The Logic of Globalization and Substantive Democracy

Manuel Couret Branco
Universidade de Évora, Departamento de Economia
Resumo/Abstract:
Despite some notable achievements in many parts of the planet the gap between the rich and the poor has become wider rather than tighter. On the political sphere success seems much more unequivocal, though. Indeed, beyond a handful of anachronistic exceptions, the world seems to have surrendered to the delights of democracy. From there to the conclusion that globalization favours democracy there was a small step that many political scientists all over the world have not hesitated to make. Refusing to share this optimism, many other scientists have, on the contrary, severely questioned the democratic character of the global economy, almost since the term globalization itself has been invented. In this work I will show how the logic of globalisation, in other words the logic of internationalised market capitalism conflicts with a substantive definition of democracy in developed countries as much as in developing countries.

Palavras-chave/Keyword: Globalisation, Democracy, Capitalism, Development, Underdevelopment

Classificação JEL/JEL Classification: A1O A11, A13, F01, F02, O19, P10
Introduction

For quite some time now the global village metaphor has been served to the world’s public opinion, very fond of magical formulae, with the subliminal purpose of transmitting the idea that economic globalisation is the only model capable of reconciling economic efficiency and fraternity amongst all peoples. However, despite some notable achievements in many parts of the planet the gap between the rich and the poor has become wider rather than tighter (see Mazur, 2004; Honey, 2004). On the political sphere success seems much more unequivocal, though. Indeed, beyond a handful of anachronistic exceptions, the world seems to have surrendered to the delights of democracy.

From there to the conclusion that globalization favours democracy there was a small step that many political scientists all over the world have not hesitated to make. Refusing to share this optimism, many other scientists have, on the contrary, severely questioned the democratic character of the global economy, almost since the term globalization itself has been invented. Many studies have dealt with this question (see for example Obstfeld, 1998; Groupe de Lisbonne, 1995; Sapir, 2002; Przeworski and Meseguer, 2006, Hamilton, 2002; Fitoussi, 2004) reaching varied, and often contradictory, conclusions. Our concern here will be slightly different. We will not ask if globalization has brought more or less democracy to the world but if the logic pertaining to the global economy intrinsically favours the deepening of democracy and of human rights. The first step of this endeavour is to demystify the meaning of the concept of global economy.

What is the Global Economy?

Economic Globalisation cannot be assimilated with the sole growing internationalisation of national economies, consubstanciated in their deeper interdependence, in the increasing level of international trade and in the accelerating planetary circulation of productive factors. Firstly, and regarding the allegedly growing importance of international trade within the main national economies, we are facing an optical illusion that mistakes the verifiable increase of the absolute level of international trade with structural changes within these same economies. Indeed, despite having been continuously growing, the weight of foreign trade in Gross Domestic Products today is not significantly higher than that of 1914 for major economies (Rodrick, 1998; Feenstra, 1998).

Regarding capital, the idea that the recent lifting of major barriers to its circulation catapulted the economies to a new era is also very common. Once again such a judgement succumbs to a scale effect resulting from a shallow appraisal of the past. The extraordinary amount of capitals wandering the world in a sort of peripatetic stroll is hiding a less scintillating reality, though. The net flows of capital, measured by the difference between domestic savings and domestic investments are, on the contrary, inferior to those met during the Gold Standard (Obstfeld, 1998: 11), and, therefore the
vibrating global financial market of the turn of the nineteenth century has still not found an equivalent one hundred years later.

Regarding labour or just people, are borders more permeable today than they were ever before? Tourism has shown a remarkable expansion and undoubtedly constitutes one of the most dynamic economic activities all over the world, but to extend this recent permeability of borders to the circulation of labour is above all an act of faith. The trivialisation of travel cannot hide the fact that labour mobility is not stronger today than it was in the beginning of the twentieth century. The borders of the most powerful economies seem, on the contrary, more inexpugnable than ever as the electronic and barbed wire wall separating the United States from Mexico or the Shengen Zone futuristic virtual fortress perfectly illustrate.

Indeed, the intense media coverage of the continuous scattering of illegal immigrants on our western shores is revealing enough of the difficulty rather than of the easiness of crossing the seas in search of a better life, especially when compared to the huge international migratory movements of the early twentieth century.

Despite these assertions, we cannot, however, conclude that history is repeating itself. The global economy of the beginning of the twentieth century embraced only a small part of the world economies, in other words market capitalism, because that is what this is all about, was dominant in just a bunch of countries. In the majority of the planet’s territories, when such a thing as an economy existed, this could be classified, at the most, as pre-capitalist.

As market capitalism began to expand beyond its original nucleus, competing regulation systems made their appearance, firstly with the Russian revolution, then with Fascism and Nazism. With the end of the second world-war and later the end of colonial empires, capitalism confronted socialism in a struggle that lasted till the Berlin wall fell down. Contrasting with what had been its behaviour during the first stage of its expansion, capitalism reduced its degree of internationalisation during this period, localised itself, accepted ideological compromises with the state. What characterises the global economy of the turn of the millennium is, in my understanding, the expression of capitalism’s expansion to all corners of the globe with the exception of some bubbles of resistance that only rhetorically threatens its supremacy.

In its essence, then, the global economy consists in the definitive conquest of the planetary supremacy by the market capitalism model. There is nothing awkward in this assertion. Capitalism has always been historically averse to national reclusion. The fact that one of the main targets in the economic and political agenda of globalisation is removing barriers to the so-called adjustment by the market, perfectly illustrates the essence of this aversion (see Kozul-Wright, 1995: 159). Globalisation, therefore, is as old as capitalism itself, rather, is one of its constitutive features (Heilbroner, 1988; Collin, 1997; Held, 1997), a conclusion that wouldn’t surprise Lenin for whom a particular reading of globalisation, called imperialism, was supposed to be the supreme and final stage of capitalism (Lenine, 1977).

This conclusion is very important for our argument. Indeed, it is useless to look for the relationship between globalisation and democracy within the statistics concerning foreign trade or in any other part of the balance of payments sheet; one
should rather look for it but within the logic of market capitalism and of the institutions that have been guiding its propagation. As I have written elsewhere about the intrinsic contradiction between capitalism and democracy (Branco, 2000) I will not go through it again.

Instead I will focus on some of the aspects that are more commonly identified with global issues, that is to say the conflict between the territorialisation of democracy versus the deterritorialisation of the global economy; the undemocratic character of decisions within the Inter-Governmental Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Some particular aspects of the conflict between democracy and the global economy concerning developing countries will also be referred towards the end of my argument.

**The territorialisation of democracy versus the deterritorialisation of the global economy**

One of the conditions demanded by a democratic regime is the right of the people to participate in the process of making a decision that will affect them (Dahl, 2000). To cut a long story short, today, such participation is obtained mainly through free and competitive elections involving every citizen of age. The only true problem here is to decide who is a citizen and who is not. This is a very important question because a decision can only be democratically legitimate if it is sufficiently independent of influences and interactions originated outside the Demos (Collin, 1997; Dahl, 1997). The democratic system is, thereby, confined to the political geography of a given community.

That is why the development of the democratic idea followed the steps of the evolution of this political space. According to Michel Beaud both Greek’s democracy and the tax payer’s democracy of pre-capitalist State-Cities expressed themselves within a finite space. The physical boundaries of both these democracies matched those of the city and the interests at stake corresponded to those of very specific groups, citizens in the first case and merchant bourgeoisie in the second (Beaud, 1997: 233). Modern democracy, in turn, expanded its political space by matching its territory with the boundaries of the nation-state and adopting universal suffrage.

The path taken by the market economy is substantially different. The spatial confinement that the very notion of market suggests, in other words the place where trade happens, gave place in the global era, not to the expansion of its territory, but to its disentanglement, in other words to a “deterritorialisation” of the mechanisms of creation, production and distribution of goods and services, contrasting sharply with the “territorialisation” of democracy.

Thus, whereas a substantial part of major economic decisions is made within a “deterritorialised” frame, in other words within a virtual territory woven in network by the “world markets”, the mechanisms of democratic participation and its constitutive institutions are, on the contrary, confined to the growing narrowness of the Nation-State. The result is an increasing physical separation between the centres of decision and the people affected by those same decisions (Cassen, 1997), weakening, therefore, the scope of democracy.
It seems that the transformation of the economy is going on at a faster pace than the transformation of the polity, then. Is that a coincidence or is that part of a deeper movement? According to David Morris this increasing separation between governance and citizenship is part of a long process also characterised by the separation between the producer and the consumer or between the city dump and the dustbin (Morris, 1996: 220), in other words is part of a process that can also be called economic development. Therefore, the separation between the decision and the community affected by that same decision is nothing more than the political expression of the growing partition of society resulting from specialization and social division of labour, the conflict between the global economy and democracy being, then, the normal outcome of the expansion of market capitalism.

Does this mean that only small communities closed to the outside world can really live in democracy? No! This means that one has to look for new ways of participating democratically in the decisions that are shaping the world today. How can we do this? I do not possess miraculous recipes, but one thing is for sure, for the time being one cannot expect the International Institutions, like the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO to play a decisive role in producing democratic global governance.

**International Institutions and Democracy**

As mentioned above, economic globalisation results from the normal unfolding of capitalism’s logic, but one should not conclude that the global economy is the product of decentralized decisions only. In other words the global economy does not result from the unrestrained action of market mechanisms only.

Both national governments, by legislating in favour of the market or by lifting barriers to the circulation of goods and capital, and Intergovernmental Organisations actively contributed to produce and shape the global economy. In what governmental action is concerned, their decisions can be considered democratic as long as the governments themselves have been democratically elected, although we could engage into deeper debate. As far as Intergovernmental Organisations are concerned the matter is slightly more complex.

Indeed, the decisions produced by these organisations can hardly be considered democratic. The criteria upon which decisions are made differ substantially from those adopted by national governments. Whereas the majority of votes legitimates national governments to act on behalf of a country’s citizens, that is not the case within Intergovernmental Organisations.

Let us take the case of the IMF and the World Bank, for instance. It is not the number of votes, expressed by the number of voters that weighs the most but economic strength. In this particular case it’s a country’s contribution to the organisation’s budget that determines its power to influence decisions. Imagine that a country’s government was elected not by the system of each citizen one vote, but each euro one vote, in other words a system according to which the rich would have more power to decide than the poor. This would certainly be unacceptable. Well this is how it works in the IMF or the World Bank! This is all the more shocking as these organisations have been interfering
more and more deeply with matters for which national governments were exclusively responsible before.

Take the conditions countries have to meet in order to get IMF or World Bank loans, for example. In the 1980s countries that asked for loans had to meet 6 to 10 performance criteria, whereas in the 1990s these same countries had to meet something like 26 criteria (Kapur, 2001). Well, about half of the voting power in the IMF and the World Bank is in the hands of seven countries; the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia and Saudi Arabia.

This is only possible due to the particular method of assigning votes within these organisations. Each member country possesses 250 basic votes plus one additional vote for each 100,000 Special Drawing Rights they contribute to the organisation’s budget (Momani, 2004, 881). That is why the United States hold 17.11% of the votes whereas China only 2.94 % (Momani, 2004: 882). If the calculation method rested on the principle of one man one vote instead of one Special Drawing Right one vote, China would have to hold 4 times more votes than the United States, instead of holding 6 times less. The new calculation method made some changes but this scandalous discrepancy was only slightly mitigated.

The heart of the matter is that within the Intergovernmental Organisations the majority of member states can only participate theoretically in the making of decisions that affect them, violating, therefore, a major principle of democracy. Twenty three African countries amongst the poorest in the world and the most affected by the conditionality criteria imposed by the IMF, for instance, hold only 1.16% of the votes (Momani, 2004: 882).

Some facts can be added to this non democratic process of decision making. In the course of the IMF’s history the undemocratic character of its decisions was even reinforced. While 135 more countries joined the IMF, the percentage of basic votes in the total amount of votes for the entire organisation decreased from 12.4% to 2.1% (UNDP, 2002), reinforcing, therefore, the power of the richer countries.

This concentration of power within the Intergovernmental Organisations represents the contemporary face of global hegemony, that is to say the United States hegemony in the world economy. According to Paul Knox and others, the British hegemony within the capitalist world economy was characterised by a mix strategy of formal and informal imperialism, in other words, by imperial-building and extensive investment outside the empire, whereas the United States avoided the burden of formal imperialism by sponsoring Intergovernmental Organisations, with the same results (Knox et al., 2003: 76-77). By not being able to influence decisions that affect them, many countries lost de facto a substantial part of their sovereignty. This external imposition happened discretely but by no means should one conclude that this process was not violent.

The loss of national sovereignty constitutes always a violent event. Edward Goldsmith in an article entitled “Development as Colonialism” tells us a very revealing story about Tunisia’s loss of sovereignty to France. In the end of the nineteenth century, the Bey of Tunis, in order to reimburse his debts towards French banks, was obliged to accept the creation of a French protectorate in Tunisia, a testimony of how national
independence can be traded against financial solvency, either following an imperialist or neo-imperialist strategy (Goldsmith, 1996). Indeed, the ways in which the IMF and the World Bank operate do not seem substantially different from the methods used by France’s colonial power to submit Tunisia.

Many scientists will tell you that if the IMF and the World Bank’s decisions are far from being democratic the World Trade Organisation, on the contrary, respects the basic principles of democracy. At the WTO the voting system rests on the principle of one nation one vote and the decisions are taken through consensus. Therefore, less powerful countries can allegedly influence decisions and especially veto those decisions that can harm their interests (Hamilton, 2002: 10).

However, reality is not as bright as it seems. Firstly it is not certain that the system of one nation one vote is much better than the system one euro one vote, as China will have the same power as Luxemburg which is several times less populated. On the other hand the more relevant decisions are not taken in general assemblies but in what has been called the “green room”, in other words in small committees called by the organisation’s Chairman and generally influenced by the United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada, and from which developing countries are generally excluded (UNDP, 2002: 118).

To this democratic deficit one should add the fact that the Intergovernmental Organisations are unaccountable before those affected by their decisions (Muchlinski, 2003). Indeed, one doesn’t know yet to whom they respond. To national governments, to the people, to nobody?! If a government makes decisions that are contrary to the will of the people, the people can overthrow it in the following elections. If Intergovernmental Organisations make decisions that are contrary to the will of the people, the people can do little about it!

Globalization and Democracy in Developing Countries

Let me now talk of something not completely different but yet parallel. It has been said that authoritarian government constitutes an obstacle to development. Well, globalisation can be an obstacle to democratisation in developing countries, as the examples of social and economic structure, colonial heritage and structural adjustment perfectly illustrate.

Social and Economic Structure

From a slightly orthodox economic standing point, if rulers are so weakly inclined to democratised their countries, despite the fact that there is some sort of second rank consensus to take democracy as the best political system for economic development, it can only be because they are not interested in democratising, or in other words because democratisation goes against their best interests. An autocrat will rationally resist to democracy, then, if this means that in the process he will lose more than just political power (Robinson, 1998).
This behaviour is consistent with a classical and institutionalist compromise theory that considers institutional change to preferably occur when agents detaining power perceive the advantages of pursuing their private interests according to different rules of the game (Grindle, 2001; Robinson, 1998). The crucial question becomes, then, why losing political power constitutes an attempt on rulers’ economic interests. Some answers can be found in the social and economic structure of many third world countries.

These countries’ economies, most especially in Africa, are frequently dependent on the export of a scarce variety of natural resources or plantation crops. This particular economic structure has shown a tendency to lead to loot-seeking activities (Collier and Gunning, 1999: 9). In other words through monopoly, excessive taxation and corruption, rulers have had a relatively easy opportunity to gripe a considerable share of their countries’ resources. This kind of appropriation of national income is clearly opposed to democratic, problem solving, distribution of national wealth, even more so when the ruling elites constitute a small group.

The gains to an extractive strategy, an euphemism for loot, are closely related to the size of the ruling elite group (Acemoglu et al, 2001: 1376). When the elite is scarce, each member can expect a larger piece of the pie and so, the smaller the elite group, and we could add the more unequal the income distribution, the greater the incentives to be extractive. Following the same line of thought, the greater the extractive character, the greater the risk for the elite’s members of becoming political losers, that is to say, of losing their economic and social status if replaced, which, in turn, favours authoritarian strategies to keep the power.

Furthermore, this kind of economic structure does not favour the uprising of new elites that, along the lines of agency theory, would engage in political struggle with the already installed elites and would end up forcing them to accept the democratic game (see Mazo, 2005).

It is not all too unexpected that this kind of economic structure incites rulers to keep the power. Indeed, with the notable exception of Botswana, most African countries that rely on natural resources are having more troubles either to democratise or to consolidate democracy than others. Angola (see Campos and Marques, 2005), Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone or Equatorial Guinea are good examples of this phenomenon. What can be more unexpected is that, in these circumstances, the population may receive the same incentives, in other words to be hostile to democratic alternation.

Indeed, through free elections, people may be pushed to prefer keeping rulers in office despite clearly condemning their behaviour. In a street interview on the occasion of the first pluralist elections in Mozambique, when asked to comment the performance of the party in office, the Frelimo, a citizen declared they had spent their time robbing the people. Continuing with the interview, the journalist asked whom was he going to vote for. Much to the astonishment of the interviewer, he said that he was going to vote for the Frelimo. When the journalist confronted the citizen with the possible contradiction of his negative opinion about the Frelimo and his voting intentions, he simply answered that unlike its competitors, namely the Renamo, Frelimo had already done its share of robbing the people.
Well this economic structure is the result of what has been called dependent development, meaning the particular place that was reserved to developing countries in the global economy, in other words international division of labour. There is a consensus on the fact that the logic of boundless capitalist development leads to the intensification of international trade and to specialization. In this sense globalization can constitute an obstacle to democracy in developing countries because it reinforces the formerly mentioned vicious dependency on natural resources in many countries, with a special reference one again to Africa. Indeed, not only this dependency has not been overcome, but other negative aspects, such as degradation of the terms of trade, were added to exacerbate this dependency.

The evolution of the terms of trade has not been historically favourable to developing countries and the situation seems to have worsened in the last decade. As far as agricultural exports are concerned, in sub-Saharan Africa for example, the terms of trade index, base 100 in 1990, shrank from 185 in 1960 to 85 in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2005). This not only affects the availability of means that can influence democracy, but also pushes countries to insist on expanding those few sectors that are responsible for the production of foreign currency, in other words leads them into reinforcing specialization, and perpetuating an economic structure unfavourable to democracy.

**Colonial Heritage and Democracy**

If one admits that social and economic structures are, in essence, historically determined, referring to the several hundreds of years of European colonial rule, under which the great majority of countries in the third world has lived, is unavoidable. In relation to the theme of democracy, colonial heritage can influence democratisation insofar as it has been determinant in shaping both the social and the economic structures and in trapping cultural diversity within the limits of arbitrarily designed territories.

In many third world countries, and especially in Africa, both the excessive specialisation and alienating dependence from volatile external markets, whose effects on democracy have just referred to above, are essentially an historic resilience of European colonisers, of the fact that they were mainly interested in exploiting natural resources and exotic crops (Frank, 1966; Jalée, 1973; Amin, 1973; Amin, 1977).

In turn, the fact that the colonial administration delegated the day to day running of the state to a small domestic elite (Acemoglu et al., 2001), as well as the low investment made on educating the native population, partly explains the existence, at the time of independence, of a small elite group, almost exclusively connected to either extractive activities or colonial administration.

After having taken control of the state, these elites received few incentives to change the institutions and consequently favoured the undemocratic and extractive institutions that prevailed in the colonial era (Acemoglu et al., 2001). A comparative study of Botswana and Lesotho provides an enlightening example on this subject. Despite sharing the same traditional ruling institutions in pre-colonial times and being culturally very close, Botswana evolved towards a democracy and Lesotho did not. The reason for this divergence could be sought in the recent history of the two countries.
The limited impact of colonial rule in Botswana, as compared to the experiences of many other nations in Africa, South America or the Caribbean, allowed the continuity of pre-colonial institutions and the elites that came to power after the independence were only partly members of the former administrative elite (Acemoglu et al., 2002: 23), and the power, therefore, became essentially delegated. In Lesotho, on the contrary, the wars against the Boers and the fact that the British were much more intervenient undermined the traditional institutions and contributed to the centralisation of political power in the hands of the colonial elites (Acemoglu et al., 2002: 29).

Finally, the colonial heritage can also partly explain the recognised difficulties in democratising multicultural states. Indeed, the colonial administration is not only responsible for the imprisoned cultural diversity by designing administrative regions, upon which the new nations were to be built, regardless of its cultural profile, but also for the invention of ethnic diversity itself (see Branco, 2006).

The methodical slicing of native populations into tribes and ethnic groups was usually done with the purpose of controlling vast territories with just a handful of expatriated administrators, as the British did in Nigeria or the Belgians, more paradigmatically even, in Ruanda Urundi, which later gave birth to two independent countries, Rwanda and Burundi, through the well known artificial definition of pseudo anthropological and cultural differences between the Tutsis and the Hutus in order to justify the delegation of the colonial executive administration into the hands of the Tutsi minority (Lacoste, 1993: 747-748).

Well, there seems to be some generalized recognition that it is easier for a culturally homogenous country to democratise than for a country with deeply differentiated and conflictive subcultures (see Dahl, 2000; Bardhan, 1999; Leftwich, 2000; Boutros-Ghali, 2003). Indeed, whenever there is strong ethnic diversity, political structures tend to be organized around ethnic groups rather than around interest groups. Therefore, whenever an election is called it appears to be ethnic belonging, or demographic vigour, that is being balloted, rather than strategies outlined to enhance the public good.

Furthermore, sympathizers of a particular culture frequently see their demands as questions of principle, as too crucial to indulge in compromise, and democratic resolution of political conflicts needs, precisely, negotiation, conciliation and compromise (Dahl, 2000).

**Structural Adjustment and the Debt Burden**

The debt burden, and the consequent need to face their international financial commitments, pushes developing countries exactly in the direction already seen above, that is to say to perpetuate an economic structure unfavourable to democracy. The structural adjustment programs, for example, especially designed to ensure debt repayment, have forced these countries to adopt policies that affected the conditions of democratization and its consolidation. Firstly, many developing countries were obliged to overemphasize their commercial objectives at the expense of their social objectives. In consequence, not only the struggle against poverty and the effort to raise the level of
education were slowed down, but the economy got more dependent than before on the export of natural resources (see Mazur, 2004) as well.

Secondly it seems quite clear that structural adjustment policies are so rough on the people that very often its execution implied slowing down and even abruptly stopping democratic processes. About Chile, for example, W. Bello (1996) suggests that, on account of the sacrifices demanded to the population, only a dictatorship like the one established by Pinochet in September 11, 1973, could have managed to implement such a harsh structural adjustment program without igniting a social uprising.

In turn, M. Teubal, shows how, in a softer manner, governments led by former Argentinean president Menem, with the pretext of structural adjustment, passed more bills through the expedient of decrees of Necessidad y Urgência, in other words without parliamentary approval, more often than all the preceding governments added (Teubal, 1996: 212). One should not be surprised, then, if when asked about what would be the more favourable political regime to structural adjustment, H. Biennen and J. Waterbury, politely answered one where votes do not count (Biennen and Waterbury, 1992:396).

At last, the fact that these programs have been presented to developing countries as the only alternative to conciliate financial orthodoxy and development did not leave, one must admit, much room for democratic debate.

Conclusion

This paper’s intention consisted in arguing that worries concerning the low content of democracy within globalisation, sometimes expressed even by some of their more enthusiastic heralds, are, indeed, funded, but mostly in showing that phenomena underlying these worries are much more complex than what is generally put forward in debate, namely in the media. Indeed, the undemocratic character of globalisation does not exhaust itself in a collection of anecdotes about global bureaucracy being unable to address issues raised by global citizenship. Not only one discovers that democratic erosion is a heavy tendency of the dominant economic model but also that counteracting it demands more than just procedural reforms.

The main threat impending on democracy does not concern individual freedom taken in the classical sense as the individual liberty limited only by another individual’s own liberty; it concerns the menace of destroying politics. I believe that democracy can only find its deep meaning when it incorporates a collective ideal, a progressive utopia, in other words a project for bettering each citizen’s life. This project supposes a dynamic of change, to which globalisation claims to subscribe as a matter of fact, but progress is not a synonym of change. Change is observed by looking into the past, and can be taken as a scientific fact unadorned by value judgements, in other words change can happen for better or for worse. Progress, on the contrary, must be built upon ethical values and projects itself in the future. Thus, in a democratic society one should be able to decide what values one cares the most for and then design an economic system that strengthen these values.
One of the objections to this critique of globalisation could consist in saying that people’s powerlessness in imposing their choices is not new and that it is not forcibly the outcome of globalisation only. That is true, but what needs to be stressed at this stage is that globalisation does not contribute to change this situation; on the contrary, it contributes to make things even worse. Imagine yourself as a prisoner unfairly convicted to a life sentence. Imagine, then, that you are transferred from a normal prison, where there are some chances of escaping, to a maximum security prison, where the chances of escaping are close to none. This transfer is not responsible for the fact that you were unjustly imprisoned. Indeed, the new prison didn’t change a thing to the fact that you were condemned to spend your life in prison. Nevertheless, the fact that the escaping perspectives are null, from your particular point of view, constitutes a non negligible constraint added to your despair.

REFERENCES


