philosophy*, London. Interview realised during the XVII International Meeting in Political Studies, Hotel Estoril Palace, 27.06.2009

Questions: 1) Do you believe in liberal interventionism? 2) Do you believe that we need a Global Alliance of Democracies (Theme of the Meeting's debate)

Mr. John O' Sullivan: Executive Editor of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Political Commentator, Journalist, and Author. Interview realised during the XVII International Meeting in Political Studies, Hotel Estoril Palace, 27.06.2009

Questions: 1) Does America still need a strong relationship with Europe given the emerging challenges of the 21st century? 2) What was, in your opinion, Tony Blair's impact in transatlantic relations?

Mr Mark F. Plattner: Editor: *Journal of Democracy*, Director: IFDS, Washington D.C. Interview realised during the XVII International Meeting in Political Studies, Hotel Estoril Palace, 26.06.2009

Question: 1) Does America still need a strong relationship with Europe given the emerging challenges of the 21st century?

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8.1. Books

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8.2. Articles in periodicals/journals/newspapers

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