Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37227

Title: Market configurations when marginal costs are quality‐dependent
Authors: Pires, C.P.
Jorge, S.F.
Catalão-Lopes, M.
Pinho, J.
Garcês, P.
Alventosa, A.
Keywords: Endogenous market configurations
Quality-then-price game
Qaulity dependent marginal costs
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Issue Date: 2024
Publisher: Wiley
Abstract: Most quality-then-price decision models under vertical product differentiation con-sider a predetermined market configuration. We endogenize market configuration considering quality-dependent marginal costs and conclude that a strictly interior full coverage duopoly holds for some parameter values, unveiling the relevance of this commonly assumed market structure. Moreover, we show that a monopoly never arises in equilibrium, and (i) there are multiple equilibria at the frontier between inte-rior and corner full coverage duopoly, (ii) the market is fully (partially) covered when relative tastes' heterogeneity is low (high), and (iii) there is a discontinuity in the tran-sition from partial coverage to full coverage duopoly.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10174/37227
Type: article
Appears in Collections:CEFAGE - Publicações - Artigos em Revistas Internacionais Com Arbitragem Científica

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